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Summary 
 
This exploratory study deals with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(SATRC) as a case study within a broader casing or “comparative perspective”. The study 
adopts an exploratory qualitative approach with strong auto-ethnographic underpinnings. The 
nature of the SATRC as a case study and other examples of truth and reconciliation 
commissions (TRCs) and non-TRC processes complemented by an individual narrative 
informed the study. In this regard the research represents a narrative of different “voices”, as 
well as theoretical discourse; more aptly, a dialogue between informed context, process, the 
military-civil community and the author. The research question posed relates to the question 
whether new democracies, such as South Africa, which opted for a TRC process, fared better 
in establishing working CMR and civil control over the military than new democracies that 
did not opt for TRCs. The research contends that TRC options followed by young or 
emerging democracies – inclusive of the SATRC – did not necessarily contribute significantly 
to the establishment of civil control over the military, although it may have value for others if 
the need for civil control over the military is consciously kept in mind (the benefit of 
foresight) when TRCs are conceptualised. 
 
The research, through the existential lenses of the author, suggests that TRC and non-TRC 
choices could lead in equal measure to working CMR and civil control over the military. It 
could assist the military to be aware of the dangers of partisan involvement when invited into 
the realm of politics by partisan political leaders. The study could raise awareness among 
political leaders against drawing a constitutional professional military force into partisan 
politics, thus undermining democracy and almost certainly transparency, accountability and 
human rights protection within a community of self-chosen citizens. 
 
The research processed/narrated/experienced by the author as an embedded research tool 
points towards some importance for TRC approaches vis-à-vis other approaches. But in some 
cases little difference could be proven when it came to optimal democratic control over 
military institutions in emerging democracies. This statement is open to qualification. It seems 
that in a lived experience (deurleefde ervaring) there is potential for TRC-like approaches to 
add value to eventual civil control over the military, as long as the process is consciously 
coupled to the end goal of affirming workable CMR, civil control over the “armed” forces, 
the (re-)professionalisation of the military and the persistent nurturing of human rights by the 
state, the military, the civil community and elected political leaders. Differently put, 
contemplating a TRC as a replicable or transfereable model (or even guideline) for other 
countries implies the significance of foresight rather than hindsight in incorporating CMR as a 
central part of the planning, implementation (read: TRC, a broadened mandate) and 
conclusion of such a multi-layered process. 
 
The study utilised personal experience, literature reviews, documentary and archival research 
solicited and unsolicited materials, impromptu exposures of an overt nature, coupled with 
face-to-face interviews with selected participants in order to capture as rich as possible a slice 
of life of TRC/non-TRC approaches in various countries. In this attempt I argue that this 
study captures some of the rich collage of human experiences in social processes here and 
elsewhere and that it may hold transferability value within set parameters. 
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In a rather under-researched field this exploratory qualitative study answers the research 
question(s) with qualifications. The study makes its contribution in the field of military socio-
logy and the sub-discipline of CMR. It may be considered for future deployment, provided 
that comparative and contextual differences are kept in mind. What may work in one country 
under one particular government may not be a good “export product”. Civilians, politicians, 
military professionals – even religious leaders – need to be aware of this while they strive 
continuously for improvement of CMR, civil control over professional armed forces and 
consensus on the protection and nurturing of human rights and human security within a nation 
of self-chosen citizens. 
 ix
List of abbreviations 
 
ACCORD  — African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
ACDP  — African Christian Democratic Party (South Africa) 
ANC — African National Congress (South Africa) 
APLA — Azanian People’s Liberation Army (South Africa) 
ASC — Afrika Studies Centre (Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, The Netherlands) 
AU — African Union 
AZAPO — Azanian People’s Organisation (South Africa) 
 
BCM  — Black Consciousness Movement (BCM – South Africa) 
BOSS  — Bureau of State Security (apartheid South Africa) 
 
CCB  — Civil Cooperation Bureau (Afrikaans: Burgerlike Samewerkingsburo – BSB) 
CEMIS  — Centre for Military Studies, Military Academy of South Africa 
CIA  — Central Intelligence Agency (United States of America) 
CIGS  — Centre for Intergroup Studies (South Africa) 
CIIR  — Catholic Institute for International Relations 
CMR —  Civil-military relations 
 
CODESRIA  — Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa 
CONADEP  — National Commission on Disappeared People (Argentina) 
CPSA —  Communist Party of South Africa 
CSVR  — Centre for the Study on Violence and Reconciliation (South Africa) 
 
DefSec  — Defence Secretariat (South Africa) 
DRC  — Democratic Republic of the Congo 
DRP  — Defence Review Process (South Africa) 
DTA  — Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (South West Africa/Namibia) 
 
ECOMOG  — Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
 
FF  — Freedom Front (South Africa) 
FAPLA  — Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forças Armadas 
Populares para a Libertação de Angola) 
 x
FNLA  — Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola) 
FRELIMO  — Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
 
HRVIC  — Human Rights Violations Investigative Commission (Nigeria) 
HSRC  — Human Sciences Research Council (South Africa) 
 
IAC  — Issue Attention Cycle 
IAS  — Institute for African Studies (Moscow) 
IC  — Interim Constitution (South Africa) 
ICCPR  — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICD  — Independent Complaints Directorate (South Africa) 
ICJ  — International Court of Justice 
ICMH — International Commission for Military History 
 
ICT  — International Criminal Tribunal 
ICTs  — International Criminal Tribunals 
ICTY  — International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
ICTR  — International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
IDASA  — Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa 
IDP  — Institute for Defence Policy (South Africa) 
IFP  — Inkatha Freedom Party (South Africa) 
IMMATT  — International Military and Advisory and Transition Team 
INCH  — Institute for Contemporary History 
IPSA  — International Political Science Association 
ISA  — International Sociological Association 
ISS  — Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) 
 
JOC  — Joint Operational Centre 
LRC  — Legal Resource Centre (South Africa) 
 
MDM  — Mass Democratic Movement (South Africa) 
MPLA  — Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular 
para a Libertação de Angola) 
MK  — Umkhonto weSizwe (“Spear of the Nation”), military wing of the 
African National Congress (ANC) 
 xi
MRG  — Military Research Group (ANC aligned military think tank established 
in the early 1990s, South Africa) 
 
NAMPOL  — Namibian Police (post-liberation police service of Namibia) 
NC  — New Constitution (South Africa) 
NDF  — Namibian Defence Force 
NEDLAC  — National Economic Development and Labour Council 
NGK  — Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk 
NHRC  — Nigerian National Human Rights Commission 
NIA  — National Intelligence Agency (South Africa) 
NP  — National Party (South Africa) 
NNP  — New National Party (South Africa) 
NPF  — National Patriotic Front of Namibia 
NRF  — National Research Foundation (South Africa) 
NSC  — National Security Council (South Africa) 
NSF  — Non-statutory forces 
NSMS  — National Security Management System 
NUSAS  — National Union for South African Students 
 
OAU  — Organisation for African Unity 
 
PAC  — Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa) 
PDP  — People’s Democratic Party (Nigeria) 
PLAN  — People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (Military wing of SWAPO) 
 
RC01  — Research Committee 01 of ISA 
RENAMO  — National Mozambican Resistance, also known as MNR 
RoD  — Military Discipline Code (Afrikaans: Reglement van Dissipline) 
RPF  — Rwandan Patriotic Front 
 
SAACI  — South African Association for Conflict Intervention 
SACC  — South African Council of Churches 
SACP  — South African Communist Party 
SADC  — Southern African Development Community 
SADF  — South African Defence Force (apartheid era) 
SAKK  — Suid-Afrikaanse Kleurlingkorps (S.A. Cape Coloured Corps) 
 xii
SANDF  — South African National Defence Force 
SANNC  — South African Native National Congress 
SAP  — South African Police (apartheid police) 
SAPS  — South African Police Service 
SASA  — South African Sociological Association 
SASS  — South African Secret Service 
SATRC  — South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
SATRCR  — South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report 
SSC  — State Security Council (South Africa) 
SWAPO  — South West African People’s Organisation (Namibia) 
SWAPOL  — South West African Police (under apartheid rule) 
SWATF  — South West African Territorial Force 
 
TRC  — Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
TRCs  — Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
 
USME  — Universiteit Stellenbosch Militêre Eenheid 
UDF  — United Democratic Front (South Africa), established 1983 
UN  — United Nations 
Unisa — University of South Africa 
UNITA  — Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese: União 
Naçional para a Independênçia Total de Angola.) 
UNTAG — United Nations Transition Assistance Group 
UWUSA  — United Workers Union of South Africa (Inkatha Union supported by 
apartheid government) 
 
ZANU  — Zimbabwe African National Union 
ZANU-PF  — Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front 
ZAPU  — Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
 xiii
ABSTRACT 
 
This work narrates a qualitative sociological exploration with auto-ethnographic 
underpinnings. It deals with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(SATRC) as a contextual case among others. The thesis seeks to answer the question of 
whether countries following a TRC route did better than those that did not use TRCs, when it 
comes to establishing civil control over the military. The author’s exposure and involvement 
in the process as participant, participant observer, observer participant and observer inform 
the study. With the SATRC as one cornerstone other cases reflected upon include Argentina 
and Chile (Latin America), Spain and Portugal (Southern Europe), Namibia, Nigeria and 
Rwanda (Africa). 
 
Keywords: 
 
Truth and reconciliation, democracy, apartheid military, military sociology, auto-
ethnography, South African National Defence Force (SANDF), civil control (South Africa), 
authoritarian rule, liberation struggles, reflexivity, armed forces (in transition), scientific 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS IN CONTEXT 
 
Historical man always sees and understands from his standpoint in time and place; he cannot 
stand above history and procure “objectively valid” knowledge. There is no standing place 
for the interpreter outside of history; a subject can never be seen from the point of eternity  
– Palmer, 1969: 178ff. 
 
Humans observe the world around them through sets of spectacles or lenses, called concepts 
and relational terms – Meehan, 1988: 45. 
 
What matters, then, in the making of peace is the transfer from angular viewpoint to generic 
vision – Desan, 1987: 110. 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Transition from authoritarian rule to democracy has led to a number of countries instituting 
truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs). Such a process can broadly be defined as 
opening up past human injustices caused by oppressive national governments; revealing 
human rights extremes, allowing especially victims, but also perpetrators, to make their 
voices heard, attempting to achieve reconciliation and justice (arguably peace also), and 
proposing mechanisms ensuring that similar events will not reoccur. Prominent TRCs were 
instituted in Argentina, Chile and South Africa. African countries also decided on TRC 
approaches, for example Burundi, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC). In Rwanda, a process is occurring that reflects some elements of a TRC and similar 
processes have come into being in East Timor and Cambodia. 
 
“Truth commissions are now standard post-conflict structures set up in over seventeen 
countries in the last twenty years to investigate unresolved cases from past human rights 
violations … as one strand of the globalisation of human rights, they have taken on a trans-
national validity as one of the main mechanisms for announcing a new democratic order” 
(Wilson, 2001: xviii). I would not go as far as Wilson, arguing that truth commissions are 
now a universal standard. However, they are frequently viewed as a standard approach to deal 
with a history of past human rights excesses within national communities. For some such 
commissions has become a norm, if not close to a blueprint (Sverrisson, 2006: 8). 
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It speaks for itself that not all these cases can be discussed within the scope of this thesis. 
Each case involves people, humans in interaction. As alerted by Palmer in the epigraph above 
(1969: 178ff), chosen cases cannot be discussed from a viewpoint of eternity, the author being 
from his contextual position but one human interpreter of such social processes in a 
continuously changing context. 
 
Compared to other processes, the TRC approach is relatively new on the political scene. 
Introduced around the 1980s, an extensive corpus of literature on TRCs is available today. 
Since 1992, a spectrum of publications on South Africa’s history of oppression and its 
aftermath has seen the light. A significant percentage of these works deal with the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC). The number of publications on the 
SATRC and others is still increasing. 
 
Publications and reflections since 1999 cover an array of issues that have an impact on the 
current academic – and to a degree public – discourse in South Africa. These discursive 
materials include social recollection, collective remembrance and historical consciousness, 
even attempts at inducing a debate among South African historians, which has been much less 
successful (see text in block on page 26). The SATRC, its workings, structures and victims 
also deserve much attention. Several reflective works deal with the impact of and the 
prospects for reconciliation on community level. Other aspects that are dealt with include 
language games or discourses reflecting on process, power and literary perspectives, the 
psychological impact of apartheid and unearthing the truth about apartheid repression and 
“the politics of memory”, inclusive of flaws in the SATRC process. Others reports deal with 
the impact of the TRC in particular communities or the effects of human rights excesses, such 
as torture or the loss of loved ones or issues of gender and being a witness before the TRC 
(Nomoyi, 2000). Others venture into meta-fiction, reportage and partial memoirs1 [Works 
related to and/or referring to the SATRC include Sanders (2006), Verwoerd (2005) Wilson 
(2001), Villa-Vicencio (2002), Meredith (1999) and Christie (2000). See also James & Van de 
Vijver (2000), After the TRC – reflections on truth and reconciliation in South Africa, 
Christodoulidis & Veitch (2001), Mamdami (2000) and Goodman (1999)]. 
 
An observer, theorist or participant in a social process views the world through human eyes. 
Such views or angular optics (context-bound perspectives) on, and attempts at understanding 
the SATRC and other TRCs abound. I prefer the term angular optic rather than “context-
                                                 
1 The work of Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull, is seen as part of this genre (Sanders, 2000: 73ff). 
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bound perspectives” or spectacles. The former for me implies human agency – despite its 
limitations – and the possibility to “see” through the eyes of others from different viewpoints, 
even argue or generically live these viewpoints interactively in the hope of attaining peaceful 
relationships in a given community. Despite human – even one’s own – deficiencies, I believe 
that different angular optics that are shared can lead to generic visions that improve attitudes 
and socio-economic structures. Lessons learnt from the past can lead to a society where socio-
economic and political structures will enhance communal tolerance and human rights, one 
trusts; in other words the “transfer of angular viewpoints to generic visions” (see the Desan 
epigraph). This also applies to the way in which structures of military power are approached. 
 
In 1995, the South African government opted for a TRC approach that was strongly modelled 
on the earlier Chilean approach. A five-volume report on the TRC was issued in 1998, 
addressing issues such as its advocacy, rationale, history, composition, detailed witness 
proceedings, analyses of victims’ reports and experiences, perpetrators’ accounts, issues of 
amnesty and socio- and individual psychological concerns. In the last volume of the report, 
released in 1998, recommendations were made on restitution and reparation (TRC Report, 
1998, Volume 5: 420ff). This volume also included the “minority position” submitted by 
Commissioner Wynand Malan and the TRC’s response to the minority position (TRC Report, 
1998, Volume 5: 436ff). 
 
Sverrisson rightly argues that despite the fact that TRCs attempt to unearth the truth, they 
leave some victims dissatisfied. In other cases TRCs became controversial in hindsight 
(Sverrisson, 2006: 7). Such observed shortcomings relate to various issues that I address 
below. 
 
Seemingly lacking in the wide-ranging literature on TRCs are the possible effects of TRCs on 
CMR within democratised countries such as South Africa, and effecting for the citizens of 
these countries future control over military and other security agencies. While there are many 
in-depth analyses of the potential failures and successes of CMR in South Africa and other 
countries, there is not enough on what a TRC meant, or could (or should for that matter?) 
have meant, for civil control over the military. 
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There are arguably reasons for this. For example, in South Africa the SATRC and the 
Defence Review Process (DRP)2 ran concurrently. Yet, with some hindsight these processes, 
each valid in its own right, ended up as two entirely independent processes. Between the TRC 
and the DRP there seemed to be limited cross-fertilisation, instead of an observable reciprocal 
influence, which with foresight could have taken place and would have added to the 
enhancement of CMR. 
 
An argument frequently offered is that it was not part of the SATRCs mandate to address 
future CMR. Inherent within the definition of TRCs we find two elements: (1) A directed 
attempt to unearth the truth about the past and (2) the outspoken principle of never again; in 
other words to prevent a return to similar occurrences. The latter, I argue, includes future civil 
control of the military. Yet, there are few concrete suggestions in the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Report (SATRCR, Vol 5: 304ff) that explicitly attempt to prevent 
a return to past actions, and offer means to ensure future civil control over the military 
specifically. That these issues were not dealt with in the SATRCR’s recommendations is 
regrettable in hindsight – even if the arguments hold water that the mandate did not include it. 
 
The SATRCR (Vol. 5) makes reference to ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights the United Nations Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment (1998: 348), and the promotion of a human-rights culture 
(1998: 311–312). It briefly suggests that the Defence White Paper’s civil education 
programme provides “a positive initiative to prevent future human-rights abuses by members 
of the security forces and to encourage and instil an understanding of human rights values in 
the population at large” (1998: 329). It also indicates that the White Paper provides some 
guidelines for the future conduct of security forces and the relationships between state and 
security, and that the South African constitution (Chapter 11, Section 199) should be adhered 
to. However, no detailed guidelines or instructions, nor analyses of proposed civil control 
over the military were provided (consult the recommendations of the SATRCR in Volume V, 
1998: 302). 
 
It is regrettable that even if it had been only minimal, there was not the foresight at least to 
address the issue of civil control over security institutions in more detail in the SATRCR. 
TRCs – with the limited exception of the Chilean commission – that went before did not pick 
                                                 
2 The DRP in South Africa involved the public in the process of co-designing the new South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) vision and mission with regard to its future strength, budgetary 
needs, force projection, primary and secondary of the military in the new democracy. 
 20
up this potential strength of a TRC process. This however does not mean that South Africans 
involved in the design of the process should have suffered the same shortcoming. 
 
One may ask why other TRCs did not reflect the foresight to address future CMR, even as a 
small part of the reports’ recommendations. There may be many reasons, yet this general 
oversight by instigators of TRCs when setting the mandate is regrettable and the opportunities 
missed are clear. 
 
Another observation lurks in the background. In contrast to TRC exercises it seems that 
democracies that have not opted for TRCs – particularly those that formed part of the so-
called third wave of democracy such as Spain, Greece and Portugal – addressed the issue of 
civil control over the military as well as CMR with remarkable vigour in times before TRCs 
became a vogue, even at a time when such choices were already available. In the latter case, 
one African country, Namibia (independence achieved in 1990), can be quoted as example. 
The above arguments will suffice. In the next section I will introduce the notion of 
ethnography, which forms an integral part of this narrative. 
 
1.2. Enters auto-ethnography 
 
Auto-ethnographic 
This term now commonly refers to a particular form of writing that seeks to unite 
ethnographic (looking outward at a world beyond one’s own) and autobiographical (gazing 
inward for a story of one’s self) intentions. The aim in composing an auto-ethnography 
account is to keep both the subject (knower) and object (that which is being examined) in 
simultaneous view. It is commonly claimed that the striking stories that frequently comprise 
auto-ethnography are intended to illustrate and evoke rather than to state or make a claim, and 
that the author of such a text aims to invite readers into the text to relive the experience rather 
than to interpret or analyze what the author is saying. 
– Schwandt, 2001:13
 
Some scholars frown on auto-ethnography as being radical if not unscientific. The approach is 
not new. More recently it has received much more attention and recognition. The auto-
ethnographic approach incorporates the researcher and author as part of the research and a 
voice in itself; a subjective being that relates to text and human context, rather than role-
playing the distant “neutral” observer. The latter theoretical approach frequently reflects a 
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passive style of writing and is grounded in the expressive voice of the third person viewing 
the subject(s) of study from a presumed clinical distance.3 
 
Why a preference for the auto-ethnographic approach? Firstly the involvement of the 
individual in any social process is not that of a “being- apart” from the process but “being a 
part”. Social and individual experiences inform each other. Secondly, on reporting a research 
process and its findings such involvement cannot be sidestepped. I concur with Esterberg 
(2002: 208) “that the use of passive voice tends to imply that no one actually did the research; 
it somehow merely appeared or ‘was found’”. Stated in stronger terms; the passive voice of 
the “neutral” researcher alienates the researcher from the active self in interaction with others. 
Auto-ethnography as an activity that builds on ethnographic description involves the personal 
and the author as participant in the social process in relating to and reflecting actively in 
interaction with other subjects. It aims to paint a larger, sometimes more intense and human 
picture while sharing knowledge (Ouelette, 2003: 13ff; Ellis, 2004: 31ff). 
 
“We can look at auto-ethnography this way; it gets us out of an either/or way of thinking. As 
a form of ethnography auto-ethnography … is part auto or self and part ethno or culture” 
(Ellis, 2004: 31). Auto-ethnography can include interpretive or narrative ethnography and 
unfolding, dialogic plots (Ellis, 2004: 32). In the words of Josselson et al. (2003: 3) it is “Up 
Close (and Personal)”. In reflecting on research and how to communicate the research 
process, auto-ethnography became part of a shifting landscape or a widened digm in the world 
of research that represents different moments – and in some cases – different voices, likely in 
the same work to communicate to the reader or fellow traveller a larger collage of life 
(Sparks, 2002: 2–5). I discuss this approach in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 
                                                 
3 More positivistic-orientated researchers insist that the author should write “scientifically”, i.e. (Van 
Maanen, 1988, Sparkes 2002) references must be in the third person, i.e. the distant observer. 
Following a comment of a South African reviewer on earlier work, I consulted several accredited and 
international journals. I found first person references in among others the African Sociological Revue, 
Journal of Democracy and Social Identities. Accredited South African journals in which first person 
terms were found include Scientia Militaria, Politikon, Koers, Politeia, Society in Transition (journal 
of the South African Sociological Association)and Journal for Contemporary History (Afrikaans: 
Joernaal vir Eietydse Geskiedenis). Other South African journals include African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, African Security Review and Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) publications. It 
seems that with regard to the third person reference (“the distant voice”), earlier researchers in South 
Africa and elsewhere adopted preferences (bias?) as a rule. More recently approaches using the active 
voice have been examined and accepted by for example the University of Johannesburg and the 
University of South Africa – among others in the fields of business science, psychology, 
communication sciences and theology (pastoral care). Esterberg argues: “I strongly recommend writing 
in the active voice. It is better to use ‘I’ or ‘We’ to show that a real person did the research” (Esterberg, 
2002: 208). I agree with Esterberg. 
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The choice for TRC-type processes or against them (re-) touches peoples lives, past and 
present experiences of individuals and communities – also those that worked closely in or 
were touched by that particular environment; it is individually and collectively “up close and 
personal” and forms part of this study. Up close and personal relates to the individual, the “I” 
of the researcher, his/her experiences and socialisation within a concrete context – also in this 
case – my personal interest in the topic cannot be divorced from the scientific narrative 
deployed here. Next my personal interest in this study needs discussion. 
 
1.3. Personal interest in the study 
 
Earlier South African debates concerning its TRC, starting as early as 1992, triggered the 
present study. Initially, my main interest was the debate on the SATRC as possible avenue for 
reconciliation (see Boraine et al., 1994; Liebenberg, 1992). Villa-Vicencio (2002: 4–5) 
mentions that many South Africans embraced this notion. As one that originally advocated the 
TRC as a path of reconciliation, I was led to an interest in TRCs elsewhere and a desire to 
undertake at least some tentative comparative work on TRCs.4 (Admittedly before I started 
advocating the SATRC as a choice, I wrote at least one article in which I hinted that the new 
democratic government, after taking power, should embark on internal criminal proceedings 
against some prominent figures representing the ancien regime [Liebenberg, 1992] At the 
time I could not care less if that put me in the same league as some members of the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC) or Mrs Winnie Mandela, former wife of President Mandela, and a 
radical voice on dealing with the past of apartheid excesses. Following through such an 
argument in South African realpolitik, however, presents problems as the ruling National 
Party – even if reluctantly and under pressure – became involved in a process to relinquish 
power through a negotiated settlement and was not replaced through conquest). 
 
Christie aptly remarks that, “Despite the number of attempts to examine the past there have 
been (too) few comparative studies which attempt to shed light on the phenomenon” (Christie, 
2000: 46). Christie wrote about the South African process and apparently refers to comparing 
the SATRC with other similar processes. 
 
The continued violence after the unbanning of the liberation movements in South Africa and 
the ascendance of covert operations acted as a stimulus to make a personal contribution to 
unearth covert operations as part of continued violence by the then incumbent government 
                                                 
4 This edition quickly sold out and a second edition followed. For a list of related publications by the 
author see Appendix 1 (page 433). 
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against its own citizenry. For me personally unearthing the truth also implies making a 
contribution to the prevention here and elsewhere of similar occurrences during and after 
transition. Upholding apartheid came with violence, structural and physical. This legacy was 
carried into the South African attempt to become a democracy. On the one hand, the security 
issue in South Africa became entangled with both democratisation and civil control. On the 
other the reduction/prevention of violence and community reconciliation – or at least social 
accommodation – became an urgent imperative. 
 
In South Africa transition coincided with violence spurred on by among others government-
orientated “third forces” (Sanders, 2006: 255ff; SATRCR, Vol. 5: 424 [1998]; Coleman, 
1998; Schutte, Liebenberg & Minnaar, 1998). The attempt to make a tangible contribution in 
the South African context led to an initiative that set out to describe state intervention aimed 
at undermining attempts at attaining a democracy in South Africa. In a project on covert 
operations that we undertook the sociologist, Charl Schutte, from the Human Sciences 
Research Council (HSRC), a military sociologist and ex-Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) officer, 
the late Rocky Williams and the historian and criminologist, Anthony Minnaar, also in the 
employ of the HSRC, played a significant role. The project was funded by the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung and the Danish 
embassy. After procurement of external funding (our then employers were not particularly 
enthusiastic about the project), we held a conference at Espada Ranch outside Pretoria, which 
in turn resulted in a widely reported publication, The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in 
South Africa (1994).5 
 
An earlier interest in democratisation in my case gave rise to exploring CMR in emerging 
democracies, partly as a result of previous experience and individual involvement with the 
South African DRP as part of the civil society component. My friendship with the late Rocky 
Williams, military sociologist and a colonel of MK background in the newly created South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF), played a role too. Regular interaction with persons 
close to the process also enhanced my interest in these matters. A participant-observer 
position enabled close monitoring of the ongoing complex, if not problematic, integration 
process of previously adversarial armed forces in post-apartheid South African and taking part 
in an “organic process” where civil society and the military could interact on civil-military 
issues. 
 
                                                 
5 It was revised and appeared as a second edition in 1998. 
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Over time, in my case, a convergence of interest in TRC processes, CMR and democratisation 
came about. These issues happen to be a crucial nexus in a post-transitional democracy such 
as South Africa, as well as others. 
 
1.4. Social science, sociology and the military 
 
Sociology as a social science is interested in social groups, institutions and societal processes. 
Virtually every element of society, be it institutions, small or large groups of people in 
interaction, power relationships, economics and people, the world of work, conflict, peace and 
socio-cultural aspects, is investigated by sociologists. 
 
Likewise, an interest in the military among social scientists and sociologists is not new. 
Sociology: a systematic introduction, authored by Harry M. Johnson (foreword by Robert 
Merton) deals with military organisation (Johnson, 1961; 40–46, 292ff). John Robert 
Beishline, a military scholar, as far back as the 1950s ventured into military sociology by 
discussing military organisation, interaction between commanders and subordinates, military 
functions and functionalism, management and group activities and line command functions 
within the military structures, which are themselves part of broader society (Beishline, 1950). 
An illustration of strong interest in the military is the International Sociology Association’s 
(ISA) research committee (RC01) that is dedicated to military sociology. 
 
In the case of South Africa the same applies. Interest shown by South African sociologists in 
military-related topics, as well as by international scholars in South Africa’s military and 
political interface, has existed for some time. 
 
The role of the military and military policy was mentioned as early as the 1970s by social 
theorists in discussions related to political change (see Sachs in Thompson & Butler, 1975: 
229ff; 239). Heribert Adam, well known sociologist, in Modernizing Racial Domination, 
spent time on discussing the role of security institutions in upholding white control (Adam, 
1972: 53ff, 125ff)6. Some works paid attention to security legislation and its effect on human 
rights (Dugard, 1978: 151ff). In particular cases they took up insights by people involved in 
South African politics for further analysis. For example, a decade earlier the then leader of the 
African National Congress (ANC), before the organisation made the choice for armed 
                                                 
6 Ten years later Adam, in a work co-authored with Hermann Giliomee, would reconsider the theme of 
the security forces and the trend towards militarisation in South Africa (see Adam & Giliomee, 1981: 
184–185; 196ff).  
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struggle, referred to the problematic role of the military in upholding white power (Luthuli, 
1962: 114, 204–205). As political personalities pointed out the dangers associated with 
security and human rights in South Africa, social scientists, among them sociologists, 
followed suit. 
 
During the 1980s the debate for and against the role of the military and issues related to 
military policy in apartheid South Africa have increased. Some works simply cited the ever 
increasing list of security laws (Horrell, 1982). Others interpreted the effect of an increasing 
range of legislation related to state security, policies related to it and its effects on human 
rights (Mathews, 1986; Hund & Van der Merwe, 1986).7 Other works less critical of apartheid 
ventured into comparing South African defence policy with the policies of other countries, 
such as Australia, France, India and Japan (Roherty, 1980). Works that addressed the role of 
the security forces, internal oppression, external aggression and the ideology of Total 
Onslaught as an anti-communist (and black) tool increasingly appeared and analysed the 
South African state (Frankel, 1984; Leonard, 1983; Grundy, 1987). South African foreign 
policy, the role of the military and foreign aggression were analysed in detail (Geldenhuys, 
1984; Grundy 1988); (Du Pisani, 1988). 
 
During the early 1990s the debate continued as security forces remained active through front 
organisations and covert operations, trying to set hurdles in the future political playing field in 
favour of the ruling National Party. The growing dependence of the politicians on the military 
– or viewed alternatively, the military increasingly being sucked into politics by the 
politicians – continued to be hot points of discussion (Evans & Philips, 1988; Cock, 1990; 
Seegers, 1990; Swilling, 1990; Liebenberg, 1990; Minnaar, Schutte & Liebenberg, 1994). 
This debate has continued through the 1990s (Rosenberg, 1999: ix–xii; Meredith, 1999: 55ff, 
167ff) to the present day (Sanders, 2006). 
 
                                                 
7 H W van der Merwe, a sociologist, is well known for his work in conflict resolution and advocacy of 
a negotiated settlement to South African conflict. He graduated from the University of Stellenbosch in 
Sociology and completed his PhD in Sociology at UCLA. He lectured at Rhodes University before 
heading up the Centre for Intergroup Studies, in Cape Town (UCT). Van der Merwe contributed 
numerous articles to sociology journals. He was nominated as a SATRC commissioner but not selected. 
An example of his views on the SATRC can be found in his contribution “Punishment in Perspective” 
(Van der Merwe, 1996 and in his autobiography Van der Merwe, HW 2000. Peacemaking in South 
Africa: A life in Conflict Resolution. Cape Town: Tafelberg Uitgewers). In the latter he deploys the 
auto-ethnographic style.  
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Civil-military research within the field of military sociology is currently producing a 
warehouse of social-relevant analysis.8 The same trend can be observed in South Africa. Over 
the past decade – and more – I have noted the activities within various (sub-)disciplines and 
study areas, including military sociology. In these subject areas relatively less research was/is 
done on the relationship between CMR, inclusive of civil-military control and the specific 
relationship with TRCs in attaining and sustaining civil control over the military, or security 
governance, to use a wider term.9 It is clear that South African military sociology, while it has 
become a thriving theoretical enterprise, is lacking in the research area that specifically links 
TRCs and their outcomes with CMR. 
 
While a broad corpus of literature on CMR in South Africa and elsewhere is available, fewer 
authors deal with the important relationship between the TRC and civil-military relationships 
and civil control over the military and the potential value that such a link could have had. Put 
differently, had we had the foresight to make this linkage, even if other countries that 
embarked on TRC exercises did not, the South African experience could have added value to 
civil control over the military. Foresight in this case would have benefited South Africans and 
others alike that consider TRCs or implementing them in future. 
 
The argument is made that this lack of foresight on a wider understanding of the mandate of 
the SATRC is understandable. I referred earlier to the mandate that did not explicitly refer to 
future CMR and implementing structures and attitudes of civil control over the military. 
Secondly the integration of several armed forces, transforming the apartheid military 
apparatus, and the writing of the White Paper on Defence took energy and effort. Closely in 
its wake, the DRP was instituted on a national basis, which in itself tapped organisational and 
                                                 
8 South African sociologists working on the military and the civil-military interface are among others 
Gavin Cawthra, Rialize Ferreira, Lindy Heinecken, Laurey Nathan and Jackie Cock, South African 
theorists such as Garth Shelton, Philip Frankel, Inus du Plessis, Abel Esterhuyse, Theo Neethling and 
Deon Fourie frequently deploy sociological insights in their work. Earlier works by Moses Khanyile in 
this regard are also to be noted. The late Rocky Williams added an array of military sociological 
insights to the transition of the military up till his untimely death in 2004.  
9 Somewhat different interpretations of terms such as security governance, civil control over security 
agencies, civilian control over the military and democratisation of the military exist. Another term 
much used and that may again be demarcated from the above is reprofessionalisation of the military. 
All of these terms relate closely to control by civilian institutions such as the elected bodies over 
military (and by implication security) institutions and will be discussed from Chapter 3 onwards. The 
nearly all-embracing term of human security also enters the picture. I decided to work with concepts 
other than human security while the term relates to the discourse here. Reprofessionalisation of the 
military implies that military institutions adjust in attitude, ethos and structure to a new democratic and 
constitutional state following transition from authoritarian rule; thus a state aimed at securing and 
enhancing human rights. 
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human resource skills. With the exception of a few persons, not enough work was done on the 
crucial link between the SATRC and civil control over the military.10 
 
Influential publications on the SATRC, such as Boraine (2000), James and Van de Vijver 
(2000), Wilson (2001), Goodman (1999), Villa-Vicencio (2002) and Christie (2000), refer to 
CMR or civil control over the military on a limited scale. Worthwhile publications, such as 
Williams (1999), Cawthra and Abrahams (2003), Cawthra and Luckham (2003) and Frankel 
(2000), focus extensively on CMR and security governance, but seldom refer to the SATRC, 
or any TRC for that matter. A significant, and in all respects an important, theoretical 
contribution by Molo (2000) highlights the negotiation process for civilian control from the 
Transitional Executive Council/the Interim Constitution and the New Constitution adopted in 
1996 and provides extremely valuable insights into “civilianising the military”, yet deals only 
sketchily with the TRC. Up till now, I argue, few enough significant systematic attempts have 
been made to provide a theoretical construct linking the SATRC and civil control over the 
military, nor was the issue explored in a focused way by social researchers, including 
sociologists. 
 
1.5. Motivation for the study 
 
Margaret Archer provides an important view on the relevance of real-life social involvement, 
whether the one involved is a theorist or practitioner or participant: “The ‘problem of 
structure and agency’ denotes central dilemmas in social theory … These issues are central 
for the simple reason that it is impossible to do sociology without dealing with them and 
coming to decisions about them” (Archer, 1995: 65). She continues: “Imperative as it is the 
problem is not one that imposes itself on academics alone, but on every human being … For it 
is part and parcel of daily experience to feel both free and enchained, capable of shaping our 
own future and yet confronted by towering, seemingly impersonal constraints … 
Consequently in facing up to the ‘problem of structure and agency’ social theorists are not 
just addressing crucial technical problems in the study of society, they are also confronting 
the most pressing problems of the human condition” (Archer, 1995: 65). 
 
Her words reminds one of experiences lived through, attempts made to address problems of 
enormous proportions, with real or potential negative or positive social consequences. In 
addressing such problems, we remain caught up in struggles past and present and a struggle 
                                                 
10 One is an exploratory paper and a resultant article by Rocky Williams and a co-author on the impact 
of the TRC on the SANDF, published in 1999 (Williams & Liebenberg: 1999: 89ff). 
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for the future, while acting within a concrete and given current South Africa with prevailing 
social challenges. In a very real sense this study is exactly about this – and other societies 
going through the same trials and tribulations. 
 
There are many reasons for researchers deciding to launch research on particular social 
realities, problems or phenomena, one of them, as in my case, being a desire to make a 
contribution in some practical way. My conviction, originally triggered by what some would 
glibly call “moral outrage”, was facilitated by personal experiences as well as the socio-
political changes taking place in South Africa.11 
 
By reconsidering the foresight one had, but lack of time at that stage to radically tease out the 
puzzle of TRC influences on post-oppressive politicians and the military (read: inclusive of 
other security agencies such as the police, paramilitary and intelligence services) a thesis such 
as this represents reflection and study of the SATRC and other cases. Sources informing such 
knowledge gained and communicated are human and qualitative. They represent people rather 
than distant objects or “objectivity”. 
 
The angular optic deployed here, I believe, will establish some knowledge, and at the same 
time could assist in solving or alleviating problems related to civil control over security 
institutions in this field. 
 
I believe that research findings should be used to improve the quality of social life. I concur 
with Meehan (1988: 8): “The fundamental human purpose to be achieved through systematic 
thinking is always and everywhere to maintain and improve the conditions of life of some 
human population.” My belief is that these “golden threads” should be reinforced by applying 
a research approach that reflects qualitative elements (including auto-ethnography) and 
elements of action research, or in the words of two local experts, Mouton and Marais (1990), 
undertaking participatory research. Participatory research or action research reflects 
“understanding the life-worlds of the research subjects. It contains an element of political 
commitment to the empowerment of participants or betterment of the social conditions of 
participants; affinities with critical research paradigms; being (slightly) more inductive than 
deductive, (is informed by) participant observation, semi-structured interviewing, using 
documents, constructing stories and/or narratives” (Mouton, 2001: 150–151). 
 
                                                 
11 For the role and value of passion and conviction in qualitative research, consult Ouellette in 
Josselson, Lieblich and McAdams (2003: 26). 
 29
Regardin qualitative research Sparkes suggested that we are in [a] moment of discovery and 
rediscovery and new ways of looking, interpreting, arguing and writing are debated by 
researchers (Sparkes, 2002: 6). Consequently, “qualitative research can no longer be viewed 
from a neutral or objectivist positivist perspective …” (Sparks, 2002: 6). Scholz and Tietje in 
a similar vein argue: “The intent of qualitative researchers to promote a subjective research 
paradigm is a given. Subjectivity is not seen as a failing (that needs) to be eliminated, but as 
an essential element of understanding” (Scholz & Tietje, 2002: 45). 
 
Over years, this position through experience was cemented as I observed, consulted various 
oral and written sources, debated, interacted, participated, differed and agreed with friends 
and peers over the practical value of involvement – and frequently acted upon such 
knowledge and experience.12 
 
Various countries that have been transformed from oppressive or authoritarian regimes 
purporting to be democratic have not been successful. Failures in this regard also had an 
impact on the civil conduct of the military. In many cases this led to negative social and 
political consequences, such as the case of Ethiopia, deteriorating into continuous social 
conflicts at the time (Daniel, 2000; Toggia, 2004: 32ff). Others experienced a short “spring” 
of attempted reconciliation but regressed into tension and authoritarian type practices 
underpinned by the support of the security forces. Zimbabwe represents a Southern African 
example. The same applies to the outcomes in other regions in Africa (Appiah-Mensah, 2005: 
7ff; Du Plessis & Gevers, 2005: 23ff). 
 
In the majority of these failures, the relationship between civilians and the military remained 
– at best – an unsatisfactory status quo and at worst deteriorated. In many instances optimal 
CMR and civil control over the military were not institutionalised during transitions. The 
civil-military theorist Robin Luckham rightly speculates whether (new) democracies can 
“write an epitaph for Frankenstein’s Monster” – “The Monster” in this case being 
militarisation and the spectre of praetorian or authoritarian regimes (Luckham, 1996: 1). One 
of the participants in this study makes a point worth reflecting on: He argues that post-
oppression “the military tends in ‘forget’ resulting in most people not being able to forgive” 
(E-mail response 2007). For this reason TRC exercises could do well by giving specific 
                                                 
12 The interest in military matters academic or through socialisation in apartheid South Africa spans 30 
years odd. I assume life experience as child, socialisation in the school cadet system and as a conscript, 
citizen force member, political objector to military service and various others experiences, such as 
belonging to a lower middle class family and my parents being from a working class background, may 
have played a role too. 
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attention in their reports to the creation of attitudes and institutionalising measures of future 
civil control over the military. 
 
No matter how interesting researching a topic is, it could only be meaningful if its research 
findings contributed to resolving a social problem by illuminating a particular socio-political 
context and contributing to solving pertinent problems in the chosen field. Solving problems 
in this case is closely intertwined with guarantees for human rights through civil control over 
the military (read: all national security agencies) and CMR that enable security governance of 
high democratic standards. 
 
Apart from what possible positive influence TRC-like processes can have on civil control 
over the military, another nagging question remains. Do national communities or a nation of 
self-chosen citizens in a post-oppression period need TRC-like processes? 
 
Since one is aware that no single individual can hold or present the whole “truth” and thus 
obtain “objectivity”, and aware that in any large social process the individual forms but a 
small part of the process, a complex knot of questions and challenges deserve attention 
(Desan, 1987: 5, 17ff). “The cruel fact is that (at times) one is unable to live the open-
mindedness one (may) want to display … one does not de facto climb out of one’s prison. 
This is an intricate psychological [sociological also – my insertion] problem, which cancels 
[or at least inhibits – again my insertion] the Husserlian claim of ending up with objectivity” 
(Desan, 1987: 63). This acknowledgement about individual subjectivity by Desan might be 
seen as a weakness. Viewed differently, it may be a strength in our search for alternatives to 
authoritarian rule and establishing civil control over and for the military in the aftermath of 
gross violations of human rights. 
 
To face challenges even when overshadowed by historical burdens remains a human trait. The 
field in which the sociologist finds her/himself carries with it the same implication. “Keep 
your eyes open to the varieties of individuality, and to the modes of epochal change. Use what 
you see and what you imagine as the clues to human variety … Know that the problems of 
social sciences, when adequately formulated must include troubles and issues, biography and 
history, and the range of their intricate relations. Within that range the life of the individual 
and the making of society occur; and within that range the sociological imagination has its 
chance to make a difference in the quality of human life in our time” (C Wright Mills quoted 
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by Plummer, 2001: 6).13 Incidentally, auto-ethnography accepts that social change falls within 
this range. 
 
The need to recognise the link between the individual as subject, his/her narrative 
engulfed/embedded/woven into social processes, be it conflict, strife, reconciliation, 
governance, any part of social life and its fabric, provides some clues to problem-solving and 
enhancing the (social) quality of life (see among others arguments by Plummer [2001], 
Bochner and Ellis [2002] and Garrat [2003: 117ff].) For this reason the research approach 
includes auto-ethnographic elements. 
 
1.6. Objectives of the study 
 
The objectives of this study are the following: 
 
Firstly, I explore the question of whether post-oppressive societies that transitioned to 
democracy (new or emerging democracies) need a TRC process to inculcate working CMR 
and civil-military control. It is important to point out at the outset that, during the research 
process, while I formulate tentative hypotheses, I do not strive to construct a fully fledged 
construct (e.g. theory or a model), to illuminate the relationship between TRCs and CMR. 
Very important for me is that the study will provide unique and valuable insights into the 
dynamics between TRCs and CMR. 
 
In the second instance, I tell the story of the individual, others in similar contexts and 
communal interaction in such a way that it generates greater understanding of our 
contemporary social experience in the chosen field. Various names in the world of qualitative 
research have been given to the story of the individual (embedded in a particular slice of 
social life), for example, narrative ethnography, interpretive ethnography, personal 
narratives, reflexive ethnography, evocative ethnography, narratives of the self, writing 
stories and phenomenological ethnography, while for Ellis auto-ethnography has became the 
current term of choice. Even the critics of this approach have lately used this description, she 
points out (Ellis, 2004:40). 
 
                                                 
13 According to Plummer (2001: 6) C Wright Mills said this at a lecture during a visit to Latin America 
rather late in his career. I cannot help thinking that a person of such capacity could have doubled his 
worth in social experience and teaching by being exposed to that part of the “Americas” much earlier.  
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Thirdly, while being cautious of uncritically “exporting advice” from one context to another, I 
aim to provide policy pointers and recommendations based on the qualitative research 
findings and auto-ethnographic moments (human experience) for others at present in 
transition from authoritarian and/or oppressive rule to democracy. 
 
Fourthly, by drawing on the research findings in this exploratory qualitative work and its 
auto-ethnographic elements embedded in our experience of truth and reconciliation and CMR, 
I wish to contribute some further foundations for social-scientific knowledge in local military 
sociology and prioritise further areas for research. The latter amounts to laying some building 
blocks for future research in the area (Mouton, 2000) through auto-ethnography and through 
shared experiences. 
 
An underlying aim incorporated in this study and garnered over years is that I chose as far as 
possible not to exclude persons that contributed to one’s knowledge and shared experience. In 
the process of findings one’s way to assist in bettering society, there are many sources. 
Insights gained, experiences lived and knowledge built and shared does not belong to one 
person but to many persons. In knowledge one stands on the shoulders of others’ experiences 
and foresight. And frequently we stand amidst our own and fellow travellers’ hindsight … 
 
1.7. Anticipated contributions of the study 
 
Undertaking the research as an involved individual within a concrete, changing context 
should firstly shed light on whether the SATRC succeeded in facilitating better CMR and 
civil control over the newly-established SANDF in democratic South Africa. 
 
Secondly, it will illuminate whether embarking on TRCs may lead to more effective and 
workable CMR and civil-military control elsewhere. 
 
By answering such questions, one should be able to illustrate how democracy can be 
strengthened through enhancing civil-military control in newly-democratised societies, and in 
turn, contribute to sustaining democratic states and ensuring human rights during TRC 
processes or in their aftermath. 
 
Thirdly, the study is meant to lead to (cues on) the formulation of policy related to civilian 
control over security institutions and thus limits potential weaknesses in the civil-military 
arena. Simultaneously, the study aims to answer the question whether TRCs are imperative to 
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properly functioning CMRhips. In this regard the study holds an element of problem-solving. 
“Policy science (or the researcher/go-between) is therapeutic and pragmatic … (it may assist) 
to heal the polity” (Parsons, 1995: 19). 
 
Lastly, the study aims to make theoretical and methodological contributions to local military 
sociology through the use of auto-ethnography coupled with an “extended case study”. 
 
1.8. Research question 
 
The research question is: Did new democracies that opted for a TRC process, fared better 
in establishing working CMR and civil control over the military than those that did not 
institute such a process? 
 
Differently put: Does a national community – or to use a Habermasian notion – a 
community of self-chosen citizens, need a TRC process at all to institute sound CMR and 
civil control over the military in building the emerging/ sustaining democracy and 
nurture human rights? 
 
Some may argue that following this general question the postulation of more hypotheses is 
important. As will become clear when dealing with my scientific beliefs in Chapter 2, I hold 
a different position. This question may instead be explored by undertaking an in-depth study 
of the lived experiences of the researcher and the conceivable “other”, those closely involved 
with the SATRC and other similar processes. 
 
One may argue that quantitative research will better be able to answer the question. It may be 
so. I will retort that reading through an account of others’ experience and one’s own can 
answer the above questions through the real life experience of the individual and the 
conceivable “other”, “the other” being those that lived through the experience, pains and 
tribulations of a rich and sometimes torturous real life process in the area under study. In 
understanding various processes in dealing with past transgressions of human rights, 
typologies may be of value. Personal reflection and consultation of sources provided at least 
one intellectual tool, namely the following14: 
 
                                                 
14 The aim here is not to provide a fully fledged literature review (which will be attended to in Chapter 
3) but instead to shed some light on different approaches in dealing with human rights excess and 
simultaneously to illuminate the SATRC and others similar TRCs. 
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1.9. Typologies 
 
Some years ago I became aware that no typology on “dealing with the past” had been 
expounded in academic literature. This “discovery” followed a discussion with Elin Skaar 
from the Michelsen Institute in Norway. I developed the categorisation of approaches 
described below to assist research in this field. These assisted in my own work to prevent 
“fuzzy” distinctions like those made by Amnesty International up to 1996 and Hayner in her 
earlier work (1994). These typologies form crucial references in the rest of the thesis and I 
will discuss them here. 
 
1.9.1 Truth and reconciliation commissions 
 
“Truth Commissions are relatively new social attempts by which recently democratized states 
choose to unburden their past through public acknowledgement coupled with restitution and 
in search of justice. Such countries have been typically under authoritarian rule and 
experienced prolonged human rights abuses. Following democratisation such countries 
decided on a moral or pragmatic basis to come to terms with their history of oppression. They 
do it in a way that would allow for public admission (or at least description) of the conditions 
that led to the excessive and systematic abuse of human rights” (Liebenberg & Zegeye, 1998: 
541). With TRCs we differentiate between various other pathways addressing systematic 
human rights abuses, such as international criminal tribunals (ICTs), government-appointed 
commissions and/or forgive-and-forget approaches. 
 
As I already pointed out, countries that opted for TRCs include Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Guetamala and South Africa. The DRC also passed legislation in 2004 on a TRC (Mail & 
Guardian, 2004, September 17–22: 14).15 Hayner as early as 1994 reported 15 truth 
commissions and Bronkhorst (1995) 37 attempts to get to the “truth”. Both Hayner and 
Bronkhorst’s definitions were quite wide and included government commissions of enquiry at 
the time. Wilson points out that over the past 20 years more than 17 countries opted for TRC-
like approaches (Wilson, 2001: xviii). Wilson’s clear distinction between TRC-type 
commissions and other approaches is relevant. 
 
                                                 
15 An attempted TRC in Yugoslavia was short-lived. East Timor embarked on a Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Sverrisson, 2006: 5). 
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The Rwandan peace process also reflects, at least partially, some elements of a TRC process. 
The corresponding part of the post-conflict Rwandan process is called the Cacaca process 
(Wolters, 2005: 1). 
 
1.9.2 Forgive-and-forget approaches 
 
These are also referred to as drawing a line through the past. This approach was followed by 
Spain, Portugal, Namibia and Zimbabwe after regime change. For various pragmatic, 
ideological and political reasons, or realpolitik pressures, the new post-authoritarian regime 
chose not to act directly on past human-rights transgressions, but rather to focus on socio-
economic reconstruction and attempts to strengthen the new state. 
 
Post-Franco Spain, after democratisation, embarked on reforming and reprofessionalising the 
military to meet democratic standards and prevent future human-rights abuses rather than 
initiating a TRC process (Bañón & Carrillo, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c).16 Portugal, following the 
fall of the Ceatano regime as a result of the Carnation Revolution, chose the same route. 
 
Taking such steps was facilitated by the greater need to reconstruct a viable and growing 
economic system in the new democracy to the benefit of the broad citizenry. 
 
1.9.3 International Criminal Tribunals 
 
TRCs and ICTs are distinctive processes dealing with mass abuse and violation of human 
rights. Rakate (1999), a law scholar and former staff member during the Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), however, sees some common characteristics, yet achieved by 
different pathways. Both TRCs and ICTs “force their respective communities to confront the 
past; forge a collective memory, acknowledge atrocities of the past; build a future of state 
ethics; move towards reconciliation; and move through a process of historical catharsis” 
(Rakate, 1999: 1). Rakate in support of his argument quotes Barrie: “the purpose of both 
bodies is to create lasting peace and justice.” (1999: 1). This remark by Barrie on the issue is 
more complex. I will discuss the problems of TRC’s vis-à-vis ICT intentions and outcomes in 
more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
                                                 
16 The link between (re-)democratisation, consolidation of democracy, (re-)professionalisation of the 
military and the decline of direct military participation in politics following Spain’s transition to 
democracy are discussed in detail by these researchers. For definitions of terminology, see Appendix 
2, page 437. 
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The ICT in its most generic form can be defined as a forum or tribunal that is created to deal 
with human-rights abusers following the incapability – or inaction – of a state to act in 
instances where extensive human-rights abuses took place. “In a more formal sense, there has 
been a long ongoing debate in the international human rights community, where the classic 
response to gross human rights violations is prosecution” (Boraine, 2000: 279).17 In 
international law a distinction is frequently made between international human rights law 
(IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL). According to this argument IHRL is more 
difficult to enforce than IHL. Conceivably ICTs find themselves in the realm of IHL. TRCs 
following this logic deal with human rights violations and not humanitarian law. I focus less 
on this distinction in international law here and more on the chosen typology. 
 
Where the state fails to intervene in crises it is believed that the international community has 
the right – even a duty – to take action against these states (Boraine, 2000). However, not 
everyone agrees with this argument: “Rather than a duty to prosecute, we should focus on a 
duty to safeguard human rights and to prevent future violations by state officers or other 
parties” (Boraine, 2000: 280). In contrast, Orentlicher states that amnesty (for past offenders) 
contradicts the rule of law and damages the perceptions of justice that requires that people are 
answerable for what they have done (Duvenage, 1998: 366).18 Therefore, the need for an 
international forum of justice arises. Nino, on practical grounds, argues that this is not always 
possible and that prosecution may result in further violence or a return to undemocratic 
practices (Nino, 1992: 309ff; Boraine, 2000). Nonetheless, the ICT approach – closely 
modelled on the lines of the Nuremberg trials of 1946 in Germany – is still in use; but mostly 
“as an exception rather than a rule, because they are appointed to address extreme situations 
such as genocide” (Boraine, 2000: 280; compare also Nino, 192: 309–312). The case of Nazi 
Germany’s defeat after WW II is one example. An international criminal tribunal set up in 
Nuremburg heard and sentenced Nazi leaders for their role in planned extermination of large 
segments of the German inhabitants and those in adjacent communities (In this regard 
historian’s debates are both welcome and interesting – see following page)  
                                                 
17 For more detail on this debate, including the role of the “communitarian trend” versus the classical 
liberal approach to human rights, see Nino (1992: 309ff). 
18 In this I am in agreement with her. However, I disagree with her statement that TRCs or ICTs are the 
only way to deal with human-rights transgressions in the absence of amnesty. 
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HISTORIANS DEBATES 
 
The genocide wrought by Nazi rule went further than people of Jewish origin. It included 
Slavic peoples, resisters to Nazi rule, Christians, Communists and Gypsy people. 
Steinbach (1994: 45–49) provides a list of persons in ein breites Spektrum widerständigen 
(a wide spectrum of resistance) that were executed or died in concentration camps and 
organisations (social movements if you like) that were distroyed. 
 
The Lutherian pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a leading member of the Bekennende Kirche 
(Afrikaans: Belydende Kerk, in English translated as the “Witnessing Church”) was but 
one of many Christian people executed for resistance against Nazi racism and authoritarian 
rule. 
 
Noticeable is the possible historical impact of a TRC and its potential to spark debates 
similar to those of German historians (Historikerstreit), which included the morality of 
Nazi action against Slavic peoples, Jews, Christians, Communists, Social Democrats, 
Pacifists and a host of minorities during Nazi rule (1933–1945). Adorno and other German 
philosophers provided fundamental criticism against the extermination of opponents of 
authoritarian rule under the Nazis. Only during the 1960s and 1970s did German historians 
enter the debate on this topic. 
 
In Germany revisionist historians in defence of the Nazi past, such as Hillgruber, Stürmer 
and Nolte, were confronted by Habermas, Alexander and Margaret Mitscherlich and others 
(Duvenage, 1998: 366–368; Steinbach, 1994: 45ff). A public debate on history, the 
morality of ultimate power, the genocide and reliving the painful past ensued. Historians 
played an important public role, either defending the past authoritarian practices or 
morally criticising these. 
 
A distinction should be kept in mind between the general discourse concerning TRCs, 
including South Africa’s, and resultant debates and what is called a “historians’ debate” in 
which the meaning, impact, legacy and moral issues of apartheid in South Africa’s history 
receive attention. The SATRC sparked wide public discussion. In contrast, too little of a 
“historians’ debate” took place in South Africa. This debate only took off by the end of the 
1990s. The debate has been slow to penetrate public discourse. One important reflective 
account is the work of R.A. Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South 
Africa: Legitimising the Post-Apartheid State (2001). 
 
In South Africa a “historians’ debate” seems to be outstanding a decade after the TRC was 
institutionalised (Duvenage, 1998; Duvenage & Liebenberg, 1996 and Liebenberg, 1999. 
See also Williams & Liebenberg, 1999: 89–90). At the end of the 1990s debate was 
sparked by those in the literary field and other social scientists. An example was “The 
TRC: Commissioning the Past Conference”, hosted by the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation and the History Workshop at the University of the 
Witwatersrand (11–14 June 1999). The work of Wilson (2001) mentioned earlier is 
another example. Unfortunately, few Afrikaner historians entered the debate. Currently 
more reflective works on the past are being published (see Du Pisani, 2007: 1–12). 
Perhaps the “historians’ debate” on the meaning and impact of apartheid and its outcomes 
in South African society still lie ahead. 
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In the case of South Africa under apartheid, genocide was not an option – even if purely to 
retain social stability and an effective labour force for a system of racial capitalism. Unlike 
those in Nazi-Germany, the Rwandan-Burundi massacres and the German colonial offensive 
against the Herero people, South African human-rights abuses did not have genocide as the 
aim or outcome. The human-rights offences in South Africa reflect actions pursued through 
various means to institutionalise the separateness of races and suppress resistance against this 
ideology and the social engineering process by critics and liberation movement supporters, 
rather than a planned attempt at systematic extermination of race or ethnic groups. The issue 
was subjugation through harsh measures, not destroying a populace needed to uphold a white 
racial system of capitalism. 
 
ICTs come into practice when states seem to be too weak to deal with a past of human-rights 
abuses and supra-national bodies see a need for intervention. In other instances, the 
responsibility to deal with past excesses may fall on the state. 
 
ICTs depart from the qualification that there is a “duty to safeguard human rights and prevent 
future violations by state officers or parties”. As a rule, the “model followed by international 
law remains that of the Nuremberg trials and the International War Crimes Tribunals set up in 
The Hague to prosecute human rights violators in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda” 
(Boraine, 2000: 280). Sverrisson cautions that an ICT, in view of the difficulty to lay criminal 
blame as a result of a “blurring of criminal responsibility”, sets major challenges in achieving 
reconciliation (Sverrison, 2006: 18). He quotes the case of the ICTY. “Up to an extent the 
ICTY might be seen as a solution. However, almost seven years after the end of the war the 
ICTY has not become a significant contributor to the reconciliation process in Kosovo” 
(Sverrison, 2006: 19).19 Logically following through this argument, the choice between TRCs, 
ICTs and forgive-and-forget approaches becomes complex and a road strewn with landmines. 
 
It is normally expected that the International Criminal Court will regulate acts of genocide, 
“ethnic cleansing” and crimes against humanity in future. It is believed to do so by, among 
others, advocating norms that all states are obliged to follow. Secondly, it will be required to 
act when states contravene these international (human-rights) norms. An earlier case is Nazi 
Germany’s political leadership put on trial after the fall of Berlin 1945. One recent case in 
Africa includes the tribunal following the genocide in Rwanda (1994). 
 
                                                 
19 He goes further: “The arrest of Milosevic does not seem to be relevant for Kosovo …” (when 
reconciliation is at stake” (Sverrisson, 2006: 19). Sverrisson’s argument is worth reflecting upon. 
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The ICTY is an example. The United Nations (UN) requested its secretary-general in October 
1992 to establish an impartial commission to investigate breaches of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. In May 1993, an ad hoc ICTY was established.20 
Following the African Union’s assessment of the Darfur crisis in the Sudan, some observers 
speculated that an ICT might follow. This was after the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1593, that referred to prosecution of those responsible for atrocities in Darfur (Du 
Plessis & Gevers, 2005: 23ff). 
 
From another perspective, some scholars argue that ICTs are usually established by the 
victors against the vanquished, and have less to do with human-rights concerns than new 
configurations of power. Others argue that the “impartiality” of such tribunals presents 
problems (see among others Sverrisson, 2006). ICTs in the past reflected a strong element of 
the victor punishing the vanquished.21 I will return to these arguments in Chapters 3 and 4.22 
 
The choice for or against ICTs is no easy matter and interpretations differ on which approach 
is regarded as most fruitful. Reflecting on Kosovo, Hjortur Sverrisson argues that a TRC in 
the case of Kosovo may offer an opportunity for reconciliation. He argues that it “might be a 
politically smart idea to include a debate on a TRC in current negotiations” in Kosovo 
(Sverrisson, 2006: 23). There are clearly grey areas where ICTs and TRCs potentially 
intertwine and which complicates the seemingly simplistic choice for one or the other. 
 
Sverrisson reminds the reader/persons involved in such experiences that “although TRCs are 
not designed to gather evidence for criminal prosecution, the reports and conclusions of TRCs 
have in many cases led to prosecution of perpetrators” (Sverrisson, 2006: 8). A more cynical 
                                                 
20 The full name of the commission established by the UN Security Council’s Resolution 808 and 827 
was the “International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia”. It was to 
cover the period from 1991 onwards and was extended several times. The ICTY, however, proceeded 
mainly by targeting the Serbian leadership (at least in its first five years of existence), a rather limited 
interpretation of its original mandate. 
21 The case of a tribunal, which was in fact an ad-hoc tribunal, where the flag of the USA, a super-
power in itself, adorns the courtroom, illustrates this complexity. It happened in the past, and it may 
happen in the future without necessarily providing for sustainable democracy and the entrenchment of 
human rights. One harrowing example is the execution of Saddam Hussein after what is seen by many 
as a US sponsored tribunal. An authoritarian regime has been replaced by foreign occupation and a 
multi-level civil war with no end in sight. In this case one can rightly ask whether the externally 
enforced regime change and attempted transition to a Western-style “democracy” have not worsened 
the situation and imperilled the protection of human rights, future reconciliation and stability within the 
country and the region. 
22 The contrasting perspectives held by those who instituted international trials in the former 
Yugoslavia provide some telling examples of major differences in approach (see my arguments in 
Chapters 3 and 4 in this regard). 
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analysis may suggest that part of a TRC is to prepare charge sheets for selected members of 
the ancien regime. On the other hand Minnaar, rightly remarks in his analysis of the SATRC 
that TRCs frequently relate to negotiated settlements and horse-trading between power-
holding elites. The outcome – if not the intention – in such a case is that the full truth will not 
be out (Minnaar, 1995). 
 
If this argument holds, the choice between TRCs and ICTs is the choice between facing an 
angry lion and a wounded buffalo and involves existential individual and social choices. The 
real challenge faced is to guarantee future human rights and keep politicians from calling in 
the military for partisan purposes to enhance their powers in a democracy. Simultaneously 
one has to assert that the military institution and lines of command understand their role as 
defence of the nation of self-chosen citizens when aggression takes place and not internal 
oppression by the military themselves or partisan factions. When secondary roles come into 
play one has to ensure that a military is deployed outside the borders strictly agreed to by 
regional organisations and the UN (preferably no deployment if any veto crops up). Small 
wonder then that observers find the choices between TRCs and ICTs fraught with 
complexities. 
 
 
1.9.4 Government-sponsored commissions to investigate human-rights abuses 
 
Commissions in this category are quite distinct from TRCs and ICTs. Following 
transgressions of human rights within a country, the ruling government initiates a commission 
of inquiry by choice but mostly under internal and foreign pressure. 
 
Bronkhorst (1995) lists various countries that opted for this approach. Among them were: El 
Salvador (1992), Sri Lanka (1994), Thailand (1992), Bolivia (1982), Togo (1992), Poland 
(1992), Bulgaria (1992), Albania (1992), Romania (1992), Guinea (1985), the Philippines 
(1986–1987) and Brazil (1992). In various cases reports were not completed (Bolivia, 
Philippines, Guinea, Sri Lanka). In others reports were not released, such as Bulgaria, 
Thailand, Uganda and El Salvador. 
 
Other examples include Zimbabwe in relation to the Matabeleland debacle (1985), Uganda 
(1974) and Israel following the Sabra and Chatila killings (1982–1983). More recently 
Nigeria took similar steps. The Oputa Report in this case gathered witnesses testifying on 
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transgressions in the country but the report was not released on technical grounds (The Oputa 
Report will be discussed in Chapter 5 in more detail). 
 
In pre-democratic South Africa, examples are the McNally and Goldstone Commissions that 
attempted to unravel violence and a possible “third force” element in the pre-election violence 
(1990s). 
 
Such commissions are undertaken while a government remains in power after claims have 
surfaced about human-rights abuses by the security forces. In some cases, reports are released 
and corrective steps taken. 
 
South Africa itself, apart from the McNally and Goldstone Commissions, offers two examples 
of “government-in-waiting” reports on human-rights abuses. (The ANC denied it was a 
government-in-waiting. Many national and international role players favoured the movement 
as a compromise solution.) In the run-up to the 1994 elections, the ANC, owing to political 
pressure, had to investigate its human-rights abuses in training and prison camps. The 
organisation appointed the Motsuenyane Commission to investigate certain allegations of 
cruelty and human-rights abuses against ANC prisoners and detainees by ANC members 
(1993). The Skweyiya Commission in 1992 also dealt with complaints by ANC prisoners and 
detainees. As in the case of the McNally and Goldstone Commissions very little transpired. 
All that was confirmed was that people had suffered and died, and that someone (collectively 
or not fully identifiable) was responsible for their suffering. 
 
1.9.5 Mixed approaches in dealing with past human-rights abuses 
 
“Mixed approaches” include a range of approaches: court cases; internment of the previous 
elite and attempts at re-socialisation (The Netherlands and Denmark following liberation from 
Nazi rule); and physical elimination of previous oppressors i.e. Italy with regard to the Fascist 
dictator Mussolini. In Rumania, after the fall of the regime, Ceausescu was sentenced by a 
hastily assembled tribunal and killed by firing squad. 
 
Several societies chose to apply the death penalty with regard to former abusers following an 
era of suppression. In this category we find again The Netherlands, as well as France and 
Denmark following WW II; or exile for the previous oppressive leadership. Somewhat more 
complex examples in this category include Iran after the fall of the Shah, the end of the 
Batista regime in Cuba and Uganda following the ousting of Idi Amin. 
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Despite perceived international opinion against the death sentence, a new precedent arose 
recently. In Iraq Saddam Hussein was tried for crimes against humanity and hung. Excesses 
that did take place in Iraq were not comparable with what happened in Nazi Germany and its 
occupied territories or Cambodia. In this case Saddam was found guilty by an “independent” 
judicial process and executed (the tribunal existed of Iraqi and American officials). Some of 
Saddam’s lieutenants followed the same route. The human-rights transgressions in Iraq, 
however inexcusable, cannot hope to mirror the slaughter that took place in Vietnam as a 
result of foreign intervention or in Cambodia. In this case a rather mixed approach seemed to 
be closely linked with punishing the vanquished. 
 
An example of a country that opted for a mixed approach in Africa is Rwanda. An ICT, legal 
proceedings by the national justice system against perpretators and the Gacaca process 
(which reflects elements of a TRC) complement one another in an attempt to achieve social 
justice and post-conflict stability. 
 
In cases of contemporary human rights transgressions observers do not rule out a mix of 
approaches in the future (see Sverrisson, 2006). 
 
1.10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a background and rationale for study, as well as personal reasons that 
triggered it. 
 
Having dealt with the context and setting out the research question, I pointed out some 
important qualifications to this study. I do not view these qualifications as weaknesses but as 
strengths. The subjective involvement of an individual in the collage of social and individual 
life can enhance military sociology as a sub-discipline of sociology. Deploying a broadened 
case study approach that is qualitative and exploratory in nature, brings about insights that 
cannot be garnered through quantitative approaches, even if longitudinal and comparative in 
nature. 
 
An approach enriched by auto-ethnographic insights gained through human interaction with 
others in the same or similar contexts could assist with hindsight being transformed into 
foresight when social processes resembling TRCs and future CMR are at stake. 
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If so, research on CMR as sub-discipline of military sociology can be enriched in South 
Africa and presumably elsewhere too. In such a case one can speak of value added through 
shared experiences and identify areas to better life for others through hindsight transformed 
into foresight in the chosen field of study. 
 
A choice for any one of the typologies to deal with past human rights abuses as discussed 
earlier enters the picture here. The complexities and human challenges for any of the 
typologies or a combination of them were discussed. Simultaneously, whatever choice is 
made, the relations between civilian elements and structures for future CMR are to be firmly 
established. Attitudes have to be addressed and socialised changes effected to ensure civil 
control of the military. 
 
In the following chapter I will address the methodology and introduce the metaphor of 
tracking that I use in this study. 
 
1.10.1. Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1 puts the text into context. It consists of a general orientation sketching the subject 
of the study, research questions, rationale for the choice of topic, research objectives and 
expected contributions of the study. It justifies the choice of an auto-ethnographic approach 
and explains why it will receive more attention in the chapters to follow. I also briefly discuss 
the typologies that reflect the way in which post-oppressive societies deal with past human 
rights excesses. Related concepts are not discussed here but are attached for the interested 
reader as an Appendix (Appendix 2, page 436). 
 
The theoretical framework, research setting and methodology applied in the study are 
presented in Chapter 2. My embeddedness within the chosen research setting and 
methodology, in this case an exploratory qualitative study incorporating auto-ethnography, 
receives attention. The case study approach, complemented by a broadened case study, which 
includes comparative insights, is addressed. I also introduce the metaphor of tracking that I 
deploy in the study in this chapter and elaborate on its value. 
 
In Chapter 3, I address the scholarly review. Academic material, official reports, archival 
materials and personal notes form part of it. Solicited and unsolicited materials and official 
sources, democratisation literature, CMR studies/research reports, publications by 
practitioners and security think tanks, as well as materials on TRC processes, are discussed, 
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themes pointed out and comparisons made. The interlinkages between democratisation studies 
and civilian control are provisionally analysed and highlighted and a link between TRCs as 
part of the transitional context and democratisation is made. 
 
In this chapter choices in dealing with the past come into play, such as the typologies 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
Chapter 4 provides a background to TRCs in the international context (a comparative 
element or an enlarged case study) in relation to the SATRC. The chapter also addresses the 
outcomes of the reports of these bodies in terms of CMR and civilian oversight over security 
institutions. While exploiting elements of the comparative approach, the chapter retains a 
focus on the South African case study. In addition, involvement of the researcher as subject in 
terms of observer, participant and observer-participant deserves attention. 
 
In Chapter 5 I address the SATRCR and its impact on CMR. Similarities and dissimilarities 
with other case studies are introduced, as well as insights gained from comparative literature 
as consulted in Chapter 3. Again the personal narrative is woven into Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 6, the analytical chapter, deals with the analysis of the interviews conducted for this 
exploratory study. I address interviews that I held with various South African and non-South 
African persons regarding reconciliation and civil control over the military. These interviews 
include, among others, persons active in civil society before and after 1990, persons within 
the Defence Secretariat of South Africa, current and past high-ranking officers, an exiled 
Argentinean and a Rwandan ambassador to South Africa. 
 
The E-mail schedules (as matter of “triangulation”, or rather transferability) and other 
interaction with role players in the process, as well as peer debriefers, receive attention. 
 
An analysis of interactive moments since 1993 is integrated into the other work done in this 
exploratory study and conclusions are arrived at. 
 
The chapter in conclusion briefly picks up on the role of policy and policy making in 
enhancing civil control over the military, as mentioned in Chapter 1. 
 
The focus in the concluding chapter (Chapter 7) is on policy implications and 
recommendations through the eyes of an embedded researcher-participant-narrator. This 
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chapter addresses the research question and outcomes of the study and possible guidelines for 
engagement in policy processes regarding the improvement of civilian control over security 
institutions. The chapter derives its recommendations from insights I gained by researching 
TRC and non-TRC states in terms of value added to CMR and civil control over the military. 
 
Apart from more concrete recommendations the chapter also expands on areas for further 
research in the field and my personal reflections on the study. Such reflection includes 
feedback from peer debriefers and peers. Personal insights and reflections on the role of the 
personal narrative in such a process receive attention. After all, the personal reflection on a 
process and experiences of the author intertwine in the research approach and cannot be 
escaped. On the contrary … 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ON METHODOLOGY 
 
“The objects of case studies are complex, real world cases that are investigated with respect 
… Most embedded cases are unstructured and open systems …” – Scholz & Tietje, 2002:332. 
 
In many respects ‘What is a case?’ is a conversation that for us has no real beginning or an 
end … – Ragin & Becker, 1992: 16. 
 
“All research depends on interpretation … Standard qualitative designs call for persons most 
responsible for interpretations to be in the field, making observations, exercising subjective 
judgement, analyzing and synthesizing, all the while realizing their own consciousness”  
– Stake, 1995: 41. 
 
2.1. Introduction: On tracking versus tracing 23 
 
The auto-ethnographic approach is not frequently used in South Africa.24 This is especially 
true for disciplines such as sociology, political science and sub-disciplines such as military 
sociology.25 This is rather surprising, as C. Wright Mills as long back as 1959 declared that 
authors in social science should present themselves as people rather than automatons whose 
heavy style depends on reified knowledge of ‘how it is done’. “My reasons for presenting 
myself as ‘I’ rather than ‘the author’ stem not just from stylistic preference, but from a 
recognition of the fact that the pragmatic nature of (a) study necessarily involves me as a 
person. To present data as if I had not been involved would be to tell only part of the story” 
                                                 
23 In this chapter I belabour the choice for intersubjectivity versus objectivity, the human 
interrelatedness of the link between social and individual choices and fluidity in qualitative approaches 
as pointed out by among others Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005). Given the South African context where 
social theorists frequently still ascribe to rigid scientific/quantitative/positivist approaches, I see it as 
inconvenient, yet necessary. Despite the fact that globalisation means “fast travelling”, not all insights 
travel fast. The notion that theory is useful and helps in understanding the social world AND that there 
is an inescapable active relation between practice, things done and to do, “imagining” the  world social 
life, and that theory in practice (praxis) also includes passion, enthusiasm, tolerance and judgement, is 
not necessarily well accepted in all social science disciplines in South Africa. 
24Ellis and Bochner refer to “alternative forms of qualitative writing in their edited work Composing 
Ethnography (1996). Garrat perhaps comes closer to the bone by describing recent qualitative work, 
including auto-ethnography as “researching against the rules” and points out how orthodox researchers 
frequently react negatively to new qualitative approaches. He mentions his own experience when he 
enrolled at Manchester Metropolitan University (Garrat, 2003: 1 ff, 5).    
25In South Africa the discipline of history also suffered under the shortcoming of making too little of 
researchers “bringing back in” the researcher. But times may be a’ changing … (a dissertation by 
Alexander, 2003, completed at Unisa, serves as one example. 
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(C. Wright Mills, 1959). Because this approach is less known and in some quarters not well 
received in South Africa, the reader will have to bear with me if I belabour the point in this 
chapter and explain why this approach (the “I” of the researcher) is integral to this study. 
 
“There is no single wellspring of qualitative research. Its history is extensive, drawing from 
evolving curiosities of humankind over centuries, formally disciplined by ethnographers, 
social psychologists, historians and literary critics” (Stake, 1995: 35). One may argue that in 
contemporary social science SOME TALK ABOUT methodology and some talk about 
METHODOLOGY. 
 
In this chapter I motivate my use of auto-ethnography. I explicate my views on subjectivity 
and objectivity and post-modernism in the chosen area of study. I also discuss two research 
“steps” in the particular study, designing and execution, and will explain the concept of 
tracking and the use of this metaphor here as a theoretical construct/tool in contrast to tracing. 
 
The research steps discussed here present some measure of tracing – a compromise with the 
discipline of positivist social science/sociology. I will argue the difference between tracing and 
tracking and introduce tracking (the interpretive) into the discussion. The metaphor of tracking 
should not be confined to, or confused with tracing. The latter has a tendency to duplicate or 
simulate. In tracking one cannot duplicate, since (as in analogy with qualitative research) one 
enterprise may differ from another even if the same steps are followed. No two attempts can be 
the same. In tracking one does not find mirror images. Tracking by its nature requires a 
discipline without pre-imposed mechanisms. Since it is executed by a soma or bodily being26, 
we find in tracking that each contextual achievement cannot necessarily be duplicated as in 
“tracing”. Here the metaphor of tracking relates closely to qualitative research. 
 
Tracing, on the other hand, requires duplication within a set discipline. While tracing can be 
compared with being a factory worker on a production line, forced to carry out her/his duties 
through repetitive actions, each mirroring the previous one, tracking in many stages requires 
the build-into-an-ever-changing-context, the subjective bodily being involved in tracking and 
knowing that objectives are human and interpretive and will include discourse or non-
                                                 
26 The argument is derived from Hanna. Hanna sees the soma or person-being as “me-the-bodily 
being”. It is not just a body. It is living, expanding, contracting and assimilating; it draws in energy and 
expels it.” Somas are the kind of living being which you are at this moment, in this place where you 
are.” (Hanna, 1970: 35). Hanna in rather prosaic terms, describe the somatic while taking note of the 
formative influences of ‘information’ in the broadest terms, such as ontogenetic information and 
phylogenetic information (Hanna, 1970: 24 ff). 
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discourse. “The body, emotions, and lived experience become text to be written and read in 
autobiography” apart from the events or social processes described and analysed (Gannon, 
2006: 474). The personal is incorporated into the research (Gannon, 2006: 474). In this 
respect the lived concept of tracking versus tracing comes into play. 
 
At base tracing aims at duplicating exactly the same within tradition and/or orthodoxy. A 
tracer is forced or may choose willingly to repeat exactly the same action and thus lose the 
ability to interpret live. Frequently tracers need to quantify. In contrast tracking requires the 
ability of the tracker to move in new territories (or contexts) and still to interpret though the 
somatic being without duplication. Rationality and quantification play but a part. Emotions, 
feelings and moments of contextual impressions add to the tracking exercise. Life-in-context 
and tracking processes supersede (if not precede) duplication, just as tracking a live animal 
supersedes making a copy of the animal’s hoof prints or looking at a CD image of a 
footprint.27 
 
In hunting, tracking as an interpretive action has more value than tracing. Tracing (repetitive 
action) would rarely enable the hunter or photographer to get hold of his/her food or a good 
photograph in nature. Beyond systematic tracking something else is needed. That action by a 
being is interpretive tracking.28 
 
The research design is the researcher’s plan for executing a particular study.29 It could start 
off with tracing, but if objectives are to be met, systematic or interpretive tracking becomes 
imperative. (In following the cue from Liebenberg [1990] elements of speculative tracking 
will emerge.) Scholars offer various views, issues and suggestions with regard to research 
design, and the necessity of developing such plans (Haralambos & Holborn, 1995: 827ff, 834; 
Oran, 1998: 30ff; Ellis, 1996, 49ff; Schurink, 2004c).30 Mason (1996), points out: (1) until 
relatively recently, exponents of the ethnographic research style (because of its fluid 
                                                 
27 See on somatic being or “me-the bodily being” Hanna (1970) and on the art of tracking as one of the 
origins of science, Liebenberg (1990) [No relationship to the author]. 
28 I take a cue here from the work of Louis Liebenberg, The art of tracking: The origin of Science 
(1990). 
29 See also Velázquez (1998) in reference to personal reflections about the role of the researcher in the 
process of transformative research. Insights by Garret (2003: 110–114) on reflections as a result of 
interaction with others are also relevant. See also Gannon (2006), Humphreys (2005) and Lincoln 
(1995). 
30 I once read a peer-reviewer’s response to an essay. According to her/him one should not quote 
“second insights” i.e. of people less read and quoted than those that are recognised to be the alpha in 
academia. I do not beg to differ. I differ. The reader may observe that in many instances I quote persons 
for their insights and experience, not necessarily for their number of citations in esteemed journals. 
And I do not apologise if in my view their insights equal or supersede arguments or insights of so-
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character) resisted the idea that they should specify one or more sets of formal hypotheses 
within a rigid research design at the outset of their research; (2) regardless of qualitative 
researchers’ reluctance to design their studies prior to the fieldwork, they haven’t really had a 
choice in this matter since they are required to provide a design from various quarters; and (3) 
when qualitative researchers go off to research some aspect of the social world, they carry 
some or other mental tools of their trade with them and have plans that are typically 
formulated as hunches, which will more often than not be modified as they proceed with their 
research (Garret, 2003: 106ff; Schurink 2004c). The above also holds true for my study. It 
also explains why the notion of tracing, even if it plays an important role, finally has to 
succumb in such a process to the act of tracking. 
 
In being qualitative in a dynamic context the researcher/tracker may not (in the view of some) 
provide as much design, procedure and information as the proclaimed “quantitative” 
researcher. It has to be said here that quantitative and qualitative researchers in their 
assumptions, designs and methodology within paradigms may differ, but not the sweat going 
into the attempt to provide a view, a moment of collective being. For quantitative researchers 
the research design is set, their methodology (pre-) determined, while the findings may differ 
(but within the paradigm that is viewed as “objective”). Perhaps the latter lies in the 
orthodoxy/nature of tracing. Qualitative researchers may deploy elements of tracing, but the 
interactive, human process of finding one’s way (“understanding”) lies in the act of tracking. 
The research evolves in the process with the researcher being one of the tools in the process. 
In the nature of tracking not all decisions on the research path can be foreseen, nor 
implemented and may have to be adapted in the course of the research exercise. 
 
Qualitative researchers provide information on the procedural operations utilised in their studies: 
“Until probably the mid 1980s it was generally accepted that the problem of establishing 
credibility could be solved by providing what Becker (1970) originally called the natural history 
of a research project. Such a history contains an account of the various steps taken in the process 
of conducting a study. It typically includes information on (1) how entrée was initially gained to 
the persons, groups, or organisations that were studied, (2) how the empirical observations were 
made and how the cases or data examined in the study were actually produced, and (3) how the 
data were analysed in order to produce the results reported in the research report.” (Schurink, 
                                                                                                                                            
called “first order” referees. Earlier reflections on this issue were sparked by long discussions during 
the 1980s with a friend at the University of Stellenbosch, Abraham (Braam) Olivier, who subsequently 
became known for his work in the field of philosophy. Braam’s work that spans the spectrum of 
imagination in the existence of the human being and his enquiries into the nature of pain as teacher or 
pain as perception relates to tracking rather than tracing. 
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2006; see also Schurink, 2004, a & d). Such detailed records are still found in qualitative research 
reports, but are now generally more popularly referred to as “the audit trail” (Daymon & 
Holloway, 2002). The role of auto-ethnography and the narrative, as pointed out by Sparkes 
(2002: 72ff), Sparkes, Ellis and Bochner (1996: 182, 188) and Suchan (2004: 304ff) de Marrais 
(1998), added new values, but still presupposes the points made above in (1) to (3).31 
 
Jennifer Platt mentions an interesting point in her narrative contribution to Ragin’s What is a 
case? Exploring the foundations of Social Inquiry. In a chapter entitled “Cases of cases … of 
cases” she points out the important links between the choice of a case (or cases) and the 
audience for which it is meant – in the case of this study, practitioners, auto-ethnographers 
and military sociologists (Platt, 1992). “It is always relevant to consider the intended audience 
(just as in choosing an audience when one writes an article for an academic journal or a 
newspaper – my insertion) … and the use of cases may be treated as part of a work rhetoric” 
(Platt, 1992: 21). Obviously, in analysing a case or cases, the research to follow may imply 
themes or questions through a series of examples, chosen to provide diversity but also 
conclusions along dimensions relevant to the study, as I chose here. In doing so, one realises 
that one is entering a discussion with no end, as indicated by the Ragin epigraph.32 
 
In producing a video on the same topic tracing the same guidelines at a different time – even 
in the same space – the “video” in qualitative research cannot replicate the original. Human 
dynamics in qualitative research simply introduce too many variables to allow for mechanics. 
The quantitative project (i.e. a survey) provides a snapshot of a particular moment or a series 
of snapshots over time. Qualitative research resembles making a video once. The exact video 
cannot be reproduced because of the dynamics of human experience. Even if one attempts to 
do so, the qualitative experience cannot be replicated. At most one can hope for 
transferability. With the survey, if it is repeated under the exact same conditions and set 
procedures, one should be able to have a snapshot (a once-off study or photo) or a series of 
snapshots, which – even if one by one they are static – can relate the factual conditions at a 
moment in time or over time (the longitudinal study). With a video, it is never possible to 
repeat the same circumstances and context, not even with the same actors. Moment, context, 
emotions will differ at any repetition. This (dynamic) strength or weakness lies with the 
qualitative research approach, and that is why some refer to it as a discussion without end … 
                                                 
31 Also consult Haralambos and Holborn (1995: 856, 861) in this regard.  
32 The historian Pieter Geyl referred to history as a discussion without end. Qualitative research deals 
with people of the past, in the present, and people being historical agents. In turn, it projects human 
history, possibilities and choices. In this respect, qualitative research and history share some similar 
hunting grounds … 
 51
 
I am aware of the complexities of entering the fray of “case studies” in this regard. Ragin 
makes an important point: “the term case is central to the enduring gulf between quantitative 
and qualitative science … (It) is one of the many basic methodological constructs that have 
become distorted and corrupted over time” (Ragin, 1992: 3). “The view that quantitative 
researchers look at many cases, while qualitative researchers look at only one or a small 
number of cases, can be maintained only by allowing considerable slippage in what is meant 
by ‘case’” (Ragin, 1992: 3). I do not want to enter this debate here, but argue for the 
exploitation of comparative elements to add value to this study. In choosing between the 
afore-mentioned two research styles the choice for design becomes apparent. I will turn to this 
now. 
 
2.2. On thinking about Designs and designs33 
 
This section is structured as follows: (1) an explanation of the scientific beliefs that underpin 
the study; (2) a description of the particular qualitative research approach I opted for and 
references to the broad/general theoretical perspective I used as framework in the study; (3) 
my position on theory in the study; (4) an outline of casing34 as qualitative research design; 
(5) a delineation of the research setting; (6) the approach of selecting appropriate data 
sources; (7) a clarification of the data collection methods; (8) an explication of the data-
capturing techniques; (9) an outline of the data analysis methods; (10) a description of how 
the data would be presented; and an explanation of the strategies used to ensure a high-quality 
and ethically responsible study. 
 
“One has to …” to have or not to have scientific beliefs 
 
Qualitative researchers reflect on their scientific values before embarking on research projects 
and once having laid them bare, should use them as guiding cues throughout the research 
process. This state of affairs is aptly summarised by Potter (1996: 35–36): 
                                                 
33 Both a dam and a river hold water; the latter however implies constant movement and flexibility. Sun 
Tsu would perhaps compare the dam to an army in defence and the river as one in offence. In a socio-
political sense Gramsci would talk about a war of manoeuvre (the river in flood) in contrast to a war of 
position (holding the trenches). In context the analogy, if applied to qualitative research, implies a more 
fluid “(de)sign” versus “Design”, the river, rather than the dam, a digm rather than a paradigm. The 
South African philosopher Andries Gouws makes a distinction between the concept paradigm (derived 
from Thomas Kuhn) and digm. Paradigms can be exclusive, digms allows for more fluidity and 
openness. The digm is more flexible in discource, content and application (Gouws, 1990). 
34 Ragin and Becker (1992), frequently use the term casing. 
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“The issues of ontology and epistemology are so fundamental to our everyday 
behaviour that we may rarely bother to examine them; in fact, the questions are so 
fundamental that we might think it silly even to ask them seriously in everyday 
conversation. We tell ourselves that, of course, we believe in an external reality that 
exists apart from us… We don’t have to perceive something directly to be convinced 
that it exists; indirect evidence will do, especially in our mediated world … In the 
case of our everyday thinking, the question of existence is not dependent on our 
perceiving something directly. For example, we believe we have a brain although we 
will never see it, touch it, taste it, or hear it. We accept certain rules and follow 
certain conventions in the belief that it will allow us to organize and integrate our 
world into a shared community with others … At the same time one also has to have 
faith that other people in our culture share the same meaning for this object and will 
use the same word to express this meaning.” (Potter, 1996: 35–36). 
 
For most of us in everyday life, the words ontology and epistemology do not blatantly 
impose themselves, nor the questions invoked by these terms. Our lack of concern for 
these terms derives from their axiomatic nature, argues Potter (1996: 36). Questions of an 
axiomatic nature require us to take a position based on belief, not proof. For example 
axiomatic questions include: Is there a supreme being? What is beauty? What is moral 
life? What is a professional soldier? What moral values should a politician in a 
democracy live? Is it fair to cheat or deceive in love and war? Should an alleged 
“terrorist” not be accrued the same rights as a prisoner of war? Do we have the right to 
impose the death sentence on a dictator, a state official or a president of a democracy that 
stole large amounts of money from the populace for which it was meant? Or, someone 
that led his/her advanced country to war against a weaker state? Should one forgive a 
president of a country that invaded or destabilised other countries for economic gain? 
Should one impose sanctions of a country’s people if one dislikes their political leader? If 
a refugee camp was demolished by aggression because guerrillas used it as a transit camp 
and more civilians died than guerrillas, should one put the military commanders that 
planned and executed the operation on trial? If so, can one put them on trial if one does 
not address the top line of command (read: political leadership that approved the 
operation)? 
 
Potter suggests that “answers to these questions are beyond fact and logic; they 
require an answer based on belief. Once we have recognized our belief, then we can 
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use logic to fashion arguments and practices to follow from it. When these practices 
become established we need not think about them; we take them for granted and act 
on them, many a time without reflection” (Potter, 1996: 35–36). 
 
When we enter the world of formal scholarship, it is expected that we 
discuss/examine the foundations of our thinking (hence the importance of reflection 
– my insertion). When we do so, we discover that there exist alternative answers to 
each foundational question. Two scholars who hold different beliefs of ontology and 
epistemology may be interested in examining the same phenomenon, but their beliefs 
will lead them to set up their studies differently because of their differing views of 
evidence, analysis, and purpose of research.” (Potter, 1996: 35–36)35 
 
But what precisely does “ontology” and “epistemology” and related positions for this study 
imply? Let us trace this for the moment. 
 
The loaded dice: Ontology 
 
Ontology refers to the study of being or reality; in other words, the social world which is 
studied in the social sciences; whether it exists independently from human conception and 
interpretation, whether there is a common, shared, social reality or just multiple context-
specific realities, and whether or not social behaviour is ruled by laws that can be seen as 
constant and generalised (Mouton & Marais, 1996:11). 
 
“Questions of social ontology are concerned with the nature of social entities. The central 
point of orientation here is the question of whether social entities can and should be 
considered objective entities that have a reality external to social actors, or whether they can 
and should be considered social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of 
social actors. These positions are frequently referred to respectively as objectivism and 
constructivism.” (Bryman, 2004: 16). 
 
                                                 
35 There is little surprise in such a statement. Thomas Kuhn’s notion of contending paradigms in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), despite criticism by Amy Gutmann and others that he 
slipped into multiple uses of the term paradigm, holds. Thomas Hanna’s insights on the somatic being 
and evolution-revolution and the fluidity of human action within the world and science versus the 
plastics of repetitive orthodoxy are also relevant (Hanna, 1970:3). Note also footnote 10 in this chapter 
on digms and paradigms (Compare Gouws, 1990). 
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When considering ontological issues, it is of value to trace objectivism and constructionism. 
The former emphasises “… that social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that 
is independent of social actors. It implies that social phenomena and the categories that we 
use in everyday discourse have an existence that is independent or separate from actors” 
(Bryman, 2004: 16). The latter is a position asserting that “… social phenomena and their 
meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors. It implies that social 
phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that that they 
are in a constant state of revision. In recent years, constructionism has also come to include 
the notion that researchers’ own accounts of the social world are constructions. In other 
words, the researcher always presents a specific version of social reality, rather than one that 
can be regarded as definitive. Knowledge is viewed as indeterminate” (Bryman, 2004: 17). 
 
When I use the term constructivism it is used knowing that there is, despite the elusive nature 
of the concept, the implication that human beings do not “find” or “discover” knowledge in 
isolation; they construct meaning through concepts or abstractions. I also accept that 
constructivism in the human sciences differs from the strict constructivism found in 
mathematics, logic and psychometrics (Schwandt, 2007: 37). Schwandt makes a relevant 
point when arguing that constructivism encountered in the social sciences generally goes 
beyond the ordinary sense of constructing (i.e. naïve realism or strict empiricism). Knowledge 
is mediated procedurally, a process of (re)-constructing resulting from interaction and 
environment. Added to this, constructivism focuses on social process and interaction, in 
general referred to (in sociology) as social constructionism (Schwandt, 2007: 38–39). 
Needless to say, where social process and interaction are at stake Schwandt sees a mutual 
affinity – or at least complementary elements between symbolic interaction and ethno-
methodologies (Schwandt, 2007: 39)36 
 
Individuals can only attach meaning to their social environment through their experience and 
understanding of it. This applies to a study of TRC role players, CMR and civil control over 
the military in a young democracy. I investigate the tentative hypothesis of whether TRC 
countries did better in establishing civil control over the military when compared to those in 
the “non-TRC camp”. The aforementioned implies looking at some scholars’ and 
stakeholders’ constructions as reflected by their meanings, experiences, understanding, ideas, 
beliefs, views, stories, biographies, words, actions, reactions, interactions, situations, social 
                                                 
36 I do not discuss the two strands of constructivism, namely radical constructivism and social 
constructivism here, but their generic traits. Likewise constructivism especially radical constructivism- 
views on empiricism and rationalisation I also skirt (for more detail, see Schwandt, 2007: 38). 
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relations, social and cultural practices and processes, rules, ethical values and belief systems 
of these processes and related innovations. 
 
I explore, describe, and appreciate concrete experiences and perspectives of the (SA)TRC and 
CMR, and the potential effect of this on civil control over armed forces. From such social 
construction I explicate everyday experiences and viewpoints to the best of my ability, while 
also illuminating these by extracting relevant abstract concepts found in the literature. In 
doing so the deployment of a case develops into casing in its more extended context as 
understood by qualitative researchers. The close linkage between micro- and macro-contexts 
that Cicourel (1981: 51, 56–58) points out cannot be ignored. Micro- and macro-contexts are 
linked whether complementary, contradictory or so closely intertwined that a clear distinction 
is hardly possible. 
 
The objectives of the study have a number of implications: Ontology and epistemology are 
two sides of a coin. There are close relational links. The issues of objectivity and subjectivity 
are “reciprocally involved”. Ad Peperzak, in referring to the link between individual, 
ontology and ethics, provides a cue that has relevance for this thesis: “Antropologie zou men 
kunnen bepalen als de leer van het zijn of de ‘ontologie’ van de mens … men kan 
antropologie (de ‘ontologie’ van de mens) niet scheiden van ethiek: de mens is door zijn 
wezen een synthese van zijn en moeten, een onto-ethisch wezen” (Peperzak, 1977: 40). 
[English: Anthropology can be said to be the knowledge of being or ‘the ontology of man … 
one cannot divorce the ‘ontology’ of man from ethics. Man/mankind in essence is a synthesis 
of being and being obligated, an onto-ethical being]. Peperzak uses being and ontology in a 
more restricted sense, namely that of the individual and his/her actions in society. His 
perspective holds relevance here. Also relevant is individual involvement (Peperzak, 1977: 
41).37 By using ontology in the more restricted sense Peperzak introduces action inclusive of 
choices (i.e. ethical choices) as ‘de-ontology’.38 Ontology is no longer a static universal 
outside the human being/entity, but part and parcel of the human. Such a viewpoint influences 
research choices here. 
 
                                                 
37 Despite their philosophical differences the Dutch philosopher Peperzak (1977) inclined towards 
anarchism and Luijpen, an existential phenomenologist (1980), agrees on the involvement, or rather 
interwovenness of the subject in making sense of the world. Their agreement has implications for a 
qualitative study such as this, where the individual researcher in a concrete social research context acts 
as one of the research tools. See also the epigraph by Stake at the beginning of the chapter. 
38 A good friend of mine since our student years, Pieter Snyman (“Oom Piet”) alerted me to the work of 
Peperzak in 1984. At the time I was reading Luijpen (1980) mentioned here. The discussion with 
Snyman led to the discovery of important insights proffered by Peperzak. 
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Firstly, as participant in life (or researcher/intellectual/practitioner/participant/observer) one 
engages with literature in a scholarly manner and otherwise in the field under study, critically 
and in the spirit of inter-subjectivity rather than objectivity 39 (the same applies to social 
interaction). In the social sciences, it is generally assumed that the researcher aims at 
objectivity as far as humanly possible. Horton and Hunt argue: “… objectivity means the 
ability to see and accept facts as they are, not as one might wish them to be” (Horton & Hunt, 
1984: 6). Many other theorists agree with them. But “pure objectivity” is not achievable. On 
the other hand, one cannot enforce personal subjectivity on what one finds through one’s 
tracking in a study.40 The qualitative researcher finds him- or herself between the angry lion 
and the wounded buffalo, walking on red hot sand or desert thorns in this regard. 
 
Popenhoe, Cunningham and Boult argue: “Like other (hard) scientists sociologists strive to 
reach conclusions and present findings that are objective and not biased by emotion or 
preferences” (Popenhoe, Cunningham & Boult, 1998: 3). But such a capability implies the 
distant observer. Things are more complex (Giddens quoted in Maharaj, 1997: 214). 
Theoretical reflection also plays a role (Mouton & Muller, 1998: 3). Here the qualitative 
choice or angular optic enters the picture. The reader may discover elements of critical theory 
in this text. Popenhoe et al in my view retain an optimism, if not a conviction, that cannot 
hold. Frequently theorists and qualitative researchers, among them auto-ethnographers, 
suggest – even if in different degrees – that human emotion and subjectivity enter the 
equation (Graeber, 2005: 189ff; Velazquez, 1998: 65; Neumann, 1996: 172ff; Garrat, 2003: 
xiii; 112–113, Scholz & Tietje, 2002: 44–45; 116). I accept this as a reality. I also agree with 
Scholz and Tietje that subjectivity is not a failing. Rather it is an essential element of research 
(Scholz & Tietje, 12002: 45). Critical theory may also appear in such a research approach 
(Graeber, 2005: 192; Neuman, 1996: 183). I did not set out to do a social critique here. Given 
                                                 
39 One often hears that in “decent research” one should not quote newspapers, newsletters or NGO 
publications. In going “qualitative” one should use structured interviews or focus groups only. (Does it 
mean that one should not make a mental note about a discussion after visiting a church, a function, 
gathering of friends, a trade union meeting, soldier’s reunion, a visit to family or a pub and later follow 
up on it?). Such arguments postulate that academic sources solidified in regimental order are the “real” 
way to understand the world around us. Those that argue thus really believe it. A thesis should quote 
from accredited (international) journals or websites. So, does the alienated researcher have to become 
another duplicator (read: a tracer) instead of a tracker in the academic world? Thus, twice alienated and 
silent about what society feels and what experiences suggest? In academia? Maybe yes. In experience? 
No. In intellectual enterprise? No. 
40 I do venture to say that those who trace mechanically may end up referring to themselves as “the 
researcher”, rather than “I” or “me” within society and hence tend to think that they are “objective”, an 
eye outside the material social process. At most the point made by them (even if not so realised by 
them) introduces another level of potential intersubjectivity, which in itself is a necessary condition for 
any discourse or life attitude or human accommodation. 
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one’s experience and socialised being, it may occur. For me critical theory – also here – holds 
an important place. 
 
On a micro-level a critical approach cannot be excluded. A critical stance certainly played a role 
in the study. Many of the ideas or themes in the study had been discussed at length and were 
sometimes debated heatedly from various angles with colleagues and compatriots working in 
the field, such as the late Rocky Williams, Solly Molo and others. In addition, many other peers 
and colleagues active in sociology and military sociology gave criticism, supplied feedback, and 
in many ways corrected some of my assumptions. Apart from these critical interactions one’s 
past schooling in critical theory and social criticism may evidently play a role. 
 
Secondly, instead of the Great Objectivity, the researcher here opts for intersubjectivity. 
Knowledge and insight can be achieved through critical engagement with literature, 
interaction with people (such as interviewees, practitioners, colleagues, observers, peer 
debriefers, antagonists and political commentators), contextual research, and mutual dialogue, 
debate and socio-critical communicative interaction.41 Objectivity as a goal is open to 
shortcomings (read: is not obtainable or worse, lends itself to superiority – even ideological 
impositions). Of relevance is also the insight of Leo Braudy that reminds us in times of 
cultural, social crises or contending collectivities that “modern culture presents itself as a 
species of story telling” that often features a first person or autobiographical voice among 
shifting markers and events (Braudy quoted in Neumann, 1996: 183). 
 
A more fluid digm (rather than a more static paradigm) of contextual difference and 
agreement relating to intersubjectivity is needed. I argue for the latter and deploy it in this 
research project. 
 
Thirdly, involved research plays a role here, since the absolute truth in the idealist sense 
cannot be achieved (see the first epigraph in the prologue). “Wie een ‘absolute waarheid’ in 
de zin van het idealisme accepteerd, heeft in feite opgehouden de geschiedenis van het steeds 
voortskrijdende onthullen voort te setten, omdat hij deze geschiedenis voltooid ag” (Luijpen, 
1976: 139) [English: He who aspires to ‘absolute truth’ in the idealist sense, has terminated 
(historical) understanding because history is (in such a case) viewed as complete]. 
 
                                                 
41 Ragin reminds us again about qualitative research being a conversation with no real beginning or 
end (1992: 16). See earlier epigraph. 
 58
“Getting to the truth” is an ongoing process, which involves many actors within changing 
contexts over an extensive period of time (see Schwandt, 1996: 63–65 on ”social enquiry as 
practical philosophy”). I take cognisance of Mouton and Marais (1990) and many other 
scholars’ position, namely that the practice of social science research can never provide full 
proof of scientific claims (nor can it provide fool-proof claims – my insertion). Therefore, 
when judging the “truth value”, I identify with the following: “The hallmark of science is the 
pursuit of truth and the limitation of error. As such, science is an attitude of mind rather than 
a set of procedures. The defining characteristic of that attitude is a commitment to subject any 
claim to rigorous evaluation and the conscientious seeking out of evidence that might 
contradict or modify that claim.” (Murphy & Dingwall, 2003: 204). The reader may observe 
the link between the statement above and my choice for the metaphor of tracking. In Latin 
America there is a saying, abrigamos esperanzas (“we shelter hope”). The qualitative 
researcher nurtures the hope for intersubjectivity, inter-humanity and bettering the quality of 
life for some people rather than imposing the conviction (authoritarianism?) of objectivity. 
Such a position may include social criticism on a micro- or macro-level in my view (see again 
Cicourel, 1981; Collins, 1981; Habermas, 1981, all in Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel, 1981). It 
would include the Popperian notion of minimising pain. Critical theory and humanity play a 
role even in dissertations and theses. Preferably such a consciousness should apply to the 
community in practice (Read: praxis) within and outside the ivory tower. In linking the 
narrative and qualitative research in a community setting, Velaquez points out the appearance 
of transformative research (Velaquez, 1998: 65). 
 
The metaphor of tracking allows for a re-search understanding that allows for transformation. 
In this respect Velaquez rightly argues a relevant point: “Transformative research is not a 
methodology. It is an orientation toward research that is defined by its intended outcome: 
producing a more just and equitable society”. For her this entails process, critical reflection 
and (creating or accepting) change rather than testing theory (Velaquez, 1998: 65). In my 
analogy; tracking as a choice rather than mere tracing. 
 
Fourthly, a related consequence, which is not new, nor particularly radical or controversial, 
and to which I have already alluded to, is that research may improve the quality of life and 
our (social) environment. Such commitment plays a pertinent role and the reader will discover 
that it is one of the “golden threads” in the study. In this regard, I restate the point that 
Meehan, a policy analyst, makes: The fundamental human purpose to be achieved through 
systematic thinking is always and everywhere to maintain and improve the conditions of life 
of some human population (Meehan, 1988: 8). 
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There are of course countless examples of systematic thinking where the essential human 
purpose (regardless of citizens or social groups) was not to “maintain and improve the 
conditions of the life of humans”. In some cases, systematic thinking analyses society 
“objectively” without attempting to suggest steps towards improvement. This is frequently 
found in quantitative research approaches. In the absence of concrete steps to be taken in 
order to better some part of human society, such research approaches and outcomes are 
frequently camouflaged with terms such as “objective”, “rational”, “factual” and “neutral”. 
Part of the above may relate to the researcher perceiving him- or herself as an entity outside 
the world in which the research is conducted – a researcher alienated from social processes 
and concrete human conditions in search of (or even believing in the attainment of) 
objectivity. Garrat, following Palmer, argues that historical man cannot stand above history 
and procure objectively valid knowledge. “Subjects cannot be seen from the vantage point of 
eternity” (Garrat, 2003: 116). What is the choice then? Rather then, for me, intersubjectivity, 
through being involved as bodily-being in the social process and participating with human 
beings in the social setting, is to be investigated. 
 
The dangers of science masqueraded as objective valid knowledge are relevant here. Well 
known are numerous instances where science was/is used as a tool to legitimise authority, or 
worse, domination over scarce resources (for a particular group), and where people or groups 
who found themselves outside the ruling group and/or elite are systematically deprived of 
scarce resources – even their lives. Such a belief in an “objective view” of the world leads to 
the systematic suffering of the subject persons – apartheid and the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian territories being two examples (see Rock, 1997). In such a case the objective 
rationality frequently serves as the handmaiden or serf to domination and repression. See for 
example Watson on how the proto-ideologies of the Protestant ethics and privateering/private 
enterprise became a determinist ideology imposing a “new global order” despite evidence and 
active human agency in opposite (Watson, 2003).42 
 
In such systems, science is masqueraded and becomes a tool of domination and exploitation. 
One finds here an ideology which benefits only a privileged minority at the cost of the 
majority. In these instances, systematic thinking is clearly not deployed as a tool for the 
betterment of society. Two quotations will suffice: “To analyse the ideological aspects of 
                                                 
42 Watson was not the first to observe this. Several scholars point toward the links between rationality, 
domination, exclusion in modern society/late industrial capitalism (Held, 1980: 43–45, 53–55; 65–69, 
251–252, 253 ff,  260 ff; Howard, 1977: 7–9, 119 ff, 123 ff, 185; McLellan, 1979: 260–267, Miliband, 
1980: 71–73, 165 ff, 204 ff). 
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symbolic orders … is to examine how structures of signification are mobilized to legitimate 
the sectional interests of hegemonic groups” (Giddens, 1979: 188). 
 
Feuer goes further in referring to ideology (which may be expertly camouflaged as “rational” 
or “scientific” or “objective”): “When ideas are used (and remember these ideas may be 
systematically arranged – my insertion) as weapons they are finally evaluated for their fire-
power in psychological warfare, not for their truth … An idea (or a systematic set of ideas – 
my insertion) gains in fire-power to the extent that it can arouse aggression, envy, hatred, 
resentment. (Such) ‘truth’ as weaponry finally leads every ideology to anti-intellectualism and 
insists on the irrationalisation of political life” (Feuer, 1975: 109–191). Clearly, it may also 
imply the destruction of humanity and the dignity of people.43 It is for this reason that I chose 
to track (read into) the processes under study rather than to trace and produce another 
objective study in the field. Ontology and epistemology, I argued, are two sides to the coin. I 
chose not to load the dice. 
 
Finally, in pursuing the ideal to maintain and improve the conditions of life of some 
human population in contrast to a “science” that does not aim at betterment of society 
and social problem-solving (Meehan, 1988: 8), I was guided by the sub-text of 
involved research (Afrikaans: betrokke navorsing) as identified by Mouton and 
Marais (1990: 17). I attempted to achieve a high level of contextual empathy – in this 
case CMR and truth and reconciliation attempts – in South Africa and its implications 
for other societies leads the argument here. A methodological dimension of 
“involvement” or “involvedness”, entered the research process. This was facilitated, if 
not “enforced”, by my participation in South African politics and evolving civil-
military issues. Having said this, the implication is also, where possible, to provide 
                                                 
43 South Africans will remember how critics of the apartheid system, which was rationally planned and 
executed, were frequently reminded that dit nie nou die tyd is om sag te word nie (Translation to 
English: It is not the time now to grow weak or to become soft). The generation of young men that 
lived through conscription may remember how the South African Defence Force was portrayed as a 
highly disciplined and rational institution. At the same time the public was informed that new and 
highly technological arms were produced (known as procurement at the time) and a well planned 
policy of political reform was in place. Instead internal violence escalated, the sophisticated arms 
obtained through procurement and acquisition (acquired through deals that circumvented the arms 
embargo) and systemic repression were deployed against South African citizens and in the Southern 
African region through an unspoken foreign policy of destabilisation – even if some did not realise it or 
deny it to till this day [On destabilisation see Grundy (1987) and Leonard (1983).]  
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some pointers that may be helpful (arrived at through attempted intersubjectivity) 44 in 
solving problems in CMR; or at least assist in minimising them. 
 
 
Coins have two sides: Epistemology 
 
Related to ontology is epistemology, a theory of knowledge referring to a stance on what 
should be taken as acceptable knowledge in sociology, study areas such as military sociology, 
or any other discipline or study area. Particularly important in this context is the issue of 
whether we can (and should) be studying the social world according to the same main beliefs, 
procedures, and tradition as the natural sciences, associated with what is known as positivism 
(Bryman, 2004: 11). 
 
“Positivism is an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the 
natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond. But the term stretches beyond this 
principle, though the constituent elements vary between authors” (Bryman, 2004: 11–12). My 
epistemological stand is that one could achieve insight and understanding of the TRC and 
CMR as far as humanly possible. I did this by employing qualitative, unstructured, and 
flexible methods to capture, describe and appreciate the rich experiences of those who were 
involved with this social experiment and related phenomena – and more challenging, to 
interpret what this may mean for South Africa in the future and others on a similar pathway. 
In contrast to positivism, I identify with interpretivism, a view on the subject matter of the 
social sciences, people and their institutions essentially different from that of the natural 
sciences. I have empathy for Max Weber’s Verstehen approach: “… the interpretive 
understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and 
effects” (Weber, 1947: 88); phenomenology, a philosophy concerned with how individuals 
make sense of the world around them (see, for example, Luijpen, 41ff, 197ff, 201ff; Peperzak, 
1977 – various sections; Schutz, 1962; Muller, 1986: 6–8, 10ff) and symbolic interactionism, 
coined by Blumer (1962) as a tradition postulating “… that interaction takes place in such a 
way that the individual is continually interpreting the symbolic meaning of his or her 
environment (which includes the actions of others) and acts on the basis of this imputed 
meaning” (Bryman, 2004: 14). 
 
                                                 
44 Afrikaans: Intersubjektiwiteit. 
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Regarding a general theoretical perspective, or digm, the study has a multi-perspective 
outlook. (Case studies tend to invoke multi-perspectives or what I will call angular optics – 
see Ragin, 1992; Platt in Ragin & Becker, 1992; and Abbot in the same work.) 
 
The interactionist approach provides valuable real-life angular optics, and at the same 
time clearly provides some “bread in the basket” in terms of application rather than 
the full “seven yards” of knowledge45. In addition, there are other concerns that 
impinge on designing and conducting social research. One of these is the issue of 
ethics. 
 
2.3. Research ethics: To hear or not to hear, to report or not to report, to protect or to 
expose, to assist or not to assist … 
 
“Ethical issues are the concerns and dilemmas that arise over the proper way to execute 
research, more specifically not to create harmful conditions for the subjects of inquiry, 
humans, in the research process” (Bryman, 2004: 509 ff; Neuman, 2000: 89 ff, 412–413 
Schurink, 2005: 43). Neuman (1997) correctly points out that ethical issues involve trade-offs 
between competing values and are typically situational; that is, they depend on the research 
subject or topic and research participants. 
                                                 
45 A term well known to pilots in WW II. “Nine yards” and “seven yards” (of ammunition) were used 
interchangeably. Using all one’s ammunition can make the pilot return safely from a mission or 
depending on other variables – not. Frequently, however, saving a yard for the return to base is wise. 
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Ethically responsible research depends on the integrity of the individual researcher and, more 
particularly, his or her values. “Ethics begins and ends with you, the researcher. A 
researcher’s personal moral code is the strongest defence against unethical behaviour. 
Before, during, and after conducting a study, a researcher has opportunities to, and should, 
reflect on research actions and consult his or her conscience … Ethical behaviour arises from 
sensitivity to ethical concerns that researchers internalise during their professional training, 
from a professional role, and from personal contact with other researchers. Moreover, the 
norms of the scientific community reinforce ethical behaviour with an emphasis on honesty 
and openness. Researchers orientated towards a professional role that are committed to the 
scientific ethos, and who interact regularly with other researchers, are likely to act ethically” 
(Neuman, 1997: 443). It is unlikely that there will ever be one clear answer to the issue of 
ethical research, but to act ethically (being an onto-ethical being) remains of importance. 
 
Schurink (2005: 44), for example, advises researchers to follow a practical approach in 
which they ask questions and push themselves consistently to find answers: “The researcher 
needs to be honest about the purpose of his or her research. The study is likely to include not 
only the advancement of knowledge or understanding of some aspect of the social world, but 
also factors involving personal gain such as the achievement of a personal qualification, of a 
promotion, of some standing in a discipline (among colleagues, friends, rivals, relatives, 
etc.), and/or research funding”. Research and human interaction are about understanding. 
 
I abided by the ethical prescriptions and norms as laid down by social science research 
communities generally and regarding ethics and local codes. At least the following main 
areas are important in a discussion of ethical principles: not causing harm to one’s research 
participants, obtaining informed consent, not invading privacy and not misleading research 
participants (see Diener & Crandall, 1978; Bryman, 2004: 509ff; Neuman, 2000: 482ff; 
Preston-Whyte, 1990: 239ff). For this reason I opted from the beginning to gather data 
overtly, not covertly. I made a point of letting people know about the research I was 
interested in. In cases of formal and informal contact people knew about my interest even if 
we disagreed. After interaction I returned to reflection (read: a personal double check) on 
what is to be related to the reader within the limitations of the research ethics generally 
recognised, but also measured against one’s own code of conduct. The latter was important, 
as in matters of conviction not all interactions – especially informal ones – are amicable. 
Even altercations or deep personal differences had to be filtered through reflected-upon 
codes of ethical conduct. 
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I conducted the research overtly. Thirdly, I provided all prospective research participants 
with information about the study, the implications of their participation, and obtained their 
consent.46 To the best of my ability I took care that all data sources were confidential. In 
some cases, where certain personal (and possibly incriminating) information was shared by 
an interviewee or informant, I chose not to report on such observations, and opted for the 
right to privacy of the research participant rather than the reader’s right to know (see, for 
example, Schaefer, 2005: 42–43). 
 
2.4. Subjectivity and reflexivity: the RE-searching “I” and the somatic being in social 
context 
 
Since the researcher is epistemologically – particularly from a constructionist position – 
considered but a research instrument, his or her presence in the lives of those studied is real 
(see, for example, Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Experiences during the research process are 
of similar importance. Managing one’s personal values or dealing with one’s subjectivity is an 
obvious consideration and has, not surprisingly, receiving quite extensive attention from 
qualitative scholars, resulting in substantial literature. This follows in the wake of an era in 
which many academics have traditionally seen and enacted academic research as impersonal. 
In advocating, if not prescribing, such an approach we were taught that research rigour 
demands a stance of distance (DIS-stance) and non-involvement.47 In short, subjectivity was 
seen as contamination of so-called “pure” or “objective” research (Etherington, 2006: 24). 
Against such a prescriptive “God’s eye view” qualitative researchers increasingly advocated 
and practised an approach where the reader or the audience for which the narrative was meant 
could develop some “feeling” for the author and the socio-political setting. Steier, on research 
within society, rhetorically asks: “Why do research for which you must deny responsibility 
                                                 
46 See Confidentiality Agreement in Appendix  3 (page 473). 
47 This was particularly true for South Africa. At Afrikaans universities and some liberal universities 
historians and political scientists and some sociologists (to be honest about the discipline I work in) 
called for objectivity and neutrality while they as educated scholars knew that apartheid repression was 
ever present and more frankly, they knew the results of such repression. Some of them knew that 
colleagues were working for state security agencies. An example: In the case of one department of 
political science in South Africa one professor did work for military intelligence, one lecturer that was 
“imported” from another Afrikaans university was the chairperson of Youth for SA (Jeugkrag, SA) that 
was partially funded by government sources to counter left-wing politics. Another one ostensibly 
involved in left-wing politics submitted testimony at the SATRC of being a paid agent of the Security 
Police. At the same time academics involved in countering repression (shall we call then practodemics 
for the moment) were killed by the apartheid state inside or outside the country, e.g. Richard Turner, 
Neil Agget, David Webster and Ruth First. Others were exiled or ostracised/excommunicated from the 
communities in which they worked. In the latter case the list is nearly endless.   
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for what you have found?” (Steier, 1991: 10). “Personal views and beliefs do guide our 
choices between paradigms and methods, as well as our topic of research and what we intend 
as our purpose” (Etherington, 2006: 24). I cannot agree more, despite criticism against this 
approach. 
“Different to quantitative researchers when we study social reality qualitatively, we do not 
believe that we can be detached from our research in an attempt to limit, if not avoid, bias. 
We are convinced that we need to become immersed in people, social situations, and any 
social reality we study. Amongst others, we assume varying interactive social roles when 
we observe, interview and interact with people in order to collect and capture data, 
interpret them, and finally validate our reconstructions of social worlds. In our interaction 
with our research participants we put the main emphasis on the necessity of a skilled and 
properly prepared person in contrast to some instrument like a questionnaire. But how do 
we deal with our own experiences and viewpoints? We explicate them as far as possible, 
inter alia, in memoirs, project diaries or natural histories or audits trials, and/or auto-
ethnographic notes. In short, we strive towards what Erickson (1973) and Mason (1996) 
respectively term disciplined subjectivity and reflexivity, requiring a critical self-
examination of our roles as researchers throughout the entire research process” (McMillan 
& Shumacher, 2001; see also Schurink, 2005 – emphasis in the original). 
 
Reflexivity, among others defined as the capacity of researchers to acknowledge how their 
own experiences and context (which are fluid and changing) interplay in the processes and 
findings (the destination) of the enquiry (Etherington, 2006: 31–32). Reflexivity has become 
an increasingly noticeable approach and, like all new approaches, open to debate and 
contestation. One type of criticism levelled against it is that of potential bias. The reflexive 
researcher needs to recognise this element inherent in auto-ethnography as a moral dilemma 
and should share this with the reader/audience. I was acutely aware of my potential bias 
during the study, and without consciously planning to, opted to resolve this by reflecting and 
intermittently sharing and discussing my thoughts with colleagues and people that lived 
through similar experiences. 
 
Reflection is used to “… refer to a reflectiveness among social researchers about the 
implications for the knowledge of the social world they generate of their methods, values, 
biases, decisions, and mere presence in the very situations they investigate” (Bryman, 2004: 
543 – emphasis mine). Using colleagues and friends and selected individuals to reflect with – 
which has been described as peer debriefing – played an important role. (For the importance 
of reflection on ethics see Daymon & Holloway, 2002; Etherington, 2006: 32.) The re-
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searching body, the re-flexive I should be able to show tracks of choices and real life. Past 
socialisation illuminated and recognised where necessary the way one or more views matters 
and how choices and actions contributed to changes and developments in one’s identity 
(compare Etherington, 2006: 15). In my case this is true and will be illuminated. 
 
Reflexive research is using “our selves” in research and stating “my own pathway”. It 
represents how we track our lives in a social context, the choices made by a human animal 
with the insight garnered through experience, be it failure or success, and includes the hearts 
and minds of the researcher and other individuals or historic agents (important or less so) in 
evolving experience (compare again Etherington, 2006: 16). 
Criticism against reflexive research includes the possibility of self-indulgence, solipsism 
and/or narcissistic tendencies. Just as in a work of literature, in writing an article as a 
journalist, presenting a sermon to people in a parish, giving a lecture, writing a tutorial letter, 
or training soldiers or guerrillas, the person communicating (the I) needs to be conscious of 
this possible shortfall. Etherington (2006: 141) points out that the main criticisms against the 
auto-ethnographic approach have been addressed and largely refuted. She points out, for 
example, the credible disputations of among others Mykhalovskiy (1997) and Picart (2002). I 
would add Sparkes (2002) and Schurink (2004). What critics of auto-ethnography frequently 
forget is that in reflexive research, the research path is shared with others and could provide 
clues for other researchers and practitioners. 
 
The reflexive researcher knows that subjectivity is not an end in itself and that the researcher 
is also a filter, a heuristic tool (Etherington, 2006: 125). She/he is aware that the intentions 
and choices in the research process involve the being (and becoming) of others. This should 
be shared with the reader or audience and thus provide a measure of transparency. The issue 
of ethics plays a salient role and needs to be measured against what is necessary to share with 
the audience in providing the fullest collage possible in the setting. The same applies to 
sharing of the researcher’s intimate experiences or emotions. 
 
When reflexive social inquiry into the military and the interface with civil society is at stake, 
two arguments have relevance. Firstly, Charles Moskos argues that “good” research into the 
military does not need to be only institutional analysis, strategic studies or quantitative 
studies, or managerial approaches, and that qualitative approaches are not only relevant but 
much needed to make up for the shortcomings of other approaches. My research methodology 
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is basically that of participant observation … I always prefer a solid anecdote over a slippery 
statistic (Moskos, 2007: 15).48 
 
In recent contributions the issue of reflexivity, the act of going beyond participant observer 
approaches that marked modernist qualitative approaches in dealing with the military, is 
addressed. Knowledge is produced in specific social circumstances that shape it in some way, 
and acknowledgement of this social process offers greater potential for transparency and, 
ultimately accountability in the research process (Higate and Cameron, 2006: 220). One of 
these authors’ latest contributions to military sociology explores this issue further with regard 
to people in and outside the military. The study includes elements of casing, i.e. individual 
case descriptions, reflections on such descriptions and in comparison/contrast the lived 
experiences of the “outsider” to the military (Higate & Cameron, 2006). 
 
Deployment of a self 
As a qualitative researcher one has to consider how intensely one would take part in the 
activities of the research participants, disclose the study, devote directed attention to the 
research and the amount of time spent with the research participants, and, finally, the 
“directive-ness” of the research questions (Patton, 1990; Marshall & Rossman, 1999). From a 
slightly different perspective: How should one deploy the self to maximise data-collection 
opportunities? 
 
I realised the value of the auto-ethnographic approach when a close friend and methodologist 
(who incidentally, has never been involved in this area), pointed out the advantages of my 
participant and “insider position”, my own socialisation and life choices. And how obvious it 
was, but I did not notice this before! He pointed out the value of my knowledge of this social 
world and its value from a qualitative research perspective. Strange, I thought afterwards, that 
I did not realise it myself, as I have been apart from the above, also as researcher/academic (at 
some stage a consultant) involved in various previous projects of a qualitative research nature, 
some on national level. As frequently happens in life, one needs someone to point out the 
obvious. 
 
As in all real-life research, the literature used in the study stood on the shoulders of other 
people’s experience and exposure/involvement (the reader will discover that the literature 
                                                 
48 See Moskos, “Socializing with Soldiers”, Contexts, Vol. 6(2): 78. The rest of Moscos’s remark 
should best not be put in an epigraph for sensitive readers. It reads: “The graffiti in portable potties 
(toilets) offer insights that surveys can never reveal” (Newsletter, ISA RC01, 2007: 15). 
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overview that is dealt with in Chapter 3 has already started in Chapter 1 and evolves here). 
More so, the “I” of research has been co-formed by previous personal experiences, such as 
military experience and later exposure to activists and MK members in the 1980s and returned 
guerrillas following the first accords between the ruling government and the unbanned 
liberation movements. 
 
Various previous experiences and exposure to other societies facilitated gaining information 
and data from a number of colleagues, friends, scholars and practitioners – also journalists 
and parliamentarians – and added to an enriched picture on issues such as democratisation, 
truth and reconciliation, views on international tribunals, security and civil society debates 
and civil-military issues. My involvement with the Centre for Intergroup Studies, IDASA and 
conscious exposure to materials on conflict and democratisation since then and during my 
tenure at the HSRC between 1991 and 1999 played a role. Exposure to other societies and 
literature on relevant fields was facilitated by among others a research visit to The 
Netherlands in 1988, and even more so a further visit I made in 1996 to the Afrika 
Studiecentrum in Leiden. Exposure to African states and South African politics in the 1980s 
and onwards also played a role in providing a robust background. Interaction with politicians 
and practitioners during visits to countries such as Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, 
Namibia, Senegal, Swaziland and Zimbabwe may have played a role. I was fortunate enough 
to have visited the then Soviet Union (now Russia) since 1990 and Cuba since 2000 several 
times, as well as Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Hungary. 
 
Through my friendship with Rocky Williams and members of our circle I met and interacted 
with some senior-ranking officers and civil-military scholars from countries such as Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Nigeria, and some prolific scholars from the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain who made Africa their speciality49. Acting as host for Prof. 
Dani Nabudere (African Studies Centre, Mbale, Uganda) played a role. My interaction via 
Prof. Vladimir Shubin (whom I met in 1990) and others such as Viacheslav Tetekin, Prof. 
Apollon Davidson, Andrei Pritvorov, Veronika Usyachova and Gennadin Shubin, enabled me 
to exchange views and information with former Soviet, and current Russian, scholars, 
especially via the Institute for African Studies. This enriched my knowledge greatly. Russian 
academics take great pride in paying close attention to historical data and political nuances in 
the African context. I could not but benefit from such exposure. 
 
                                                 
49 The reader will be able to track various names in the source list.  
 69
My “coming of age” in the South African Defence Force (SADF) as conscript officer played a 
role: observing and experiencing political anomalies (if not outright contradictions) and my 
choice (at the time as a junior officer) to object to further military service in 1987/1988. 
Involvement with student politics in the National Union for South African Students and as 
chair of the Action for Social Justice played a role. So did participation in the United 
Democratic Front’s (UDF’s) One Million Signatures Campaign. In many ways it was 
experiences lived through (Afrikaans: deurleefde ervaring) that played an ever salient role. 
This is why the choice of this study was in many ways dictated by personal experience and 
hence facilitated a qualitative approach and a personal narrative. 
 
What also became clearer was that “I” – as researcher – had to consider my role when 
gathering data all the more carefully and that you as the “I” do not always write a script but a 
script also write you. Such a statement contains NOTHING NEW. Writing a script implies 
that the “you” forms part of the “I” and is encapsulated in the social context in which one 
grew up and is still growing into. 
 
2.5. Research collaboration, embeddedness, process 
 
Writing on the extent to which (qualitative) researchers (read: somatic beings) may 
collaborate in gathering evidence, Potter (1996, 109) identifies three options: (1) sharing of 
analysis among researchers, or horizontal collaboration; (2) collaboration of researchers with 
research participants, or vertical collaboration, and (3) collaboration among researchers, each 
of whom arrives at his or her conclusions independently in a situation where those 
conclusions are presented together but unsynthesised among researchers, namely 
compartmentalised collaboration. 
 
In my view a fourth level should be added; the same levels of collaboration or rather living 
with in empathy (and in some cases existential solidarity) apply to practitioners, those of a 
non-academic background but who themselves lived through their own experiences. I 
deployed – even if not initially intended – these four categories in garnering data and 
experience in this study. 
 
In reflection: 
 
Firstly, the link between conceptual and methodological analyses on the one hand, and 
science and research on the other, is evident in the study. As I hinted, the project reflected 
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various elements of the above. Social research is “about finding out”, and this starts with 
some question or another (Buchler & Puttergil, 1997: 139). While this topic was “selected 
because a researcher is personally interested in it” (Buchler & Puttergil, 1997 quoting Bell, 
1993), there were other reasons for choosing the topic too. These include, among others, the 
practical applicability of the research and the longer-term (theoretical) contributions it 
offered. The study strove to reach both these aims. As indicated by Bailey (1982: 20), a 
chosen study should have practical applicability and make some relevant theoretical 
contribution. 
 
At a bare minimum, the study’s aim was to answer the research question and in doing so 
contribute to practical suggestions. A theoretical contribution is implied, since reflecting on 
elements of both qualitative and comparative research forms part of the narrative casing 
(Neuman, 1997: 384). The study has the potential to develop scientific building blocks by 
employing simple typologies and (auto-) ethnography.50 
 
Problem-solving highlighted by various theorists (Anderson, 2000; Parsons, 1995; Friedrich, 
1970) formed part of the research approach.51 At times, I ventured into a more critical 
approach with the emphasis on empowering people (civil society) and government to enhance 
human-rights protection through better CMR (see Neuman, 1997: 330; Ramphele, 1990; 
Buchler & Puttergill, 1997: 133). Describing and analysing social settings can gain from 
critical social approaches, I argue. If necessary I criticise policy initiated or neglected by the 
South African government or others or for example where oversights in a TRC took place. 
This corresponds with my belief that social science research needs to address social problems 
and inequalities – especially with reference to enabling civil oversight over the military to the 
benefit of the citizenry in emerging or young democracies. Through exploratory “interpretive 
tracking”, my aim is to contribute to problem solving and/or enhancing the policy interface in 
the area of CMR after having immersed myself in the data-gathering process. 
 
At the same time, in a context where civil politics is undermined, the military is not 
necessarily the demon. Social circumstances, whether economic or political, rarely (need to) 
dictate, but may at times favour military intervention. And more frequently than expected 
civilians and/or politicians invite/provoke/invoke/instigate the military into politics. As in the 
case of South Africa, even if somebody is a professional soldier (seeing him/herself as a 
                                                 
50 As argued by Neuman (1997: 42–43), “like ideal types, typologies are extremely useful complex and 
abstract concepts … a typology is a classification. Sometimes these typologies and/or classifications 
are referred to as constructs (Walizer & Wiener, 1978: 414–415; Buchler & Puttergill, 1997: 115). 
51 See Chapter 1. 
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constitutional soldier), he/she is offered the opportunity to engage in politics by the 
camouflaged and fogged jargon and spin-doctoring of politicians or frustrations of a civil 
society neglected by political leaders. I believe that the professional soldier in the South 
African apartheid context should have objected on moral grounds to being called to uphold 
the regime, but personal circumstances differed and so the moral interpretation of what was to 
be done in the immediate context differed depending on socialisation or (imposed) loyalties. 
 
At the same time it cannot be denied that a rather large percentage of ex-South African 
permanent force members were racist and many that left the service remain so to this day, 
which complicates the South African setting. 
 
The same obligations face current members of the military, more so since the South African 
population as a self-chosen nation of citizens has committed itself to a constitution born out of 
strife and transition through negotiation. Should a situation arise where a government 
oversteps the imperatives of our declared constitution as the historical contract of a civil 
community, professional soldiers in our context, as elsewhere in the world, may face such 
moral choices again. 
 
Notwithstanding my personal feelings or emotions, the study is not intended to perform an 
activist role, while a questioning role or evocative element is not excluded.52 
 
Liebenberg’s (1990) valuable distinction in introducing tracking as a metaphor for science is 
again relevant. Several forms of tracking inform our lives, conduct and choices: direct 
tracking (or simple tracking); systematic tracking (a more thorough step-by-step process); and 
interpretive tracking, where the tracker cannot (merely) “read the tracks in the sand”, but, 
being faced with difficult or challenging tracks, one has to “read into the sand”. The last-
mentioned, in more complex cases, may have to be followed by speculative tracking. The 
reader may perhaps see an analogy with what is referred to as a hermeneutical exercise or the 
researcher as a heuristic tool. The same applies to understanding or coming to understand 
                                                 
52 The findings of the study may lead someone into political activism because political activism 
sometimes confronts research or theory. The question about the relationship between meaning and 
action and related debates cannot be entertained here in detail. In contemporary South Africa, 
compared to the apartheid society and domination through reform stages (1983 – 1989), the situation is 
qualitatively different. Chapter 11 of the new Constitution, read together with the Bill of Rights, sets 
the parameters of what military obligations in our context mean. Simultaneously it prescribes the 
implied relations for civil oversight over the military as a coercive arm of the South African state, 
though it lacks detail. 
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one’s choices in an oppressive or militarised society, such as South Africa was at the time and 
the subsequent transition to an emergent democracy. 
 
The study did not entail evaluation or “doing an audit” of the SATRC or other comparable 
ones, but points towards challenges, oversights and problem-solving and aims at practical 
value. This relates to the assumption that, having received very little attention from scholars, 
the possible impact and outcomes (or non-outcomes) of the SATRC in terms of civilian 
control over the military and facilitating workable CMR has to receive focussed attention. 
Instead of doing a “snapshot” (or a series of snapshots over time) through the prism of 
quantitative or positivist empirical mechanics, I attend to angular optics of human experiences 
and the outcomes thereof and reflect thereupon. The interface human rights and civil control 
(or at least monitoring) and oversight of the state’s military/security institutions and hence the 
enhancement of sound CMR should be a major focus of theoretical work with a view to 
practical outcomes. If the qualitative researcher himself is but one of the research tools the 
tool will have added value if it can improve the human situation in some way or other. 
 
The study is/was not a solitary project. “Research problems emerge as part of ongoing work 
(or consideration of the area under study – my insertion). One research project (or question – 
my insertion) may easily lead to another because it raises issues that were not previously 
considered” (Giddens, 2001: 642). Again, no person comes to reflection, praxis, life attitudes 
or a life philosophy apart from society and outside other beings. 
 
A point Giddens differentiates, which holds true for this study, is that “a sociologist may 
discover puzzles by reading the work of other researchers in books and professional journals 
or by being aware of specific trends in society” (Giddens, 2001: 642). I would add the 
concepts of socialisation and interaction here. Giddens’s statement could be interpreted as 
arriving at involved research. Involved research frequently has as wellspring personal 
experience. 
 
Aware of one’s ability to confront problems, but restrained by the socio-political context and 
the knowledge that a society (or an individual) sometimes survives by muddling through 
(even when one aims at survival by excellence), I suggest that many research projects, 
including this one, are by nature exploratory. 
 
2.6. The dam and the river: fluidity in methodology 
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In designing quantitative and qualitative research approaches or orientations, various 
traditions are at the researcher’s disposal. Existing theoretical and methodological traditions 
within a particular discipline and study area have a bearing on the decision to use a chosen 
methodological approach. This is the case in various disciplines and study areas where 
quantitative approaches have dominated for some time and where qualitative research has 
only risen in stature in recent years (see Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 
2006: xi–x; xxi, xxv; 2–3).53 
 
I argue that too little work appeared on the directed interface between the SATRC and CMR 
and the (potential) of a TRC on future civil control of the military. The former is one reason 
why I opted for a qualitative methodology: “Qualitative research, because of its exploratory 
nature, is demonstrably most useful when there has been less written about the topic area” 
(Daymon & Holloway, 2002: 39). Many qualitative studies are descriptive and exploratory. 
As such rich descriptions of complex circumstances that are unexplored in the literature are 
built (Marshall & Rossman, 1999: 33). In addressing such questions personal experience 
plays a role. “Often a person’s own biography will be an influence in defining the thrust of his 
or her work … particular topics, settings or people are of interest because they have touched 
the researcher’s life in some important way” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003: 51). Writers (should) 
connect their academic work better with their personal lives. I agree with Suchan (2004:1) 
about this when it comes to the subject of my research path. 
 
In this project the phenomenon of an implied intent of qualitative researchers to promote a 
subjective research paradigm is a given (Scholz & Tietje, 2002: 45). Add to this Velázquez’s 
notion of the dialectic between practice and experience and improving social life through 
moments of being part of society (Velázquez, 1998: 65 compare also DeMarais, 1998: 65ff). 
As DeMarais and Velázquez imply, a bold conjecture would be to accept that transformative 
research (such as achieving a better quality of life for people/persons within a given context – 
my insertion) relates more closely to a process of life quality improvement and 
intersubjectivity than a mechanistic methodology. Human agency is one of the assumptions 
made in this study where the interface between truth and reconciliation processes and civil 
control over the military is under the spotlight. 
 
“In short it (such research/involvement) begins with a problem-posing phase characterised by 
a process of critical reflection … research that is defined as its intended outcome: producing a 
                                                 
53 Especially relevant for this study is Hesse-Biber and Leavy’s arguments on “Listening as Method” 
and “Friendship as Method” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006: xxiv–xxvi). 
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more just and equitable (principled equality – my insertion) world (Velázquez in deMarrais, 
1998: 65). Given the nature of the TRC process and interface between the civilian population 
and the elected representatives and the TRC-civil-military interface in South Africa, the stage 
is set for colourful and rich immersion in the topic. 
 
A theorist argues that the SATRC is “undoubtedly the most widely discussed TRC process in 
the world … and to many accounts … among the most effective any country has yet 
produced” (Gibson, 2006: 409ff). If his assumption is correct, the relationship and/or 
influence of the SATRC and others that follow the approach regarding civil control over the 
military by a citizenry of a self-chosen democracy is important. 
 
The above is one reason for this research, not necessarily because the SATRC is the most 
widely discussed and most effective TRC on the globe (this observation by the above theorist 
is questionable) 54, but because TRCs could (should) have an influence on CMR if foresight 
enters into the picture. In this study, what is meant by methodology? 
 
“The” or “a” meaning of qualitative methodology? 
 
Qualitative methodology and more so auto-ethnography evolve during tracking. Social-
political changes over many decades influenced exponents of qualitative research (see Denzin 
& Lincoln, 1994 & 2000; Schurink, 2003). A number of broad “moments” or phases in the 
development of this research style have been distinguished (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994 & 2000). 
I do not intend describing the various qualitative research development phases (or the 
“moments”) here yet; suffice it to say that the one applied in the study relates to an extent to a 
late modernist tradition55 rather than post-modernism. However, I add some qualifications, as 
the reader will discover. 
 
Schurink states that qualitative researchers went through various phases. Sometimes a phase 
valued social realism, naturalism and slice-of-life ethnographies, but also represented 
                                                 
54 Gibson fails to quantify how he and other co-researchers came to the conclusion that the SATRC is 
the “most widely discussed in the world” and how it has become “among the most effective any 
country has yet produced”. He may have come to other conclusions if he had immersed himself deeply 
in the SATRC process or the processes of countries in a post-authoritarian rule phase that chose not to 
have TRCs. 
55 Should any elements of pre-modernism, late modernism or critical theoretical approaches be 
perceived in this work, they should not be regarded as an attempt at post-modernism. Note the warning 
sounded by Martin Albrow (1996: 184–185; 188–189) who points out that a perceived decline in the 
modernist project and epochal change does not necessarily translate into the need for a post-modernist 
paradigm (or worse, post-modernism as an ideology). 
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moments of scholarly and political creative ferment. In the post-war years, into the 1970s and 
the mid-1980s – even today – various texts by qualitative scholars provided “formalised” 
methods; a phase marked by the interpretation of reality by means of formalised qualitative 
methods and the undertaking of rigorous data analysis, such as analytical induction and 
grounded theory (Schurink, 2006: 4). 
 
Examples include symbolic interactionism (SI). This phase saw a generation of students from 
various human disciplines who were drawn to qualitative research practice believing that it 
would allow them to give a voice to society’s less privileged and underclass citizens, and who 
in their perception saw post-positivism developed as a useable paradigm, with many 
researchers attempting to apply Campbell and Stanley’s (1963) internal-external validity 
model to “interactionist and constructionist conceptions of research act.” 
 
SI was fairly well established in mid-twentieth-century methodological discourse. Among 
others, it has striven to make qualitative research as rigorous as quantitative research (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2003). Causal narratives have been central to this research that has been 
combining open-ended and quasi-structured interviews with participant observation and the 
careful analysis of the collected materials in uniform, numerical form. Structured interviews 
and focus group discussions along a planned schedule also played a role as part of the 
approach. I now focus on the use of theory within qualitative research and also discuss its use 
in this study. 
 
2.7. The “use of theory”: Praxis, theory and Being 
 
Applying theoretical concepts in qualitative research, even if only in reviewing literature, led 
to much debate. This debate is not new. It has evolved in qualitative circles for some time.56 
                                                 
56 The talk about this is much older and well known to theorists and academics, as well as the person in 
the street or hunter-gatherer. One finds it in the questioning life of a philosopher soldier like Socrates in 
contrast to the idealistic view (academia) of Plato. One finds it in Schleiermacher’s adherence to 
interpretation, in Dilthey and others. Or one may find it in Gadamer tracking linkages between being, 
experience and language as a human cave/prison. Trying to reconcile clashing paradigms is not new 
(Bleicher, 1980; Ricoeur, 1982.  Consult Collins & Makowsky, 2005 on attempts in Sociology to deal 
with this). Let us reflect on Heidegger for example, negotiating a place for philosophy under a Nazi 
regime. The fusion of horizons is no easy challenge. Heidegger as someone who did not take up 
existential resistance to the human extreme spoke in contrast to the angular optics of Marcuse, 
Habermas and Adorno as radical social critics. I developed an affinity for these theorists (see Garrat [ 
2003: 10ff] for the value of critical theory in qualitative research). Clashing angular optics – in a 
broader view – paradigms do not reconcile easily. Even if by intent one operates within digms rather 
than paradigms, the achievement of intersubjectivity is still no easy challenge, a somewhat daunting 
track to follow and simultaneously interpret. But then, no social tracking is by divine insight; it is 
finding a way between clashes of interpretation and aims at minimising conflict through “action 
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Jennifer Mason struck a chord with me in her definition of qualitative research as a method 
grounded in a philosophical position that is broadly interpretivist and dealing with a social 
world and processes that are manifested in a complex – multi-layered – social world. It 
frequently strives to put emphasis on a “holistic” form of analysis (Mason referenced in 
Schurink, 2004: 3). 
 
Qualitative research (like positivism) represents but one of many paradigms in social science. 
As such, it may find itself in conflict with other research approaches or at times 
complementary to a search for understanding in combination with other approaches. A 
holistic understanding of science as being and a being in human science could indeed be 
complementary in the working world of those interested in societal dynamics. Human 
animals, it seems, by nature track as heuristic tools. Tracking invokes other abilities as well. 
Unlike non-human animals, humans lack some skills and frequently have only their 
mind/rationality as one of a few skills. But the human animal can transform this weakness 
into a workable tool – as human animals have done for millennia. 
 
As with tracking in nature (for example the photographer or hunter), such an approach 
(inculcated skill) is not strictly empirical, as it involves sense perception and human 
imagination and an awareness of clashing/contending angular optics, as well as what 
C. Wright Mills calls the sociological imagination. The metaphor for this project is a 
metaphor born out of personal experience and observation, with somewhat less space for (pre-
determined and imposed) beliefs.57 It involves speculative tracking and sociological and 
political imagination on a qualitative track – an exploration into life experiences. 
 
The narrative or metaphor in a broad sense relates to the deeply intertwined role of reality as 
lived, reality as perceived, and what this study (re)presents. In this project, first order 
                                                                                                                                            
reflected upon” to better the life of some people in some practical way. See also Douglas Ezzy on 
symbolic interactionism and hermeneutics (Ezzy, 1998: 239ff). Before Foucalt reminded us about 
sharing a smile with a cat in the park, the human animal experienced, according to a Zulu proverb, that 
‘the bone of a dog smiles together with the bone of a human being’ (Mutwa quoted in Roos, 
Liebenberg & Van der Westhuizen, 2005: 125). And all of this we find in a world to be interpreted and 
made sense of by human animals. 
57 Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and Paul Feyerabend’s Against 
Method (1978) appeal to me. In the same vein Thomas Hanna’s Bodies in Revolt (1970) can be 
mentioned. Their work offer valuable insights and powerful tools for social science research. In 
choosing the metaphor of tracking within a qualitative research ambit, despite my admiration for these 
imaginative intellects, I follow a more personal track for the purposes of this study, one reason being 
ironically enough that such tools, especially in the case of Kuhn, potentially impose a meta-framework 
that may undermine the value of a qualitative approach. The positive counter-side of Kuhn’s work 
invites dialogues to achieve intersubjectivity.  
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constructs (or what one would call “simple tracking”) frequently lead to second order 
constructs (interpretation). 
 
By using the metaphor of tracking one may also “read into” this study that the use of the 
research pathway will lead from the concrete to the abstract, from first-order constructs to 
second-order concepts in analogy with direct tracking and interpretive tracking to speculative 
tracking. 
 
 
Theory and methodology in this context are exploratory. Rather than just reading “in the 
sand”, it “reads into the sand” (to interpret, illuminate through experience). I track the issue of 
TRCs and CMR in this study by investigating/tracking the relevant questions posed earlier. I 
deploy not only direct and systematic tracking – two concepts a step further than or distinct 
from tracing. I also venture into interpretive and speculative tracking informed by “the 
individual-in-the-socio-political-world” experience. 
 
In this case the researcher deploys theory (as a fluid qualitative concept – it evolves during/in 
tracking) by reading social signs, by anticipating developments, by systemic and speculative 
“tracking”, moving from the concrete to the less visible/the abstract. 
 
Direct and systemic tracking involves a cautious approach. In turn, interpretive and 
speculative tracking requires a bold approach where the tracker anticipates the animal’s 
movements (or in analogy the social process). In the first approach mentioned, the chance of 
losing the track is smaller, in the latter, bigger. Arguably, the latter approach may yield more 
insights. “In principle there is a fundamental difference between systemic and speculative 
tracking. In practice they are complementary and a tracker may apply both at the same time 
… the tracker may however tend to be more systemic at times and more speculative in his 
approach at other times” (Liebenberg, 1990: 107). The above seemed to me to be very apt in 
an exploratory study such as this. 
 
2.8. The evolving research design 
 
Direct tracking ► Systematic tracking ► Interpretive tracking ► Speculative tracking 
Spectrum: Reading in the sand ↔ Reading into the sand 
Concrete ≤ Abstract ≥ Concrete 
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“(The) research design is a plan or blueprint of how you intend conducting the research. 
Researchers often confuse ‘research design’ and ‘research methodology’, but these are two 
different aspects of a research project” (Mouton, 2001: 55). Even if they “dovetail” or are 
“collapsed” into each other, these distinctions have to be kept in mind in traditional 
approaches. The “blueprint” in qualitative work is ever evolving, adding new elements, 
leaving behind some and amalgamating some. It leaves behind tracing and enters the realm of 
the various stages of tracking. Taking this into account I discuss some of the tracks that merge 
in this study. 
 
Building Block 1: The case study 
 
While a number of research methods in qualitative methodology (Bryman, 2004; Creswell, 
2003; Babbie & Mouton, 1998) generate a comprehensive description of a particular social 
reality, the so-called case study strategy is relevant here. 
 
Case studies have become one of the most common ways to do qualitative inquiry, but they 
are neither new nor essentially qualitative (Stake, 2000: 435). Case studies, or “strategies” 
have been used for decades in many social-science disciplines (Yin, 1981). Such disciplines 
include sociology, anthropology, psychology, criminology and related study areas such as 
organisational, industrial and health studies.58 
 
No wonder that a large volume of case-study literature is available today. Contemporary 
scholars have addressed many dimensions of this method, for example, its definition, its use, 
its execution, its relationship to theory, challenges posed and how it shapes up against 
standards such as reliability, validity and generalisation. The following represents some 
prominent definitions and views of case studies, or casing, as contemporary qualitative 
scholars refer to it: 
 
• “Case study research consists of a detailed investigation, often with data collected 
over an (extended – own emphasis) period of time, of one or more organizations, or 
groups (within organizations), with a view to providing an analysis of the context and 
                                                 
58 Case study research in other disciplines is not new. In South Africa case studies in political science 
were and are still exploited. These were/are mostly undertaken in a quantitative way or in analysing 
historical-institutional pathways or in apartheid times clashing ideological organisations. In political 
science in South Africa much of this was infused by South African academics’ isolation from the 1960s 
onwards and South African political scientists having a USA-bound gaze. At the time the 
modernisation paradigm dominated. 
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processes involved in the phenomenon under study. The phenomenon is not isolated 
from its context but is interesting precisely because it is in relation to its context” 
(Hartley, 1994: 208–209). International literature on case studies include Sutherland 
(1937), Thomas and Znaniecki (1958), Shaw (1966), Horton and Hunt (1984) and 
Bogdan (1974). 
 
• “A case study is an examination, using multiple sources of evidence (which may be 
qualitative, quantitative or both), of a single entity which is bounded by time and 
place. Usually it is associated with a location. The ‘case’ may be an organization, a 
set of people such as a social or work group, a community, an event, a process, an 
issue or a campaign” (Dayman & Holloway, 2002: 105). 
 
• “Studies focusing on society and culture, whether a group, a program, or an 
organization, typically espouse some form of case study as an overall strategy; this 
entails immersion in the setting and rests on the researcher’s and the participants’ 
worldviews … A case study … may entail multiple methods—interviews, 
observations, document analysis, even surveys …” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999: 61 – 
emphasis in the original.) 
 
What are the key features of a case-study strategy, and what are the most important steps in its 
execution? “What is a case study? The basic idea is that one case (or perhaps a small number 
of cases) will be studied in detail, using whatever methods seem appropriate. While there may 
be a variety of specific purposes and research questions, the general objective is to develop as 
full an understanding of that case as possible. “We may be interested only in this case, or we 
may have in mind not just this case we are studying’” (Punch, 1998: 150). In this study, the 
latter is applicable. The reader will observe that the broadened case study is of relevance here 
as comparative elements are added in the approach. The analogy of the spectra tracing → 
tracking → various forms of tracking espoused above has to be noted at this point. 59 
 
Building Block 2: Context 
 
Context is part of a case-study design portraying many aspects or dimensions. These cannot 
be managed adequately by quantitative methods such as social surveys. Within the tracking 
metaphor, quantitative research provides useful tools for tracing and perhaps, just perhaps, for 
                                                 
59 I will discuss the issue of other cases that entered the scene in the course of this study in the next 
chapter. 
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basic or simple tracking, but lacks immersion in the rich collage of real-life processes and 
interactions. For added value the tracker (researcher) has to embark on the more cumbersome, 
and therefore more tiring, exercise of systematic and interpretive and speculative tracking. 
Note the argument by Jennifer Mason that “qualitative research is grounded in a philosophical 
tradition that is ‘broadly interpretist’” (Mason, 1996: 4). Of course the foregoing statement 
does not imply that quantitative methods have no role to play in casing [see Ragin, Bert-
Schlosser & de Meur in Goodwin et al. (1998: 749ff); Rueschemeyer (1991: 9ff); Manheim & 
Rich, 1981: 230ff]. Various qualitative and/or quantitative methods may be used in a case 
study (Kritzer, 1990: 3. See again Manheim & Rich, 1981). However, as Hartley (1994: 209) 
correctly points out: “… the emphasis is generally more on qualitative methods because of the 
kinds of questions which are best addressed through the case study method.” Qualitative 
methods that have been used successfully thus far include participant observation, where the 
researcher became actively involved in an assembly line (Burawoy, 1979), participant 
observation, where the researcher played a non-active role (Hartley, 1989), and interviews 
(ranging from semi-structured to relatively unstructured) with informants in the reality being 
studied (Edwards & Scullion, 1982). 
 
In pursuing the delicate interactions and processes that are inherent in social reality, case-
study researchers often use multiple methods because such phenomena are best investigated 
by using several methods. This also applies to the triangulation of their data (read: 
transferability of the study) as far as possible. 
 
Building Block 3: On method(s) 
 
A case study has to be approached from its theoretical orientation. In Hartley’s (1994: 210) 
words, “case study methods … are likely to be better able to adapt and probe areas of original 
but also emergent theory. Although case studies may begin with (in some cases) only 
rudimentary theory or a primitive framework, they (need to) develop theoretical frameworks 
by the end (which) inform and enrich the data and provide not only a sense of uniqueness of 
the case but also what is of more general relevance and interest … Without a theoretical 
framework, a case study may produce fascinating details … without any wider significance. 
Indeed, a case study without the discipline of theory can easily degenerate into a ‘story’” 
(Here, the critical reader may retort that stories in themselves are valuable social data). In this 
study I assume theory has a role to play apart from the intrinsic value of the (personal) 
narrative. 
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The difference between simple or systematic tracking in contrast to interpretive (and 
speculative) tracking enters the equation here. 
 
There may be a great deal of description and a blow-by-blow account of activities, conflicts, 
and decisions (the description following simple tracking) but these are of little interest to 
those outside the action if the detail does not convey ideas about fundamental social or 
organisational processes (the added value of interpretive tracking). In a case study, there are 
unique features due to organizational characteristics and the personalities and roles of 
individuals in society or the institutions they live in. These can give a case study a richness, 
immediacy and graphic quality which engages the mind and the imagination of the reader in a 
way that is often more difficult than concepts as operationalised in a questionnaire. Without a 
theoretical framework, even if dogmatic, the researcher is in danger of providing description 
without wider meaning. It is at this point that evolving research pathways become important 
for this study and where the case being tracked links up with cases being tracked. 
 
Building Block 4: Cases and cases 
 
A number of case study types have been distinguished (see Yin, 1984; Stake, 2000; Punch, 
1998; Bryman, 2004). In order to reach my aim of describing a particular effect of TRCs, I 
chose among others the instrumental case (Stake, 2004) or exemplifying case (Bryman, 2004). 
 
“Cases are often chosen not because they are extreme or unusual60 in some way but because 
they will provide a suitable context for certain research questions to be answered. As such, 
they allow the researcher to examine key social processes. Thus, for example, a researcher 
may seek access to an organization because it is known to have implemented a new 
technology and wants to know what the impact of that new technology has been. The 
researcher may have been influenced by various theories about the relationship between 
technology and work and by considerable research literature on the topic, and as a result seeks 
to examine the implications of some of these theoretical and empirical deliberations in a 
particular research site” (Bryman, 2004: 51). One of the case study’s major strengths, which 
originated from its qualitative roots, lies in its capacity to explore social processes as they 
develop and unfold. This point in particular is relevant in this study and its chosen strategy. 
 
                                                 
60 In South Africa students such as I, frequently grew up with the notion that South Africa was a unique 
case. The “uniqueness” of a case should be handled with care. No social experience/process stems from 
an island uniquely and is entirely distinct from others. 
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Building Block 5: Use of case studies 
 
Case studies prove useful when it is required to understand social processes in their 
environmental context. For example, particular activities and meanings may only be fully 
appreciated in the context of wider forces operating within the institution, regardless of 
whether they are historical or contemporary. 61 The same applies to failure to act, dislike of 
involvement, non-activities or choices made by actors not to decide on a course of action 
within a certain context. It is worthwhile to note that exposure to critical theory and for 
example what Plummer calls a humanistic way in science or even critical humanism may find 
its way into the narrative (Plummer, 1–2; 14 ff). 
 
Case studies are particularly appropriate to explore perceived new processes or activities, or 
those that are not understood. “In this case, case studies have an important function in 
generating hypotheses and building theory. They have a high likelihood of generating new 
theory, and furthermore, the emergent theory is likely to be testable with constructs that can 
be measured and hypotheses that can be falsified … because the theory building has largely 
been inductive. This is not to suggest that researchers go into the case study with no theory at 
all – they would quickly become overwhelmed with data – but the key point is that the initial 
identification of research questions and theoretical framework will work best where it is 
tentative – with recognition that the issues and theory may shift as the framework and 
concepts are repeatedly examined against the data which are systematically collected” – 
emphasis in the original (Schurink, 2004b: 3, 5–8, 23; see also Haralambos & Holborn, 1995: 
833; Scholz & Tietje, 2002: 311, 346). Needless to say that individual experience, that is 
reflected upon over time confirms the arguments of these theorists. 
 
Building Block 6: The (or “a”?) case in broader perspective 
 
Comprehensive case studies may prove to be essential in cross-national comparative research, 
where an intimate understanding of the meaning of concepts to people, the meanings they 
attach to particular behaviours and the way in which sets of behaviour relate to one another, is 
essential. 
 
In using various theorists and appropriating their insights, i.e. Buroway (1979), Edwards and 
Scullian (1982) and Hartley (1989; 1994), elements of the current work could be seen as an 
                                                 
61 I touch on this later with particular reference to CMR in South Africa in Chapter 3 and 4.  
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exploratory-descriptive study. The descriptive study is discussed at length in Mouton and 
Marais (1990). They classify the case study as but an element of “descriptive research” (46–
47; 53). 
 
A study such as this is clearly not solely descriptive. It aims to provide answers that could 
facilitate hypotheses, which in turn, could be tested by future researchers in the field (see 
Bouma, 1996: 90). This study describes behaviour, meanings and processes and is thus 
exploratory, but invokes tentative hypotheses. 
 
Building Block 6-and a half: A case is a case but comparisons help 
 
The SATRC developed within a specific context and was not devoid of external influences 
and a broader (read: international) discourse. Elements of what has been termed “the 
comparison”, enters the collage (see Bouma, 1996: 96). Comparative approaches have 
yielded important insights that complemented other research approaches. In qualitative 
research the latter is frequently encapsulated by the term broader casing, which is also the 
case here. 
 
Particularly important in this regard is Manheim and Rich’s argument, namely that there are 
definite limitations to an exclusive focus on one case only. Should one wish to improve the 
ability to explain (and perhaps even predict/suggest steps to facilitate problem-solving – my 
insertion), one possibility is to apply a comparative approach (Manheim & Rich, 1981: 230). 
For more detail on the potential shortcomings of a case-study approach, consult Bouma 
(1996: 96ff); Manheim and Rich (1981: 230–233) and Mouton (2001: 154–155). “The best 
sociological research begins with problems that are also puzzles … Puzzles (represent) not 
just lack of information but a gap in your understanding” (Giddens, 2001: 641). For the 
moment one could say that solving human puzzles does need building blocks even if these are 
to be replaced by others, as archaeology teaches us. Alternative forms of qualitative writing 
attend to puzzles and frequently trigger research and alternative approaches rather than 
orthodox pathways (Neumann, 1996: 195). Auto-ethnography plays a role in this approach. 
 
The point of departure in the study is that the TRC process in South Africa, while it may have 
achieved various of the set objectives and aims, did not adequately solve the puzzle of how 
CMR should be (re)structured – inclusive of mechanisms and processes – to ensure that 
civilian oversight over security institutions is structured/institutionalised/ facilitated so that 
human rights will be guaranteed in a sustainable South African democracy. Nor does 
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scrutinising the local body of TRC-related publications solve the nagging question of why the 
TRC process and the DRP appear to be two different processes in the same country at the 
same time when one would rather have expected them to interface, dovetail and interact much 
more. In addition, much of the research on the SATRC does not have a “personal feel” to it. 
 
I incorporated elements of what has been termed qualitative historical-comparative research, 
which is useful since it enables researchers to focus on one or more cases at a time and/or on 
society or nation at a particular point in time. Esterberg (2002) explains that researchers using 
this type of research compare cases across a number of dimensions by using primary and 
secondary materials such as newspaper articles, legislative documents, published memoirs, 
minutes of meetings and accounts of historians. 
 
Esterberg is not the only one to point this out. Becker (1998), Ruschemeyer (1991), Smith 
(1991) and Griffen et al. (1991: 110ff) did likewise. Wieviorka rightly points out that the 
comparison between, and analysis of, cases can assist in “deconstruction of preconceptions”; 
and at the same time it “may construct a unity of what seemed to be broken up (rather 
mechanically – my insertion) into practical categories” (Wieviorka, 1992: 170). In fact, in 
recent years qualitative comparative analysis has become a sub-discipline in qualitative 
sociology [Becker, 1998: 213. See also Wieviorka in Ragin & Becker (1992: 159ff)]. What 
might be seen as different approaches can enrich and yield complementary insights while 
simultaneously serving as a critical tool to review chosen cases. 
 
This study focussing on the SATRC serves as both a trigger and platform for obtaining data 
that shed light on the TRC in relation to local CMR. The SATRC could have far-reaching 
implications. Various other countries started modelling their truth and reconciliation 
experiments on South Africa’s attempt. Just as the SATRC modelled itself on the Chilean 
TRC, others now looked towards the South African experiment for replication. I decided not 
to limit the present study to the local case since one could benefit from looking at similar 
experiments in other countries. Furthermore, one can attend to the question of whether the 
SATRC is a model for uncritical replication. At the same time it would be nearly impossible 
to deal with all these attempts up till now. 
 
A comparative element in addition to the case study is important as far as researching CMR 
on the African continent is concerned. “CMR are clearly not a mere relationship between the 
military, structures of state and society, but a rather complex dimension of all these 
institutions, and between components of the institutions and the military, as well as within 
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sections of the military itself … an eclectic approach in analysing CMR on the African 
continent is probably the best methodological approach to take in view of the various factors 
that have influenced the continent and CMR over time” (Ngoma, 2004: 13). In this case I 
view Ngoma’s statement as relevant for combining casing with comparative insights.62 
Ngoma’s observation about the possible value of eclectic theoretical approaches in terms of 
CMR has wider implications and is worth reflecting upon. One may expand his observation to 
C. Wright Mills’s plea “to image all the range of alternatives that exist” (in methodology, 
application and policy – my insertion) [C. Wright Mills quoted by Albrow, 1996: 1 ff]. 
 
A similar argument by Rocky Williams stated that a more open-ended philosophical and 
intellectual approach (drawing on the diversity and plurality of intellectual currents being 
generated in the late twentieth century) needs to be adopted (Williams, 1998: 38).63 
 
In qualitative research and in casing it is practice to outline the setting where the study takes 
place. This is required for two reasons: In the first place, to contextualise the research and 
secondly, to sketch the boundaries of the study, including the particular dimensions that will 
be studied. Ipso facto, by sketching the boundaries and illuminating the dimensions of the 
study, one also speaks on the limitations of the study. Building blocks suppose a social setting 
and human contexts. Let us reflect on this. 
 
2.9. The research setting(s) 
 
The SATRC followed a negotiated transition and was perceived as a viable choice, given an 
era of systematic human rights abuses and the status quo of no victor nor vanquished after 
decades of civil strife. To a large extent, the SATRC was modelled on the Chilean TRC 
experience, yet intended to be more far-reaching. South Africa made the transition from 
authoritarian rule and praetorianism of a special type to a constitutional democracy. Debate 
grew about dealing with a past of apartheid human rights abuses. In the SATRCR the choice 
for a TRC is argued as follows: “There were those who believed that we should follow the 
post World War II example of putting those guilty of gross violations of human rights on trail 
as the allies did at Nuremberg. In South Africa where we had a military stalemate the victor-
                                                 
62 See Comparative Sociology and the Sociological Imagination (Albrow, 1996: 1 ff). Note Albrow’s 
comments on narrative and science in the same work (184ff). A close friend, the late Ruhr Martin, first 
alerted me to the work of Albrow. On the potential value of what I would call supportive eclectic 
philosophies and analysis, see Thomas Hanna mentioned earlier. 
63 Williams advanced the need for a post-modern approach in the analysis of CMR in South African 
states and possibly other African states in subsequent debates (personal discussions between the author 
and Rocky Williams, 1998 onwards). 
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vanquished option was not viable. Even if a military stalemate did not enter the scenario, civil 
discontent and popular mobilisation (call it civil disobedience on a large scale) brought about 
a real need for another way to look at the impasse at the end of the tunnel of oppression. 
Neither side in the struggle (the state and the liberation movements) had defeated each other 
and hence nobody was in a position to enforce so-called victor’s justice” (SARTCR, 1998, 
Vol. 1: 5).64 
 
Apart from the above the SATRCR implied that in view of the influence of the ex-military an 
attempt to punish the previous incumbents could be problematic – if not dangerous. TRC 
advocates further argued that resources could be better spent in a society “now reaping the 
benefits of a stable and democratic dispensation” (SATRCR, 1998, Vol. 1: 5). The SATRC 
was seen as the most viable “transitional option” by advocates of the TRC (SATRCR, 1998, 
Vol. 1: 5). 
 
Following the negotiated transition, Parliament instituted the TRC process, while a DRP was 
instituted with regard to future CMR. The DRP was initiated to enable the public to give their 
input regarding future force structures, the role of the new defence force, its values, core 
functions, missions and objectives. This study, as part of a military sociology enterprise, is 
situated in such settings. It takes a closer look at the people involved as part of the research 
setting. 
 
Various church and civil-society leaders opted to propagate the SATRC as instrument, rather 
than adopting a forgive-and-forget approach or instituting criminal proceedings against the 
former old-guard politicians and military leaders who transgressed human rights. Following 
various media debates and conferences, the idea was concretised in the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, which opened up a systematic and drawn-out 
process to come to terms with the past. By 1998 the five-volume SATRCR was released and 
became available to be scrutinised, reflected and debated on. The mission of the SATRC was 
to allow the victims to be heard, information of human-rights abuses to be made publicly 
known and to hear the testimony of perpetrators. One of the core missions of a TRC, 
including ours, is/was to allow as much justice as possible and to effect, where possible, 
societal reconciliation. It was hoped that this would be followed by some measure of 
restoration, if not compensation, for victims. 
                                                 
64 The so-called “military stalemate” that certainly would have arrived at some stage in the future was 
not yet a particular threat, or the primary reason for the need to negotiate. Rather internal fears and 
mass mobilisation brought about a political impasse, or what Hein Marais (2003) refers to as an 
organic crisis that necessitated a negotiated transition. 
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At the same time, the newly integrated SANDF started its first steps towards transformation 
following the new White Paper on Defence and the DRP. At the same time the SANDF was 
involved in a simultaneous process of rationalisation, the honing of the integration process of 
previous guerrillas, the “homeland armies” and the old SADF. Among its new core functions 
to be considered was the growing need for future deployment as a peace-keeping force on the 
African continent. The impact and management of affirmative action also deserved attention. 
 
The core mission of the White Paper on Defence and the DRP was based on the ethos of an 
increased level of public participation in a democratic state. Thus, it was linked to an attempt 
to democratise state and society. The negotiated Constitution and civic participation in the 
White Paper and related processes invited a measure of input into the process, thus invoking, 
by implication, civil oversight into the scenario. This exercise was an important step for a 
young democracy. 
 
While the SATRC attempted to unburden the past and allow perpetrators to speak out, its 
underlying objective was to prevent similar excesses in the future, in short, to enhance, secure 
and sustain human rights in the future South Africa. In turn, the White Paper and the DRP had 
as objective a widening of citizen input through public participation in order to re-model (and 
by implication re-professionalise) the new defence force. Furthermore, it strove to enhance 
the civil-military dialogue in order to assist in improving CMR. This was to be done while 
managing levels of demobilisation, rationalisation and reconstituting the new SANDF with its 
role spelled out in the new Constitution of 1996 (Clause 11). 
 
The Defence White Paper, entitled Defence in a Democracy, played an important role. The 
White Paper was to re-align the South African military with democratic values and respect for 
a democracy. The instituting of a civilian Defence Secretariat was based on the democratic 
values of civic participation and civil control over the military, thus largely the ethos of the 
Rechtstaat or Constitutional State. In terms of this the military would abide by constitutional 
principles and accept civil authority and civilian leaders (politicians) in turn, enter a social 
contract not to invite the military into partisan politics, as had happened under apartheid rule. 
 
Both processes aimed at adding value to a new democracy, but for the observer, they seemed 
to be separate processes where the role players had minimal contact with one another. Both 
were processes that sought to deepen democracy and could potentially have far-reaching 
consequences. One should question why the processes did not eventually complement each 
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other much more, even in the phase of conceptualising and designing, if not in the 
implementation stage. 
 
The SATRC worked through various structures that were put into place after the Act was 
passed. Commissioners were appointed through a public process. Sub-structures were formed. 
Its statutory committees were the Amnesty Committee, the Human Rights Violations 
Committee and the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee (SATRCR, 1998.Vol. 1: 267–
287). 
 
Because the transition was a negotiated transfer of power, the ruling and outgoing National 
Party and the contenders (the would-be incumbents) were the major role players from 1990 to 
1995. Obviously, church leaders, religious societies, business and political parties (the 
previous incumbents, the new governing party and the opposition) also had a stake in it. Other 
core role players in the TRC were the victims (for it was their stories that had to be heard); 
perpetrators (who applied for amnesty) to state their case publicly, the initiators of the process 
and the commissioners, such as Bishop Desmond Tutu, Dr Alex Boraine, Dumisa Ntsebeza, 
Mary Burton, Bongani Finca and others. Needless to add that commissioners and workers on 
the project on regional level also played an important role (for understandable reasons the 
process had decentralised its work to cover all regions of South Africa). Regional offices were 
opened in Cape Town, Durban, East London and Johannesburg (SATRCR, 1998, Vol. 1). 
 
In the DRP and the White Paper, the core role players were the new civilian government, the 
parliamentary committees and civil society participants from widely differing backgrounds 
and convictions. Simplistically, some referred to the civil-community participants in the DRP 
as representing different values, namely those of militarism (“the militarists”) and those that 
had a more pacifist orientation (“the anti-militarists”). The latter were sometimes referred to 
in pejorative language as the “peaceniks”. Owing to their technical expertise, and because the 
DRP was exactly about the role of the military, they became crucial role players. 
 
The media also played a role. Parsons (1995: 106) argues that in any society the media play 
an important role in identifying real or perceived problems, the setting and/or altering agendas 
and raising or lowering interest in an issue.65 The power of the media to change agendas, to 
highlight certain issues or ignore others is a general phenomenon in all societies (Freedman & 
                                                 
65 Note also the need to “reverse an overheated media” which could raise tension in a national or 
international environment identified by McLuhan (1995: 33ff). See also Freedman and Freedman 
(1975: 117ff). 
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Freedman, 1975: 115 ff). The media are in “the business of ‘manufacturing’ news” (Parsons, 
1995: 107), and thus co-construct images of social problems (Parsons, 1995: 108). Parsons, in 
following Downs, argues that in a democratic society the media, rightly or wrongly, raise 
issues to high levels of interest, ignore other issues, or dump some issues in favour of others. 
This cycle is referred to as the issue attention cycle (Parsons, 1995: 115). 
 
With regard to the SATRC and the DRP, issues were raised and dumped – sometimes in 
quick succession and without providing a broader context. This resulted in what I would call 
fragmented images or fast-screening kaleidoscoping. These fluid, and at times contradictory, 
images had to be kept in mind during the research process, like the micro-agendas of 
individuals and groups in both processes, and their clashing personalities. 
 
The TRC released its five-volume report after three years in 1998, behind the original 
schedule. The report was not unanimous, and a minority report was released. The process was 
applauded by many, and strongly criticized by others, especially the work of the amnesty 
committee, which, given the complexity of the cases involved, ran behind schedule and 
received close public scrutiny and media attention. 
 
Since the DRP was completed, two pertinent developments have taken place. Firstly, the 
SANDF (now drastically rationalised) was called upon to contribute to peace missions in 
Africa. This added a new dimension to the tasks of the South African military as well as 
ushering in some new core values, i.e. preparing to maintain or enforce peace according to the 
UN Charter, rather than acting in national defence or, in a worst-case scenario, embarking on 
aggression. The “worst case scenario” during the DRP was not entertained. The SANDF, it 
was argued, operated and was likely to do so in future under a “non-threat” scenario and the 
secondary role rather than its primary role (national defence) became pertinent, hence a re-
evaluation of the role, posture and mission became important. 
 
Secondly, the reported allegations of corruption in the arms deal complicated the issue. If the 
allegations were to be proven correct, the process of arms procurement as executed pointed to 
some weaknesses in civil oversight. The allegations and resultant commissions of inquiry and 
court cases brought about antagonism and public debates that focused on and questioned the 
role of some politicians and Defence Secretariat members who were allegedly implicated in 
corruption. Some serving members of the Defence Secretariat, because of the incident, 
eventually left the service of the Secretariat (i.e. Chippy Schaik). Other spin-offs resulted in 
the conviction of Schabir Schaik and the dismissal of the deputy president, Jacob Zuma. This 
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left deep cleavages in the ruling party. As a result of the Heath Special Investigative Unit and 
the controversy about that, the Scorpions Unit – established to fight crime and corruption – 
became part of public contestation about its future role and deployment. Since then the British 
and Swedish government have also embarked on enquiries into allegations about corruption in 
the course of the arms deal. 
 
It was reasonable to expect this state of affairs to have an influence on various levels in future. 
I therefore had to remain aware of these developments and their possible consequences 
throughout this study. Such developments, including public contestations, form part of my 
continuously “evolving data”. 
 
However, the research setting is broader. The SATRC and the relationship with CMR deserve 
attention. I alluded to the interplay between the case-study approaches complemented by a 
comparative element. In this regard, Latin American case studies and African case studies are 
discussed. In terms of the case studies perused and analysed, I used not only literature but also 
unsolicited material. I conducted an interview with a knowledgeable person from Argentina 
(an exiled activist) and one from an African state, namely Rwanda. The rest of the interviews 
were conducted with various experts and practitioners in South African society. Some of these 
were from an ex-SADF background and some from an MK background. 
 
I was fortunate enough to receive ample unsolicited material, such as submissions from 
different political parties at the TRC. Material from peer-debriefers proved useful. One 
example of unsolicited material that I received provided not only lengthy feedback on an e-
mail from a West African theorist, but very useful unsolicited material published by the 
person. 
 
2.10. Obtaining access: A crucial nexus 
 
In qualitative research, obtaining entrée and reaching agreement with people involved in the 
research setting represent crucial decisions (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006: xxv; Holliday, 2007: 
116; Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005). In gaining access, in some cases access being bestowed 
without a direct request or attemp to source entrée plays a role. In some cases, I gained access 
without consciously deciding to do so. 
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How did I obtain access? Owing to my involvement much earlier in student politics – among 
others in organisations related to the UDF from 1983 onwards – and my work in IDASA,66 
which I joined in November 1986, I had ample opportunity to witness (and participate in) the 
activities of anti-apartheid civic-action groups. Later on, I retained contact with the Justice 
and Transition Project and especially publications issued by it (the Justice and Transition 
Project initiated by Alex Boraine, one of the previous directors of IDASA, played an 
important role in advocating a TRC for South Africa). Shortly afterwards, I moved to Pretoria 
to take up a position at the HSRC’s Unit for Political Studies headed by Dr Daan van Vuuren. 
Daan, an admirable future-orientated academic, acted as a soundboard for my ideas and also 
allowed me to further my interest in the South African liberation struggle and issues 
concerning forgiveness, the nation-building debate in South Africa and my growing interest in 
post-apartheid ways to deal with the past. We started a journal, South Africa in the 90s, in 
September 1991 (first edition October 1991) that among others addressed issues of dealing 
with the past.67 
 
I started and continued my research on TRCs while I was involved in other projects. This 
brought me into contact with theorists, past victims and practitioners who had experience in 
the area. It was during this time that I met various comrades from the UDF (later to become 
the Mass Democratic Movement), such as Rocky Williams, Solly Molo, Tyrone and Bernie 
Richards, André van Wyk and many others. At the HSRC colleagues such as Anthony 
Minnaar, Charl Schutte, Marie Wentzel, Dirkie Offringa, Deneys Coombe, Laura Best, Moira 
Machonachie and Johan Olivier also worked on aspects of violence in South Africa. 
 
These interactions resulted, among others, in initiating a conference on covert operations that 
sought to understand community violence and so-called black-on-black violence, which we 
believed was not the only reason (or perhaps not the reason at all) for continued post-1990 
violence. The conference took place in 1993 at Espada Ranch near Pretoria. As a result of the 
conference, organised with funding from IDASA, the Danish government and the Friedrich 
                                                 
66 It later became the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. 
67 The journal, meant to be accessible reading, featuring short punchy articles aimed at practitioners and 
political observers, was unfortunately terminated after the HSRC lived through one of its restructuring, 
re-alignment and strategic re-positioning exercises, which by then had become a management habit. 
The Unit for Political Studies (UPS) became the Centre for Constitutional Analysis (CCA) and started 
advocating federalism as a solution for South Africa. Following the retirement of Daan van Vuuren and 
the scrapping of the UPS, the CCA was headed by a “verligte” National Party member with previous 
Broederbond/Ruiterwag connotations [Ruiterwag: The youth wing of the secretive Afrikaner 
Broederbond (AB)]. The CCA in turn was terminated a few years later during yet another restructuring 
exercise. 
 92
Naumann-Stiftung, I also had the opportunity to come into contact with ex-SADF senior 
officers and officers of the new SANDF.68 
 
Constant interaction with research groups and security think-tanks, such as the then Military 
Research Group (MRG) and the then Institute for Defence Policy (IDP), today the Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS), were important. An invitation to the DRP as a participant member 
of civil society also greatly facilitated access to data. My interaction then and now was at all 
times overt. In fact, one of the changes in the evolving political situation in South Africa was 
that covert access was not necessary, nor was it contemplated at any stage during study. Data-
gathering through access to the social setting in the case of this particular study falls in the 
realm of what Bryman calls overt ethnograpy (Bryman, 2004: 294). 
 
My contact with fellow workers Mandla Seleoane, Jabu Sindane and William Dichaba and 
discussions with them on various aspects of South African socio-political issues played a role. 
Especially fruitful were conversations with Mandla. 
 
I deal quite extensively with these and other interactions/exchanges in the analytical chapter 
[Chapter 6]. For now I briefly state my previous involvement and exposure in South African 
society, including exposure that forms part of the socialisation of the person. Some 
involvement and experience(s) in the field also facilitated access to data – even after years: 
 
• Growing up in a provincial environment in the Northern Cape69 in an increasingly 
militarised society taking part in the cadet system70 and the Voortrekkers71 and 
developing an intense interest in the history of war. 
 
• Involvement with the military, both SADF and MK, over many years.72 SADF: since 
1974 as school cadet and as commando member (1977–1978) and junior officer 
(1979–1983). Contact with MK members since 1986. 
                                                 
68 Many of the ex-MK and SADF correspondents of necessity need to remain anonymous. 
69 Today it is called the Northern Cape Province. At the time, in colloquial reference, it was North 
Western Cape (more specifically in our area people referred to Gordonia district – the name derived 
from an earlier colonial official, Sir Gordon Sprigg). 
70 A system by which all high school boys (Grade 8) and upwards were introduced to military training 
as preparation for conscription by the Christian national government. On a voluntary level school girls 
also took part. 
71 A youth movement started in the 1930s to advocate Christian Nationalism and Afrikaner Volks-
values.  
72 I was never a member of MK, but had contact with some of its members since 1986 and especially 
1987 onwards. 
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• Involvement as an activist since the 1983 One Million Signatures Campaign initiated 
by the UDF. Among others being a member of the End Conscription Campaign 
(ECC) and being elected to the steering committee to launch a branch of the Nusas at 
Stellenboch played a role. At the time a few fellow students and I also initiated the 
Aksie Sosiale Geregtigheid (Action for Social Justice) at Stellenbosch. Added to this, 
within the society for political philosophy, the Socratic Society, we embarked on 
much more social activist conduct than before. Joining IDASA followed. 
 
• Involvement with the TRC debate (as author of several articles, being present at TRC 
hearings and making a submission to the TRC on conscripts). 
 
• Participating in a joint HSRC/ISS survey on public attitudes regarding the newly 
created SANDF and analysis of the data together with Charl Schutte, Lindy 
Heineken, Jakkie Cilliers and others. 
 
• Coordinating a study for the ISS funded by the European Union (EU) on demobilised 
soldiers in South Africa during 1999/2000. As part of this qualitative study interviews 
were conducted with 300 demobilised guerrillas and ex-SADF personnel. 
 
• Exposure as a result of being a civil society participant in the DRP. 
 
• Gaining access to various groups and individuals for formal and informal purposes 
between 1983 and 2007. These persons included participants (activists and militants), 
politicians, observers, theorists, security experts, civilians and practitioners. 
 
 
It would be difficult to argue that all of these interactions were planned; they evolved as a 
flow of life, an individual making judgements to the best of his abilities followed by choices 
for action. The same applies to my choice of subject for this study. In fact I did not know 
during the early/middle 1990s that I would choose on this specific topic for my thesis, 
although I was at the time interested in the TRC and published articles on it. It was only in 
1999 that I made the decision to study the interface between the SATRC and CMR. I also 
made some tentative decisions on which other persons or actors (know as “informants” in 
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qualitative research) could perhaps play a role73 or that I needed to involve or establish access 
to. Earlier experiences greatly facilitated this. 
 
2.11. Data have many faces: selecting, sourcing and data collection 
 
Is there anyone in the world, Meletus, who believes in human activities and not in human 
beings? (Socrates in Plato’s apology, quoted in Albrow, 1996). Human beings are important, 
perhaps sometimes the being more than the activity in qualitative research. 
 
I conducted face-to-face interviews with a number of identified participants in the TRC 
process in South Africa. These include participants in other fields relevant to the applied side 
(military, intelligence and Defence Secretariat staff) on national and regional level. Having 
been so close to some key people and the process generally, I was in a fortunate position 
(partly as an insider) to assess the various options to attain relevant data to approach people 
and select sources. Since I describe how documents and other literature were selected in the 
scholarly review (Chapter 3) and the analytical chapter [Chapter 6], I do not outline this 
process here. 
 
The role of the researcher as participant-observer is crucial to this study. Prominent 
qualitative researchers, Lofland and Lofland (1984: 12), argue that “field observation”, 
“qualitative observation”, “direct observation”, or “participant observation” refers to the 
processes in which a researcher establishes and sustains a many-sided and relatively long-
term relationship with a human association in its natural setting for the purpose of developing 
a scientific understanding of it (compare also Moscos, 2007). 
 
“Participant observation is undoubtedly the principal method used in field research, and … 
requires some involvement by the researcher in the lives of the people studied. Essentially, 
participant observation can be described as a method whereby the researcher personally, to a 
greater or lesser extent, becomes part of the everyday eventualities of the subjects and can 
gain an understanding of their life world by observing, asking questions, listening and 
capturing information. In short, the process of participant observation with the researcher 
entering into the flow of a group of people’s social behaviour in an attempt to reconstruct 
their reality, entails a number of important steps and decisions” (Schurink 1992: 80). I link the 
                                                 
73 The notion of informants used in qualitative research should not be confused with informers (on 
other people) that are paid by the security services of a country (in South African jargon such informers 
were known as impimpis and were viewed as traitors to the political cause). 
 95
above statement with that of Sparkes “… since the researcher is an active participant in the 
research process, it is important to understand the researcher’s location of the self in the 
process … (as such) fieldwork in a social setting, inhabited by embodied, emotional physical 
selves … (helps) to shape, reproduce, maintain, reconstruct, and represent our selves and the 
selves of others” (Sparkes, 2002: 17–18). Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006: xix ff), in describing 
emergent methods in social research, go even further. They refer to the body (as physical, 
fleshy, corporeal reality), the centrality of the body and integration of body and mind in the 
research process that lead to “knowledge (that) in a very real sense (is) constructed at the 
junction of body and mind”. Their view closely resembles Thomas Hanna’s conjecture of the 
human as a somatic being (“me the bodily being”) that “livingly” interprets the world and 
enacts choices (Hanna, 1970: Introduction). Hesse-Biber and Leavy’s conjecture struck 
resonance with me, as it reflects by implication part of my beliefs about research. Their views 
and Hanna’s strongly imply the individual attempt to go beyond tracing but to embark on the 
process of direct tracking, systematic tracking and speculative tracking referred to earlier in 
Chapter 1 and this chapter. 
 
This approach allowed me to access data on various levels. I now briefly turn to this and 
distinguish between different forms of data. Being a body and mind in conjunction, 
participant-observer and observer-participant enabled me, in the metaphor used previously, to 
“track down” information accessed through a spread of data. Having done this, I found that 
the information allowed for and facilitated systematic and interpretive “tracking”. 
 
Assuming that the researcher is also a research tool (and hence intrinsically linked to data), 
one’s own experience is, so to speak, part of the broader story. Compare, for example, the 
rather new approach by Ellis and Bocher (2000) and Plummer (2001). Ellis and Bocher 
(2000) describe auto-ethnography as an autographical writing style and research-conducting 
displaying many levels of consciousness, which connect personal to ethnic or cultural aspects. 
Plummer (2001: 34–35) writes: “Recently (‘auto/ethnography’) has been developed to capture 
the breakdown in distance (and the complex relationship) between ethnographer, biographer, 
and subjects – bringing the accounts together. (The) term ‘auto/ethnography’ has come to 
have a double sense: referring either to the ethnography of one’s own group or 
autobiographical writing that has an ethnographic interest. Thus either a self (auto) 
ethnography or an autobiographical (auto) ethnography can be signalled by ‘auto 
ethnography’ … Sometimes, these ‘auto ethnographies’ are short essays that bring out a 
different style and sensitivity for doing social science … Whilst only a relatively small 
amount of social science is taking this personal, narrative path, there are nevertheless signs 
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here of a shift. The ‘auto ethnography’ brings the author firmly into the text, with a 
heightened self-consciousness of textual production; once this happens it may be only a small 
step away to the ‘fictional autobiographical ethnography’, where the distinction of forms 
becomes completely ‘blurred’.” 
 
The positioning of the qualitative researcher, the narrator of a scientific tale in terms of 
exposure, can be seen in the following figure from Bryman (2004: 301). The involved reader 
will notice the link between feeling and interpretation (compare the figure earlier in the 
chapter (page 76) on tracking. 
 
 
Figure from Bryman, 2004: 301. 
 
Formal interaction (i.e. a scheduled interview or participating in a panel discussion or chairing 
a panel discussion/seminar and later reflecting on it or analysing it) or informal/ natural 
interaction through discussions or exchanging views frequently leads to data being obtained 
through unsolicited or solicited material. Documents are typically used by qualitative 
researchers. They provide first-hand accounts of the social experiences from the participants’ 
point of view or world-view. However, one should be aware that documents may be 
misleading and/or one-sided. Documents are frequently one’s basic resources and could be a 
primary resource. In other cases they can be used complementary to others sources. In using 
documents as I did in this study, I needed to be aware of this. Unsolicited and solicited 
documentation (e-mail and otherwise) complemented each other. Bryman makes an 
interesting point that is applicable here: garnering of solicited documents occurs in two ways: 
during interviews or by casual questioning during conversations. Important to note is that 
Bryman suggests that in solid qualitative discussion the boundary between interview and 
conversation is by no means clear-cut and after spontaneous or ‘natural’/informal interaction, 
solicited accounts are a necessary way forward (Bryman, 2004: 300). 
 
I accessed various documents. These included academic documents, submissions to official 
bodies, official documentation and communiqués issued by governmental bodies. Some of 
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these documents can be described as internal documents, such as memorandums or 
submissions to organisations or official bodies. Others were external communications 
produced by organisations (i.e. the SATRC or the Department of Defence or Defence 
Secretariat) for public consumption. Bogdan and Biklen (2003) make a relevant distinction 
between internal and external documentation, which I found useful. I also requested e-mail 
feedback from expert practitioners and used other relevant e-mail correspondence, some 
received as late as May 2007 (research evolves while tracking). Bogdan and Biklen (2003) 
argue a somewhat controversial point. While photos and research have been linked for many 
years, some argue that photos may be misleading. Personally I saw the value of both 
arguments. Hence, to a limited extent I made use of photographic material for illustrative 
purposes – and sometimes just to provide a reader’s break amidst what could be seen as a 
lengthy text. 
 
There are different categories of interviews, ranging from the informal conversation-type, or 
in-depth interviews, or unstructured interviews using schedules to open-ended interviews 
(Haralambos & Holborn, 1995: 839ff; Neuman, 2000: 370; Schurink, 1992: 80ff). 
 
Understandably, these categories overlap. In the case of this study, less by design and perhaps 
by circumstance, my interaction with individuals and selected participants reflected informal 
conversation-type interviews (though given the time involved, these bordered on in-depth 
interviews). For the “formal” interviews that I had with selected persons, I made use of 
schedule pre-prepared and piloted interviews and conducted them face to face. Obviously, 
informal exchanges and accidental communication were (highly) informative and led to 
unexpected information and in cases new insights. Some of these interactions assisted in 
reflecting and correcting previously incomplete or even incorrect ideas that I held. 
 
A list of themes or topics was used in conducting these interviews – or focused interviews, as 
they are more commonly referred to. The main topics in the schedule were identified during 
sustained interaction with practitioners and theorists and then piloted in an interview with a 
prominent Ugandan academic and transitional Minister of Justice after the fall of Idi Amin. 
Refinement took place after soliciting comments from peers and persons versed in military 
and civil affairs. 
 
The chief aim of the qualitative element in this exploratory-descriptive study was to generate 
data on the TRC as well as to reach an understanding of the TRC’s role in CMR in South 
Africa. In addition, these focused interviews facilitated access to information that can simply 
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not be adequately obtained through the study of literature alone. The qualitative approach here 
is particularly valuable following the release of the TRC report and its relevancy to this 
study.74 Apart from making use of the extensive published material in the areas of TRCs and 
CMR in new or emerging democracies, literature on democratisation and transition to 
democracy in the aftermath of authoritarian or oppressive rule, other methods were applied. 
 
An interview schedule derived from consulting research materials for a variety of wide-
ranging discussions with theorists, practitioners and colleagues was compiled. Thus, semi-
structured interviews played an important part in the chosen methodology. Face-to-face 
interviews were generally conducted. 
 
During the course of the study, I realised that additional e-mail schedules sent out to peers and 
practitioners added value. Firstly, it allowed for a measure of peer review and, hence, internal 
validation. Secondly, it partly constituted a measure of triangulation or rather transferability. 
It provided a soundboard for reflection on the main themes of the study and the research steps 
taken. What I thought initially would at best add additional data, turned out to be of 
importance for the research project. The peers and practitioners that I approached came from 
various countries, i.e. Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe, The Netherlands, Turkey, Portugal, 
Italy and Angola. In all cases I ensured that the persons who were approached had exposure to 
or knowledge of the problems of countries that had experienced a transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy. I contacted participants or informants by telephone, fax or e-
mail. If they agreed to respond, schedules were sent by e-mail to be filled out and returned. 
Clarifying was done telephonically, where necessary. In a few cases participants requested the 
schedule to be relayed to them by post or fax and I received their feedback in the same way. 
 
The analysis of the data relied on the literature review and accumulated knowledge obtained 
through the interviews and ad hoc exposure and consultations over an extended period. The 
eyes of people in a living process and what Eurocentrics would call “oral tradition”, form part 
of the research body. 
 
2.12. Data capturing, safeguarding and retrieving 
 
Since one wants to capture as completely as possible the experiences and viewpoints of 
research participants, I had to ensure that I secured these. I did this by recording field-notes 
                                                 
74 For the interview schedule, see Appendix 3 (page 473). 
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after interviews and observation sessions and reading/studying unsolicited documents 
(minutes of meetings, official documents). In one case, I tape-recorded a panel discussion 
with the permission of the participants, in which the issues of TRC processes, civil-military 
issues and internal conflict were discussed, to be used for reflection and further analysis. The 
tape-recorded interviews were secured as well as possible for later use. The same applied to 
the panel-discussion recording. Because of lack of funding some interviews were transcribed 
while others were carefully summarised from the recordings. Transcriptions were held for 
safe-keeping. 
 
Since 1983, I have kept files of newspaper cuttings,75 news bulletins, newsletters, anti-
apartheid (grassroots) newspapers, as well as publications and pamphlets by anti- and pro-
apartheid groups, which I obtained through my access due to previous involvement with 
various research institutions and civic/activist bodies. Twenty years down the line such 
materials constituted valuable archival resources. [Many of these publications were 
occasional, ad hoc and written during the struggle “deemed to be ‘subversive’ at the time”) 
and hence cannot be found in archives today]. I took part in a workshop on violence between 
the police and the community in the Western Cape, as well as the debates on the Don Foster 
report (October 1985), and this provided access to more data on apartheid human-rights 
transgressions. Participation in newspaper debates against National Party loyalists on the 
Forster “torture” report, which was described by some pro-state academics as “politics under 
the pretence of science” played a role in honing one’s own convictions (Diko van Zyl in Die 
Burger, 27 October 1985).76 A project undertaken for the Centre for Intergroup Studies on 
media representation of conflict in South Africa and an earlier project on the role of the media 
(circa 1983) also played a role.77 
 
                                                 
75 One file was labelled “Van Marteling tot Moord” (From Torture to Murder). Looking at it today, it 
recalls the sad history of racial oppression and the callousness of  Christian National politicians. 
76 Because of its uncritical pro-National Party stance, the newspaper was frequently referred to by 
people critical of government policies at the time as Die Buiger – in other words “bending the truth”. 
Die Burger’s sister newspaper, Beeld, also owned by the pro-government Nasionale Pers, was likewise 
referred to as Skewe Beeld, meaning to present a skewed picture of political realities in South Africa.   
77 Some of the colleagues who came out in defence of the Don Forster report that alleged widespread 
torture in detention during the state of emergency in South Africa were Amanda Gouws (Department of 
Political Science, Stellenbosch), Johan Graaff (Department of Sociology, University of Cape Town), 
Susan Roothman (Stellenbosch) and Kobus Sadie, a friend studying engineering (then University of 
Stellenbosch). Various academics from UCT and other universities also took part in heated public 
contestations related to the report. Their public stance stood in sharp contrast to academics loyal to the 
National Party, who in an apparatchik way defended government and its treatment of detainees by 
security forces. 
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While in the service of IDASA, I kept a copy of each of IDASA’s publications, such as 
Democracy in Action, an IDASA bulletin and IDASA Occasional Papers. Again, these would 
prove to be valuable archival sources. After the start of the TRC debates circa 1992/1993, I 
did the same by archiving newspaper cuttings and other publications. Likewise, these would 
prove to be invaluable as background material. 
 
The fact that I retained a large volume of notes and impressions filed with articles and 
newspaper cuttings prior to 2000 (and subsequently), as well as notes on various lectures, also 
proved of great value. The capturing of the data is discussed in more detail in the chapter on 
scholarly material and the analytical chapter related to interviews and other qualitative 
information sourcing. 
 
2.13. Data analysis 
 
The following is relevant: “The language of qualitative research is one of interpretation … 
(qualitative researchers) discuss cases in their social context that emphasise tracing the 
process and sequence of events in specific settings” (Neuman, 2000: 144). “A qualitative 
researcher begins with a research question and little else. Theory develops through the data 
collection process. This more inductive method means that theory is built from data or 
grounded in data … A qualitative researcher builds theory by making comparisons” Neuman, 
2000: 145 146). For this reason Neuman suggests that context is critical and qualitative 
researchers are natural bricoleurs. They learn to be adept at doing many things, drawing on a 
variety of sources and making do with whatever is at hand (Neuman, 2000: 146–147. See also 
Schwandt, 1997: 10–11). 
 
I applied a mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning tactics, which are part and parcel of 
modernistic qualitative methodology. More specifically, insights gained from participants and 
my own experience, as well as social science concepts (used in military sociology and related 
fields) played a role in illuminating the data. To return to the tracking metaphor: I proceeded 
from basic and systematic tracking to interpretive tracking, aware that speculative tracking 
can provide insights on personal growth as well as social processes in the chosen field, though 
it should be used with care. 
 
In systematizing the data, there are various informal and formal methods qualitative 
researchers use. I selected and ordered the collected materials (my personal archive) and 
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marked them clearly. In many cases, I read an article and made short notes on it, identifying 
main themes or arguments. Thus it is possible to review them – even if months or years later. 
 
I made “field notes” by recording my impressions, my own approach, that of the respondent, 
and comments on the interview setting immediately after an interview. Thus, the interview 
and field notes were secured on one recording, marked and safely stored. In some cases, I 
took a note or two during a discussion, especially on terminology or arguments that I did not 
know, and in the minority of cases I also wrote brief field notes in addition to the notes that I 
recorded. [Consult Bryman (2004: 308–309) for types of field notes.] These notes were 
sometimes detailed and in other cases rather cryptic.78 Later on, I worked through them on my 
own, where needed consulting closely with peers such as Willem Schurink (later to become 
my promoter) and Rialize Ferreira, a colleague. Two further peer debriefers were selected in 
consultation with the promoter and co-promoter and kindly contributed their criticisms and 
insights. They were General Solly Mollo (ex-MK, now senior military staff member) and 
Colonel Louis du Plessis, previous director of the Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS) at the 
Military Academy in Saldanha. 
 
In most cases where I attended seminars, conferences or talks I made notes and/or got hold of 
the papers and, in quite a few cases, solicited additional material from the speaker or 
respondents on the panel. I made use of a systematic approach when possible, backed up by 
an informal approach. I applied some elements of grounded theory and analytic induction.79 
From my own experience in this study and previous ones I have found that the combination 
works well. I have to admit that in some cases my experience was that persons share much 
more of their insights informally once they know what one is interested in than when 
approached formally– in which case the classic interview bias between interviewee and 
interviewer encroaches. In formal interviews this frequently applies to both interviewee and 
interviewer. This explains why I limited interviews and made use of the informal approach 
when it seemed more fruitful, which it proved to be in the case of this study. 
 
What Becker (1998: 207) calls a “not so rigorous analytic induction” (Becker 1998: 207ff), 
was used. I did the recording of data manually and did not make use of any computer-assisted 
qualitative software. 
                                                 
78 Mental notes and notes jotted down as tools of the trade are relevant here (Bryman, 2004: 308).  
79 Incorporating various elements of the former position, Bryman (2004: 400) writes: “Analytic 
induction is an approach to the analysis of data in which the researcher seeks universal explanations of 
phenomena by pursuing the collection of data until no cases that are inconsistent with a hypothetical 
explanation (deviant or negative cases) of a phenomenon are found.” (Emphasis added.) 
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2.14. The research narrative 80 
 
The human tale or narrative forms an intrinsic part of the life and history of the human 
animal. Talking narrative, tale, story or fact is a qualifyable human trait. 
 
Schurink (2004: 14) argues that there seems to be few, if any, agreed-upon canons or 
heuristics for evaluating new forms of qualitative research. It is generally accepted that 
readers should judge the credibility of research as described in research reports. Part of the 
evaluation, separate from the issues discussed earlier, is to provide a “trial” of execution 
(some may prefer to call this an audit-trial); simplistically put, to tell the story of the steps 
taken in the course of doing the study. To use an earlier metaphor: it aims to provide the 
reader with some “tips” to track the tracks of the researcher – to confirm or double-check the 
tracker’s tracking. 
 
Though the qualitative researcher should provide information on the procedures used in the 
research, this does not imply a complete exposition of all these steps. Ipso facto, a complete 
exposé of decisions taken during the execution of the project is not required. In contemporary 
qualitative research it is accepted that the problem of establishing credibility can be solved by 
providing what Becker (1970) originally called the natural history of a research project. 
 
In the remainder of the work, I present an account of how the study was executed, the 
building blocks brought together. This narrative, or in Becker’s (1970) term “natural history”, 
represents a “story” of the various steps I took in executing this project. At this point I offer 
some key steps. I refer to tentative results of the research and provide information to assist the 
reader in establishing the study’s credibility (Athens, 1984; Schurink 1989; Silverman, 2000) 
and through analysis of data and acquired materials conclude with some pointers for future 
civil-military research and research in the field. 
 
Overall, I deploy an auto-ethnographic style, telling the story of the SATRC and selected 
other TRC-type cases as much as I tell about my personal experiences before and during the 
study. However, here I restrict myself to some brief, and perhaps cryptic, comments in this 
regard. The reader will be able to infer much of the “story” in the subsequent chapters. 
 
                                                 
80 I chose the term “The Research Narrative” rather than the formal term ‘Executing the Study’. The 
latter reminds me about formalism and a technical exercise, a sort of imposed research technocracy. 
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My experiences as an advocate of democracy and activist led me to an interest in 
democratisation studies, which was eclipsed (or complemented, rather) by my interest in the 
SATRC and comparable experiences. But CMR entered the picture, as abuse of power relates 
to security governance. By 1999, I had decided (in broad outline) to link these three areas. 
 
In 2000 I enrolled at Unisa in the Department of Sociology, where I was appointed in a 
contract position. It was at that point that, in terms of time frames, the past, present and future 
research choices merged. My past experience, exposure in various academic and non-
academic environments, collection of materials over an extended period and continuous 
fruitful contact with others active in the area (firstly practitioners; secondly observers and 
thirdly theorists)81 were relevant to the topic. 
 
The study progressed slowly, although I wrote a few articles in related fields that were 
published in accredited journals. Vladimir Shubin suggested that I deliver chapters on a 
monthly basis. I had a first – rather thin – draft of five chapters ready by the end of 2002 (My 
then first promoter played a low key role). Vladimir provided detailed feedback and critical 
remarks on each chapter within a short time. Mostly I ran behind in incorporating his 
comments and he would “chase” me for further work. This draft I expanded during 2003, but 
it was a slow process with intermittent disruptions (the fact that I took on trade union 
responsibilities and publishing projects did not assist either in constant progress). During 
2003, I also started conducting the face-to-face interviews according to a considered schedule. 
This was after the pilot interview had been done. The unstructured in-depth interviews and 
informal exchanges go back more than a few years. 
 
In the latter part of September and the first part of October 2004, I took recess leave and 
“receded” to a farm, named Rooigat in the Bushveld (Limpopo Province) – kindly offered for 
use by Tienie and Hettie du Plessis and Louis van Wyk, where I could work without 
interruption – or relatively so (I lectured once a week at a university in Johannesburg and had 
to travel from the Northern Province/Limpopo to Johannesburg – approximately three hours, 
thus a minimum of six hours to and fro. Occasionally I would stay over for a night in Pretoria 
on return from lectures to fit in a karate class and see Mariaan and the children). 
 
                                                 
81 During, for example, visits to Portugal, Spain and The Netherlands between 1996 and 1998, I was 
fortunate to meet people from countries that I was considering as part of the comparative component of 
the study. Contact with, for instance, Rui Perreira, Nuno Rigeiro (Portugal) and Raphael Banon (Spain) 
proved useful. 
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The relative distance from the everyday work and humdrum resulted in some progress. By 
then, peer reviews and peer debriefing had become part of the process, as well as feedback 
from especially my co-supervisor, who had extensive knowledge of South African politics. 
 
An important milestone came in October 2005 when I was able, amid a rather hectic 
programme, to take 23 days’ recess leave (weekends included, this allowed for some 30 
days). Given the continuous feedback by means of peer debriefing from Willem Schurink, 
later to become my first promoter, and Rialize Ferreira, which contributed to the research 
process, and the added value of (re-)analysing the interviews, the study benefited. In the 
meantime, I also received valuable feedback from a theorist-practitioner, Prof Deon Fourie. 
He made comments on my research approach and provided quite a few substantial points of 
criticism on various aspects that needed reflection. 
 
Early in 2005, in discussion with a colleague, I decided to add a request for information, 
partly along the lines of the interview schedule, from learned colleagues, about half of them 
living and working outside South Africa. They were experienced people in the case study or 
comparative countries that I selected. I approached them by e-mail, except in cases where 
there was no e-mail contact. In such cases I did it in writing, with surprising results. I received 
a variety of unsolicited materials, apart from feedback from these persons. As I was able to 
make new contacts, such as with the ISA RC 01 group (the military sociology research 
committee) during an ISA Congress in Durban in 2006, I succeeded in receiving more e-mail 
feedback as late as May 2007. 
 
The past three and a half years was, in some respects, not amicable on a personal level. Two 
close friends, Rocky Williams and Elize Botha, died and my father passed away. In late 2006 
I lost another close colleague and friend, Ruhr Martin, in unnatural circumstances. These 
experiences were strenuous and painful. A publication on the Anglo-Boer War experienced 
several delays, and sapped energy. Yet, in many respects, I found the completion of this 
thesis, despite setbacks, more satisfying than was the case with my master’s dissertations (one 
at Stellenbosch and one at the University of the Western Cape.) This was mostly due to the 
support and friendship of colleagues, good friends, my life partner, children and a relatively 
amicable living environment.82 
 
                                                 
82 When my life partner asked my son what he was doing, playing around in his room, he commented: 
“Ek werk aan my D!” If I-Ben was “working on his D”, Marian before my departure to Cuba for a 
conference reminded me: “Pappa moet nie van jou D vergeet nie!” 
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The final part of the process confronted me with a familiar consternation: when should one 
conclude an article, or a book, or a thesis … Looming deadlines, your daily work, current or 
new projects, family involvement and matters of mere “life administration” assisted in 
enforcing the decision to keep writing and finally to stop writing – the latter sometimes a 
grave challenge, as new sources and ideas keep cropping up. 
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ROLLING STONES, DISTANT TALES AND MAKING BOOKS: 
Your story is my story, my story is your story and theirs … 
 
In the work A Hero of Our Time, by Mikhail Lermontov the reader finds an interesting rupture in 
telling a story. Halfway into the novel Lermontov informs us that a certain Pechorin died. We are 
informed that this freed the narrator in this novel because he could now publish excerpts and notes 
from the writing of this man that somehow came into his possession. The novel continues and the 
reader has to assume – if we can believe Lermontov – that we are now reading Pechorin’s journal. 
It remains unclear to the reader up till the end whether it is the experience of the narrator himself 
being written, or a tale taken from a dead man.83 “Kafka’s world does not resemble any known 
reality; it is an extreme and unrealized possibility” (Kundera, 1988: 43). This brings us to 
allegories and a tale such as this: 
 
“Sometimes one stumbles on half-written narratives. If not for a dustbin that was blown over 
in a strong wind, I would never have found this one: 
 
The human tale covers wide territory. It could be descriptive, enquiring, confessional or 
evocative. It more or less only excludes inert passivity. It implies in cases scepticism about 
concepts such as Neutrality or the greater Objectivity that earmarks Regimental Science. It 
also invokes the problematic distinction between scientific narrative, experience, emotion and 
human interpretation. It frequently involves the ontological-ethical being, the thinking, feeling 
human animal. 
 
The human animal has inherited the heuristic possibility to share experiences – in this case 
say for example a narrative lifted from a dustbin, similar to the journal that Lermontov’s 
character stumbled upon … 
 
In a narrator’s voice: A student/candidate submitted a manuscript to a university. Two 
examiners, including presumably her/his then supervisor, came to the judgement that it was not 
acceptable and had to be revised. Two examiners found it “solid academic work” with the 
proviso that changes be made. As a result the work was referred back to the author. A referral of 
a thesis/dissertation can be compared with one’s first article submitted to an academic journal 
being shot down in flames or coldly rejected out of hand, or worse, a manuscript deemed 
worthwhile being declined by a publisher, or after training for years, failing one’s black belt 
examination in karate, or discovering that despite all the money one has put into one’s pension 
or an insurance policy for years, one will only get 42 percent of the amount one has contributed 
– and that before tax is deducted! And so it can go on … 
 
Food for thought: One should not abandon one’s ship, camel or chosen horse. In the 
terminology of the seafarer, do not jump ship (nor underestimate the value of the ship’s kombuis 
[gallery]. The author as one of many voices in the narration did not do this. Roasting an 
acceptable leg of lamb or warthog, stirring the right soup and constructing a worthwhile book 
share similarities … all ask for involvement in the undertaking; being “there” is an imperative. 
Just as in making a good dish, the research narrative needs spices, preferably from distant lands, 
real living material and human touch … and people. 
 
                                                 
83 The same can be said about some works by Milan Kundera. Kundera frequently deploys the same 
technique; telling a story to the reader through other voices. ”The novel is not the author’s confession; 
it is an investigation of human life …” Kundera explains thus: “If I locate myself outside the novel … 
it does not mean that I wish to deprive my characters of an interior life … it means that there are other 
enigmas, other questions to pursue” (Kundera, 1988: 27). A recent South African novel by Andrew 
Brown (2005), Coldsleep Lullaby, richly weaves the university town of Stellenbosch and its 
apartheid/post-apartheid realities into a socio-historical and somewhat psychological novel disguised as 
a detective narrative that deconstructs the racism of the past and present. All the time different voices 
speak, deploying an interesting discursive or structural trick (I have to thank Bernadette Richards for 
bringing this novel to my attention). 
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In making good food, people are integral. It is the same in passages into the world of RE-
Search. Research collaboration works on at least four levels. Cooperation with supervisors, 
peers and colleagues the narrator recalls is important to the recipe. It also and by necessity if not 
as primary value, involves the non-academic community as one of the strongest pillars in 
reliable narratives. And as in theories of stratification, one finds the concepts vertical and 
horizontal and grassroots strapped into the equation. 
 
Let’s say the failed student (re-)engaged with the study with a new first promoter and the tried 
and tested second promoter who had been there from the beginning. Things change. 
 
The second promoter from the early beginnings of his appointment was always there, giving 
feedback, criticism, advice and in cases acting as devil’s advocate – much needed in qualitative 
research. But not only this; through his interaction he frequently opened new vistas for the 
student/candidate via his critical approach. Needless to say she/he (the candidate) appreciated 
this dearly and continued to work with the second promoter or supervisor. 
 
The new first promoter of the candidate (whom he had known for years and with whom he had 
cooperated in qualitative research projects for a decade or more before), was passionate about 
his work and interaction with students. More so, he was passionate in sharing experiences on 
successes and failures – even if personal. What a difference … 
 
The first promoter immediately engaged with the second one, to which the candidate stuck 
because there was trust – and the additional element of a human relationship (maybe both the 
candidate and his second promoter were part activist, part academic interested in application and 
social change). The first promoter, in realising this, honed the tri-lateral communication between 
candidate and supervisors that did not exist before. (Here was another promoter with a feeling 
for contexts, different voices, and possessing a unique inherent emotional intelligence. A most 
suitable mix between the human and professional being, one may argue …) 
 
The first promoter made time to meet with the second promoter and candidate even when 
faced with limited time. The second promoter, despite a distance of several thousand 
kilometres, made time to meet with the first promoter and the failed candidate face-to-face – a 
tradition that the second promoter established earlier in his relationship with the student (the 
student likewise, when money permitted, did the same). Despite globalisation and the so-
called information society few interactions are as valuable as extended personal interaction … 
 
Also helpful were the regular workshops that the first promoter arranged for his Master’s and 
PhD students to discuss qualitative research methodologies, (auto-) ethnography and logistical 
problems on the research path. It also brought students together that could share their 
experiences, difficulties and successes and most of all, information and laughter. 
 
Blowing winds are interesting things …” 
 
 
 
2.15. Conclusion 
 
The study parts ways with other studies that try to analyse and validate the SATRC (or any 
other for that matter) or ones that advocate the SATRC and others in a moral or political 
sense.84 Also, it differs from studies attempting to reflect, or focus exclusively on a history of 
                                                 
84 Examples in this genre include Asmal (1994), Asmal et al. (1996), Boraine, Levy and Scheffer 
(1994), Boraine (2000), Van Roermund (1997), and implicitly, Shriver (1995). 
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violence (and counter-violence) and its possible consequences for a philosophical and 
historical-moral debate or historian’s debate.85 
 
Instead, the study aimed at the practical by taking a case study, namely the SATRC, to 
enhance a specific demarcated area, namely CMR and civilian oversight over security 
agencies in sustaining a human-rights culture and expand/deepen democracy in South Africa. 
In the process of casing, the value of similar cases that were completed or still running was 
considered. I made the choice here to look at completed cases as well as cases still in process 
for an obvious reason: The completed cases and the “lessons learnt” could inform current 
cases and cases that may follow in the future. These cases, being ones completed, currently 
running or still to come, share two things: Firstly they are meant to benefit the post-
oppressive, post-conflict society and secondly they share a conviction or at least the hope that 
future recurrences will be prevented. The past ones share a third communality, namely lack of 
foresight to address the future role of and control over the military by civil institutions as part 
of the set mandate. 
 
Using a case-study approach, complemented by comparative data and involved research, and 
using documentary research and qualitative approaches, the aim was not to provide moral 
pointers, but to provide rich description of a social context and finally practical 
recommendations including meta- and meso-policy (policy design, formulation and 
implementation) to the benefit of human dignity and human rights in a new democracy within 
a civil-military context. The study aimed to do this without losing the flavour, or the 
experience, of recalling a rich socio-historical collage and political dynamics. 
 
Experience and the individualised narrative of “society in process” following authoritarian 
rule comes into play – not in DIS-Stance but through Being as part of a collective. 
 
In planning and executing the study, practical considerations played their part and in cases 
played a part with me as author. Studies can also dictate at stages … after all, the researcher is 
but a tool in a much larger social process. 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Examples in this genre include Buur (2001), Cherry (2000), Duvenage (1994, 1998), Verwoerd 
(2005), Goosen (1999), Liebenberg and Duvenage (1995), Norval (1999), Magubane (1998) and 
Liebenberg (1999). 
 109
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE SCHOLARLY REVIEW: WHAT YOU READ AND WHAT READS YOU 
 
 
There are the author’s position (including his views on using constructs and existing research 
results) and the positions of researchers and research participants … and providing new and 
innovative forms of display which have impacted across the whole field regardless of the 
epistemological tradition or the research approach chosen – Gribich, 2007: 12. 
 
One acquires the right to a story through ‘going out there’ … i.e. the empirical experimental 
paradigm … I could not have confined myself to my room when researching … There would 
have to be a field … and journeys … the rights of passage into communities … 
– Chaim Noy, 2003: 3. 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Qualitative research is certainly about going out there and rites and or rights of passage. It is 
also a journey or journeys – in this case journeys into state of the art publications on the topic. 
 
“A literature review is a description, critical analysis and evaluation of relevant texts – both 
current and seminal – that relate to your research topic. On the basis of the literature review 
you develop an … argument for your own research. The literature review in qualitative 
research is not completed at any early stage but continues to be upgraded through the entire 
period of your data collection, analysis and writing up the final document” – my italics 
(Daymond & Holloway, 2002: 35).86 
 
Literature is a living entity and so, I believe, should the scholarly review be. If a living being 
reads a text the text is not only “out there”, i.e. a cold/distant discourse between neutral 
observers, or a research subject to be objectified. It is also up close and personal. Therefore, 
before proceeding some reflections are in order. 
 
                                                 
86 The reader will notice that as far as the literature review goes, it already started in Chapter 1 and 
continued in Chapter 2. It follows in subsequent chapters as the qualitative/scientific narrative evolves 
while tracking. 
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Reading literature alive – history, being and social contexts: As a rational being, one needs to 
be aware of the interplay of fact, reality and the interpreting subject, the “I” of research. It was 
important for me to remind myself that one could easily “impute ‘reality’ to certain things” 
(Gouldner in Boalt, 1969: Introduction: xix. See also Hookway & Pettit, 1978: 17ff, 43ff, 
107ff, 127ff and 145ff; and Joubert, 1979). This is true for the sociologist, as for any other 
human being. Through vertical and horizontal interaction with research participants, peers, 
peer debriefers, the promoters and the voices uttered in the literature, the goal of transparent 
intersubjectivity could be kept in mind. (On transparency and reflexive research, see Higate & 
Cameron, 2006: 219ff; Kvale, 1995; Lincoln & Guba, 2002: 205: Holliday, 2007: 135. 
Consult Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007: 27, 29–31 on the value of literature. 87) 
 
Micro and macro: An intellectual awareness of a Weberian ideal type distinction of micro- 
and macro-sociology is relevant for my discussion. What is referred to as the micro-context 
and the macro-context is much more closely intertwined (“messy”, if you like) than we would 
sometimes prefer it to be (see Cicourel, 1981: 51ff). For that reason, one should be careful to 
make concrete distinctions uncritically as it can obfuscate (or at least camouflage) some 
helpful insights in the course of one’s research. Ideal-type distinctions are problematic in the 
literature and should perhaps be treated as a nuisance variable that manifests it presence 
throughout a/this study.88 Even in this review the distinctions made are haunted by close 
linkages and in some cases their “messiness”. We may – and I did – distinguish them by 
headings or topics such as here or in the attached appendix on key concepts. But as in social 
life or the world of sociology, these topics or headings complement one another at times. 
These topics may even infringe on or devour one another. This forms part of the world of 
research – making sense from different voices. 
 
Definitions and “us”: Definitions shape us as much as the data we confront. That is part of 
the sociology of research. Gouldner argues: “I suggest that it is not only theories or facts, but 
anything that the sociologist defines as ‘real’ that will shape his work importantly. For 
                                                 
87 Qualitative research, especially ethnography and auto-ethnography, and works of literature share two 
potential entrapments. In writing these reflections I was reminded of a statement by Kundera: 
“Something essential has the right to exist (but can be) too “weighed down by technique, by 
conventions that do the author’s work for him”. In such a case one way ahead is to rid the work of the 
automatism that detracts. Secondly, one does have no hope of “encompassing the complexity of 
existence in the modern world in one book” (Kundera, 1988: 72–73). However ethnography and 
especially auto-ethnography share an important liberatory possibility with works of literature; that is 
what Kundera calls polyphony – the simultaneous presentation of two or more voices that are bound 
together and yet keep their relative independence (Kundera, 1988: 74). 
88 For more detail consult Harré in Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel 1981, as well as contributions to this 
edited work (1981). 
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simplicity’s sake I will suggest that there are two kinds of things that are imputed to have 
reality by any sociologist. One consists of ‘facts’ yielded by previous researches, whether 
conducted by themselves or others. The second however consists of what I will ‘call’ the 
personal ‘real’. These are aspects of the social world to which sociologists will, like those 
who are not sociologists, impute reality because of their personal experiences; because of 
what they have seen, heard, been told, or read and which are distinct from the ‘facts’ that they 
have systematically gathered and evaluated” (Gouldner in Boalt, 1969: Introduction: xx). 
Gouldner argues that many elements in the “personal” reality have been developed long 
before the sociologist was professionally trained or intellectually mature (Gouldner, in Boalt, 
1969: Introduction, xx).89 
 
I agree. After all, the research that we do, stand on a much older tradition and is underwritten 
by a larger stream of life. Our contributions are always measured against a much larger 
canvass and as such should install a much needed humility in us. But it also tells us a lot about 
human potential, freedom and agency and infuses us with energy (on agency and action see 
Barry Barnes, 2000). Again in qualitative research the involvement and inter-linkages of 
written text, discourse and the researcher play an informative and crucial role. 
 
In a similar vein it is argued that “the values of researchers can never be eradicated from their 
work and no amount of methodological technique or declarations of bias can strip them of 
their theoretical presuppositions” (Higate & Cameron, 2006: 220). Higate and Cameron, it is 
worth noting, work on military-related issues. The social conditions of research refracted 
through the researcher as human “tool” cannot be separated from the researcher’s work 
(Higate & Cameron, 2006: 221). In view of this Higate and Cameron suggest that in 
redressing the previous imbalances caused by an excessive focus on empiricism in military 
sociology, there is now a need for researchers that write themselves into research through 
reflection. Janowitz and Kurtz point out that in the past applied scientific approaches deferred 
much needed reflexive approaches (Higate & Cameron, 2006: 221). This also applies in 
dealing with literature (Holliday, 2007: 114 ff, 123 ff). 
 
                                                 
89 This does not by definition invoke only values. The social action/practical action element can cause a 
fusion of describing circumstances and description of events. Reflexivity – derived from Garfinkel – 
enters the picture (Cuff & Payne, 1980: 129–130). Sociologists of all orientations, also reflexive ones, 
still have to struggle with the notes of caution offered by Cicourel that common-sense knowledge can 
be used in unexamined ways. Being resourceful sociologists, for Cicourel, should more frequently 
complicate their resources. In criticising orthodox sociological methods, Cicourel opened an avenue for 
alternative approaches, which is relevant here. 
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“Venturing in”: Awareness of the above, my immersion in others’ experiences and subjective 
qualitative data linked with a long-time developing interest in the area under study, 
surrounded my first steps venturing into an array of literature collected since the early and 
mid-1980s. These materials and others garnered up till 2007 complement the narrative 
tracked, the exploration undertaken. 
 
The examination guidelines provided by institutions of higher learning imply that one of the 
“rites of passage” into Academia is one’s ability to trace scholarly work related to one’ study 
subject, critically working through these sources and providing quotations or references from 
those regarded by scholars as accredited. At risk of a hyperbolic statement, the candidate 
needs to “imperitivise” the orthodoxy of repetition and so procure the researcher’s/candidate’s 
academic union card. In terms of tradition I trace the selected literature in this chapter. 
 
Before exploring the state of the art I refer to (1) some prominent matters and (2) constraints 
and challenges in the writing of the review. 
 
Matters that matter 
 
By tracing existing literature I step progressively into tracking a narrative of society and that 
of an individual and its implications within a broader setting. 
 
Secondly, the “literature review”, which Mouton (2000: 86) chooses to call a “review of 
existing scholarship”, the choice of design and methodology, subsequent fieldwork and 
collection of data, analysis, reflection and reporting of the findings, are important building 
blocks in traditional research (Bouma, 1996; Giddens, 2001; Manheim & Rich, 1981; 
Mouton, 2001: 86ff). 
 
In qualitative research, the process may lead to changing the emphasis on one issue (a matter 
that matters), rather than another as the project is executed or “evolves in the process of 
tracking”. The qualitative student immerses himself/herself in the human elements of the area 
being studied, their environments or “settings”, and the life world of subjects. Reading 
complements the setting and the process of study; it assists in bringing the human side of the 
story to life. The review of literature, in turn, provides some “natural history” or “audit trail” 
of materials consulted. 
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A good example of such work where a qualitative angle is combined with the reading of 
relevant documentation, is that of the acclaimed author Tina Rosenberg. Her work The 
Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts after Communism (1995) is an impressive qualitative 
journey, a narrative by the author. The narrative in itself comprises multiple stories of victims 
and oppressors such as Stasi agents (or perceived Stasi agents) that in themselves became 
victims through their suggested collaboration with security networks. Her qualitative journey 
written in an ethnographic style and allowing simultaneously different – often contradictory – 
voices to speak to the reader, includes a selected bibliography and frequent references to 
archival and unsolicited materials. Rosenberg does not claim objectivity in this work. She 
makes it clear that she dislikes authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Her discomfort with 
communism is blatantly clear. She is candid about her subjectiveness as observer. Her work 
does not present observer-participant elements, as she did not form part of the oppressive 
society, the resistance or the “cleansing” process following thereafter. Yet she colourfully 
describes and “imagines” the roles of participants, be they the oppressor’s agent or the victim 
or both. The agents or actors speak in their voices through their experiences to the reader. 
Rosenberg becomes a tool in communicating voices of experience. 
 
In her earlier work on Latin America, Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin 
America (1991), she followed the same pattern, combining her observer’s role with literature, 
differing deeply from the Latin American upper classes, well aware of their role in subjecting 
the poor to exclusion and consistent oppression. This includes the authoritarian rulers and 
their torturers as well as inhuman action taken by guerrilla movements or their leaders. She 
mingled with the military, torturers, human rights transgressors, high-flying upper class elite 
mimicking USA lifestyles, “bang-bang” journalists, guerrillas, victims and persons innocently 
caught up in the cross-fire of a violent society. All this time she was collecting materials and 
writing down these experiences, the narrative of a society unable to loosen the Gordian knot 
of cycle upon cycle of violence. In her exploration she shares her emotions with the reader. 
Yet the bibliography of this work sports an impressive array of literature on the subject. She 
relates a disconcerting narrative in classic auto-ethnographic style, using the “I” of an intense 
observer (Rosenberg, 1991).90 
 
Thirdly, one challenge in the review of literature in a chosen field is not to be side-tracked too 
much and too often. However, not to be side-tracked is not truly human! In the metaphor of 
                                                 
90 The work of David Goodman, Fault Lines: Journeys into the new South Africa, falls in the same 
genre: “The story that I tell in the following pages is about people. Real people …” (Goodman, 1999: 
ix). 
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tracking: side-tracking could be accommodated if it will add value to a study and assist in 
attaining the set objectives. Of course we know there are more often than not unintended 
consequences: One can lose valuable time on a side-track. But there is also the positive side. 
Sometimes, when one is led on a side-track, one may stumble on some valuable data and/or 
insights. Examples from the hard sciences are offered by among others Jardine (1978: 122–
124), Kuhn (1969: xi, 3, 11, 59–60), Watson (2003) and Feyerabend (1984). 
 
Fourthly, when reviewing literature one needs to know when to stop. It is contrary to our 
intention to be serious and interested simply to cut off and walk away. However, in the case 
of a thesis one needs to do so. Looking back, I often had to remind myself about this. My 
success in this was varied: the looming deadline resulted in having to stay within bound 
parameters – while it simultaneously dampened the fear that I could miss out on insights 
gained from literature. This is typical of social science research, particularly qualitative 
research. 
 
Bouma argues that “research is a disciplined way of coming to know something about 
ourselves and the world” (Bouma, 1996: 5). Perhaps more important: “… If the results of the 
research are clear, the researcher will be able to settle the questions (my paraphrasing), not by 
appeal to authority, but by appeal to the evidence they have collected and can show to others” 
(Bouma, 1996: 5).91 It is here that the literature review is important. Such a review, I contend, 
is a matter of (i) becoming “educated” by reading relevant literature, and (ii) literature in turn 
is filtered through one’s experience and the society in which one lives and (iii) the rites of 
passage bestowed on us as living interpreters. With reference to this study it is reasonable to 
argue that an acute awareness of political developments within the South African body politic 
and social systems and countries sharing comparable experiences added value. Consultation 
of a wide range of material over an extensive period together with personal experiences 
facilitated the formulation of the study’s research question. When discussing the literature 
study as interaction between oneself and literature, (you) as the reader, our society and social 
context in flux, including the impact of the review of consulted materials, had to be kept in 
mind. 
 
Fifthly, while qualitative research is certainly hard-won knowledge, it does not imply mere 
knowledge for the sake of knowledge; rather it is value-laden knowledge that contains 
elements of involvement to improve society or a part thereof. This also applies to knowledge 
                                                 
91 Bouma says nothing about un-settling questions or that “matters that matter” change consistently, 
sometimes unexpectedly outside the realm of prediction. His silence on this is a point for reflection. 
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gained by auto-ethnography. “Becoming experienced” or “educated” denotes agency rather 
than a static warehouse of “knowledge out there” (see among others Anfara & Mertz, 2006: 
189; Barnes, 2000: 17ff, 82ff.).92 
 
It is important to bear in mind that undertaking qualitative research need not be approached 
from a post-modernist perspective. Post-modernist research, among others, for me holds that 
individual agency may become so subsumed by a gaze of “coming to understand” so 
“uniquely” that it excludes social involvement aiming at the betterment of society (praxis). 
Praxis forms an important part of this thesis – if not the backbone.93 Social processes and 
humans (individual or as a collective) are intrinsically connected. One can’t escape the human 
obligation that to assist is to enhance the life of others through the rites of passage gained to 
communities and social processes. Here Noy makes an interesting point: “The metaphor of 
the journey, at times (backward looking – a propos nature) and at times modern (a propos 
science), means that the experience of becoming a scholar is that of the individual arriving at 
new destinations or colonies of knowledge, previously unknown” (Noy, 2003: 1). He adds 
that this is one metaphor of modern science, i.e. its progression into terra incognita (quoting 
Josselson & Lieblich, 2002; Green, 1993; Boorstin, 1983). Noy’s metaphor of being on a 
journey is analogous with my use of tracking as a metaphor. Like Noy, I harbour some 
skepticism about post-structuralism/post-modernism in deploying auto-ethnography with its 
qualitative roots. I agree with Noy (2003) that improvisation, intuition, candidness and 
personal as well as social and cultural sensitivities are sought and valued by the qualitative 
researcher.94 Again this applies to what is selected for the review of literature. 
 
The different rites of passage endow the scholar taking this approach with avenues that affect 
the researcher’s moral code when compared with his or her positivist-orientated counterpart: 
“One more conservative, and one more liberal, one more serious and the other one more 
playful, one more abstract, the other more embodied. Neutrality is exchanged for 
involvement, passivity for agency” (Noy, 2003: 5). However, because studying a concrete 
setting, as in this thesis, is anything but “playful” as Noy (2003) suggests, I prefer “fluidity”. 
                                                 
92 See also Bunge, M. 1996. Finding Philosophy in Social Science. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
On remarks related to the “public making” of the research process, or bringing the research in the 
“open sphere” consult Anfara, Brown & Mangione (2002: 28–38). 
93 See the Noy epigraph at the beginning of the chapter. For a useful – albeit general – definition of 
praxis consult Schwandt, T. A. 2001. Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry. New Dehli: Sage Publications.  
94 When facing persons committed to positivism in a debate/dialogue – or for that matter conservative 
politicians and economists – one may find that “are sought and valued” may have to be replaced by 
“could be sought and valued”, “should be sought and valued” or “progressively defended” or “needs to 
be advocated”. 
 116
The study and the literature (i) involve human beings, human pain, human difficulties and 
mistakes and their lasting consequences; human aggression and excesses that we as 
(collective) beings can apparently not overcome, but also (ii) implies possible successes in the 
application of research findings to the betterment of society. Literature on “lessons learnt”, be 
it from a failure or a success, is relevant here. 
 
Human experience and agency in the social world are not apart from society, but written into 
it. I took care to situate the individual in context and process. In this narrative, I could do 
nothing else. It also applies to my review of literature. 
 
Constraints as challenges 
 
The key challenges I faced in reviewing the situation were the following: 
 
Language Constraints: My inability to read French, Portuguese and Spanish resulted in my 
inability to study literature published on Argentina, Chile, Portugal and Lusophonic countries 
or Spain, except for works published in English. The same applies to French for use in 
African case studies. Not being able to read these languages resulted in many academic, 
official and/or popular sources being excluded. Access to sources in these languages would 
have been helpful when it comes to Latin American cases or African states like Rwanda, the 
DRC and others in the Great Lakes region. This lack of ability makes for a study poorer in 
content. I cannot escape this fact as auto-ethnographer. 
 
Limited budget. Accessing unsolicited materials such as personal memoirs, official 
documents, eye-witness accounts (i.e. affidavits), unpublished reports, personal 
correspondence or unpublished individual notes would have added value to this study, or on a 
more mundane level, yet of crucial importance, to interact with people in their own 
environment, i.e. staying over with a family, meeting a victim, visiting a military institution or 
hospital. Despite “globalisation” and the “information society” the physical visit means 
gaining real life rites of passage into other communities, which in the case of this study were 
outside my physical location. Site visits are both important and valuable in a qualitative study 
(see Rosenberg’s works mentioned earlier as example). 
 
During my first year of study, the National Research Foundation approved a grant of  
R50 000.00 for the study over the next four years. An amount of R8 000.00 was released for 
the first year. When I inquired the following year about the next instalment, I was informed 
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that, in future, one should apply on an annual basis owing to a change in regulations, but I had 
missed the deadline. At a next inquiry, I was told that it was too late to apply. At the same 
time I became aware of other students that seemingly did not have to re-apply. Rather than 
find my way through such a confusing array of stipulations I did not reapply (such an 
experience reminds one again of Weber’s view of bureaucracies having a “rationality” of their 
own). On my income and keeping financial obligations to (the extended) family in mind, 
taking out a bank loan to subsidise studies would likewise not be a wise step. This resulted in 
limited funding and ruled out regular site visits. It constitutes a definite limitation in this 
thesis. 
 
3.2. Talking about assumption(s) in reading selected literature 
 
I suggest that an apolitical military is not possible. The idea that there is a neutral or apolitical 
military for me is an uncritical – if not dangerous – assumption. It is a not-too-frequently 
discussed issue in literature by theorists in “highly developed states” or Western industrial 
democracies when referring to their own societies. However, in referring to and analysing 
“other” societies it is frequently mentioned. It seems in much of such literature – if not 
blatantly implied – that only the militaries of “developing” or “underdeveloped” states are 
politically inclined and interventionist or tend to covertly/overtly act as praetorians. It also 
seems that, with the exception of C. Wright Mills, John Kenneth Galbraith and Noam 
Chomsky, it is too seldom said that politicians in “developed democracies” (read: advanced or 
“mature” democracies) are also inclined to depend on their military and invite them into 
politics, if need be in civilian suits. In this area a need clearly exists for military sociologists 
in Western democracies to study and follow through on earlier critical reflections by Wright 
Mills [1977 (1959)], Galbraith (1969) and others. 
 
I make the assumption that no military, present or past, anywhere on the globe or in history in 
any society, is a-political. The military and related security agencies represent the (potential) 
coercive arms of the state and no state is neutral. The challenge in any society claiming 
democracy is to provide within the structures (and inculcate attitudes) in the new democracy 
for levels of civilian oversight and a veto of military intervention in internal politics and to 
control a military that becomes so influential that it undermines civil society and its 
representatives, to the detriment of that society, i.e. subvert human rights, instigate human 
rights transgressions or in their outward projection of power, lead a democratic society to war. 
In the latter case the potential of the military taking the lead together (or invited by) hawk-like 
politicians remains in every society, including so-called Western democracies such as the 
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USA. On the other hand militaries, the proverbial man on horseback, that end up in 
oppressive politics are not always the only party to blame. A counter-balance can be provided 
by the professional soldier through a moral praxis that restrains hawkish politicians when they 
open avenues for the use of the coercive arms of the state against its own people or in 
unjustified and continued aggression (militarist force projection) outside the borders of such a 
country, large or small. As a mirror image politicians should be aware that the security arms 
of the state, including the professional soldier, should not be invoked or manipulated 
(“invited”) into partisan internal politics (Ravnborg, 1998: 117 ff). In South Africa this 
happened with sad consequences and remains as a blotch to clear, a lesson learnt – to prevent 
similar occurrences under our current and future governments. I selected or rather exposed 
myself to literature covering an extended period. 
 
3.3. Selection and scope of the literature 
 
I will not address literature on qualitative research – more specifically the auto-ethnographic 
approach – and the scientific narrative here. They have been dealt with before and will crop 
up frequently as the exploration unfolds. 
 
The range of literature I selected covers areas related to the subject of study, that is political 
sociology, including political reconciliation and military sociology. Regarding military 
sociology I address CMR, civil control over the military, democratisation, (re-) 
democratisation and demilitarisation following oppressive rule. I do not provide any 
comprehensive discussion of concepts found in these areas but refer the interested reader to 
Appendix 2 (page 436) where I outline their key characteristics and features. 
 
Literature on states that made a transition from oppressive/authoritarian rule to democracy 
and subsequently followed TRC-like processes I reviewed was informative. Contrasted with 
literature on selected countries that opted for TRC-like processes, I consulted research on 
states that chose not to use TRCs but other options.95 
 
Reading about, reflecting on, and contrasting these different approaches allow for the research 
question to be addressed in its setting. Necessarily, I had to balance the reading on the case 
study, South Africa, and the added value of comparative perspectives – as I had to do with the 
interviewing, impromptu exchanges, gathering of solicited and unsolicited materials and 
                                                 
95 See the earlier typology in Chapter 1. 
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incorporation of my lived experiences. My insights were necessarily filtered through the “I” 
of the researcher (me as a subject or somatic being embedded in a broader social context). 
 
I perused literature on CMR and issues pertaining to civil control of the military. In the thesis 
I touch on issues such as “reform of the military”, “civilianising or democratising the 
military”, and the sometimes contested term “(re)professionalising the military”. In a study 
such as this, a variety of concepts inform one another, link up with other concepts themselves 
interlinked, and illuminate or clarify relevant focal questions or themes. 
 
I need to emphasise that I opt for a case study, but at the same time bear the necessity of 
socio-historical comparisons in mind. I take heed of the fact that the TRC concept is not 
entirely new. Neither is it unique to South Africa. This assumption enabled me to deal with 
TRCs in different contexts, in different time periods and to a degree comparable, but different 
subjective circumstances addressing similar issues. In addition to this, depending on given 
conditions, not all countries – and arguably with good reasons – having transitioned from 
oppressive, dictatorial or authoritarian rule, opted for a TRC-like process. 
 
The cases that come under scrutiny here – or rather initially triggered my interest, at the outset 
of the study – represent examples of options introduced in countries in Latin America, 
Southern Europe and Southern African countries. In the early phases of the project, I 
restricted the sources that I read to Argentina, Chile and South Africa as examples of TRC 
cases, while I limited non-TRC cases to Spain, Zimbabwe and Namibia. I do make brief 
references when applicable/illustrative to other cases in this exploration (i.e. Portugal and 
Uruguay). Naturally, in order to comprehend a particular TRC-like process requires some 
knowledge about others. Reading about one case frequently calls to mind others. With regard 
to broader casing I selected Nigeria and Rwanda. I chose not to investigate TRC-like 
processes in Eastern societies, for reasons such as a different religious setting, different socio-
cultural histories, values and traditions, may differ substantially from societies that nominally 
subscribe to the Christian paradigm.96 
                                                 
96 One of the main feeding sources of truth and reconciliation exercises stems from the Christian 
tradition, where it is believed that wrongs committed can be forgiven through confession, while those 
being wronged also receive the opportunity to witness and share their pain. In theory it also allows for 
perpetrators to confess their “wrongs” (read: “sins”) and ask for forgiveness – which may be 
forthcoming or not. Interpretations of truth and reconciliation by Western theorists work within such a 
framework and carry this text on a meta-level. See, for example, an informative work that deals with 
issues such as guilt, remembrance, time and forgiveness as the grammar of reconciliation 
(Christodoulidis & Veitch, 2001). One example of the many thoughtful chapters in this work is the 
work of Bert van Roermund on the grammar of reconciliation and reconciliation as a political process 
(Van Roermund, 2001: 175–190).   
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I also exclude the more recent case of East Timor because in a study such as this I had to limit 
the number of cases; I had to have a cut-off point. 
 
I excluded Eastern Europe despite advocacy for TRCs in the region as I had to limit the 
selected cases for study. I would suggest a further argument for exclusion here. The fusion of 
politics, civil society, the nature of the political systems and the role of the state security arms 
present qualitatively different cases in Eastern Europe. The role of the coercive/security arms 
of the state were mainly secret police and “self-censorship”, rather than per se the military’s 
involvement. When others subdued “subversion” the military in these countries stuck to their 
constitutionally prescribed role and did not interfere in politics in most cases, which stands in 
stark contrast to what happened in Latin America, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The 
secret police (including their willing informers) and social self-censorship did the subduing, 
not the military. 
 
Siding with Van Roermund who states that “reconciliation is a different process in different 
contexts” (Van Roermund, 2001: 175), I argue that reconciliation as a given relation of 
opposition versus oppression is deeply influenced by the cultural grammar. This holds true 
particularly in the case of Eastern European countries with integrated socialist systems. I 
exclude these cases because countries in this region and their relationships with civil authority 
have over many years developed qualitatively differently. 
 
On a more mundane level I had to limit the cases being studied, as many attempts at TRCs 
exist – too many to deal with in one work. More are currently under consideration or debated 
and this thesis, like any other project, has a cut-off point. I also do not deal with all the cases 
of TRC-like attempts in Latin America to deal with past oppressors.97 Argentina and Paraguay 
put previous rulers on trial, Argentina sentencing some to life imprisonment. The UN 
instigated a TRC-like process for El Salvador after the civil war. The cases in only a Latin 
American context are simply too numerous to deal with in detail for every example.98 Before 
discussing a case as distinct from other cases, I address the subject field here. 
                                                 
97Latin American attempts at unearthing the truth share similar backgrounds, such as authoritarian 
military rule and a social context with a Christian/Catholic background. The military and military 
leadership stand central to the process of oppression that evolved or where reversion to military rule 
through a coup d’ etat took place. In a generic sense the social conditions were similar – even if the 
concrete outcomes and/or success of such attempted processes differ. South Africa in this respect 
shares a similar background and experience (70 percent of the South African population nominally 
subscribe to Christian beliefs, whether Protestant, Catholic, Apostolic or independent indigenous 
churches such as the Zionist Church). 
98 In an earlier article (1996) in the Journal of Public Law I focused on among others Uruguay and 
Paraguay, which I skirt in this thesis. 
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3.4. Military Sociology: social sciences eyeing the soldier 
 
Military Sociology (MS) is a sub-discipline of Sociology. While CMR form part of MS, the 
area of CMR is not restricted to sociology but also encompasses political science, social 
psychology, (military) history, interdisciplinary studies, even political economy (compare 
Ball, 1981). At the same time the concept of CMR is younger than MS. I will discuss MS here 
before I move on to CMR later in the chapter. 
 
Before the development of the discipline of sociology by its founders, such as Auguste 
Comte,99 Harriet Martineau, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, 
people described and interpreted the military, which the founding fathers seldom did.100 
Various examples can be named. Some of these are Sun Tzu’s work The Art of War, written 
in 500 B.C. and several references to the role and conduct of the military in Lao Tzu’s Tao 
Teh Ching (Tzu was the founder of Taoism and his work was also written circa 500 B.C.). 
 
Nietzsche, Hobbes and Machiavelli found it important to refer to the phenomenon of the state, 
security and the military – in the case of Nietzsche quite scathing in his references to Prussian 
militarism and the militarised nation-state.101 Saint Simon (1760–1825) accredited with the 
founding of socialism, found it necessary to criticize the militarism of Napoleon and 
authoritarian practices of the fathers of the French revolution stringently (Collins & 
Makowsky, 2005: 18; Van den Aardweg, 1971: 74). In Africa someone like Naguib Mahfouz 
in the 1930s, through his novel Thebes at War, illuminated the links between warring parties, 
nations and the society touched by it [Mahfouz, 2003 (first edition 1944)]. 
 
Through narrative, history writing, social criticism and social philosophy the military in 
society became a point of debate and reflection before sociology as a formal discipline was 
established and in CMR as sub-sub-discipline set its sights on the theme. In the case of 
Mahfouz it was articulated outside the parameters of social science and manifested itself as a 
narrative on human society at war. 
 
                                                 
99 A protégé of Saint-Simon before a series of quarrels split them apart – see “The Prophets of Paris” in 
Collins and Makowsky (2005: 15 ff, 21). 
100 I would include Rosa Luxemborg here, but it is a contestable argument for later discussions. 
101 Nietzsche’s criticism of the state, politics – even the media – can be found in among others Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra (Penguin Translation, Foreword by Hollingdale, 1982: 75–78); A Nietzsche Reader 
(foreword Hollingdale),  1981: 220; Collins & Makowsky, 2005: 66ff). 
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In South Africa, before MS became an established practice, political actors pointed out the 
dangers of a military used in subduing people of the land in the 1800s. Edward Roux recalls 
an interesting incident from South Africa’s colonial history, namely the 1818 “Kaffir War” in 
the Eastern Cape. After the surrender (by his own decision) of Chief Makana, one of 
Makana’s headmen in discussion with the English Commander Willshire remarked: “(This) 
war, British Chief, is an unjust one. You are trying to extirpate a people which you forced to 
take up arms. When our fathers and the fathers of the Boers first settled in the Suurveld (an 
area west of the Fish River in the Eastern Cape) they dwelt together in peace. Their flocks 
grazed on the same hills, their herdsmen smoked together out of the same pipes; they were 
brothers … We wish for peace but your troops cover the plains and swarm in the thickets, 
where they cannot distinguish man from woman and shoot all” (Roux, 1964: 14–15). Sadly, 
things were to turn progressively worse. The rulers of the land were to use their military 
might in years to come. The last so-called “Kaffir War” (Frontier War) ended in 1878 and the 
Xhosa people came under the British heel. The Sotho people were defeated in 1854 at Berea 
by the British and the rest in the Sotho-Boer War of 1858. In 1879 the Zulu kingdom fell and 
the Bapedi people were subdued by military force by the British in 1877 and 1879 after 
holding the Transvaal Boers at bay in skirmishes in 1852, 1867 and 1869. After its defeat by 
Boer forces in 1898, Vendaland finally fell under British authority (Pampallis, 1991: 6, 12–
13). Chief Albert Luthuli, leader of the ANC, whose precursor was established in 1912, 
pointed out the dangers of the apartheid state using its military and security forces such as the 
South African Police (SAP) and the SADF, previously the Union Defence Force, against its 
own population (Luthuli, 1962).102 Similarly members of the then Liberal Party (LP) in South 
Africa objected to against the use of security forces against disenfranchised South Africans 
(Van der Westhuizen in Liebenberg et al, 1994: 87–88). 
 
                                                 
102 In a country that still reflected the antagonisms of the Anglo-Boer Wars, the Rebellion, the WW I 
amd WW II, the acronym for the South African military forces after 1948 reflected an interesting 
difference in their translation (South Africa had two official languages at the time, namely Afrikaans 
and English). In the English translation it was the South African Defence Force (SADF) derived from 
the Union Defence Force. In Afrikaans the new elite, among others Erasmus, the first Minister of 
Defence when the Malan government came to power on the apartheid dictum (1948), chose the Suid-
Afrikaanse Weermag (SAW)  It may be that the Dutch translation “weermacht” played a role here as 
Afrikaans had Dutch as feeding sourse. It happened to be a poorly chosen term. The word Weermag for 
many seemed to be a direct translation from Wehrmacht, associated with Nazi rule under Adolf Hitler 
(Hitler in coming to power changed the Weimar Republic’s defence forces’ name from Reichswehr to 
Wehrmacht). WW II that ended three years before was still fresh in the international collective 
memory. Apartheid with laws passed on separate living areas, separate “amenities”, homelands and 
resettlements, influx control, prohibition of mixed marriages and the 1960 state of emergency did not 
endear it to observers from the outside – or for that matter South Africans living on the receiving end of 
the racist policies. The SADF became associated with a partisan minority state; not a good starting 
point for optimal CMR. 
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In Namibia, then German West Africa, before the outbreak of the Herero War, Chief Samuel 
Maharero complained about the German use of security forces against his people. His appeal 
fell on deaf ears. The German – Herero War (also known as the 1904–1907 War of 
Resistance) broke out. This war would eventually lead to the Herero genocide that started in 
October 1904 under Gen von Trotha after the defeat of the Hereros at Hamakari (Katjivivi, 
1988: 9). Von Trotha bluntly stated, “I believe the Herero must be destroyed as a nation” 
(Katjivivi, 1988: 10). By the end of 1905 between 75 percent and 80 percent of the Herero 
population had been exterminated and 14 000 of the 16 000 survivors were in German 
concentration camps. Roughly 45 percent of the Nama population was destroyed (Katjivivi, 
1988: 10).103 Following the Treaty of Versailles the Union of South Africa became the 
mandate holder of Namibia as directed by the League of Nations. Again the military 
(including the newly created air force of South Africa) was deployed against Namibians i.e. 
the Bondelswarts people in 1922 (Maxwell & Smith, 1970: 29). Maharero’s earlier 
protestations about military force clearly made little impact. CMR meant unequivocally the 
military acting when and if deemed necessary against civilians that resisted state policies in 
Suidwes. Two months before, the same point was made at home when the newly established 
South African Air Force played its first role in active deployment, defeating what big business 
and government perceived to be socialist-orientated white mine workers in South Africa on 
the Transvaal mines in a strike. CMR, as in the Bondelswarts rebellion, meant subduing those 
that militated against government policies. South Africa’s treatment of its own citizens, the 
illegal occupation of Namibia and forays into Angola up to the end of the 1980s followed in 
this tradition. 
 
In sociology the issue of the military received little attention for some years. One theorist 
laments that “The problem of the influence of military organization of society has on the 
whole failed to attract the attention of social sciences” (Andrezejewski, 1954: 1).104 For Lang 
one area of omission remained “the place of the military in society” (Lang quoted in Van 
Aardweg, 1971: 93). Things were to change. At the University of Leiden (Rijksuniversiteit 
Leiden) J.A.A. van Doorn set out to write on the military in his work Sociologie van de 
organisatie (1956). In 1959 C. Wright Mills remarked critically on the military establishment, 
big corporations (i.e. advertising agencies) and government departments as belonging to the 
                                                 
103 During the Anglo-Boer War or South African War (1899–1901) 28 000 Boer women and children 
died in British concentration camps. Black South Africans that died in concentration camps accounted 
for 16 000, with the possibility that not all cases were recorded. Compared to this, the South Africans 
came off better under the British scorched earth policy under Kitchener than the Herero and Nama 
people as a result of German action taken by Gen. Von Trotha. 
104 Stanislaw Andrzejewski’s book was entitled Military Organisation and Society. London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul Ltd. (1954). 
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realm of “non-democratic areas of society” (C. Wright Mills, 1959: 114–115). In the same 
year Janowitz and Little published Sociology and the Military Establishment, which saw 
several reprints over the following years. 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s the number of publications increased sharply. Huntington 
released Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), offering the realisation that “political 
order is a goal not a reality” (Huntington, 1968: vii). The book was thoroughly anchored in 
the Eurocentric paradigm of political modernisation. At the time it was ranked as the most 
important book in the field in the USA. Despite the fact that that it was later criticised by 
some South African scholars, it was widely prescribed to South African political science 
students. At the risk of overstatement, my experience as a student was that it became a virtual 
handbook of “how things are to be done” when it comes to political modernisation – also with 
regard to South Africa where the order aspect received a lot of attention. Finer’s seminal work 
on the role of the military appeared somewhat earlier, in 1962. For many it became a standard 
book of reference. This happened because this work investigated various issues, i.e. political 
intervention by the military, but also motives that inhibit the military from intervention. It 
addressed weaknesses of the military (institution), modes and levels of intervention and the 
results of intervention in the past and insightful ideas about the future of the man on 
horseback. Finer’s work pointed to the creation of (ideal?) societal conditions where there is 
no case for intervention, nor a disposition towards intervention or possible socio-economic 
and political conditions that invite intervention; in short a context where “The military does 
not need its ‘own government’ and government does not need its ‘own military” (Finer, 1988 
(1962): 306). This at best is a tall order and points to the complexities of CMR. 
 
Several works looking at the military as institution, the military in society, and civil control 
over the military – with the term CMR not yet in vogue – appeared subsequently. Janowitz 
published Military Institution and Coercion in the Developing Nations (1964, republished in 
an expanded edition in 1977), again written in the modernisation paradigm. His contribution 
among others places emphasis on the education of the military elite and intervention and the 
economic factors that influence intervention, as well as notes on regime consolidation 
(Janowitz, 1977: 44 ff, 84ff, 125ff; 151ff). Military Sociology: A Study of American Military 
Institutions and Military Life by Coates and Pellegrin should be mentioned (Coates & 
Pellegrin, 1965). The work, after introducing the notion of MS, addressed several aspects of 
the military in society, such as the traditional role of the military (cultural and social settings 
coupled with dominant values), social change and institutions, formal hierarchies and 
informal relationships and military professionalism. Particularly important – and innovative – 
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was the analysis of “scientific management” as a concept, human relations and the “sociology 
of management” (Coates & Pellegrin, 1965: 177 ff, 245 ff). Likewise Coates and Pellegrin 
addressed the well-known sociological construct of social stratification. They reserved some 
space for critical remarks on the future of the military profession and problems concerning 
minority groups and racial integration (Coates & Pellegrin, 1965: 337 ff, 411 ff). This was 
quite bold of them because the USA was reserved about social integration at the time. It is to 
the credit of Pellegrin and Coates that they ventured into the debate on a non-racial military 
society. The book, however, was orientated to the American audience, with few generic or 
comparative elements being addressed. 
 
Mosen produced Eine Militarsoziologie in 1967. Van Doorn delivered Armed Forces and 
Society: Sociological Essays, an edited work, in 1968. In the same year the 12th edition of the 
Kölner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie published “Beitrage zur 
Militarsoziologie” with co-workers such as Rene Konig, Klaus Roghmann, Wolfgang Sodeur 
and Rolf Ziegler. In 1969 Galbraith published How to Control the Military. The book became 
controversial for its criticism of militarism and the growing influence of the military-
industrial complex in the USA.105 I found Galbraith’s work particularly informative and 
stimulating. 
 
The Working Group on Armed Forces and Society associated with the International 
Sociological Association started publishing its regular Sociaal Wetenschappelijk Bulletin in 
this era (see for example, Militairen en Maatschappij, No. 4 of this bulletin)106. Van Gils 
edited The Perceived Role of the Military in 1971. An example of research dissertations at this 
time (in this case Germany) is Linnenkamp’s Gesellschaft und Militärorganisation 
organisationssoziologie aspekte der Streitkräfte, defended in 1971 at the Rheischen Friedrich-
Wilhelms-Universität in Bonn. This contribution was aimed at the military as organisation 
and internal mechanisms for communication and control. In my field of focus it was 
interesting but not relevant to the chosen field of study. 
 
Other theorists need mentioning: Abrahamsson followed with Military Professionalization 
and Political Power (foreword by Janowitz) in 1972. His work is remembered for among 
others introducing references to transformation in the military and more specifically the 
notions of professionalisation of the military and what he calls “corporateness”. He also 
                                                 
105 If Kenneth Galbraith’s warnings about the growing military industrial complex and militarisation of 
American society were then relevant, it is more so today with the blatant international external force 
projection of President Bush Jr. and his associates. 
106 At the time the working group was based in the Netherlands. 
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became one of a new generation of authors that used the term civil control over the military 
(Abrahamsson, 1972: 12 ff, 21ff, 59–70, 151ff). Van Doorn returned in 1975 with The Soldier 
and Social Change. Shortly thereafter World Perspectives in the Sociology of the Military, 
edited by George Kourvetaris and Betty Dobratz, was to make yet another contribution 
(1977). Again comparative angles played a role. Claude Welch wrote Soldier and State in 
Africa (1970). This was to be followed by Military and Military Rule (with Arthur Smith) in 
1974. In this work they developed a typology of CMR through a five-country case study 
(Welch, 1992: 3). 
 
Nordlinger embarked on a work in the 1970s that built on an earlier paper (1968–1969). What 
interested him was the phenomenon of praetorianism (soldiers influencing the political 
leadership of the state). His main interest was the states in Latin America, Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East (more than half of all states in these regions) that succumbed to various levels 
of military intervention since the end of World War 2. In his analysis of explanatory factors 
for intervention (or praetorian trends) he dealt with what he called the “internal features of 
the military” and what he perceived as “environmental variables”. Nordlinger pointed out 
three models of civilian control. The first is the traditional model where the political elite 
seldom interferes with the military; civilian supremacy characterises this model (Nordlinger, 
1977: 11–12). The second is the Liberal model that presupposes a military that accepts the 
rule of a perceived more skilled civilian elite, soldiers and officers that reflect a civilian ethic 
(not to disobey the civilian control and “attitudinally disposed … to retain a neutral de-
politicised stance even when in difference with the ruling government”). The liberal model 
also assumes that civilians will have due regard for the military and will not interfere in 
professional military affairs or “interject political considerations into the armed forces”, such 
as appointing party political (partisan) officers (Nordlinger, 1977: 13). Clearly a civil “stand-
off” between the civilian ruler and the military is the intention here. He warns, however, that 
civil control is “not as firm a foundation as might appear at first glace”. The relationship can 
be corrupted from either side. Thirdly Nordlinger identifies the penetration model, where the 
civilian rulers penetrate the military with political ideas and thus secure their loyalty – a 
system that can function well in homogeneous societies. However, Nordlinger is at pains to 
point out that any of these models can develop fault lines and bring the military overtly into 
politics (Nordlinger, 1977: 18). In South Africa, applying Nordlinger’s models (there lies 
their weakness), would be problematic. The military could ostensibly fit into the traditional 
role, the liberal model or a penetration model. However, the military forces were the coercive 
arms of a minority state, a segregated state that operated on domination from above. Yet they 
believed in constitutionalism and the government of the day. They did not seek active 
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political influence or take over government. In earlier works I referred to this as 
“praetorianism of a special type”. This notion is open to qualification, I would argue today. In 
a certain sense the apartheid state (including the “reformist” apartheid state between 1983 and 
1988) co-opted the military into a systematic regime of oppression mixed with “sham” 
reforms. Tanzania under Julius Nyrere and the mobilising slogan of Ujamaa may fit the 
penetration model that Nordlinger speaks about. 
 
When the military elite, owing to their skills, political orientation or bureaucratic interest, 
enter politics Nordlinger imagines different typologies of ruling officers, one typology being 
an officer corps as moderators, where the military does not take control of the civilian 
government but has a virtual veto over government policies. “Civilians govern, but their 
power is checked by the military” (Nordlinger, 1977: 22). In the following category of his 
typology we find the guardians. They overthrow a government to prevent large-scale social 
change and to retain the political status quo. Lastly there is what he calls praetorian rulers. In 
this typology the military takes control of government with total domination as intent. They 
“not only control the government but dominate the regime … sometimes attempting to control 
large slices of political, economic and social life through structures of mobilisation” 
(Nordlinger, 1977: 26). Using Nordlinger’s typology one could argue (with qualifications) 
that many military regimes in Latin America acted as guardians and then proceeded to 
become praetorian regimes. An example of a praetorian regime in Africa could then be 
Burkina Faso under the rule of Thomas Sankara in the 1980s. For various reasons military 
regimes may be subverted or succumb again to civil political control. In some cases (e.g. 
Nigeria, which I deal with as a case study later on as a prime example) the military also re-
enter politics, leave politics (back to barracks, military withdrawal from politics) and return 
again to politics. This cycle, whether predicted or unpredicted, complicates civil-military 
analysis in such cases. 
 
An African scholar, Ododa (1977) developed a refined categorisation of military regimes. He 
discussed case studies where the military had some influence (in various degrees – not 
necessarily praetorian) such as Ghana under Nkrumah and the regime of President Leopold 
Senghor, as well as Gowon in Nigeria. He then proceeded to provide a refined categorisation 
of military regimes, namely (1) progressive military regimes, (2) retrogressive military 
regimes, (3) restorative progressive military regimes, (4) restorative retrogressive military 
regimes, (5) consolidative progressive military regimes and (6) consolidative retrogressive 
military regimes. Unfortunately his innovative categorisation is not described in more detail 
and fully overshadowed by his views on Pan-Africanism as a final goal. It is clear that with 
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some qualification Ododa has empathy with military rule. He critically concludes, 
nonetheless, that “military regimes in Africa have tended to dampen rather than promote Pan-
Africanism. Some of these reasons stem from the nature of the military as an institution; 
however others arise from the specific instance (read: context) of the African military” 
(Ododa: 1977: 260). 
 
Perlmutter and Bennetts’ The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader, 
published in 1980, is worth mentioning. Influential authors contributed perspectives to the 
work, among them Parsons, Morris-Jones, Mosca, Perlmutter, Luckham, Paxton, Stepan, 
Deutcher, Nassar, Cohen and Huntington. Comparative studies were subsequently to become 
an increasingly more important feature of MS. Sam Sarkesian’s Beyond the Battlefield: The 
New Military Professionalism (1981) is viewed as a mostly empirical work. It contrasted 
scholarly viewpoints and analysed the dimensions of military professionalism. Perhaps more 
important is that Sarkesian furthered the comparative genre in this work (Sarkesian, 1981: 19, 
41ff, 59ff). Janowitz edited a comparative study entitled CMR: Regional Perspectives in 
1981. It dealt with CMR in “advanced democracies” , “modernizing societies” and developing 
states, in Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Africa (in the last case Nigeria and 
Ethiopia). This work not only furthered legitimised comparative studies but also demonstrated 
the wide range of cases that can be dealt with in an international context. Janowitz’s work 
also popularised the terminology CMR further. Janowitz in no uncertain terms dismisses 
standard approaches dealing with comparative studies: “THERE IS LITTLE POINT in 
endlessly debating the most appropriate strategy to be utilized in the comparative analysis of 
CMR. It is clear to me, that the study of armed forces and society requires alternative 
approaches if the role of the military in political affairs is to remain a vital subject of scholarly 
investigation” – emphasis in the original (Janowitz, 1981: 9). Welch returned in 1987 with No 
Farewell to Arms? Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America (Boulder: 
Westview Press). Welch’s works are characterised by his use of case studies (Welch, 1992: 
3). Welch also points out the important role of comparative studies (Welch, 1992: 5). For 
Welch one fruitful example of work from a comparative angle is that of the Bangladeshi 
scholar Maniruzzaman, who investigated more than 70 cases of military disengagement from 
politics (Welch, 1992: 5). 
 
In 1988 Finer’s The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics re-appeared in a 
third enlarged and revised edition (the previous editions were published in 1962 by Pall Mall 
Press and in 1976 by Peregrine Books). Finer’s work for me, despite criticism, remains an 
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important one and a pace-setter for its time. It includes many generic insights that still hold 
relevance today. 
 
The term postmodern military, in an admittedly rather wide interpretive paradigm, entered the 
scene. An important example is The Post Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, 
edited by Moscos, Williams and Segal (2000). South African scholars also contributed to this 
work. Of particular interest to me was the contribution by Cilliers and Heinecken on South 
Africa emerging from “a time warp” in terms of CMR following internal civil strife and 
international isolation when faced with reprofessionalising the military and honing new 
conceptions of CMR/civilian control over the military after 1993 (Cilliers & Heinecken in 
Moscos et al., 2000: 242–264). 
 
As seen from the above, various works addressed the role of the military in developing states. 
Most of these were unfortunately published within the modernisation paradigm (i.e. 
Huntington, 1968, Janowitz, 1977; Nordlinger, 1977; Welch, 1970, 1974, 1987). I will give 
my criticism of these authors and the modernisation paradigm in this chapter. 
 
These works had a major influence on thinking about the military in a social context, its roles, 
nature of the organisation and outcomes in politics. In turn they would spawn more literature 
and lay a foundation for future scholarly work. An academic tradition within the sub-
discipline of sociology (and political science) was founded that would serve as a wellspring 
for future reflections, both quantitative and qualitative in nature. At the same time, since some 
of these works were embedded in a European/Northern context and others explicitly in the 
modernisation paradigm, new research opportunities beckoned. This would come from among 
others African-based scholars critically reflecting on the arguments put forward by earlier 
scholars. Academic and social critique, among others “home-grown” African voices, became 
a new angular optic in scrutinising the military … 
 
I will mention other publications in this field, especially those by critics of previous 
approaches during the 1980s and 1990s, later in this chapter. I will also address works by 
African scholars in more detail at that point. 
 
3.5. The literature and the research question 
 
One question I set out to answer is whether the SATRC and previous TRCs had the foresight 
to address the need for sustainable and working CMR and civil control over the military. If 
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not, why did this not happen? If the SATRCR had addressed the issue of CMR, it could have 
had an influence, or provided outcomes, that would lead to viable policy priorities and 
choices, formulation of policy, and policy implementation that benefited the objective and 
aims of civil control mentioned above. I am also interested in whether weaknesses and/or 
fault-lines in the unfolding of the SATRC can be identified (among others critical reflection 
on the mandates of the SATRC and other TRCs). If these are identified, the next question is 
how to address these shortcomings/fault-lines in order to solve some current 
problems/tension/challenges regarding CMR that may occur in the South African polity. In 
answering these questions, I aim to provide some generic cues for other countries in similar 
situations. 
 
If the SATRC did not contribute to outcomes that benefited future CMR, does such a process 
have any value for civil control over the military elsewhere? The counterside of the coin is 
then important to me: If the SATRC process did not contribute to better CMR or civil control 
over the military, did other countries – that did not make use of a TRC exercise – come off 
worse or better, or the same? I assume here that perusing literature to complement experience 
will add value to the exploration. 
 
In the following sections I will discuss TRC-related literature first and then continue with 
civil-military literature. I will then discuss and graphically illustrate the tortuous background 
to the SATRC and the transitional arrangements in South Africa that set the stage for the 
SATRC. I will refer throughout to relevant literature in this regard. 
 
Comparison with literature on TRCs outside South Africa 
 
There are reasons why I chose a comparative element or broader casing for this study. The 
SATRC developed in a specific context that was not devoid of external influences and a 
broader (read: international) discourse. 
 
In this research design other cases receive attention. I will exploit what Bouma calls “the 
comparison” (Bouma, 1996: 96). Manheim and Rich argue that there are limitations to “the 
exclusive focus on one nation” and, should one wish to improve the ability to explain (and 
perhaps even predict/suggest steps to facilitate problem-solving), then possibly “one way is to 
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take a comparative approach” (Manheim & Rich, 1981: 230).107 Comparative approaches 
have proved to yield important insights that may complement other research approaches. 
Neuman (1997: 384) argues convincingly for the combination of case studies and comparative 
research elements underpinned by a qualitative approach. 
 
“We reconsider what we know about the problem and what other scholars studying it have 
learned. A systematic review of the literature will unearth different answers, conflicting 
results (and) multiple opinions” (Manheim & Rich, 1981: 191). I concur with the authors. In 
qualitative research the perceived weak point (conflicting views through human experience) is 
a strength. Conflicting opinions, different voices speaking, provide valuable insights for one 
case or a case among cases (generic insights also have value here). For this reason, reading 
the comparative literature or broader casing was both challenging and imperative in this 
study. 
 
Various publications appeared on TRCs outside South Africa. Works by Aguero (1993), 
Bronkhorst (1995), Brysk (1994); Ensalaco (1994), Hayner (1994; 1996), Skaar (1994) and 
Fraser and Weissbrodt (1992) need mentioning. While some of these sources discussed only 
TRCs, others attempted to compare TRCs from various countries (Skaar, 1994; Hayner, 1994, 
1996; Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992). 
 
Additional selected material dealt with TRCs, but distinguished TRC processes from ICTs or 
government-sponsored commissions of enquiry (Sverrison, 2006; Rakate, 1999; Robertson, 
1999). Such works proved to be informative in relation to the research problem. Consulting a 
fairly wide range of materials on similar cases added value. It provided for a broad historical 
collage that enabled me to continue basic and systematic tracking. In addition, it opened 
pointers for the act of interpretive tracking so urgently needed to answer the research question 
and sub-questions. 
 
The materials mentioned above were highly informative. They provided descriptive elements 
and important historical background. Sociology without historical insight would be so much 
poorer! The comparison (broader setting) is now widely accepted in sociology. Comparative 
elements in works produced by Bronkhorst (1995), Skaar (1994) and Hayner (1994, 1996) 
contributed to a larger living collage on the topic. These contributed positively among others 
to my interest in embarking on comparative work. I found the work by Bronkhorst of 
                                                 
107 On the shortcomings of a case-study approach, consult Bouma, (1996: 96ff), Manheim & Rich 
(1981: 230–233); Mouton (2001: 154–155). 
 132
Amnesty International (complemented by a long unplanned discussion in 1996) of value. The 
work by Skaar and later telephonic conversations, for example, triggered the tentative 
typology that I explicated in Chapter 1. 
 
Literature on CMR in new or emerging democracies 
 
I mentioned that CMR as a sub-discipline of MS is a relatively young genre in sociology. 
Earlier works referred to the military bureaucracy and policymaking (Janowitz, 1977; 
Linnekamp, 1971; LaPalombara, 1971), soldiers in politics or coups or guerrilla armies when 
the so-called “Third World” was discussed (Greene, 1974, Nordlinger, 1977). Works in this 
genre were written within the broad ambit of modernisation politics or the analysis of so-
called developing societies. Examples include Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in 
Changing Societies (1968), Eric Nordlinger’s Soldiers in Politics: Military coups and 
governments (1977) and Thomas Greene’s Comparative Revolutionary Movements (1974). 
These works dealt with security and modernisation/development issues from a paradigm 
widely different from that of contemporary works on CMR108. The military withdrawal from 
politics or “disengaging from politics” played an important role in many works (Welch, 1992: 
3–5). General conditions that favour withdrawal from politics would include among others the 
will and/or realisation by the military leadership to withdraw from politics, military support 
for (any/the) new government and confidence in the emerging new political leadership 
(Welch, 1992: 4). Sundhaussen goes further in these generic requirements: “All groupings 
within the military capable of independent action must favour a retreat from action” (Welch, 
1992: 4). In short, the before presents the challenge. The military in toto in a particular 
country should wish to exit politics/go back to barracks and put their wish into action by 
accepting the new political leadership (would-be incumbents). 
 
The so-called Third Wave of Democratisation played a role here. Various commentators 
observed that attempts to establish multi-party democracy started sweeping across Africa 
(Van Hanen, 1992: 15; Decalo, 1992: 132ff; Napier, 2000).109 This happened to coincide with 
the “fall of communism” equated with the dissolution of the USSR and with the increasing 
reliance on a discourse on a New World Order and later globalisation. 
                                                 
108 Huntington in his article “Reforming CMR in the Journal for Democracy (1995: 1 ff) continues 
writing in the sub-text of a modernisation paradigm, the Northern interpretation of “developing” 
countries in contrast to “developed (read: mature) democracies” (Incidentally, Huntington starts his 
article by writing in the first person.) 
109 Decalo (1992) links up to the, by now standard, argument that the “fall of communism” caused 
democratisation in Africa or the renewal of the democracy debate in Africa. The argument is rather 
simplistic and deserves further debate, which cannot be entertained here. 
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CMR seen in the context of coups or the military in politics – especially in Africa and Latin 
America (Huntington, 1968; Nordlinger, 1977; Welch, 1974, 1976) – also dealt with the role 
of the military integrated in the nation-building projects of one-party states or national 
projects of an ideological nature (compare for example Tanzania, Zambia and Ethiopia as 
African states or Cuba, China110 and Turkey as examples outside Africa). 
 
In the last cases mentioned relations between the civilian population or citizenry and military 
institutions may have been functioning well, but the military is interwoven with the socio-
political fabric and the ideology of one people and/or one political system. Tanzania under the 
rule of Julius Nyerere, with the social ideology of Ujamaa that fused the civil community, 
state departments and the military, is one example. Burkina Faso after the Sankara coup 
followed a similar route. With some qualifications Turkey after the rule of the generals 
reflected similar tendencies.111 
 
CMR became a serious point of discussion after 1990 in the African context. Compare, for 
example, articles by Habasonda (2003), Negonga (2003), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), Phiri 
(2001; 2003) and Williams, Cawthra and Abrahams (2003). South African authors 
contributed a fair share of these. In most cases the modernisation paradigm did not dominate. 
In some cases it did not feature at all (Williams, Cathra & Abrahams, 2003). Works pertinent 
to the research question in this study that contrasted with modernisation and stages of 
development for the “underdeveloped” were those by Ferreira (2003), Habasonda (2003), 
Liebenberg (1995) and Nathan (1994). Other works informative to this exploration that I 
found useful contributed a unique home-grown voice (or rather voices) to the study. I would 
like to mention Negonga (2003), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), Phiri (2001; 2003), Seegers 
(1990), Williams (1995), Williams, Cawthra and Abrahams (2003) and Le Roux, Rupiya and 
Ngoma (2004). 
 
One has to compare these works and the contextual issues that they address with works from a 
Northern American perspective. The work of Roherty on defence policy formulation (1980) is 
one example. I found it startling. This work addresses various issues and accommodates 
                                                 
110 For an analysis of contemporary CMR in China, consult Scobell (2005: 227–244). For an earlier 
contribution on CMR in China see Harlan Jencks (pp. 120–159) in Janowitz (1981). 
111 Turkey is analysed in a comparative context in for example the contribution by Demirel (2005). 
CMR in Turkey in contrast to other EU states are addressed by Guney and Karatekelioglu (2005: 439 
ff). For earlier justifications on the close association between the military, political leadership and the 
ideology of Kemalism see Kili (1968). 
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different perspectives, including comparative perspectives. Thus it provided at the time a 
good framework for discourse on the issue. But defence policy is also a civil affair. Yet, CMR 
as a focus in itself are seldom emphasised or concretised in the involved way that one sees 
with CMR and publications today. In judging this work one has to keep in mind that CMR 
became a topic of discussion much earlier (Abrahamsson, 1972; Van Doorn, 1969). 
 
Another example would be a work by Beishline on military management and national defence 
in the USA (1950). A conceptual analysis of only the title seems to exclude civilians; it is not 
Military Management and National Defence, or Military Management and Defending the 
Constitution. It is Military Management for National Defence, as if planned outside the realm 
of civil input. One would expect that a work dealing with “national defence” in a mature 
democracy (a Western industrial democracy based on a liberal constitution in a plural society) 
would address, at least partially, the role of civilians and the nexus of a public-military 
interface and its management, even if the term CMR did not exist at the time. Yet the work 
does not do this, except if references to church organisations (pp. 18, 27) or “civil affairs” (the 
then Section G-5 for Civil Affairs or Military Government and the appointment of a 
comptroller on the general staff) level are seen as encapsulating civil society. But a “civilian” 
comptroller clearly does not, at least not in a plural democracy with a “liberal” constitution, 
constitute CMR or civil control over the military or reflect public participation in defence 
policy formulation. Perhaps because civil-military research is relatively new, or TRCs a rather 
late phenomenon compared to other approaches in dealing with excessive human-rights 
abuses, or perhaps because there were more pressing issues to research (such as 
modernisation theory, democratisation or transition studies (“transitology”), election politics, 
quantitative survey findings on voters’ preferences, advocacy of the “end of history”, or a 
perceived “clash of civilisations” cum “new world order”, weaknesses in CMR did not 
receive the much-needed self-critical analysis by theorists situated in “mature democracies”. 
In this area there is a need for further self-critical research. 
 
Thus international publications on CMR are numerous. Related conceptual issues, such as the 
military in “developing states”, received ample attention, especially from the quarters of 
modernisation theorists, i.e. Huntington (1968)112, Nordlinger (1977), Cox (1976), Janowitz 
(1977), Clapham and Philip (1985) and Danapoulos (1992). More critical analysis, e.g. of the 
                                                 
112 A South African theorist as far back as 1992 pointed out that especially Huntington’s approach was 
seen as “conservative” and “status quo orientated”. The same theorist quotes Kesselman saying that 
“Huntington’s order is not a prerequisite for achieving the highest political good, but itself becomes the 
highest political good” (Duvenhage, 1992: 31). He points out the limitations of the modernisation 
approach and need for new theoretical approaches (Duvenhage, 1992: 22). 
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military’s role as promoter of capitalism and consumers of scarce resources, also saw the 
light, such as Ball’s The Military in the Development Process: A Guide to Issues (1981). Ball 
adopts an innovative angular optic an under-researched topic. She problematises the role of 
militaries as promoters of capitalism and consumers of scarce resources. This is a definite 
area for more future research, not only in developing countries, but also Western industrial 
democracies. 
 
Comparative studies on military regimes in Africa received attention from Odetola (1982). 
More recently research on the military and politics with specific reference to engaging with 
democracy and constitutional control has received attention from African scholars (Kieh & 
Agbese, 2004; Salih, 2001; Baregu & Landsberg, 2003). 
 
Likewise large amounts of academic, theoretical and applied work on CMR in general exist. 
The same applies to work done on the African continent by African scholars. A growing 
corpus of work started developing in the mid-1980s and issues about military intervention in 
politics were discussed in academic literature as well. These works and reports provided 
important insights for this study (see for example Baregu & Landsberg, 2003; Salih, 2001 and 
Oyugi et al., 1988). Apart from comparative work, case studies also received attention. 
 
TRCs receive little attention in these works and I contend that publications relating TRCs to 
CMR and what effect they may have for the future should receive far more attention. 
 
3.6. CMR in South Africa 
 
Changed contexts bring new voices. By as early as 1991, the civil-military debate had 
independently entered the picture of the TRC in South Africa. At the time, much of the debate 
was pioneered by the MRG aligned to the ANC. Newly established think-tanks such as the 
IDP (today known as the ISS) entered the fray. Between 1993 and 1995 the debate in this area 
became more focussed. During the period when the Interim Constitution was valid, 
integration of the armed forces became both a point of discussion and a necessity.113 
 
Works on defence transformation, CMR and civil control over the military in South Africa 
have experienced a virtual renaissance since 1992. The corpus of work done by South African 
                                                 
113 The process leading to the acceptance of the Interim Constitution is discussed in greater detail in 
Liebenberg (1996: 39 ff). I remain thankful to Marion Edmunds, not only for criticising my arguments 
but actually for “instructing” me to re-think and rephrase some of them in this article. The end result is 
not to be blamed on her. 
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theorists, researchers and think-tanks (such as the ISS) is impressive. In a very real sense, 
since 1992, South African researchers have engaged with CMR, perhaps more so than many 
“highly developed states” (one may refer to a renaissance of literature on CMR in Africa and 
South Africa). 
 
Research by exiled South Africans among others played a role. One example is the Ph.D 
thesis by Williams (Rocky) entitled Beyond the Barracks: The changing parameters of CMR 
under the P.W. Botha administration (University of Essex, 1996). Williams argues that CMR 
are never a complete process. Despite the fact that South Africa was a racial capitalist state 
abnormal in its exclusivity, the country recorded a relatively stable history of CMR. After 
1978, Williams argues, the SADF showed growing assertiveness as a result of various factors 
and extended its influence increasingly. Much of this had to do with the centralisation of 
policy-making and state departments under P.W. Botha despite the rhetoric of 
“decentralisation”.114 In the 1980s the influence of the military increased substantially during 
the states of emergency. The creation of the National Security Management System (NSMS) 
and the shifting locus of power towards this system played a role. Since the 1970s police 
influence had gradually been eclipsed by military presence. The influence of the military was 
only to wane in the late 1980s.115 Personalities also played a role: Magnus Malan was like 
P.W. Botha a hawk. Botha himself was a top-down ruler116 (Williams, 1996; several personal 
discussions with Rocky between 1994 and 1999). 
 
Practitioners, including former SADF senior officers and returned senior MK cadres, 
contributed to the debate on the future of the military in South Africa. In the first category of 
contributors one finds Gen. (Ret.) Chris Thirion, a career officer with many years’ 
intelligence experience in the SADF. In the South African Defence Review he made 
suggestions on the future role of military intelligence in South Africa: (i) military intelligence 
should not involve itself with any non-military and non-intelligence functions; (ii) the 
functions of various intelligence agencies should be spelled out in full; (iii) the concept of 
national security should be judiciously spelled out; (iv) a code of ethics should be developed 
and rigorously applied and (v) a national security advisor should be appointed.117 He 
                                                 
114 South African theorists at the time observed tendencies towards centralisation rather than 
decentralisation. Du Toit & Heymans (1985: 79–85); Heymans, 1986 (unpublished), Liebenberg (1990: 
108).  
115 Audie Klotz refers to an era of Cold War militarisation in South Africa (Klotz, 1995: 75–76).  
116 See Van der Meulen, 1984: 1984 ff).  
117 Thirion repeated the call for a national/senior security advisor for South Africa in a later publication 
(1998: 405, 408). 
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cautioned that it may serve little purpose to import other models uncritically because South 
African conditions may differ from others (Thirion, 1993: 18–21). 
 
Joe Nhlanhla, previous National Administrative Secretary and Secretary of the Politico-
Military Council of the ANC, in the same publication discussed the issue of accountability 
and a transparent military culture with reference to the military and special forces (Nhlanhla, 
1993: 37 ff). He, like Thirion, does not question the need for military intelligence in the future 
but points out the changed context. The ethical underpinnings of future intelligence services 
are important to him. There should be transparency and accountability. He calls for a code of 
conduct for all officers of the intelligence community and the “institution of an ethical 
modular component in the professional training of all officers”. Again he and Thirion concur 
on this point. They share a similar observation: In the past the intelligence briefs of the 
various services were at times confusing if not clashing and there was lack of effective 
coordination. 
 
Despite principled calls for a new ethics, Nhlanhla called for pragmatism at the same time 
(Nhlanhla, 1993:42–43). At the time it was feared that intelligence would be abused by the 
white right wing (or maybe that was the standard propaganda in the ANC, at the time. The 
ANC leadership up till today labels left-wing critics of either radical social democratic or 
socialist views as the “Lunatic Left”). Despite this, Nhlanhla’s words, uttered in 1993, had 
generic value, an element of foresight, if implemented at the time: “Recent events have 
illustrated the danger of displacing these members from within the armed forces onto the 
extra-parliamentary terrain where they can utilise their considerable skills in pursuit of party 
political goals” (Nhlanhla, 1993: 42).118 
 
In a contribution to the African Security Review on the future of the South African Army 
(previously the South African Defence Review) Ronnie Kasrils, Deputy Minister of Defence 
of the South African Government of National Unity, suggests: (i) the end of what he calls the 
“Cold War” caused a realignment of military thinking; (ii) since security is much wider [it 
should for example include the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme, a 
national programme of upliftment and social reconstruction along social democratic lines]; 
                                                 
118 Recent developments seem to suggest that the same dangers remain, as well as inter-party loyalty 
issues that involve personal differences and the leadership struggle between Mbeki, Zuma (and 
whoever else may enter the picture between now and the next elections). The e-mail fracas in 2005, in 
which some members of the national intelligence services were allegedly implicated, is one example. 
Nhlanhla’s code of conduct and the suggestion by Thirion about a code of ethics to be adhered to may 
be of help now and in the future. 
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(iii) it should be seen in the light of the increasing importance of regional security measures. 
He proposes that the challenge of CMR in a dynamic context should be met by effective 
political control over the armed forces via a Ministry of Defence. (Note that Kasrils chooses 
to use the words political control rather than civilian control.) Also important is the creation 
of a Secretariat of Defence, similar to the British model. Important is that “the ministry is 
always subordinate and accountable to Parliament. Civilian control is vested in parliament” 
(Kasrils, 1995: 2–3). Rationalisation (read: demobilisation and corrective action) “will be 
necessary”, (but) “should not affect the operational and professional capacities of the Defence 
Force”; rationalisation should be a fair process and demobilised personnel from the “old” 
SADF and cadres not elected for the new force should be assisted in the process among others 
by demobilisation packages and training them for skills to (re-) enter civilian society. 
Rationalisation should be handled with “compassion and humanity” (Kasrils, 1995: 3–4). 
Important words for the time, I argue. Somewhat worrying is Kasrils’s use of the term 
‘political control of the military’ rather than civil control over the military. Positive is his 
emphatic statement that the military (should) be subservient to parliament. Foreseeing 
problems of rationalisation without losing skills in constituting a new military was farsighted. 
Not all things always go as planned. South Africa has to deal with problems related to lost 
skills and inadequate care of demobilised cadres from the liberation movements that left them 
destitute and led some of them into organised crime. [In 1993, Jackie Cock pointed out the 
need for meaningful demobilisation that benefits the demobilised (1993: 1–17.)] Essentially 
her argument suggests effective, compassionate and humane demobilisation that successfully 
inserts demobilised personnel into civil society and the economy. Things did not go that well. 
By 2002 various reports had pointed out cases where the process was not particularly “human 
and compassionate”, nor was it very effective at re-inserting demobilised soldiers into the 
civil economy (Gear, 2002; Liebenberg, Roefs & Ferreira, 2002). 
 
Looking at the debate in South Africa at the time in a broader perspective is important. 
Practitioners and experts from previous contending backgrounds were engaging in debate, in 
many cases a dialogue with one another. If such a dialogue was to continue, be stimulated or 
rekindled continuously, it could auger well for a country in transition from military-supported 
or authoritarian rule to establishing democracy and with it civilian control over the military. 
The same applies to current South Africa; the debate on these issues should be kept alive, 
made part of continuous reflection and public debate. 
 
Important works on the transformation of the military related to post-apartheid South Africa 
appeared. Their merit cannot be doubted. Books such as Cilliers and Reichardt’s About Turn: 
 139
The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence (1995), Frankel’s Soldiers 
in a Storm: The South African Armed Forces’s Democratic Transition (2000), and Nathan’s 
The Changing of the Guard: Armed Forces and Defence Policy in a Democratic South Africa 
spring to mind. An edited monograph on the transition in the South African Army drew 
several contributors from inside and outside South Africa, including practitioners and serving 
and former SA(N)DF staff (Cilliers, Ed., 1998). 
 
Other notable works related to the democratic control of the military following transition on 
the African continent also appeared (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003; Chuter, 2000). Works to 
which practitioners contributed that deal with CMR in South and Southern Africa include Le 
Roux, Rupiya and Ngoma’s Guarding the Guardians: Parliamentary oversight and civil 
military relations – Challenges for SADC (2004) and a case study by Chileshe et al. entitled 
CMR in Zambia (2004). New voices, to say the least … 
 
The same can unfortunately not be said about literature about the SATRC and its effect on 
CMR. TRCs receive little attention in these works. I contend that publications relating TRCs 
to CMR and what effect they may have for the future should receive far more attention. 
 
There is no doubt that the civil-military debate is alive and well in South Africa. Indeed, a 
discourse of immediate and future relevance is growing with foreseeable positive outcomes. 
There is little doubt that such a debate and social dialogue will influence theorists and 
practitioners alike. Perhaps one could be excused for believing that these research projects, 
their angles for identifying and solving problems and the applied nature of these works auger 
well for future sustainable democracy in Africa. 
 
What is of more value is that the analyses contributed in works such as those issued by ISS 
are mostly by practitioners, not the distant academic observer. It represents experience written 
from the bottom up rather than in-the-clouds theorists embarking on grand theories, typologies 
or “serious” rebuttals in respectable journals (that are seldom read by more than a closed 
circle). Or for that matter; pedantic conference altercations between “leading academics” as if 
conferences are the crux of social change. 
 
The civil-military literature covering a broad range over an extended period that I reviewed 
definitely added value to this exploration. It contributed to insights, strengths and weaknesses 
that could be exploited in this study. Moreover, at various stages it also provided pointers to 
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future policies, which in itself proved useful: policy recommendations are frequently 
mentioned and such literature alerted me further to this aspect of the study. 
 
The spread of literature, individual studies or case studies that I perused also introduced the 
necessary element of a blend of deductive and inductive approaches, and complemented 
insights gained in interviews with stakeholders, participants and observers – and in some 
cases victims. It added value to this study. 
 
It is worth recalling the following: “Our steadily increasing stock of observations and 
inferences is not merely subjected to continuous cross-checking and critical discussion but is 
(or needs to be – my insertion) deliberately scrutinized to discover and correct hidden 
preconceptions and biases.” (Hesse in Hookway & Pettit, 1978: 10). The researcher, if 
involved in serious qualitative work, should have a wider view. It includes those involved in 
practice and oral interaction (oral tradition too). If one builds on the foundation of those that 
went before us only in writing this is true. If we link it with those that went before us in 
experience, exploration and tracking beyond mere tracing, it is most probably more true. 
 
3.7. CMR on the African continent 
 
Past experiences played a role. Africa as a setting for scholars provided a different case and 
experience-in-context. Before 1990, in the African context, theorists were often concretely 
caught up in their immediate circumstances. Prempeh argues that in Africa theorists, scholars 
and jurists for that matter “are emerging from decades of powerlessness and marginalization 
at the hands of omnipotent executives and strongmen” (Prempeh, 1999: 135). For example, 
amid military coups, (quasi-) military rule or attempts to establish one-party states, an 
International Commission of Jurists in Africa and theorists had to deal with an important 
issue, namely how to enhance or protect human rights in a one-party state. To do so at the 
time was imperative; the context did not allow for a discourse on CMR. Nor, one can argue, 
should the jurists have spent time on the theoretical debate related to CMR because the 
protection and enhancement of human rights in their particular context and era were a priority 
(International Commission of Jurists or ICJ, 1978). In other cases, civil-rights activists, jurists 
and legal practitioners had to fight their way through a quagmire of contradicting laws on 
human rights, presidential decrees, changing constitutional provisions, amendments to 
constitutions and the flux of power politics (Prempeh, 1999: 135ff; Yakubu, 2005. For a 
telling example of the complex legal implications under such circumstances, see Yakubu, 
n.d., and Yakubu, 2005, and correspondence, 12 September 2005). 
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To speak about CMR without mentioning transition to democracy in contemporary Africa and 
also Latin America is difficult to imagine. Many publications appeared, most of them highly 
informative, on transition to democracy. Of these, a variety published over a long period were 
collected, selected and consulted (see for example Colomer, 1991; Royo, 1984; Pridham, 
1984; Luckham, 1996; Chuter, 2000).119 While valuable to obtain insights on transition and 
emerging democracies, and in pointing to future constitutional issues (also related to security 
forces), they proved less helpful in making the necessary linkage between TRC and CMR, 
even if some of the countries studied in this regard, such as Argentina and Chile, did use 
TRCs. In the context of regime change these works had value (Mozaffar, 1994). Several 
scholars addressed the politics of regime change under the spectre of military rule, e.g. Frazer, 
(1995), Ninalowu (1995); Mozaffar (1994) and Decalo (1989). Regional dimensions were 
highlighted by Khadiagala (1995). 
 
This research is of immense importance and future value. It may well contribute to a 
qualitatively new setting of civil-military interaction to the benefit of democracy and future 
sustainable human rights in Africa and other continents. The current stream of publications on 
CMR in Africa is written by Africans themselves/ourselves. It constitutes a revival in the field 
and a new appreciation for problem-solving and applied research in our context. The lack of 
work addressing the interface between TRCs and their direct influences remain, however. I 
believe that the link/interface between truth and reconciliation processes and civil control over 
the military will attract more attention in future (if questions and opinions are already 
discussed publicly, social scientists will follow eventually). 
 
3.8. Resources on TRCs directly related to CMR: a lacuna 
 
What happened in the field of CMR and the interface with TRCs closer to home? Reading 
material on issues pertaining to the military, military regimes and CMR played an important 
role. In tracing I looked for a direct linkage, a theme that linked the SATRC or for that matter 
any TRC to civil control over the military. I searched in material at the time TRCs were 
advocated or in the debate on the necessity for TRCs, for statements about the need for the 
mandate to include some explicit references to civil control in the longer term as part of the 
report. What direct control can TRC-like exercises make to civil control over militaries in the 
desired future democracy? I tracked for foresight in dealing with the longer-term outcomes of 
                                                 
119 Evolving experiments on constitutionalism are described by Napier, a South African scholar 
(Napier, 2000: 77 ff). 
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a TRC-like process when it comes to controlling the military, or as the other side of the coin, 
a professional military that through earlier experience could suggest to a TRC some concrete 
steps to prevent similar human-rights transgressions in the future. Of more importance is that 
political leaders at the time frankly admitted that they misused the military for their own 
interests, e.g. in South Africa. I looked for answers to the puzzle of the research question. 
 
The mandates of TRCs are relevant, but in tracing I started to track for some foresight from 
civilians (in this case political leadership past or present, TRC commissioners and the military 
(past or present – in this case the SADF and cadres of the guerrilla movements fighting for 
liberation in South Africa). If I make critical remarks about the lack of foresight these are not 
only directed at the actors mentioned. I made a submission to the TRC and scarcely addressed 
the issue. It was clearly a personal lack of foresight. If in hindsight one experiences the 
necessity to share one’s own lack of foresight if it can assist other similar experiments, I 
regard it as necessary in my research at this point. 
 
Here examples of literature such as the works of Kieh and Agbese (2004), Clapham and 
Philip (1985), Danopoulos (1992), Cox (1976), Cosmos (2007), Huntington (1995), Varas 
(1989), Rosenberg (1991), Hayner (1994, 1996), Bronkhorst (1995), Le Roux et al. (2004) 
and Williams, Cawthra and Abrahams (2003) are relevant. All of these were written after 
TRCs became accepted practice. After all, CMR, codes of conduct and civil control over the 
military stand central to the upholding of the democratic constitution and measures to sustain 
democracy and a good human rights record. In my view, during and in the aftermath of the 
TRC, there was significant lack of research on the links between TRCs and CMR and the 
future impact of these. To illustrate: a work entitled After the TRC: Reflections on truth and 
reconciliation in South Africa (James & Van de Vijver, 2000) does not include a single 
contribution on the TRC’s potential impact on CMR or civil control over the military. 
 
This published work followed a high-profiled conference entitled “The TRC: Commissioning 
the Past”, hosted by the University of Witwatersrand History Workshop and the Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) in June 1999. Not a single paper dealt with the 
links between, potential of, or the outcomes of the TRC and CMR, specifically future civil 
control over the armed forces. The organisers were high-profiled academics, some of them 
university activists, but lack of foresight in the area under study was clear. I am also a guilty 
party here. At the time I did not have the insight or foresight to see the relevance of the crucial 
link between the TRC (one case or comparative cases) and its possible outcomes or non-
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outcomes for civilian control. The conference, on the positive side, proved that any TRC 
cannot be discussed in isolation; comparisons and generic insights need to be shared. 
 
Another work that can be described as a high-quality and extremely valuable publication dealt 
in detail with legal issues and the constitutional questions and obligations of the state and its 
legal mechanisms aimed at social justice and reconciliation. Yet, in using a range of socio-
legal and socio-philosophical perspectives, the work fails to devote a single chapter related to 
issues concerning the military, military professionalism, codes of ethics or constitutional 
obligations to achieve public oversight over the military (Christodoulidis & Veitch, 2001). I 
do not demean this highly respectable book, but illustrate the lack of focus on CMR and the 
foresight to discuss it. I missed something important in the work, the foresight to address civil 
control over the military.120 (It was on a different level one of the best works – if not the best 
– in recent years on philosophical, moral and legal issues in inter-linkage with reconciliation. 
The discourse is fascinating. Introducing the grammar of reconciliation as a humanly 
embedded discourse makes for valuable reading material and much food for thought.)121 
 
Tracing the linkage hindsight/foresight on the role of TRCs and civilian rule, I intend to 
contribute to this area instead of discussing issues of morality and legal interpretations or 
for that matter discourse analysis at length. 
 
3.9. Background to the SATRC: “Local was not Lekker”122 
 
Before the SATRC: Truths, untruths, realities and CMR 
 
I consulted various academic articles and chapters in books pertaining to the case of South 
Africa and cases in Africa, Latin America and Southern Europe regarding authoritarian rule, 
democratisation and truth and reconciliation processes. Local and international journals 
proved useful. International journals consulted over a long period, such as the following, give 
                                                 
120 An earthy allegory: Qualitative researchers are bricoleurs, or perhaps a bit like stonemasons. They 
work, search and imagine. They look at soil, they look for building blocks to construct a larger 
architecture – even of suitable colour – as strong as possible but aware of the possible shortcomings. 
Collages are not eternal. Architecture may last, but can it be used eternally for the same function? That 
remains a question. 
121 An interesting contribution of conceptual and social philosophy is the work by Van Binsbergen in a 
paper read at the HSRC in 1999, previously published in a shortened version in de marge, 1997. I 
unfortunately did not keep track of the later publication of the paper.  
122 I chose the opposite of a current colloquialism: “Local is lekker” implies joyful interaction, festivity 
and interaction between people – usually in a celebratory context. The times before the SATRC were 
not “lekker” (Read: not nice). They were the opposite. 
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an indication of the spectrum covered: Africa Today, Africa Development, Review of the 
African Political Economy, African Sociological Review (published by the Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa – CODESRIA); The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, African Journal of International and Comparative Law, Human Rights 
Quarterly, the Journal of Democracy; Armed Forces and Society (an interdisciplinary journal 
of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society) and the American Political 
Science Review provided illustrative information/background on the topic. 
 
Articles in South African journals are important. They cover areas such as democratisation, 
military transformation and the SATRC. Examples are the following: Journal of Humanities 
(issued by the South African Academy for Science and Art), Scientia Militaria, an accredited 
journal produced by the Military Academy of South Africa in Saldanha (University of 
Stellenbosch); the African Journal on Conflict Resolution;123 Politeia (an accredited journal 
for the political sciences), Society in Transition (a journal of the South African Sociological 
Association), Politikon (a political science journal), Transformation (published by the 
programme of economic history at the University of Natal) and the Journal for Contemporary 
History (accredited – University of the Free State). Valuable journals, though not “accredited” 
by the Department of Education, are African Security Review (previously African Defence 
Review) and Codicillus, published by the Faculty of Law, Unisa. I would like to refer the 
reader to the source list at the end of the dissertation as various references to other journals 
appear there. 
 
The rather lengthy transition between 1990 and 1996124 took place through a negotiated 
settlement and protracted bargaining – therefore the term “negotiated transition”.125 In the 
process, the South African state was to transform itself from a non-democratic entity led by 
securocrats and an “executive presidency”, through liberalisation and transition, into a 
democratic (and constitutional) state. Implied in such a transition was the withdrawal of the 
                                                 
123 The African Journal on Conflict Resolution is an independent journal published by the African 
Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, registered as an educational trust and based in 
Durban, South Africa. The ISS publishes African Security Review. The journal publishes contributions 
from recognised practitioners and experts in the field of security studies. 
124 Frequently people choose to refer to the transition period as from 1990–1994. I chose here 1990-
1996, as the new constitution was still being written, the National Party as part of a government of 
national unity would withdraw and the SATRC come into being (TRC’s are usually associated with 
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and hence a “transitional” issue). 
125 The transition through negotiation in South Africa up till 1993 is well described by Davidson and 
Strand (1993). The actors involved and the negotiation process receive ample attention in their work 
(Davidson & Strand, 1993: 30 ff; 88 ff). See also a rather lengthy article by the author on “The long 
haul to democracy” dealing with constitutional development and transition in the Journal for 
Contemporary History (1996: 22–55). 
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military from the politics into which they had been brought by their political leadership and a 
return to the proverbial barracks. 
 
Transitions are characterised by uncertainties if not fear. One of the nagging questions in 
South Africa during the transition process – contested as it was – was whether the military 
would accept the changeover to a new regime. Fraser rightly points out that “Civilian control 
ultimately rests on the normative acceptance of the legitimacy of civilian rule by the military” 
(Frazer, 1995: 40). There was also the question of whether the politicians that advocated a 
negotiated settlement within the National Party could be trusted. South Africans/Southern 
Africans had lived through a series of betrayals by the apartheid government before. Under 
Vorster’s rule Southern Africa was promised détente, but Angola was invaded (1975). 
Internal reforms were offered. Instead the Tricameral Constitution legally entrenched 
apartheid – perhaps even more so than the previous constitution and the Tricameral 
parliament became synonymous with a state of emergency and the deployment of SADF units 
in black townships. South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique, which was to 
end South African military involvement in Mozambique. Yet destabilisation continued, the 
South African government condoned military support to RENAMO, a proxy force, and 
Samora Machel, the president of Mozambique, with whom the accord was signed by 
Executive President P.W. Botha, died in a plane crash inside South Africa after an alleged 
“navigational error”. No wonder that South Africans deeply distrusted the National Party 
political leaders and their military, and rightly so. 
 
It was strenuous times, with some expecting a coup and others a white right-wing revolt. Talk 
about the military in cahoots with reactionary politicians taking power was rife. Arguments 
for and against the possibility were raised. I remember at the time that Rocky Williams spoke 
on various occasions about the unlikelihood of a coup scenario before numerous audiences (I 
did not keep the references, nor the dates of Williams’s lectures or of our frequent 
discussions). In our circle of friends the issue was discussed frequently – with the same 
consensus: a coup was not possible and if attempted, would not be successful. 
 
At the HSRC, a rather conservative (and supportive of government policies) research 
institution, the issue became a point of discussion. A colleague, Dan Mavimbela, whom I met 
in Dakar and who returned from exile in the early 1990s, and I were moved to write an 
occasional paper for the Centre for Constitutional Analysis on the unlikelihood of a coup in 
the country. Even the likelihood of a coup that was successful for longer than two weeks was 
remote. South Africa was deeply divided; mass mobilisation was wide-spread; even if the 
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military was powerful it was unlikely that all sections would agree on a coup – particularly 
large segments of the Citizen Force and the home defence units or commandos. Conscription 
was being phased out (but even with conscription in place a large percentage of conscripts 
deeply disliked the majority of Permanent Force members and were likely not to follow their 
“legitimate” orders); some senior old guard military staff members were in favour of a 
settlement, some right-wingers would not join the revolt, either for personal reasons (mostly 
their egos) or because they felt that the military was too closely aligned with P.W. Botha, who 
was unpopular on the right and the left in South Africa. The Afrikaner Broederbond, whose 
members were mostly well-off middle class men and had a history of National Party support, 
hedged its bets on transition (new opportunities beckoned) and the business community was 
divided, with many looking for re-entry into the international economy. Lastly, what would 
the military do once it took control of Pretoria? South Africa is a large country with several 
metropolitan areas and large rural areas conducive to guerrilla warfare. At the time it already 
had to deal with international sanctions. It was similar to the Catch 22 situation if South 
African forces involved in the destabilisation of Angola since 1975 should take Luanda (if 
they ever could, which they sometimes imagined in their mistaken belief of being a regional 
superpower in Africa and their self-presumed military prowess). What thereafter? In the long 
history of humanity no aggressor could hold another country’s capital (or its own), even less 
subdue the population … 
 
However, the notion of a coup by the military remained a much talked about issue and a real 
fear in some quarters. I have little doubt that rumours about a right wing coup were inflated 
by right-wingers and some conservative senior military staff. More likely, in my opinion, is 
that “enlightened” National Party supporters saw the sustaining of such rumours as a 
bargaining chip to force any contender’s hand, especially the ANC as the dominant liberation 
movement. Despite the utter unlikelihood of a coup in transitional South Africa, a generic 
point is relevant: Adekanye’s argument (1985: 64) that after a process of “transition and 
demilitarisation” a return to “a stable pattern of civilian rule” is not guaranteed. His point 
about the potential for reversal – even after a transition – is hauntingly true, and so it was the 
feeling among some South Africans. Against this background the SATRC enters the picture. 
 
The SATRC followed the transition to democracy from authoritarian, minority rule, through 
successive apartheid governments, and later through a mixed mode of reform and repression 
under the Tricameral new deal. During the period of “reform” it was attempted to co-opt 
segments of the oppressed in South Africa to stave off a growing legitimacy crisis and civil 
unrest and resistance. The coloured and Indian communities of South Africa became targets 
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for the strategy of co-optation. These attempts aimed to include some minority components, 
with the National Party (and thus the majority of the white population) still dominating the 
economic-political arena and maintaining full political control. The era (1983–1989) of 
attempted co-optation is perhaps best described as “domination-through-reform” (Van 
Vuuren, 1985: 47ff).126 Van Zyl Slabbert, who resigned from the Tri-cameral Parliament in 
1986, frequently used the term “sham reform” in discussions. 
 
This strategic hold-on-to-power game took place in an environment of the militarisation of 
state and society, the continued subversion of the rule of law and the development of parallel 
structures alongside the restricted political institutions; the latter called the NSMS.127 The 
NSMS was developed under the auspices of the State Security Council (SSC) as a parallel 
structure on national, provincial and local government level to an integrated system that could 
deal with problematic areas where unrest took place. It combined various committees where 
security staff, military officers, police and state departmental or local government officials 
acted as a frontier of decision-making in localised strategies on how to deal with unrest or the 
revolutionary onslaught. In general the strategy had two prongs, namely to discredit agitators 
through soft strategic communication or if necessary remove them from society through 
detention, banning or even assassination (the repressive element) and to clean up oil spots 
(problematic areas) through service delivery, community projects, empowering local leaders 
(strongmen) and propagandistic efforts to “win the hearts and the minds” of the affected 
population. At the same time government was centralised despite talk of decentralisation or 
“devolving” government responsibilities (Du Toit & Heymans, 1985; Heymans, 1986; Van 
der Meulen, 1984; Liebenberg, 1990). 
 
Various observers described the then-militarised South African state built around minority 
(more specifically, Afrikaner rule) in imaginative terminology. Frankel refers to praetorian 
                                                 
126 The literature on this topic is almost endless. Any superficial consultation of academic articles by 
social scientists in South African journals and elsewhere between 1977 and 1987 testifies to that. See 
apartheid and the modernisation of apartheid as key terms. Other terms that would be useful to the 
theorist in this genre are, among others, the militarisation of apartheid, reform and repression, the 
apartheid state, the garrison state, the bunker state, isolation of the apartheid state, resistance to 
apartheid, the liberation struggle (in South Africa), strategies of liberation, regional destabilisation 
and frontier armies and apartheid contradictions. 
127 A plethora of publications is available on this topic. See, for example, Evans and Phillips in Swilling 
et al. (1988), Cawthra in Singh (2000), Mathews (1986), Seegers (1996), Hund and Van der Merwe 
(1986), and a whole range of articles by Annette Seegers. For a more detailed list of sources on the 
issue of militarisation and the role of the state security council and parallel structures, see some earlier 
publications by the researcher: Ideologie in Konflik (1990), an article in the Journal for Contemporary 
History (1990) and two closely-related chapters as contributions to The Hidden Hand (1994 and 1998). 
Many further references are to be found in the list of sources in these works mentioned. 
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tendencies and the “rise of the garrison state”, the latter being a corollary to militarisation 
(Frankel, 1984: 29ff, 79ff). The siege culture of the militarised state, for Davis, meant “the 
bunker state” (Davis, 1992: 31ff). For Adam and Giliomee, Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation had 
its roots in socio-economic conditions and eventually resulted in a militarised society where 
the locus of decision-making moved away from parliament and the influence of, for example, 
the police bureaucracy declined, while the influence of the military bureaucracy increased. 
This was complemented by increasing executive rule of the Prime Minister, later President 
P.W. Botha (Adam & Giliomee, 1981: 176–179, 196). 
 
For Grundy, the centralisation of state power led to the centrality of the security establishment 
(Grundy, 1988: 34ff). This, in turn, spawned the rise of the executive state based on a 
securocratic and hierarchical approach (Grundy, 1988: 38). One cannot but be reminded of 
Weber pointing out that power tends to concentrate at the top – especially where 
bureaucracies and structures of law and administration are involved (Weber, 1987: 25). In this 
the South African securocrats and their executive president found support among large chunks 
of the civil service and public sector employees. Adekanye’s observation about the state and 
its close relationship rings true for the South Africa of the late 1970s and the greater part of 
the 1980s. “(The bureaucratic elite), compromising the civil service and public sector 
employees is the second major potential pro-military group with an active interest in politics 
… ” (Adekanye, 1985: 66). The involvement of powerful, dominating personalities can add to 
such undue power concentration – in the case of South Africa people like P.W. Botha and 
Magnus Malan. South Africans also experienced their own version of “omnipotent executives 
and strongmen” [Prempeh (1999; 135) refers to strongmen as bedevilling politics in Africa]. 
The rule of law likewise suffered (Hund & Van der Merwe, 1986; Daniel, 2000). That white 
South Africans were indoctrinated/bombarded with the Total Onslaught ideology with the 
earlier subtext of die Swart Gevaar (Read: the Black Threat) did not help either. 
 
The extent to which the South African political elite between 1972 and 1988 increasingly 
drew the security apparatus as a coercive arm of the minority state into internal and regional 
politics with negative outcomes is well described (see Sanders, 2006; Saney, 2007; SATRC, 
1998; Geldenhuys, 1984; Frankel, 1984; Du Pisani, Daniel, 2000; Williams, 1995; 
Liebenberg, 1990). Among others the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) was established 
(Afrikaans: Burgerlike Samewerkingsburo – BSB). The bureau acted as a government agency 
staffed by mainly police and some military personnel with a budget to buy in co-workers. In a 
cynical quirk of authoritarian bureaucratic discourse the CCB, aimed at “co-operation 
between civil society and the government” of the day, undertook the bombing of activists’ 
 149
houses and the offices of church organisations sympathetic to the liberation struggle and 
assassinated government opponents. 
 
 
From Operation Savannah and Soweto to the turbulent 1980s and Cuito Canavale: Three 
politicians and a general. Strongmen Magnus Malan, P.W. Botha and B.J. Vorster (left to right). 
South Africa moved from a minority state that kept itself in power with police support during the 1970s 
under John Vorster to a military-supported state increasingly involved in regional destabilisation and 
internal oppression during the 1980s by the likes of Botha and Malan. At the back (left) General 
Constand Viljoen, regarded by many as “a soldiers’ soldier” and a military professional that “led from 
the front”. He was also known as a principled officer that at various times pointed out to his 
subordinates that they were not to fight civilians but the targeted enemy soldiers (guerrillas). 
Source: Huisgenoot, 1977 (date unclear). Author’s archive. 
 
 
A point worthy of note (see Adekanye above), is the role of bureaucracies and their close 
linkage with security issues (LaPalombara, 1971: 342–343, 353; Huntington, 1995: 2–3 and 
Odetola, 1982: 165ff). The military as a bureaucracy and its potential to seize power is not 
new. It stems from ancient times and continues today (see Evans, 1991: 31 on the Roman 
Empire and the powers of Augustus). Hobbes, in 1651, pointed out that “an Army is of so 
great force, and multitude, as it may easily be made believe they are the People”, and points 
out some classic examples (Hobbes, 1983: 177). Whether the army marches forcefully into 
the polity, or finds itself invited there (willingly or unwillingly) by politicians, the 
consequences are potentially disastrous. But let me return to the case under discussion. 
 
 150
  
Propaganda in a divided state – warped CMR in South Africa. Black nationalist liberation 
movements depicted as Soviet puppets by racist propaganda. Publications such as this were issued by 
Strategic Communications Operations as parts of “Soft Stratcom”. 
Source: SADF propaganda pamphlet, 1984. Author’s archive. 
 
 
Amid internal resistance, increased armed activities by the military wings of exiled 
movements and growing international isolation, the South African ruling elite became divided 
about the retention of the status quo. The “soft-hard” dichotomy, in other words the political 
differences between hardliners and “reformers” in South Africa, became characteristic of this 
period. Within the wider white community, inclusive of Afrikaners, serious schisms 
developed, with some questioning the legitimacy of the status quo. Afrikaners, though in 
small numbers (I doubt ever more than 10 percent), became involved in anti-apartheid 
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movements such as the UDF. Some went into exile to join the ANC and others joined 
localised social movements subverting apartheid rule. In small towns and rural areas white 
people critical of apartheid were simply ignored or became laughing stock – if not victimised. 
Increasingly, white South Africans expressed their preference for a negotiated settlement at 
meetings such as the Dakar Conference in 1987, where South Africans from inside the 
country met with the ANC in exile. 
 
 
 
Dakar: Bobo-Dioulasso Airport en route to Burkina Faso: Some days after Dakar. Some referred to 
a “liberal” delegation. The composition of the delegation was somewhat more complex. Afrikaans 
newspapers such as Die Burger, Beeld, Volksblad and Rapport pejoratively labelled the visit a “Dakar 
Safari” in an attempt to discredit participants. The newspaper The Citizen were likewise negative in its 
repoting on the conference (Photo: Author’s archive.) 
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Strange CMR are reflected in this cartoon, published in Die Burger (“Die Buiger”), following the 
Dakar meeting where South Africans from “inside the country” met with the ANC in exile South 
African delegates were portrayed as naïve collaborators of terrorists and barbarians. The cartoon 
depicts Van Zyl Slabbert and Alex Boraine, the leaders of the Dakar group, as being in cahoots with 
ANC “terrorists”. Note the picture in the background depicting the Soviet leader Brezhnev. At the time 
Brezhnev was no longer in power. Author’s archive. 
 
The military as institution and its role in upholding the status quo were increasingly 
questioned – as was the style of civil-military interaction in an increasingly militarised state. 
Since the 1970s, conscientious objectors (albeit on the basis of a universal pacifist stance) 
started publicly taking the choice not to serve in the SADF. 
 
By the 1980s, the ranks of conscientious objectors were augmented by political objectors.128 
Initially 11 people, and then gradually more than 700, declared publicly that they were no 
longer prepared to serve in the SADF.129 Among these were officers and men who had served 
                                                 
128 The histories of pacifists, either on universal pacifist grounds or just war grounds in support of the 
justum bellum dictum, are well-described (Centre for Intergroup Studies, 1989). Unfortunately, very 
little has been written about political objectors who were not pacifists but Christians and or deeply 
religious people and others believing in a justum bellum against apartheid – and thus on the side of the 
liberation struggle. Even less work about so-called “non-Christian” objectors saw the light. There is 
much space here for historical, sociological studies, research into narratives of social history or 
resistance through morality principles. I would like to suggest that these “objectors” were those with 
moral fibre. 
129 In the year that the author objected to military service the objectors started numbering in hundreds, 
with some going into exile or taking “low-profiled” jobs outside the reach of the SADF and PW’s 
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previously – including taking part in operational “stunts”. A delegation of ex-military men 
also met with an ANC delegation in 1988. It became impossible to label these resisters – thus 
discrediting them as was previously done – as religious dupes, mavericks, fearful mamma’s 
boys or persons with emotional or psychological problems and persons with “lack of moral 
fibre” (an old strategy used by authoritarian regimes)130. Under pressures such as these, the 
ANC, PAC and South African Communist Party (SACP) were unbanned in February 1990. 
 
The internal differences between (white) South Africans and a critical, sometimes militant 
stand against the Tricameral securocratic government were by far not the only reasons for the 
demise of apartheid rule. By 1955 the Defiance Campaign demonstrated widespread 
resistance to apartheid laws. The armed struggle started in the 1960s and continued 
throughout the period. Apart from organisations such as the ANC and the PAC, the Congress 
of Democrats and the Liberal Party (LP) arose. The 1976 Soweto Rebellion took place. By 
1983 the UDF had entered the picture and so had the National Forum. International sanctions, 
first an arms embargo and later wider international sanctions, put strong pressure on the 
minority state in South Africa. Despite Ronald Reagan’s “constructive engagement” policies, 
some firms and various academic foundations in the USA boycotted South Africa. The same 
applied to Europe and a range of non-aligned states. Much earlier, Scandinavian states and 
countries such as the Netherlands distanced themselves from apartheid rulers. Funding started 
to flow selectively to organisations that opposed apartheid inside South Africa, such as the 
South African Council of Churches, the UDF and IDASA. By the 1980s the ANC and internal 
organisations had moved into an era of popular resistance and mass mobilisation. Outside 
South Africa, South African destabilisation of Angola was met with fierce resistance and 
developed into a military stalemate by 1987/1988 at a series of battles around the Cuito River 
in Angola. 
                                                                                                                                            
army. Elite units such as paratroops contributed their share. Experienced soldiers voted with their 
feet/their absence, by not reporting for their three-month camps. South African soldiers started showing 
their morale fibre. They showed that they had little time for dictating generals and a politica army 
(Permanent Force) and the politicians that dominated the talk of: What is right? We are right! 
130 Fearful they were not. Objection could earn one six years in jail or as many years in “community 
service”, frequently in tandem with public ostracism. Yet at the time – even today – they were/are 
described as “those without moral fibre” by some military commanders and SADF veterans (Private 
discussion, Anon, 2006). 
 154
The apartheid core was not to hold … things were falling apart … 
 
 
Civil-military tension in South Africa: Labelling objectors. An example of how the apartheid state 
depicted members of the End Conscription Campaign. Posters like these were widely distributed during 
the 1980s on Afrikaans and English Technicon and University campuses to discredit opposition to 
conscription. The link is clear: Objectors are the useful idiots of a communist onslaught spearheaded by 
Moscow – mindless puppets not willing to fight for their country but willing to co-operate with the 
enemy. Funding for these propaganda items came from government sources – including military 
intelligence. Author’s archive. 
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3.10. The South African TRC: A case among cases 
 
The literature used by the researcher reveals the following broad categories: 
 
Formal/official documents: The Record of Understanding, The Interim Constitution (1993), 
the new Constitution (1996), the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 
of 1995, and notes such as The Certification of the Constitution and the SATRCR released in 
1998 were accessed. Official submissions by political parties, i.e. the ANC submission to the 
TRC (1996), those by the National Party, the Freedom Front and African Christian 
Democratic Party were scrutinised. The ANC’s submission to the SATRC was titled 
“Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission” and outlined the history of 
oppression and phases of the struggle for liberation. Out of a document of more than a 100 
pages, 22 pages (pp. 56–78) dealt with the question of whether the ANC had perpetrated any 
gross violations of human rights (ANC, 1996. Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission). The ANC statement also listed the names of 34 cadres that had been executed 
by order of the Military Tribunal (ANC. 1996 100). The ANC also submitted questions which 
in its view deserved more attention/investigation. Some of these were pertinent: To what 
extent did the National Party leadership sanction actions that violated human rights or 
constituted a gross violation of human rights, what role did the SSC (and members thereof) 
play, who were the commanders of the extensive structures that perpetrated assassinations and 
what were the lines of command and control (also, what happened to these agents and the 
resources after the structures were “dissolved”), which and how many agents were deployed 
against the UDF/Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), who ordered and authorised 
assassinations and who ordered cross-border raids, who were the commanders of notorious 
murder battalions such as 32 Battalion, the police counter-insurgency (COIN) unit, Koevoet, 
and who oversaw them and would take responsibility for their actions before the SATRC. 
Lastly, what was the full story of and detail behind Samora Machel’s “mystery” air crash 
within South African air territory and who was responsible for authorisation if it was a 
planned assassination and not an accident? (Personally I am of the opinion that it was a 
planned “accident” by South African security forces with a decoy beacon being used.) 
 
Other documents consulted consist of individual and institutional submissions to the TRC, as 
well as other original documents, correspondence and material that relate to the TRC process 
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in South Africa. Included was my own submission to the TRC, related to conscription 
(nasionale diensplig). 131 
 
Books, articles, review articles and chapters in books: As I have mentioned the names of 
various international and South African journals earlier, I will stick to broad tenets here. 
Publications consulted include those that argue the merits or de-merits of the TRC process, 
and other materials exclusively produced to advocate the TRC option in South Africa 
(publications by the Justice and Transition Project initiated in 1991/92 by Alex Boraine, ex-
parliamentarian and previous executive director of IDASA, for example). Earlier works in 
which Boraine, one of the senior TRC commissioners, was involved, such as Dealing with the 
Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, also fall in this category (Boraine, Levy & 
Scheffer, 1994). More recent works by Boraine, such as A Country Unmasked: Inside South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2000), were also consulted. Useful works, 
some passed on to me by the authors themselves, such as Bronkhorst, Truth and 
Reconciliation: Obstacles and opportunities for human rights (Amnesty International Dutch 
Section, 1995) and Elin Skaar’s Human Rights and the Paradox of Democratic Transition 
(1994), could be counted among these.132 
 
While some publications advocated and popularised the notion of the TRC (Asmal, Asmal & 
Roberts, 1996), others opposed it. A minority body of works accepted the TRC as an option 
while advocating some other options (Duvenage, 1994, 1996; Liebenberg, 1992: 14–15). 
Elsewhere, incidentally, I argued for criminal proceedings against apartheid human-rights 
transgressors, but later tended to defend, if not advocate, the TRC option in South Africa 
(Liebenberg, 1996: 123–159; Liebenberg & Zegeye, 1998: 541–558). This thesis, needless to 
say, presents a critical reflection of my previous position(s) on the issue. 
 
Other works attempted to deal with the history of the South African case study (see Christie, 
2000). A variety of works dealt with the composition, workings and processes of the SATRC 
                                                 
131 Frequently referred to by Afrikaans activists critical of conscription as diensdwang (roughly 
translatable as “duty-forced-upon”). In more popular vein, but somewhat less sanitised, others referred 
to “my tyd met P.W. en seuns” (my time spent with P.W. Botha and sons). At Stellenbosch the 
Universiteit Stellenbosch Militêre Eenheid (USME) had a most unfortunate acronym: Students referred 
to it as “Use-Me”. (The name was not chosen by the military, but according to legend the commanding 
officer himself, I have to add.) 
132 I met Daan during a 1996 study visit to the Netherlands where we had an extensive and most helpful 
discussion and gratefully received from him several items of unsolicited material on truth commissions 
and government commissions dealing with human rights transgressions. During the same visit I also 
met Peter Romijn, a historian at the Koninklijke Akademie voor Wetenschappen and attached to the 
Rijksinstituut voor oorlogsdocumentatie, which led to a fruitful exchange of documentation, some 
included in the source list. 
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(Boraine, 2000; Dorsman et al., 1999; Van de Vijver, 2000; Christie, 2000). Some of these 
analysed the functioning of the TRC on local community level and its value for reconciliation 
and conflict resolution on local level (Van der Merwe, 1997). 
 
In the case of the SATRC, works mentioned above represent mainly publications dating from 
the years 1992 to 2007. I also read material that, in the aftermath of the SATRCR, attempted 
to reflect and/or interpret the work of the TRC. An example is the work by Posel (2004: 1–26) 
that analysed the TRC as a scientific project and as (social) theatre. Cherry’s article on “‛Just 
war’ and ‘Just Means’: Was the TRC wrong about the ANC?” was more than interesting 
reading material. She discusses the issue of whether the TRC was “hard” on the ANC or 
“soft”. The SATRC held the ANC morally and politically accountable for gross violations of 
human rights in the struggle. This did not go down well with the ANC (Cherry: 2000:13, 15, 
17). Cherry comes to the conclusion that to an extent the SATRC overstated the case, but 
agreed that levels of accountability rest with the ANC leadership and finally argues that this 
debate should not be concluded for the sake of posterity (Cherry, 2000: 21, 25, 26–27).133 
 
Other examples I consulted include recent literature that reflects on the SATRC. Much of this 
was generated by the CSVR. Examples include Rauch on police transformation and the 
SATRC (Rauch, 2004),134 Gear on demobilisation of guerrillas and the effects thereof (Gear, 
2002), Verwoerd on apartheid beneficiaries in the new dispensation (2000) and challenges 
(for civil society) after the SATRC (Simpson, 2002). I selected such works in order to 
scrutinise them for references to CMR or possible policy outcomes of the TRC process. 
                                                 
133 I worked at IDASA with Janet, a committed UDF activist. She was detained twice and received a 
peace award. She later worked in the TRC’s Research Department. Her article illustrates the complex 
environment within which the SATRC operated and the emotions unleashed by it. In a low-key but 
sensitive way she pointed out the need for future dialogue on the TRC’s outcomes in South Africa 
(Cherry, 2000). I cannot agree more with her. 
134 Similar to the military in South Africa, the police services became a topic of contestation and were 
scrutinised by politicians and the public alike. The police, as much as the military, the argument goes, 
had to be made subservient to a democratic constitution when (under apartheid) they were apparently a 
power unto themselves (especially under the Vorster regime). Under the Botha regime, their role – 
specifically that of the Security Police – remained partisan and controversial. The new Constitution 
obliged the police to be subservient to the constitution, to be monitored by the responsible minister; the 
National Commissioner had to ensure that police remained non-partisan, effective and service-
orientated. A civilian secretariat akin to a civilian body such as the Defence Secretariat was to be 
established (see the South African Constitution, Chapter 11, Section 208). An Independent Complaints 
Directorate (ICD) to monitor, regulate police and enquiries into misconduct was established (Melville, 
1999). The role of the police and limitations in their powers are outlined in the New Constitution. All 
security services, the military, police and intelligence services fall under the governing principles in 
Chapter 11 (Section 198): To act in accordance with the law, including international law, strive to 
protect equality and internal peace and harmony, and subject to elected representatives (Read: 
parliament). Police responsibilities and control are outlined in Sections 205 (Clauses 1–3), 206 
(Clauses 1–9) and Section 207 (Clauses 1–6). Section 208 on a civilian secretariat for the police is 
relevant. 
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Usually, such works, while of great value for the broader discourse, yielded very, vert little in 
the demarcated field of this particular study; a tendency also characteristic of earlier works. 
 
Publications that retrospectively analysed the socio-political impact and outcomes of the 
SATRC need mentioning. Some dealt at length with the SATRC. Others contained fleeting 
references to the exercise. Among these were chapters in books and books such as Boraine 
(2001: 73–81), Burton et al. (1992: 109–114), Hendricks (1999), Goodman (1999), Mamdami 
(2001: 58–61), Ndebele (2001: 143–156), Nyatsumba (2001: 88–93), Van der Vijver (2001: 
128–142); Tutu (1999), Dorsman et al. (1999), and Slabbert (2001: 62–72); Slabbert (2006) 
and articles such as those by Hay (1999: 29–51) and Ellis (2000). It was necessary to scan 
these materials for possible pointers related to CMR as well as general references to 
upholding human rights in an emerging democracy. From consulting such “retrospective 
works”, at least one thing is clear: the TRC set the scene for future debate, research and 
theoretical analysis. In that sense, this study can be seen as belonging to this genre aimed at a 
specific focus, as outlined in this study. 
 
Comparative elements: These materials relate mainly to comparisons between the SATRC 
and the Latin American TRC processes, such as those in Chile, Argentina and selected 
African cases. Works by Rosenberg (1991), Guest (1990) and Nunca Más, the report by 
Argentina’s National Commission of the Disappeared People (English translation – 1986) and 
various articles are relevant.135 
 
Publications dealing with TRCs on various levels, excluding specifically dealing with CMR, 
are numerous. Given the perceived importance of TRCs and their real or potential impact on 
society, it is not surprising that the corpus of material is growing. 
 
Reading material included literature that relates to (attempted) TRC-type exercises in Africa 
and elsewhere. The DRC, for example, passed legislation to establish a TRC (Kasuku & 
Savage, 2004: 16). As the study progressed, especially during 2003, 2004 and 2005, I did 
more and more reading on African case studies.136 Among these were publications on Rwanda 
and Nigeria as TRC-like cases, as well as non-TRC cases, such as Namibia and Zimbabwe. 
 
                                                 
135 I also made time earlier to read Nunca Más: Uruguay Human Rights Violations, 1972–1985. Like 
Argentina’s Nunca Más, it makes for torturous and psychologically tiring reading. 
136 My co-promoter, Vladimir Shubin, played no small part in this.  
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Publications dealing with other TRCs, such as those in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and 
Uruguay, appeared somewhat earlier, but received new impetus when a TRC option was 
mooted for South Africa (Aguero, 1993; Bronkhorst, 1995; Du Toit, 1994; Ellis, 1994; 
Ensalaco, 1994; Hayner, 1994 and 1996; Skaar, 1994; Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992). The TRC 
debate in South Africa re-kindled the spark for further debates and publications. A variety of 
sources dealing with TRCs in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay, in some cases 
specifically linking these to the South African experiment, were consulted (Boraine, Levy & 
Scheffer, 1994; Bronkhorst, 1995; Du Toit, 1994: 63–69; Hayner, 1994 and 1996; Skaar, 
1994). Some publications – retrospectively – tried to enhance the debate about duplicating the 
SATRC elsewhere (Saul, 1999: 1–8; Sverrisson, 2006). 
 
Other sources sought to compare different TRCs. Other material, while dealing with TRCs, 
demarcated TRC processes from ICTs or government-sponsored commissions. Examples in 
this regard include Rakate (1999). In the case of “other” TRCs, sources from as early as 1989 
were consulted. 
 
Reading about TRC processes, I was naturally confronted by materials that (extensively) refer 
to ICTs and/or government-sponsored commissions to investigate human-rights 
transgressions. Where applicable and useful for their insights, or informing the context of this 
study, such materials were consulted and will be referred to. Examples include Ferstman 
(1997), Lemarchand (1996), Maogoto (2003), and Rakate (1999, 2001) and again Sverrisson, 
(2006)137. Most of the publications appeared in academic journals, law journals, bulletins, 
newsletters and/or brochures. A small part of the material was drawn from websites. The use 
of newspaper articles, where relevant, also made up part of this. Media articles and releases 
(by the nature of the qualitative approach) provide examples, illuminate public opinions or 
official political attitudes and statements. Moreover, they provide pointers to the agendas (or 
attempts to keep some issues from the agenda) by political actors such as the SADF, the ANC 
or businesses. As Parsons (1995) argues, the political observer or analyst should be aware of 
the complexity of political agenda-setting and the “third dimension of power”. 
 
The “third dimension of power” comes into play especially where role players, in order to 
strengthen their position or defend their interests, try to alter agendas by keeping some issues 
                                                 
137 Highly interesting material that I read but not of direct relevance for this study, is for example 
David’s work on the Polish lustration process and the South African TRC’s and earlier amnesty 
processes (2006). Sometimes one gets side-tracked, I mentioned earlier. Persons that engage in Eastern 
European case studies following transition from authoritarian rule and possible comparisons with the 
SATRC, as well as issues related to transitional justice, may find this contribution valuable. 
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out of the political discourse, or by attempting, in a conscious strategic exercise, to raise other 
issues that will distract the debate away from sensitive issues related to the case under 
investigation (Parsons, 1995: 83ff). I will refer to this in chapters to follow. 
 
Materials related to the historical, philosophical, literary and legal debates of the TRC in 
South Africa, including ones invoking a historians debate: These materials include 
publications that could be termed “the TRC debate or discourse” and its analysis: the moral 
interpretation/re-interpretation (inclusive of critical and philosophical validations – even 
attempted “audits”), of the South African attempt at conducting a TRC (i.e. Posel, 2004; 
Kistner, 2004). Among these count past and present works advocating the SATRC as a moral 
choice, rather than a pragmatic or political one (De Gruchy, n.d.; Ellis, 1994; Werle, 1995). 
Reflective works/philosophical and moral reflections that appeared some years after the 
SATRC are relevant (Verwoerd, 2005; Van Roermund, 2001, for example). Post-TRC 
religious reflections also need mentioning, for example Villa-Vicencio (2002). 
 
The greater number of papers, publications, readers (even fictional works) and website 
material in this field was produced by theologians, philosophers, sociologists, authors of 
fictional works, supporters of the SATRC, poets and linguists – strangely enough not so much 
by historians or political scientists. I still surmise that for many South African political 
scientists, and a large chunk of Afrikaans historians, the TRC and its proceedings were to 
close to the bone. They left the debate to philosophers, theologians and authors of literature. 
One has to remember that it was a time when, at some Afrikaans universities, there were 
lecturers and professors who were also in the employ of Military or National Intelligence, 
among others in political science departments (the University of Stellenbosch and the Rand 
Afrikaans University are examples). Where historians and political scientists did involve 
themselves in the discussions they entered the fray somewhat later. Materials related to the 
debates on amnesty formed a necessary part of the reading (Dugard, 1999; Schafer, 2001; Van 
de Vijfer, 2000; Motala, 1995; Hendricks, n.d; Kollapen, 1993). Recently Kobus du Pisani, an 
Afrikaans historian, reflected on the implications of the SATRC in an article and in doing that 
invited other Afrikaner historians to the debate (Du Pisani, 2007: 1–12). 
 
In this category, the materials that I consulted complied with one main objective: to enable a 
broad understanding of the international and local context of TRCs and gain insight into 
these; again the macro and the micro meshed. Apart from this, such materials provided 
important information on the outcomes, as well as useful “pointers” with regard to the 
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potential role of CMR in a post-transition society. For further reference, I could also deduce 
some insights on policy formulation in the realm. 
 
Descriptive works and submissions to the TRC: These include material that attempted to 
describe and outline the TRC and its regional activities. Others dealt with TRC submissions, 
either regional or national. Some of these works were academic, but mostly these were 
publications of a more popular nature; in other words, articles and other publications aimed at 
public consumption. For example, the SATRC’s booklet on the recommendations of the 
commission, Time to Act, fell in this category. Most of these sources appeared regularly in 
newspapers and on websites. Some interesting articles that were supportive or critical of TRC 
ideas appeared in the news media. Others dealt briefly with perceived shortcomings of the 
process. Some of these newspaper articles questioned – as could be expected – issues such as 
blanket amnesty, lack of restorative justice and the absence of trials for those who did not 
apply for amnesty before the designated period. The role of top politicians also received 
attention in this regard. Specifically the amnesty issue became a point of contestation and led 
to a lively media debate. 
 
Newspaper articles (including a personal archive): The researcher has kept an archive of 
TRC-related newspaper articles since 1992 that contributed to this research project. The same 
applies to CMR. These articles from the “personal archives” proved useful. 
 
Some other media articles (mostly from foreign and national newspapers) from the rather 
extensive “personal archive” kept since 1984, relate to apartheid oppression, such as 
detention, torture and covert operations by the apartheid state. Actions by the Security Police 
and the SADF were informative within the context of the study. These articles were collected 
before the SATRC became the subject of a debate; even before it was mooted. 
 
A significant number of articles related to the study published in the South African media 
were obtained through the Institute for Contemporary History in Bloemfontein. During a 
study visit to the Netherlands in 1996, occasional releases of collated newspaper articles 
supplied by the Kairos Oecumenisch Advies- en Informatiecentrum Zuid-Afrika played an 
important role (see for example Kairos, 1996, Vols., 1 & 2). Ad hoc releases on TRCs, such 
as those released by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, were also scrutinised. The past five years 
provided useable opportunities to access old and new materials, while I struggled to balance 
time between work responsibilities, new projects, trying to conclude older ones that still 
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dragged on, family involvement138 and one’s own needs. In some way or another, I coped. 
Solicited and unsolicited materials have played an especially important role since 2003, but 
more so in the last eight months of the study. For example, Hermien Bolton, the sister of my 
life partner, on various occasions passed on materials that could be of use, since she knew that 
I was working on the topic. With the kind assistance of colleagues and befriended journalists, 
a variety of general and in-depth articles was also obtained. Embarking increasingly on an 
auto-ethnographic approach led me via my first promoter to various fellow students and 
persons following this approach. Through their kind advice and “pointers on the way” I 
amassed literature in this field. 
 
Private Correspondence: In some cases, private correspondence with practitioners, academics 
and observers was entered into. Where useful and informative to the study, this was used and 
some examples are reflected in the source list (the minority), unless anonymity was required 
or requested. 
 
3.11. Reflection on materials consulted 
 
I have referred to an extensive corpus of materials published between 1992 when the SATRC 
was mooted and 2007. I have argued that, while such research was extensive and of the 
highest standard in addressing social issues and processes related to the SATRC, few studies 
dealt with the important interface between the TRC and its outcomes and CMR inclusive of 
civil control over the military. 
 
Splendid theoretical and analytical work in reflecting on the SATRC (related to its scientific 
basis) appeared (see, for example, Posel in Tazi, 2004: 1–26). Other recent works addressed 
issues of racism and “displacing race”, amnesty, the SATRC in the context of international 
human-rights tradition and testimonies by TRC participants. These issues were addressed in 
detail and on a markedly high theoretical level (see Fullard, 2004; Harris, Valji, Hamber & 
Ernest, 2004). 
 
Again, however, the lack of material on the link of CMR with the SATRC arose and pointed 
to the need to engage with this issue. Lack of information in qualitative research and an 
extensive exploration of materials, even when side-tracked, does not imply that nothing is 
gained. On the contrary, consulting such materials where necessary and applicable, by means 
                                                 
138 I-Ben and Marian were born in 1999. My father had a stroke and became progressively 
incapacitated, which in itself implied time having to be spent elsewhere. 
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of a side-tracking exercise, contributed to the systematic and eventually enabling interpretive 
tracking needed to complete this project. 
 
3.12. “Transition is with us”: Incumbents and contenders discoursing the future 
 
In the aftermath of the era of authoritarian rule (“Local was not Lekker”) the interface 
transition/democratisation introduced the first attempts at producing a constitutional state. 
Constitutionalism started playing a role. To provide for a further comparative element in 
reading literature, I ventured into reading some selected constitutions and documentation from 
other countries that made a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy (depending on 
whether these were available in English). The Constitution of the Republic of Portugal, 
proclaimed in 1976 (later to be revised, 1989), for example, proved insightful on the new role 
of the military within the democratic dispensation. See for example Section X on National 
Defence: Article 274 that instituted a Higher Council of Defence to advise the president on 
the functioning and discipline of the armed forces under the democratic Constitution 
(Directorate-General Communication Portugal, 1989: 150). Article 275 stipulated that “The 
Armed Forces shall obey the competent organs of supreme authority in Accordance with the 
Constitution …” and “the Armed Forces shall be at the service of the Portuguese people. They 
shall be strictly non-partisan and their members shall not take advantage of their weapons, 
posts or functions for any political intervention” (Directorate-General Communication 
Portugal, 1989: 150, my italics). Note that the new constitution also brought about “a 
democratic state based on the rule of law”, “plurality of democratic expression” and of 
“democratic political organisation” and “the safeguarding of fundamental rights and 
freedoms”. An interesting characteristic of the Portuguese constitution is that it expressly 
makes public participation an obligation – not an option. For example: “(T)he aim is to 
achieve economic, social, and cultural democracy and to push participatory democracy 
further” (Directorate-General Communication Portugal, 1989: 11). By virtue of Section VI, a 
Constitutional Court was established to oversee the Executive. Indeed, the new constitution 
was a far cry from what happened under Caetano’s authoritarian government and set up a re-
aligned environment for the role of the security/military in the new democracy. In the case of 
Portugal the military, including large numbers of conscripts, was mainly deployed in the 
“colonies”. Caetano’s rule was secured in Portugal with the help of security agents other than 
the military, even while the military leadership was expected to be unquestionably loyal. (For 
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an insightful work, see Lawrence S. Graham, 1993. The Portuguese Military and the State: 
Rethinking Transitions in Europe and Latin America. Oxford: Westview Press.139) 
 
3.13. Transition and new constitutionalism: Setting the stage for the SATRC 
 
In South Africa the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993)140 that came into being on 27 April 
1994 had the following to say about the new National Defence Force: “Only one Defence 
Force shall be established by law for the RSA”. Article 225 stated that the President shall 
appoint a Chief of the National Defence Force who is to act under the directions of the 
Minister of Defence. Parliament shall provide the legal/constitutional parameters for the new 
military force (Section 226(2)). Under all circumstances the new defence force was to be a 
constitutional defence force where all members are “obliged to comply with all lawful orders, 
but shall be entitled to refuse such an order if it would constitute an offence or would breach 
international law on armed conflicts binding on the Republic” (Section 226 (7)). 
Accountability to elected representatives is clearly spelled out in a separate section (Section 
228 (1)–(5). The Minister of Defence is accountable to Parliament; Parliament has to approve 
the budget; a joint standing committee is to be established for Defence consisting of members 
of all parties that hold more than ten seats in Parliament. This committee “shall be competent 
to investigate and make recommendations regarding the budget, functioning, organisation, 
armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the National Defence Force” and “to 
perform such other functions relating to Parliamentary supervision” of the force as may be 
prescribed by law (RSA, Act 2000 of 1993: Section 228 (3d). 
 
Under the new constitution the previous forces, statutory and non-statutory, became one 
consolidated defence force. “The National Defence Force shall consist of all members of the 
South African Defence Force, the defence forces of the former independent states of Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei and any other armed force of a political party or 
organisation that took part in the first election of the National Assembly” (Rautenbach & 
Malherbe, 1994: 65). Guerrillas and cadres from the armed wings of the PAC and the Black 
Consciousness Movement were eventually also integrated into the SANDF.141 The prominent 
clause that stated clearly that the elected President (for whose election procedures were 
                                                 
139 It was after all a professional military soldier, Gen. de Spinola, that started the fall of the Caetano 
regime in Portugal through his critical book, Portugal and the Future. Would that South Africa had 
outspoken generals (even colonels) with such moral fibre! 
140 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, Act No. 200 of 1993 published in the 
Government Gazette, No. 15466, 28 January 1994.  
141 PAC’s armed wing: Azanian People’s Liberation Army. BCM’s armed wing: the Azanian National 
Liberation Army. 
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outlined in Section 77 (a–b) was to appoint the Chief of the National Defence Force (CNDF) 
should be stressed here. The CNDF would exercise executive command of the military 
“subject to the directions of the Minister responsible for and, during a state of emergency, the 
President” (Section 225). 
 
The specific mentioning of unlawful orders in Section 226 (7) clearly indicated an attempted 
break with the apartheid past. 
 
The acceptance of the Interim Constitution, in which the Minister of Defence was made 
accountable to Parliament for (all) actions of the defence force, contrasted starkly with the 
previous modus operandi. Creating a multi-party joint committee “consisting of members of 
all parties with more than ten seats in the National Assembly in accordance with the principle 
of proportional representation to investigate matters regarding the defence force” was a 
significant addition in order to broaden parliamentary oversight (Rautenbach & Malherbe, 
1994: 66). The Constitutions stated that “no other armed force or military organisation or 
service may be established in or for the Republic” other than that (a) provided for in the 
Constitution (b) or duly by Parliament (RSA, Act No. 200 of 1993). This stipulation has to be 
seen against the background of apartheid security issues. Security structures branched out 
without the knowledge of parliament and frequently apparently without the full knowledge of 
the all members of the upper echelons of security. In at least one case someone claimed to 
have heard from a cabinet minister himself that he (the Minister) had only heard of South 
Africa’s cross-border raids following the visit of the Eminent Persons Group to South Africa 
to request a negotiated settlement, on the radio en route to Parliament. In one of my 
interviews with an ex-parliamentarian that resigned from the Tricameral parliament, he stated 
that it was “quite possible” that some members of cabinet and frequently parliament were 
“left out of the loop”. Another participant in this study, a military practitioner, suggests that 
the establishment of the CCB was a case in point where things became murky and 
uncoordinated and lines of command diffuse (Afrikaans: “dinge het wollerig geword”).142 
 
The right granted to the professional soldier to disobey an unlawful order in the 1993 
Constitution reflected a clear intention to break away from the previous modus operandi 
where, in theory, under the military Disciplinary Code, such action by defence force members 
was possible. Disobeying an order was, however, highly unlikely, given the authoritarian 
leadership style, militarised society syndrome, the extensive control of the National Party in 
                                                 
142 Anonymity required. 
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the previous parliament, the principle of an executive presidency and total-onslaught 
mentality backed up with concomitant structures such as the SSC and the NSMS. Since 
September 1984 (when the black township Sebokeng was invaded by assigned elements of 
the SADF) under the state of emergency, the military had fallen under the command of an 
executive presidency assisted by the SSC. The SSC set up Joint Operational Centres as part of 
the NSMS. Seldom Parliament was informed in detail and in some cases apparently not at all. 
 
Military deployment played an important role in quelling township unrest (CIIR, Appendix A: 
v; Cock, 1990: 87; Seegers, 1990: 113; Nusas, n.d., 28–29). It is, however, important to make 
a distinction between the role of the military in the townships and other roles. In general, the 
military leadership with some exceptions was ill at ease with deployment in the townships. It 
was felt that it was the work of the police. The activities of some police units, especially the 
Security Police and police deployed for “riot control” and the indiscriminate way in which 
they acted caused tension, also on lower command levels. The military was blamed for some 
excessive violence, while in fact such transgressions inside the country were mainly 
perpetrated by the South African Police, more specifically the Security Police. On the other 
hand it was no secret that in the Namibian and Angolan war theatre in support of Unita, some 
military commanders overstepped the “rules of combat” and allowed their subjects to do so 
too. 
 
I have to mention that some military commanders, such as Generals Kat Liebenberg and 
Jannie Geldenhuys, appeared in court because of alleged involvement with irregularities in 
the deployment of security forces. Eventually they were acquitted. After the action taken by 
the SADF in Namibia and Angola (a dozen or more large-scale operations in Angola, which 
dovetailed and overlapped with at least 120 smaller operations) the SADF was blamed for 
human-rights excesses. A number of these excesses can be ascribed to the specialised 
battalions such as 101 SWATF Battalion and 32 Battalion. Erroneously the SADF was also 
blamed for excesses by the SAP COIN unit, Koevoet, that was deployed inside Namibia 
under SAP command (Herbstein & Evenson, 1989: 61ff, 98ff; Wood, 1988:526ff; information 
shared by individuals/own sources)143. I would like to refer the reader here to the questions 
submitted to the SATRC related to the lines of command and responsibilities for the 
deployment of these units, the CCB and destabilisation/cross-border operations. 
 
                                                 
143 For obvious reasons the last mentioned will remain anonymous.  
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The fact that the SADF top leaders did not provide detailed evidence before the SATRC, that 
they destroyed vital documents and up to today insist that they only acted under orders, did 
not endear them to the public.144 The full impact of their involvement in Frontline States, 
especially Angola, which were destabilised by consistent incursions into its sovereign 
territory, also received scant attention. It was left to others to record such excesses (Herbstein 
& Evenson, 1989; Katjivivi, 1988: 89). Much dissatisfaction remained. The response of one 
of the participants in the study, that the military tends to forget (with the result that) the 
civilian component tends not to forgive, leaves me with an important cue to understanding the 
current dislike of (even white) South Africans for ex-SADF officers145. Through its 
participation in the NSMS inside South Africa the military became intrinsically linked – and 
associated – with repressive conduct in upholding the minority government and few of the top 
leaders seemed to be prepared to object publicly to such a role. This applies especially to 
persons who were involved in intelligence and counter-intelligence in South Africa during the 
1980s. 
 
In 1996 South Africa formally adopted the new Constitution, Act 108 of 1996.146 South Africa 
and its citizenry, as represented by Parliament, decided even before the adoption of the new 
Constitution, to institute a process through which past wrongdoings could be unearthed 
(brought into the open); a process through which South Africans could publicly attempt to 
unearth a violent past and – through a public and reasonably “legal” process – facilitate the 
hearing of victims and where possible, allow admission of guilt that assumedly could lead to a 
process of social healing in South Africa (TRC Report, 1998: 24 ff; Boraine, 2000: 42–43; 
48–49; James & Van de Vijver, 2000: 1ff). The bill was finally signed into law on 19 July 
1995 and came into effect in December 1995 when the 17 TRC commissioners were 
appointed (TRC Report, 1998: 44). 
 
Following the new Constitution (1996), a White Paper, entitled Defence in a Democracy, was 
released and the DRP started. The White Paper addressed the vision, mission and posture of 
the newly formed SANDF and its relationship to elected bodies and the citizenry. It was a 
                                                 
144 Verne Harris (2000: 29–56) senior archivist in the National Archives of South Africa (Pretoria/ 
Tshwane) expands on the effects and extent of destroyed documentation. 
145 I refer here in general to white members of the SADF permanent force. 
146 In the 1996 Constitution the  governing principles for security services are described in Chapter 11 
(198 a–d); the structures and conduct thereof in Section 199; defence receives specific attention in 
Sections 200 and 201.1–4 (“political responsibilities”). Command structures and the state of national 
defence are outlined in Section 203 and the civilian secretariat for defence dealt with in Section 204. 
The police services and intelligence arms of the state are prescribed in the rest of Chapter 11. 
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definite attempt to put into practice what was enshrined by the new Constitution of 1996 and 
the Bill of Rights. 
 
The DRP was started as an exercise involving civilians in a process of consultation on 
regional and national level. For the first time in South Africa’s history, the citizenry (rather 
than only elected officials) was involved in discussing the role, mission, defence posture and 
(rough) estimates of future defence expenditure of the SANDF. 
 
The DRP was, among others, criticised for (1) not going far enough, (2) being too expensive, 
(3) providing too little technical information to the civilian participants, and (4) opening up an 
opportunity to be abused by some to “slip in” the controversial arms deal.147 However, it 
cannot be denied that it was a process that allowed for public participation and could 
potentially influence future CMR as well as civil control over the military positively. 
 
I have to stress that, unfortunately, there was too little official interaction between the TRC 
process and the DRP. This led to shortcomings already discussed and which I will discuss in 
following chapters. 
 
The five-volume report of the SATRC, in its recommendations, only refers by implication to 
civil control over the military (for that matter civil control over all security institutions) in 
point 14 (308–309), point 21 (311–312) and points 62 to 68 (328–333). In its conclusion 
(points 143 to 152: 435), not a single reference is to be found on CMR or civilian control over 
the military, nor is there a reference to civil (or parliamentary) control over other security 
agencies such as the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Service, or the 
South African Police Service. The full report consists of five volumes, roughly 450 pages per 
volume, while civil control over the security/military agencies – and then only by implication 
– covers fewer than 20 pages. 
 
Some general pointers to the protection of human rights and the role of public prosecutors are 
mentioned, yet no specific recommendations on CMR, or relations between civilian people 
(the citizenry) and other security institutions (i.e. the police or intelligence services) were 
attempted. The minority report by TRC Councillor Wynand Malan also failed to address 
issues concerning future constitutional control or civil-military matters related to the research 
question to be answered. 
                                                 
147 The impact of and problems concerning the arms deal are discussed among others by Wessels 
(2005: 110–112). 
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Literature frequently brings contexts alive. Living contexts mingle with somatic experiences. 
An indication of the lack of interest in the field of TRC-civil-military linkage, apart from the 
above, may be gauged by the following personal experiences: 
 
The researcher, together with Rocky Williams (ex-MK, member of the MRG, integrated into 
the new SANDF at the rank of colonel, and later attached to the newly established Defence 
Secretariat) wrote a paper for popular consumption entitled “The impact of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission on the SANDF”. The paper was published in the IDP Papers 
(Liebenberg & Williams, 1999). Virtually no comments, positive or negative, were received 
although copies of the IDP Papers were widely distributed among members of civil society, 
the security establishment, political practitioners and the business community. A substantially 
updated and more theoretical version of the paper published during 1999 in International 
Studies (later translated into Russian and published in Yusznaya Afrika) also drew minimal 
comment locally or internationally.148 
 
This experience plays a role in the choice of this study, not so much because of personal 
affliction but because I believe a debate on this can stand us in good stead in future when civil 
control over the military is at stake. 
 
3.14. In conclusion: bringing the strands together 
 
This overview addressed the main themes of this scholarly review. 
 
The literature that I selected was useful not only to provide a background and to contextualise 
the study, but also to provide insights in order to resolve the research question. From 
“tracing” to “tracking” is relevant with reference to the literature review. So is, needless to 
say, personal experience and my interaction with others. 
 
The review demonstrated that, while ample publications on the SATRC, international TRCs, 
non-TRC approaches, democratisation, CMR and civil control over the military appeared over 
the past decade or more, few enough publications link the concepts of a TRC to CMR. In 
short, the potential positive outcomes for CMR in countries that deployed TRCs have been 
                                                 
148 A paper delivered on my behalf by Phil Eidelberg at an international conference arranged by the 
Institute for African Studies in Moscow during 2005, drew more comments and led to some debate. I 
welcome the considered critical remarks received. In reflection, these comments honed an exploration 
“on the track” by an individual. 
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neglected to date in research. In so doing, opportunities here and elsewhere were missed to 
add value to CMR and civil control over the military and hence also to strengthen new 
democracies and sustain a proven positive human-rights record. 
 
The review dealt with a range of civil-military related material published over the past two 
decades and more. It demonstrated that materials – mostly published by scholars in the 
“highly developed countries” or “industrialised democracies” – approached the question of 
the military and civilian rule mainly in terms of the modernisation or development theory 
paradigms. These do not offer enough substance to current debates, diagnoses and hence 
prognosis in the field; less so in the African context. 
 
I demonstrated that new debates and research on security evolved from 1990 pertaining to 
civil control over militaries and CMR. A large number of these works are home-grown, thus 
relating African experiences with the aim to provide answers to rather complex issues through 
theoretical and applied research. This holds true for the African continent, South and Southern 
Africa. 
 
The overriding conclusion is that ample research was done in the separate discernable fields 
as indicated, but much-needed research on the crucial linkage between TRC countries and 
non-TRC countries following transition from authoritarian rule to democracy regarding CMR 
still needs to be done. 
 
The above substantiates my argument that there is a need – or rather an imperative – to 
research these links, or at the bare minimum, initiate such research in order to benefit new 
democracies whether they had a TRC or not. If such research is executed accountably, the 
findings may assist in “bettering the life of (some) people somewhere in the world”. 
 
Necessarily, if the research done can make it possible to develop a concrete hypothesis that 
can be tested and/or to replicate/transfer such a study, much will have been achieved. 
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The SA TRC and others were viewed from many different perspectives during the past two 
decades. 
 
 
TRC-related publications and relevant areas addressed since 1980 
 
> 1980/1990s TRCs develop/evolve in Latin America and several reports appear. Calls for and 
activation of international tribunals less salient. Awareness of the bias of “victor 
versus vanquished” in previous attempts to implement international criminal 
tribunals, i.e. tribunals against German political leadership following WWII 
recognised. 
 
1992-1993 TRC-like approach following Latin-American examples mooted in South Africa. 
(Especially the Sabato Commission is quoted as an example by South African 
advocates). Various South African organisations and individuals, representing a 
minority, call for retribution rather than reconciliation. 
 
1993-1994 Advocacy by various institutions and individuals for a TRC rather than retribution 
or a “forgive-and-forget” approach salient and win the day. Latin American 
examples such as Chile and Argentina quoted as authoritative/leading/exemplary 
cases. 
 
1995-1999 Act 35 of 1995 puts SATRC in action, partly the result of a negotiated settlement, 
partly as a result of NGO advocates appealing to the Christian and rational liberal 
ethos underpinning TRCs. First appearances of works of literature from Afrikaans 
novelists and poets that (re-) introspect, individualise and moralise on the SATRC, 
e.g. Antjie Krog. Debate in public on retribution subsides in the media and 
amoung new political leadership (or vice versa). Very little of a “historians’ 
debate”. The SATRC Report appears amid acclamation and criticism. Academic 
reflections and moral (re)consideration by novelists, philosophers and Christian 
theorists appear increasingly. The DRP and SATRC proceed as different 
processes. Some quantitative studies investigate the SATRC. HSRC terminates its 
only attempt at surveying public opinions on the TRC. Studies by Gouws and 
Gibson retain focus on quantitative aspects and survey research. Publications by 
South African practitioners and scholars on CMR and transformation of the 
military/ security sector and civil control appear in increasing volumes. Few of 
these reflections link the direct interface between the SATRC and civil control 
over military and security institutions. Investigation/research into female/women 
experiences submitted to the SATRC appears in journals and newspapers. 
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2000-2007 Literary and social science reflections appear in greater numbers. Applied social 
science descriptions of SATRC and outcomes, also with regard to individual 
experiences and local/regional communities appear. D Litt et Phils and PhDs on 
female witnesses’ experiences before the TRC appear. TRC regional workers that 
experienced previous community conflicts reflect on the realities of the SATRC in 
local communities. Fictional works related to the TRC context increase in number. 
Seldom any reference to SATRC or other TRCs’ direct possible or real influence 
on the future control of the military in a democracy or the need for politicians to 
be educated NOT to invite/incite the military into politics. Publications by ex-
SADF leadership and members of Special Forces advocate their heroism and 
romanticise about apartheid’s just wars against communists, terrorists, blacks and 
Moscow. Some critical works describing and illustrating the non-heroic side of the 
apartheid domination of Namibia and Anglo appear. 
 
International tribunals (ICTs) re-appear as one way to deal with human-rights 
excesses as a reinvention of the Nuremberg Trials. ICTs as a supra-initiative 
caught up between international justice and protection of human rights. The 
allegation that ICTs serve the victor and punish the vanquished becomes part of 
the debate. ICTs notwithstanding this become the new vogue. 
 
Some theorists call for comparative studies on TRC-related processes and 
advocacy of TRC processes for other countries such as East Timor and Cambodia. 
A variety of TRCs implemented some in conjunction with ICTs. 
 
Quantitative research links SATRC to issues of reconciliation and nation- building 
– none of it focussing on TRC/civil control over the military interface. 
 
2000-2007 “Historians’ debate” still mostly absent. Moral philosophers and social 
philosophers contribute increasingly reflective notes on the SATRC and others. 
Future-orientated reflections aimed at application of TRCs elsewhere seldom refer 
to the needed link fo civil military relations. ICTs frequently advocated and 
implemented. Virtually no debate on “forgive-and-forget” approaches. Few 
reflections by theorists on what TRCs could have meant for civilian control over 
the military. In practice ICT and TRC combinations become enmeshed/entwined 
by the international community through bodies such as the UN Security Council 
(Rwanda as example). Transmutations ignoring TRCs and (re) inventing ICTs 
emerge. Some of these approaches are openly questioned within the international 
community. One example of dealing with previous oppressors after defeat (Iraq) 
features. The exercise in Iraq the Nürember trials imposed by the USA, Britain and 
the Soviet Union on the Nazis following WW II. Novelists and poets add to further 
reflection. TRC and direct links to and potential influence on civil military 
relations receive little attention. Works by investigative journalists appear. What 
they say may not be acceptable to the supporters of the old order, but these works 
provide valuable information on the abuse of security forces under apartheid and 
the involvement of some top military leaders. The absence and/or subversion of 
CMR by apartheid leaders are clear. Apart from the value of these works they also 
assist in putting the puzzle of the past together and may be of assistance in 
triangulating historical data in the future (See for example Potgieter, 2007). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
COMPARISON OF THE CASE OF THE SATRC 
 
Research is literally research, a searching after the fact – the fact that some hypothesis has 
been made, however tentative or implicit – Friedrichs, 1970. 
 
Reflexive approaches to social science research have become firmly established in many 
social scientific disciplines over recent decades, including those of anthropology, sociology 
and feminist scholarship … However despite decades of empirical and theoretical labours in 
military studies, with few notable exceptions, approaches explicitly reflective in nature 
remain largely peripheral to the field – Higate & Cameron, 2006: 219. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
What I am doing in the thesis and this chapter relates closely to the above epigraphs. I track 
research question(s) in the aftermath of individual experiences under apartheid and in the 
period of transition to democracy. More specifically I reconsider the SATRC, not in an 
endeavour to deal with its morality, value for historical recollection, or as a totalising tool (of 
nation building), or the discourse (linguistic debates) on the SATRC and other TRCs. I am 
interested in the research question through a reflective approach underpinned by auto-
ethnography. In this sense this project is about re-search. Current research, as Higate and 
Cameron remark, is in need of more reflexive elements (Higate & Cameron, 2006: 219). 
Their statement has value for South Africa, as not all subject disciplines are well disposed to 
this approach.149 In the process I share my reservations and criticisms of previous research on 
TRCs, the SATRC and CMR, however commendable these research projects were for their 
time and in the particular demarcated area of investigation. This study is context-informed 
and up close to the author and reader. 
 
Regarding CMR and civil control over the armed forces, I took note of the argument of some 
civil-military theorists that “it (is) apparent that an eclectic approach in analysing CMR on the 
(African) continent is probably the best methodological approach to take in view of the 
                                                 
149 In South Africa disciplines such as psychology, the health sciences, linguistic studies, management 
sciences and theology do entertain this approach, in contrast to other disciplines, which seem to be 
wary of it. 
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various factors that have influenced (CMR) on the continent over time” (Ngoma, 2004: 13).150 
Ngoma implies that there are generic links within regions and between regions, and therefore 
a reasonable argument in favour of gaining insights into a research question by being aware of 
the potential value of “eclectic” insights gained through living in an ever changing social 
context. I am of the opinion that to an extent the same applies to studies related to truth and 
reconciliation processes. 
 
In this thesis eclectic insights play some role. However, the methodology of the study is not 
eclectic. While the value of an “eclectic methodology” may be appreciated by some, this study 
has no interest in or objective to equate insights accrued through a post-modern analysis of truth 
and reconciliation processes and CMR. Post-modern analysis offers problems of its own and, I 
argue, does not provide the tools for problem-solving or applied research in this research 
project. In the metaphor of tracking: an attempted post-modern approach is less useful if one 
embarks on basic or elementary tracking that serves as a building block for systematic and 
interpretive tracking to solve practical challenges confronting the researcher. This is even more 
relevant when one is aiming to provide some pointers for future policy making, or replicating 
social choices for truth and reconciliation processes, or in contrast considering arguments 
against using such processes and the reasons for deciding against them. 
 
I take note of Janowitz’s view that “THERE IS LITTLE POINT in endlessly debating the most 
appropriate strategy to be utilised in the comparative analysis of CMR. It is clear, at least to me, 
that the study of armed forces and society requires alternative approaches if the role of the 
military in political affairs is to remain a vital subject of scholarly investigation” (Janowitz, 
1981: 9). Janowitz introduces another point here, namely that regional approaches are valuable 
tools for investigating the politics concerning military and quasi-military regimes. In short, 
regional approaches as part of comparative research are productive and potentially useful as a 
unit of analysis (Janowitz, 1981: 9). These insights struck me for their implied usefulness if read 
together with Higate and Cameron’s observation in the epigraph (Higate & Cameron, 2006: 
219). Janowitz, Higate and Cameron’s argument re-affirms my personal views about relevant 
research and knowledge creation. Over many years of involvement in society and being exposed 
to people (also as a re-searcher) it could be little different. Past experiences proved that we were 
too restricted, or perhaps too unimaginative, when we approached broader casing. To argue that 
                                                 
150 Janowitz leaves space for reflection here: “I believe we would find considerable uniformity within 
regions and diversity among regions…” (a theme for clarification is) …  “the distinctive style and 
results of political intervention by differing military groups” (Janowitz, 1981: 9). These differences, as 
well as similarities related to (para-) military intervention, praetorianism of a special type and its 
outcomes during and after transition to democracy in a society, are of relevance here. 
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these limited approaches were enforced by our more conservative teachers may be true, but that 
is no excuse for not venturing or tracking further. The researcher as a human agent in 
researching a chosen phenomenon or phenomena has choices, even if these invite criticism. I 
made this choice when I decided to study the SATRC as part of a broader casing and its 
relationship with/influence on civil control over the military. 
 
I will pay attention here to the SATRC and compare it with some new or emerging 
democracies that opted for a TRC exercise and some selected cases of countries not opting 
for a TRC. I believe that such an approach will assist in answering the research problem. As 
Friedrich rightly remarks, research after the fact (tracking as opposed to tracing in the 
metaphor used in this study) illuminates a hypothesis however tentative or implicit (see the 
epigraph above). 
 
4.2. What “to do” with the past: Brief notes on the SATRC 
 
In the words of Kader Asmal: “South Africans have undergone a unique experience since 
1948, with the institutionalisation of racism, a process that permeated and perverted every 
aspect of our individual and collective lives.” He continues: “The structures of state (the 
army, police, secret services and the whole of the civil service) were committed to the 
maintenance and defence of an evil system by abhorrent means” (Asmal in Boraine, Levy & 
Scheffer, 1994: vii). Asmal is correct in pointing out how apartheid and separateness and the 
ways in which it was upheld permeated South Africa, which spawned a militarised state. 
Obviously apartheid and segregation and racism came into being much earlier. Eurocentrism 
and with it racist attitudes arrived with the first ships that rounded the Cape and the 
establishment of a halfway station for the Dutch East India Company in 1652. British 
colonisation deepened these attitudes and imposed structures corresponding with it. But for 
many (erroneously or not) apartheid is seen to have started in 1948.151 
 
The legacy of apartheid, and how South Africans attempted to deal with it by means of the 
SATRC, will receive attention here. Following this, I will take a look at comparable 
experiences pertaining to the disclosure of truth after a period of repression by an 
                                                 
151 Various works point out that segregation, underpinned by racist attitudes, is far older than the 
Afrikaner nationalist ideology of apartheid. Compare various essays in the work Town and Countryside 
in Transvaal, edited by Belinda Bozzoli (1983) and Elphick and Giliomee’s The Shaping of South 
African Society: 1652–1820 (1979). An acclaimed novel, An Instant in the Wind, by the well-known 
South African author André Brink, provides an interesting historical backdrop to the race and class 
divisions in early South African society. 
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authoritarian government. Finally, some remarks will be made about the commission’s 
performance, given our political legacy and current context. I will conclude with the theme of 
the lack of research into the links between the SATRC/TRCs and civil control over the 
military and why we need more focus on this linkage. 
 
Truth commissions tend to have a “truth phase” (unearthing of and public-making of the 
truth) and a “justice phase” (ways and means to deal with compensation/restoration with 
regard to victims, as well as steps taken with regard to human-rights transgressors).152 Some 
remarks here will relate to the “truth phase” and the “justice phase”. In terms of the needs of 
the study, the phases will be looked at from the angle of their use in providing (possible) 
pointers towards civil control over the military in new democratic regimes. Again personal 
observations will creep in throughout this chapter. 
 
4.2.1. The political background leading to a TRC in South Africa 
 
I will discuss the political context of the SATRC first. As far back as 1979, Smith in Anatomy 
of apartheid gave a chilling description of apartheid in the South Africa of the time: 
 
“[T]here is a character running … a furtive malicious character that has become the skunk of 
the world. His name is apartheid and his influence spreads throughout the land. He pervades 
every sphere of public life. He separates families, splitting man from wife and parent from 
child. He is found in every government office or wherever government directs him. More 
tangibly, he is in every street and almost every building. He has caused separate communities 
to be built around himself … [H]e has caused South Africa to be a house divided against 
itself” (Smith, 1979: 1). The apartheid experiment eventually ended in an authoritarian regime 
upheld with creeping military roles and the deployment of security structures that involved 
themselves with a whole range of repressive measures such as regular shows of force, 
incarceration of opponents, threats to lives of activists and their families, creation of violent 
third forces, development of biological and nuclear warfare capabilities – biological 
capabilities on a micro-scale among others actually tested on the “enemy” – and assassination 
of state opponents. (On the development of South Africa’s nuclear capabilities, consult Steyn, 
Van der Walt and Van Loggerenberg, 2003.) 
 
                                                 
152 It is with regard to the justice phase that I argue that foresight is needed when TRC experiments are 
embarked upon. Making concrete proposals in the reports of TRCs about stabilising and honing future 
CMR will benefit societies that made the transition to a democracy following praetorianism, 
praetorianism of a special type and/or direct military interventions.  
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That the ideology of apartheid was updated, streamlined and embedded in the proto-
ideologies (Frankel, 1984) or para-ideologies (Van Vuuren, 1985) of tricameralism and 
“Total Onslaught” is today common knowledge. That this was in fact a divide-and-rule 
strategy that amounted to “domination through reform” is also well known (Van Vuuren, 
1985). That tricameralism did not broaden democracy, but rather centralised power (Du Toit 
& Heymans, 1985), that it was authoritarian and led to the militarisation of South African 
politics, is also well known.153 
 
What was/is discussed in the spectra of work in this field of research are the practical 
consequences of the application of the Janus-faced nature of “dovish” and “hawkish” 
structures of legitimation and domination presented by a “reformed” apartheid system. The 
long-term consequences that lingered after the demise of the apartheid state deserve more 
discussion. South Africans were not only psychologically and ideologically divided among 
themselves, but were also fighting and killing one another in an organised way (Duncan & 
Rock, 1997: 69ff; Buchart et al., 2000: 29ff; Emmet & Higson-Smith, 2000: 195ff). Van 
Vuuren and Liebenberg (in Minnaar, Liebenberg & Schutte, 1994: 25ff) point out that 
because of the structural adaptation of domination strategies, “government by illusion” was in 
place by the middle of the 1980s. 
                                                 
153 Luthuli (1962), Adam (1977), Adam and Giliomee (1981) and Leonard (1983) were the first to point 
out that South African socio-political life was being militarised to ensure the survival of white 
domination. Frankel (1984) points towards the development of a garrison state that was a result of the 
development of the “total strategy” (Frankel, 1984: 29ff). More detailed analyses followed. Van 
Vuuren (1985: 56ff) likened South Africa to a mobilised society-cum-garrison state. Grundy (1988) 
pointed towards the internal, and especially external, destabilisation of political opponents that had to 
follow the militarisation of South African politics. Cock and Nathan followed this tradition (1989). 
Davis referred to South Africa as a “bunker state”, mimicking Frankel and Van Vuuren (Davis, 1987). 
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“Government by illusion” relates to the government of the time and its advisors consciously 
or not-so-consciously deluding its followers – and perhaps itself – that the political agenda of 
the time was to deal with a “terrorist onslaught” waged by agitators under Moscow’s control, 
and aimed at destroying South Africa and its Christian values154. Government by illusion 
implies that the government and securocrats of the day believed that strong-handed security 
and military tactics internally and externally (the Frontline States) would be able to curb, if 
not overcome, this “onslaught”. Security and military actions increasingly supplanted political 
solutions, with long-term social consequences. If we want to understand this in tracking the 
re-search question, both the life of an individual and society need to be kept in mind. 
 
I argue that the National Party, the security apparatus, and the executive presidency of P.W. 
Botha suffered from “agenda denial”, which closely relates to Van Vuuren’s argument of 
government by illusion. In agenda denial the incumbent refuses to face real existing problems 
or even deny that they exist (Anderson, 2000: 101). Agenda denial is frequently accompanied 
by refusal or inability to act by ruling authorities (non-decision-making), simply because the 
existence of a specific problem, in this case apartheid, minority rule and militarisation of state 
and society, was denied. Instead, forceful action inside and outside South Africa was regarded 
as effective. 
 
Ironically, the agenda of other South Africans at the same time (even long before) focussed on 
attaining universal suffrage, equality and economic justice – roughly, so we are informed, 
since the 1880s (Le Roux, 1961; Odendaal, 1984,1994). In the absence of meaningful 
political transformation to a democracy, resistance movements such as the South African 
                                                 
154 Seegers convincingly argues that the South African government overestimated the geo-strategic 
position of South Africa on the globe and Soviet interest in Southern Africa, that it misinterpreted the 
support from Reagan (the Reagan Doctrine announced in 1986) and the notion of constructive 
engagement (in the latter case it was advanced by prominent state leaders such as Chester Crocker and 
Ronald Reagan and not necessarily backed up by pervasive support of Congress and the rank-and-file 
of US citizenry). The Clarke Amendment (1985) that repealed the prohibition of covert assistance to 
organisations such as Unita probably strengthened South African apartheid leaders’ belief that they 
now had a free hand in the region to undertake military action (see Seegers, 1996: 236). Between 1986 
and 1987 approximately $30 million was channelled to Unita covertly (Seegers, 1996: 236). The results 
were that “When it (the South African Department of Military Intelligence and to an extent the 
Department of Foreign Affairs) turned its analytical scalpel to larger politics, all blended into a mass of 
concentrated Communism” (Seegers, 1996: 215). Seegers rightly remarks that, “Once the hawks took 
charge in Pretoria all levers were pumped …” (Seegers, 1996: 214). The results were what Seegers 
called ‘uncivil wars’ and ‘executive wars’ waged by South Africa in Southern Africa (Seegers, 1996: 
232ff, 210ff). What André du Pisani as early as February 1988 warned against, namely that a South 
African “Frontier Army” ‘carrying a war into southern Angola by using quasi-surrogates, noteably 
Unita, was to lead to future problems, was a given (Du Pisani, 1988: 5ff. Compare also Seegers, 1986). 
 179
Native National Congress or SANNC155 (later ANC), the Communist Party of South Africa or 
CPSA (later SACP), the PAC, and Black Consciousness Movement, became increasingly 
radical and militant. An armed struggle, not aimed at Soviet-inspired rule or the destruction of 
Christianity, but pursuing the aim of attaining a non-racial one-person-one-vote democracy, 
ensued. 
 
Before the beginning of the armed struggle, Chief Albert Luthuli argued: “Congress has 
adapted itself to the needs of the situation … and with each adaptation we have brought 
ourselves and our country nearer to the vision of a homeland where man may eventually live 
at peace with neighbours of all races – because they are really neighbours, not white masters 
and other-race servants” (Luthuli, 1962: 102–103). But things were to take a turn for the 
worse. 
 
The apartheid government, especially since the 1970s, entered a repressive phase, and 
activated an extensive security-management system and a total-onslaught mythology, largely 
to defend unpopular and unconstitutional structures against internal opposition. This 
supposedly justified the institution of emergency rule to “contain” or “destroy” the ANC, 
UDF, SACP and PAC [Van Vuuren & Liebenberg, 1994: 39–41. See also Horrel (1982), 
Sanders (2006) and Dugard (1999)].156 
 
Not only were militarised political structures created to deal with the “onslaught” (Selfe, 
1994: 103ff), but the whole climate that was created favoured unconventional intervention by 
the ruling elite and their security specialists inside South Africa and the region (Coleman, 
1994: 130ff; Grundy, 1988: 34ff, 58ff, 107–109; Du Pisani, 1988; Seegers, 1986, 1996). 
Looking back at the 1980s, large-scale suppression of revolt and covert operations by security 
institutions played an integral part in maintaining the non-democratic regime. In this, the 
extensive NSMS with its multi-layered structures played an important role (Grundy, 1988: 
114, 120–121, 109ff; Marais, 2003). Grundy (1983) correctly perceived at the time a change 
in the locus of state power as a result of the rise of the security establishment. 
                                                 
155 The SANNC was established in 1912 following a national congress called by Pixley Ka Isaka Seme. 
Not all agreed with the chosen name. Sol Plaatjie and Chief Joshua Molema favoured the name Imbizo 
Yabantu (Bantu Congress). However, the proposal was rejected in favour of the chosen name 
(Odendaal, 1984: 274; Lodge, 1987: 1). The political programme was moderate, if liberal, and invited 
dialogue with the Union Government. After the institutionalisation of apartheid in 1948 the 
organisation – now called African National Congress – became (was forced to become) more radical.  
156 An interesting summary of the deepening of the crisis of apartheid and the effects of an increasingly 
security-minded state under the states of emergency in the 1980s is to be found in a report by the 
Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), South Africa in the 1980s: State of Emergency, 
published in 1980. 
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For the average white South African this changing locus of state power to the SSC and the 
NSMS was less obvious. With security forces, the coercive arms of the state in ascendancy 
the National Party rhetoric was “reform” from 1977 onwards (the tricameral parliament for 
white, coloured and Indian people to the exclusion of the black majority implemented in 
1983) and decentralisation. Exactly the opposite happened. Few, except intent observers, 
noticed that the cabinet seemed to be sidelined, the executive presidency rose in profile and 
that “reforms” on local government level involved security personnel. 
 
Detailed Organisational Chart of the NSMS 
 
 
The organisational chart above sets out in more detail parallel structures in South Africa. Note the 
central position of the National Joint Management System vis-à-vis cabinet committees and 
government departments. Note the relatively less powerful position of cabinet when compared with the 
position of an executive president. This relatively weaker position of cabinet was proved at various 
times, as related in this study. Also note the integrated parallel system on national to regional and local 
government levels – a pervasive security web (Source: Shutte et al, 1998: 140). 
 
 
Already under the rule of Prime Minister B.J. Vorster, and for years to come, the fascination 
with a “co-ordinated national strategy” evolved gradually into the military being sucked into 
the political upholding of apartheid. First the SSC was created. Then the NSMS evolved as 
part of “a more conscious, concerted and systematic effort … to integrate various mechanisms 
of white control to produce a counter-revolutionary package more rationalised and efficient 
 181
than at any time before” (Grundy, 1988: 18. Compare also Seegers, 1996: 163 ff, 285).157 
Covert operations became part of the package of counter-terrorist strategies (Schutte, 
Liebenberg & Minnaar, 1998: Introduction; Sanders, 2006). 
 
These developments were not unexpected, given the mind-frame of hard-liners constituting 
the political elite of the old regime: the political socialisation of such leadership (and 
presumably also of significant chunks of their followers) within the paradigm of a garrison 
state marked by a resultant securocratic/praetorian “threat perception”. Police and military 
action (the latter since 1984) and increasing covert operations by security agencies had an 
impact on both internal and foreign policy-making and its implementation. Organised 
violence and repression assumed many faces due to the various structures of oppression.158 
 
The politics of coercion and co-optation spread throughout South Africa. The use of front 
organisations and partner organisations became one of the sombre characteristics of the time. 
To illustrate: political organisations that were sympathetic to “legal” and non-violent 
resistance against apartheid were not only prone to become dependent on the apartheid state, 
but were also misused by the state and became (structurally and integrally) a part of 
apartheid’s oppressive mechanisms. 
 
Inkatha (later to become the Inkatha Freedom Party) is one example. Inkatha ka Zulu was 
established in 1922 as a Zulu cultural movement by the then Zulu king, King Solomon ka 
Dinizulu. It had to preserve Zulu culture and rally support for the monarchy (Mzala, 1988: 
116). The movement later became inactive until Chief Mangosotho Buthelezi revived it as a 
                                                 
157 Jacklyn Cock argued that “a politics of terror” forming part of state-security strategies evolved, 
reaching its height in the latter part of the 1980s. She also produced evidence that the SADF had been 
widely used in oppression. During 1985, 35 000 troops were deployed in the townships alone, 
according to Cock. During Operation Palmiet in 1984, 7 000 soldiers sealed off the township of 
Sebokeng. For Cock, a strategic shift away from reliance on the police force to uphold “law and order” 
took place (Cock, 1990: 87). If the figures were as high as Cock suggested, it would equal the entire 
number of a yearly intake of conscripts. 
158 For more detail, the reader is referred to Minnaar, Liebenberg and Schutte (1994). Part 1 of The 
Hidden Hand: Covert operations in South Africa deals with the theory, methodology and morality of 
covert operations; Part 2 contains 13 case studies (many more instances of covert operations have since 
been uncovered); and Part 3 deals with policy formulation. On methodology regarding research on 
third forces the chapters by Windsor Leroke and Charl Scutte in this work are relevant. For later 
discoveries of widespread covert operations – including third-force activities – see “Attorney-general 
has evidence of apartheid terrorism ‘on a huge scale’”, reported in The Sunday Independent, 4 February 
1996. It is worthwhile to remember that the apartheid regime in the 1980s made use of state-funded 
“strategic communications operations” that, depending on the “internal threat analysis”, included Soft 
Stratcom (propaganda, slandering of opponents, making use of information obtained from persons not 
knowing where such information would go, or threats) and Hard Stratcom (the remainder of the 
spectrum including murder, assassination, torture or elimination of opponents). See Sanders (2006) for 
a further discussion and more examples. 
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“national cultural liberation movement”. In the words of Buthelezi, “Inkatha declares itself to 
be an instrument of liberation” and “the business of black liberation is our business” (Chief 
Buthelezi, quoted during a press conference in Melmoth by Mzala, 1988: 119–120). Confined 
mainly to Natal, Inkatha was later usurped by apartheid (read: homeland) structures even if 
the Inkatha leadership refused and denied becoming an “independent homeland”. The 
promotion of federalism – even confederalism – by the Inkatha leadership and Chief 
Buthelezi alienated the ANC and other liberation movements from Inkatha. After 1979/1980, 
relations worsened significantly between the ANC and Inkatha (Mzala, 1988: 121–122, 125; 
Mare & Hamilton, 1987: 5ff, 27ff; Mare, 1992; Holland, 1989: 219). The involvement of 
Inkatha in non-liberation aligned trade-union activities, such as those of the United Workers’ 
Union of South Africa, and earlier non-participation in boycotts – such as school boycotts – 
probably also played a role. The alienation was compounded by clashes between political 
personalities (notably Chief Buthelezi and Dr Ntatho Motlana) at the end of 1979. The 
establishment of the non-racial UDF and its growth in KwaZulu-Natal further compounded 
the feud during the 1980s (Kentridge, 1990: 218–222, 224, 235–237, 241). Smaller 
organisations, such as the National Forum, despite their differences with the ANC, also 
strongly criticised Inkatha’s collaborationist position. 
 
Violence had many faces, with political opponents fighting each other violently and South 
African security apparatuses manipulating the agenda, or taking part in acts of partisan 
violence (CIIR, 1988; Coleman, 1998). Although Inkatha often opposed certain apartheid 
policies, its continued existence eventually depended on the apartheid state (Mare & 
Hamilton, 1987: 15ff, 27ff; Mzala, 1988: 122–128; Kentridge, 1990: 217ff). As interpreted by 
Mare: “Inkatha was, in part, formed to secure a regional base as a platform to launch into 
national politics. It aimed to secure that base through political structures and agents, and 
through the ideology of the ‘Zulu nation’. However, the costs of working within the system, 
and the extremes of co-operation with the apartheid state in defending privileges inextricably 
tied to the Bantustan and politicised ethnicity, were waiting to be exposed. That moment 
arrived when the extent of Inkatha’s involvement in the state’s ‘counter-insurgency’ strategy 
was revealed. This involvement went beyond the ‘normal’ integration demanded of 
participants in apartheid. Inkatha had (eventually – my insertion) chosen to cooperate with the 
most vicious agents of the ‘total strategy’ set in place by P.W. Botha” (Maré, 1992: 101–102; 
1994: i).159 
 
                                                 
159 For the effects of violence on local level in KwaZulu-Natal consult Liebenberg and Westcott (1998: 1, 
7). 
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Although initially not intended, the end result was that Inkatha was pulled into the “total 
strategy” in such a way that it became a partner in strategic, but highly unconventional, 
intervention such as covert training and use of Inkatha trainees as vigilante forces (such as the 
Caprivi 200)160. This serves as but one illustration of how oppression, militarised activities 
and authoritarian approaches in South Africa interfaced with a militant vision of liberation 
and led to countrywide violence.161 
 
4.2.2. In the aftermath of apartheid: the debate on truth and reconciliation 
 
Given the legacy of apartheid, it was to be expected that some or other procedure would have 
to be found to deal with the events of the past (Asmal et al., 1996; Boraine, 2000; Duvenage, 
1992, 1995; Motala, 1995; Van Roermund, 2001; Liebenberg, 1992). 
 
As the crisis and the conflict in South Africa deepened, morality in politics was relinquished. 
All sides dirtied their hands in the struggle for political supremacy.162 The ANC and PAC 
argued that given the immense repression by successive apartheid governments and strong-
armed tactics of the regime, resistance was justified. To uphold the structures of apartheid – 
which was declared a crime against humanity by the UN in 1973 – actions taken by the 
apartheid security forces with political intent resulted in terror and death among freedom 
fighters and civilians. In the struggle for liberation, political counter-action similarly resulted 
in the death of “upholders of the apartheid state”, “collaborators” and “impimpis”, but also of 
innocent civilians. The violence invoked by the apartheid state (structural violence through 
social engineering apart) overshadowed that of the liberation movements. Consequentialist 
ethics would justify such violence, and many of us in favour of the struggle for liberation did 
so at the time. Rule morality or principled ethical supporters in turn would have problems 
with violence committed by both sides. For them the perpetration of violence by whatever 
side or interest groups was in principle equal to violence – violence is violence is violence. As 
indicated elsewhere, these debates fed into the discussions on amnesty and the future rule of 
the ANC. Kollapen argues that, given the post-election scenario of nation building, a 
                                                 
160 The Caprivi 200 were trained by South African Security Forces for VIP protection of Inkatha 
leaders but instead became involved in violence against activists. 
161 The Malan trial highlighted how partner organisations were used until as recently as 1992 to 
destabilise political opponents and to “level” (read unlevel) the political playing field in favour of the 
incumbents, namely the South African government and the National Party. However, the Inkatha-ANC 
(also Inkatha-UDF) feud goes back some years. For more detail, see Kentridge (1990), Mare (1992) 
and Mzala (1988). Their insights also illustrate how the IFP was manipulated into upholding the 
apartheid system. 
162 See “How many Third Forces, South Africa?” (Schutte, 1994: 49ff; Schutte, 1998: 9ff). 
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government of national unity and national reconciliation, the focus should be on “healing”.163 
“It follows therefore that there has to be a diagnosis of what transpired, why it transpired and 
ultimately who was responsible. The history and the interests of all South Africans would 
certainly demand nothing less” (Kollapen, 1993: 1–2). Kollapen’s conclusions correspond 
with the conclusions of observers/witnesses to transitions from authoritarian rule to 
democracy in other countries, notably in Latin America and Africa. 
 
While Kollapen (1993) concurred with indemnity as agreed upon by the ANC and the South 
African government at the Pretoria Minute and thereafter (as embodied in the 1990 Indemnity 
Act), he strongly criticises the Further Indemnity Act (Act No. 151 of 1992). 
 
For him, the reasons for resistance against the promulgation of the 1992 act are fivefold: 
 
(1) the indemnity was at the discretion of the then State President, F.W. de Klerk, vis-à-vis 
the implicit meaning of the 1990 act of a representative of a democratically elected 
interim government or a government of national unity that should have the discretion; 
(2) the process was secret, as there were no public hearings; 
(3) no reasons had to be furnished for processing indemnity applications and granting them; 
(4) the Act’s wording was open to wide interpretation; and 
(5) it could indemnify people who acted under apartheid-state orders and thus amounted to 
self-imposed amnesty (Kollapen, 1993: 6–7).164 
 
Furthermore, this act also contradicts international measures for addressing past human-rights 
transgressions in recent times. In short, the act amounted to unilateral immunity given by the 
incumbents to themselves and their security/military forces for human-rights violations during 
                                                 
163 The intricacies, but also the problematic context, of nation building in South Africa is addressed in 
more detail in Rhoodie and Liebenberg (1994), Democratic nation-building in South Africa. In this 
book a range of scholars addresses the impact of such a process on the legal, economic and military 
structures. An interesting contribution by Boraine questioned the “two-nations” theory (also sometimes 
referred to as “bi-communalism”) advanced by a South African historian, Herman Giliomee, since the 
Dakar meeting in 1987 (Boraine, 1989: 2–3. See Giliomee’s argument at the time in the same 
publication.) The current head of state of South Africa, President Thabo Mbeki, who as leader of the 
ANC delegation attended the Dakar Conference where Giliomee was present, took up Giliomee’s 
notion rather uncritically and in different format. He articulated the two-nations concept as that of “a 
rich white nation” versus a “poor black nation” in South Africa. At the risk of another hyperbolic 
statement, I suggest that such conservative discourse on two-nation notions survived from apartheid 
times and transformed itself into the newspeak of the current government. More recent works 
exploiting quantitative approaches and highlighting the complexities of nation-building are those of 
Gibson and Gouws (2003) and Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier (2001). 
164 A newspaper referred to it as a “charter for crooks, murderers and thieves” (Weekly Mail, 4 
December 1992). While these words are harsh and arguably impulsive, they reflect the widespread 
dissatisfaction with the “second indemnity”. 
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apartheid.165 Kollapen contends that not only was the state of the time illegitimate, but the 
Further Indemnity Act of 1992 also viewed the fight-against and the fight-for apartheid in the 
same light. Kollapen argues that the maintenance of apartheid was “qualitatively different” 
(read: criminal), and that the two struggles cannot be equated. Kollapen’s argument is 
supported by Janet Cherry in her reflections on the SATRC report. However, Cherry, in 
defending the ANC against the accusation of “gross human-rights violations”, implicitly 
cautions about possible pitfalls in such argumentation and its longer-term consequences 
(Cherry, 2000: 26–27). 
 
Kollapen’s arguments ring true. No look at history can be a denial of history. A non-
representative and unaccountable process would serve few, and would definitely not enhance 
democracy. Yet, the rule-moralistic point of view also holds water. It states that human-rights 
abuses remain human-rights abuses, regardless of whether they occur in the course of 
liberation or in the upholding of an unjust system. Therefore, the abuses are not qualitatively 
different and they should be treated as such. This was, for instance, the approach taken by 
Bishop Desmond Tutu (see Tutu, 1999). Tutu received much support for his approach though 
many that supported the liberation struggle were inclined to view the violence committed by 
the liberation movement as of less consequence when compared to apartheid transgressions of 
human rights. I found myself in favour of this view. At the same time it was difficult not to 
have admiration for the stance of the “Arch” who was a vocal and principled critic against 
apartheid and its implications. The exact tension that individuals experienced between these 
two positions was to be carried into the SATRC when it started its work. 
 
In due course, different viewpoints about truth and reconciliation emerged. Kollapen points 
out that Zimbabwe did not have a TRC and effectively drew “a line through the past” after its 
war of liberation or what was called in Zanu the Chimurenga (Kollapen, 1993: 2, citing 
Carver). The result was a general amnesty in Zimbabwe that “allowed a culture of abuse and 
impunity to permeate the security structures”. Unfortunately, little supporting evidence is 
given (Kollapen, 1993: 2). At the time, Duvenage argues in “The German Historikerstreit and 
its implications for South Africa”, that South Africa was faced with “an enduring and 
endemic” silence emanating from the National Party and its culturo-politico satellites with 
regard to apartheid and its horrific legacy (Duvenage, quoted in Liebenberg, 1992: 14). 
Duvenage suggests collective mourning, following Mitscherlich, as one way to deal with the 
past, and constitutional patriotism as a reconstructive vision for the future (Duvenage, 1998: 
                                                 
165 In Argentina, the military also declared what amounted to a self-amnesty (Varas, 1989). 
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366 ff; Liebenberg & Duvenage, 1995: 7–8, 10–11; Liebenberg, 1992: 15). Kollapen points to 
a spectrum of options for a new representative government, ranging from Nuremberg-type 
trials to qualified or full amnesty (Kollapen, 1993: 4ff). 
 
Let us consider at this point the different options in dealing with the past that faced South 
Africans, given that South Africa experienced a mixed mode of political transition that 
resulted in a government of national unity; a negotiated interim constitution, and the pending 
release of a redrafted constitution negotiated by the various stakeholders. 
 
4.3. What to choose? Different approaches 
 
By 1992 six options for dealing with apartheid, guilt and retribution seemed to be open. They 
were: 
(1) Nuremberg-type trials; 
(2) general or qualified amnesty; 
(3) moral tribunals – like Argentina’s or Chile’s TRC; 
(4) formal legal processes through which perpetrators of state violence are brought to trial 
in cases where involvement in violence, murder, torture and large-scale destruction of 
property by political figures, police, the military leadership or members of the 
intelligence community can be proved beyond reasonable doubt; 
(5) forgive-and-forget approaches; 
(6) mixed approaches – in other words any of the above options combined with others. 
 
The above-mentioned six options available to South Africa at the stage of entering the status 
of a democracy through negotiated transition, should not be confused with the four 
approaches or typologies (even while sharing some generic traits) that were used by countries 
in the aftermath of large-scale abuses of human rights during an oppressive period identified 
earlier (see Chapter 2). The options South Africa had were real as possible choices that 
confronted the post-apartheid citizenry – oppressed and oppressors alike (The typology or 
four approaches that I developed subsequently was constructed after 1992 to facilitate 
analysis of post-authoritarian choices and not relevant at the time.) 
 
4.3.1. Nuremberg type trials 
 
Only the first approach, namely a Nuremberg-type trial, was unlikely. The transition was 
negotiated by incumbents and contenders (the new incumbents-to-be) after a political 
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stalemate.166 There was no victor or vanquished, which made the imposition of this option 
unlikely. The apartheid regime, for example, had the tacit support of the USA (through 
“constructive engagement”) and the UK, despite lip-service to sanctions. It was unlikely that 
the UN Security Council would have attained a yes vote for any form of international tribunal 
against apartheid political and military leaders. 
 
South African incumbents at the time had relatively large sections of the South African 
community on “their side”: the majority of the white community, sections of big business, 
some elements in the so-called coloured167 and Indian communities and Bantustan leaders, as 
well as Inkatha in Natal. All of them resisted such an approach. In South Africa the perceived 
influence of the military that could resist – even “arrest” – such a process was another factor. 
 
The international community implemented this measure against Nazi war criminals because 
of their consistent acts of aggression in and outside Europe, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The mechanisms of truth commissions were not yet known at that time (TRCs are a 
recent phenomenon – only known since 1974; see Hayner, 1994).168 
 
In South Africa, while there are many comparisons with the history of Nazi Germany, the 
situation differs. The South African government and the National Party, although seen by 
                                                 
166 A political stalemate in my view in the South African case should not be confused with a military 
stalemate. Despite contention by some, the South African state was not crumbling, nor the military near 
defeat. The South African military may have been forced to withdrawn after the battles of Cuito 
Canavale, but was still in a powerful position. So were the other security agencies. The military wing, 
MK, of the ANC was not effective enough in toppling the South African state and even less so the 
armed wing of the PAC, APLA which was far smaller and even less sufficient. International pressure, 
internal differences and the state of the economy facilitated what could be described as a political 
stalemate, which led to talks about talks, negotiations and eventually a negotiated transfer of political 
power. Should that not have happened a siege society, increased militarisation and violent resistance 
against that could have lasted for years longer. 
167 Race was, and still is, a sensitive issue riddled with controversy in South Africa. I use "coloureds" 
and "so-called coloured" interchangeably. Under apartheid many coloured people referred to 
themselves as so-called coloured to prove the point that racial classification forced them into a distinct 
category. Others referred to themselves as coloured or bruinmense (brown people). However, the 
majority, in resistance to apartheid laws, preferred the terms South African or black. The adjective “so-
called” has a special meaning for me. I would – and do so frequently – refer to myself as a so-called 
white. My colour or race under apartheid and the post-apartheid government is imposed by racial 
classification (the ANC government retained racial categories on its official documentation instead of 
doing away with it in favour of principled non-racialism). Thus, reference to a so-called white is a 
denunciation of imposed racial categories that are still upheld in South Africa today. 
168 Pricilla B. Hayner points out in a valuable study, entitled “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 
1994: A comparative study”, that truth commissions are a fairly recent phenomenon. She also points 
out that “although they have become increasingly popular, they are still relatively understudied” 
(Hayner, 1994: 598). As a minimal definition of truth commissions she applies the following: “Truth 
commissions are bodies set up to investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a particular 
country – which can include violations by the military or other government forces or by armed 
opposition forces” (Hayner, 1994: 600, my emphasis). 
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many – even the majority of South Africans – as illegitimate, existed as “legal” and power-
holding entities and entered the protracted negotiation process as such. Objectively, the 
incumbents, even as a minority regime, were not “defeated”, though a political stalemate 
opened the way for negotiation (Friedman, 1993; 1994; Liebenberg, 1996; SATRCR, Vol. 1, 
1998: 5). The ideology of apartheid was based on racial exploitation rather than racial 
extermination in contrast to Nazi policies, the German colonial genocide against the Herero in 
Deutch West Afrika, Polpot’s actions in Cambodia or the genocide in Rwanda (1990s). 
 
There was no foreign power that attained victory or orchestrated a victory over defeated 
peoples, and the conflict situation rather resembled a civil war without a conclusive military 
defeat. As such, the option of Nuremberg-type trials, even if favoured by some within the 
ranks of the ANC and the PAC, was unviable (Kollapen, 1993: 4; Liebenberg, 1992: 14–15). 
A greater awareness among black South Africans of the need for reconciliation and ubuntu169 
has conceivably also played a role in the move away from Nuremberg-type trials (Tutu, 1999: 
10ff; 24ff; 34–36; SATRCR, Vol. 1, 1998: 8; RSA, 1995: Act 34: 801).170 
 
Should the government have been defeated in a protracted civil war with active intervention 
by other states, Nuremburg-type trials would have been an option, especially since the 
government was seen as illegal by the contenders and also because apartheid was declared a 
crime against humanity in 1973 and perceived by some as a potential threat to international 
peace. 
 
4.3.2. General or qualified amnesty 
 
Qualified amnesty was granted to protect ANC personnel who were to return to South Africa 
following the Pretoria Minute and resultant talks. This amnesty was embodied in the 1990 
Indemnity Act. In 1992 the F.W. de Klerk government extended this amnesty to members of 
the security forces of the apartheid state, and by implication past politicians. “The South 
African government had its own idea of reconciliation and dealing with human rights abuses. 
It has to this end put into place the legislative mechanics which make it possible for the 
granting of amnesty and indemnity on an individual basis for offenders. Its effect will be very 
much the same as the granting of a general amnesty” (Kollapen, 1993: 4). 
 
                                                 
169 Ubuntu: To be a person through other people, thus recognising “the other” as part of oneself. 
170 The word ubuntu actually appears in Act 34 of 1995 as an alternative to retribution. Ubuntu implies 
being a person through interaction (with other people). It implies an accommodative/caring community. 
The fact that it was mentioned in the act is noteworthy. 
 189
The Further Indemnity Act of 1992 was promulgated amid great controversy in November 
1992. Its preamble read: “AND WHEREAS it has now become necessary, in order to provide 
reconciliation and peaceful solutions, from time to time to grant such persons further 
indemnity against arrest, prosecution, detention and legal process or the release of such 
people who have already been sentenced …” (Kollapen, 1993: 5). 
 
The act provided for it that any person who committed an act with political intent and whose 
release might promote negotiations and peaceful solutions, might benefit from its provisions. 
The operative phrase “act with a political objective” had the widest possible application: it 
included any act or omission which had been advised, directed, commanded, ordered or 
performed (1) with a view to the achievement of a political objective; (2) for the promotion or 
combating of an objective or interest of any organisation, institution or body of a political 
nature; (3) with the bona fide belief that such objective or interest would be served; or (4) 
with the approval or on the instruction or in accordance with the policy of such an 
organisation, institution or body, or in reaction thereto. 
 
In terms of this act, the State President established the National Council on Indemnity, whose 
function it was to advise him on the granting of indemnity. The State President was not, 
however, obliged to act on the advice received. The members of the National Council on 
Indemnity were appointed by the State President and consisted of three judges of the Supreme 
Court, all white and all male, remarked Kollapen. The State President had total discretion as 
to the identity and number of members appointed and they remained in office at his pleasure. 
The sittings of the council were in camera; the deliberations of the council were not 
published; neither were the names of those persons who had applied for indemnity. After the 
granting of indemnity or release of a prisoner, such a person’s name, the date on which 
release or amnesty was granted, and, in the case of indemnity, the act with a political 
objective in respect of which the indemnity had been granted had to be published. It remains 
unclear to what extent this included information such as the names of the victims and the 
identity of whoever commissioned the act in respect of which indemnity was granted. 
 
Kollapen argues that the implications of the act were as follows: 
(1)  The issue of indemnity or release was in the sole discretion of the State President; 
(2) The entire process of applying for indemnity or release and the mechanisms to effect it 
were secretive. No provision was made for victims of human-rights abuses or interested 
parties to place their case before the State President or the National Council on 
Indemnity; 
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(3) The State President was not obliged to furnish reasons for the granting or the refusal of 
an application; 
(4) The public at large was not entitled to receive any information relative to the process of 
indemnification or release apart from the formal information referred to above; and 
(5) The definition of an act with a political objective was so wide that it covered virtually 
all human-rights abuses, including murder, torture and disappearances. 
 
In Kollapen’s words: “There is in this regard little doubt that the Act will probably be 
successfully invoked by, amongst others, the still unnamed killer(s) of Matthew Goniwe and 
his comrades, the assassin(s) of David Webster as well as Brian Mitchell, the police captain 
convicted in the Trust Feed Massacre.171 The Act makes it possible for the government to 
indemnify members of the security forces who acted under government command and 
instructions in committing atrocities. In addition the State President could conceivably 
indemnify present and past members of his Cabinet and indeed himself. The Act equates the 
actions of those that fought and resisted apartheid with the actions of those that engineered, 
sustained and supported apartheid” (Kollapen, 1993: 4–5). 
 
Kollapen continues: “The Act is nothing more than an attempt on the part of the government 
to create a mechanism whereby it can forgive itself and those acting under its command, 
instructions or authority for the grossest of human rights violations” (Kollapen, 1993: 4–5). 
 
The act and the way it was implemented was strongly reminiscent of the Punto Final 
legislation in which the Argentinean military introduced a self-amnesty when it became 
evident that they were to leave office in favour of their democratic opponents. The South 
African Further Indemnity Act was criticised nationally and internationally. After it was 
rejected in one of the houses of the tricameral parliament, the government had to refer it to the 
appointed President’s Council and it was rammed through as part of statute law. 
 
A host of bodies within civil society in South Africa expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
content of the law and the way in which it was implemented. Lawyers for Human Rights (an 
association critical of apartheid and advocating a return to the Rule of Law) are on record as 
saying that such a law amounted to general amnesty and was unacceptable. 
                                                 
171 The Trust Feed Massacre took place in Hanover, Natal. A house was attacked by SAP and Natal 
special constables. Eleven people died, none of them combatants, in fact not even activists. The officer 
in command of the attack, Capt. Brian Mitchell, was found guilty (for more detail consult Coombe, 
1998). 
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They gave preference to a commission of truth and reconciliation as established in Chile.172 
 
Public debates and political developments – perhaps also public preference – brought South 
Africans to debate the notion of a moral tribunal as embodied in the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act (Act No. 34 of 1995). 
 
4.3.3. Morality and moral tribunals: A TRC 
 
Following the pathway of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (the latter to a limited level as 
Uruguay’s commission never attained the same international status or levels of acceptance as 
its Latin American counterparts) was mooted. Debates in the media vacillated between the 
different options, with the TRC option gaining ground and eventually acceptance, though the 
agreement was what some may call part of a compromise between contenders and incumbents 
during the negotiated transition in its first phases. Eventually this option held sway and 
became the chosen one (SATRCR, Vol. One, 1998: 6, 104). One of the motivations for such a 
choice was the argument that “The call to punish human rights criminals can present complex 
and agonising problems that have no single or simple solution … subtle and dangerous issues 
that can divide a country when it undertakes to punish its own violators” (Judge Marvin 
Frankel quoted in the SATRCR, Vol 1: 6). The SATRC also explicates its choice of a truth 
commission rather than forgiving and forgetting. Bygones could not be bygones (SATRCR, 
Vol. 1: 7). 
 
4.3.4. Formal legal process for perpetrators of state violence, murder, torture and large-
scale destruction of property when proven beyond reasonable doubt 
 
Some, the researcher among them, argued in favour of the fourth option (Liebenberg, 1992: 
15). Some public figures, among them Mrs. Winnie Mandela, also argued in a similar vein 
(The Star, 24 August 1995). This option was abandoned as the debate about justice and 
transition developed both inside and outside South Africa. The argument for a TRC, largely 
along the lines of the Chilean example, won the day (see among others the arguments in the 
SATRCR quoted above). 
 
At the time, however, there were those who continued to argue for such a formal legal 
process. Victoria Mxenge’s family, the late Steve Biko’s family and some leaders of the 
                                                 
172 Issues concerning amnesty at the time are discussed by among others Christie (2000), Laurence 
(2001), Loots (1996) and Motala (1995). I found the work by Kollapen crisp and concise. 
 192
Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) held that a formal legal process would be the 
preferable way to deal with apartheid crimes. So did the mother of Anton Lubowski, the 
SWAPO human-rights activist who was assassinated in Namibia in 1989. In August 1995, 
Mrs. Winnie Mandela, in her capacity as president of the ANC Women’s League, said that 
former South African presidents P.W. Botha and F.W. de Klerk should be charged for crimes 
committed under apartheid and heavily punished if found guilty. “To forgive them is for me 
the equivalent of racism”, she told a meeting of the South African Students’ Congress (The 
Star, 24 August 1995). 
 
If the arguments of those who advocated this pathway had received more public support, the 
South Africa of today, one may speculate, would have looked different (internal criminal 
proceedings may have led to the imprisonment of several top military and police commanders 
and possibly several politicians. [The death sentence was unlikely because in 1990 a 
moratorium was declared on the death sentence, which was prohibited by the new 
constitution.] 
 
Perhaps such trials would have served as a “cleansing ritual” and thus undercut feelings of 
retribution – which are still manifest today. Or would it have led to right-wing revolt and 
further strife? 
 
At the time, the attempts by AZAPO and others to question the validity of the SATRC on the 
grounds that “it takes away the rights of citizens to find redress in courts in situations where 
they were grossly wronged” received attention in some debates, but finally had to give way in 
favour of a TRC approach (Terreblanche, 1995: 16). 
 
Barney Desai of the PAC stated the following with regard to such a commission: “The cries 
of torture and abuse still ring in our ears. The fallen are deeply etched in our collective 
memory. The millions who were forcibly removed from their homes remain bewildered and 
disorientated. The abused know their abusers and they are now the accusers. They seek 
justice, they seek retribution for the atrocities committed against them … (South Africans) 
would be living in a fool’s paradise if we believed that merely telling the truth will end 
human-rights abuses by the security forces that are steeped in the most atrocious practices …” 
(Desai, quoted in Boraine, Levy & Scheffer, 1994: xii–xiii). 
 
Desai further contended that, while the PAC would support the establishment of a 
commission to investigate human-rights abuses, it was important that “the violators be named 
 193
and put on trial. It is imperative that justice is seen to be done” (Desai, quoted in Boraine, 
Levy & Scheffer, 1994: xii–xiii).173 
 
While the SATRC continued its work, some people were indeed put on trial, e.g. Eugene de 
Kock and Wouter Basson. No single senior National Party politician was put on trial, with 
lower ranking officers like Eugene de Kock bearing the brunt and carrying the can for their 
masters.174 
 
One would be forgiven for speculating whether the one-sided amnesty declared by the ruling 
National Party government was not only a step to protect the National Party leadership, but 
also a strategic move to influence the public (debate) not to opt for a formal legal process 
against violators of human rights. Somewhat provocatively, one may ask whether the 
moratorium on the death sentence declared by De Klerk was not also related to averting an 
internal legal process aimed at the previous apartheid leadership. 
 
4.3.5. “Forgive and Forget”- simply, “No steps to deal with the past” 
 
In this case, as in the case of Spain or Portugal, no steps were contemplated to deal with a past 
oppressive regime. Following transition to democracy, the main aim became restructuring of 
the political system and economic reconstruction. In the case of Portugal, for example, the 
drain on the national budget through continued war waged against liberation movements in 
Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola necessitated a return to economic reconstruction to 
cater for the backlog created by the previous authoritarian regimes of Salazar and Caetano. 
                                                 
173 The demand “that justice is seen to be done” is not necessarily inconsistent with ubuntu 
(community-centred tolerance and medemenslikheid). Ubuntu means tolerance, but is not devoid of an 
ethics of justice. Justice on its part is not devoid of retribution (see Sindane, 1995: 12–13). This 
argument is not peculiar to the philosophy and praxis of ubuntu. Van der Merwe (1996: 8) argues: “The 
work of the commission (TRC) is only part of a comprehensive process of restitution and the healing of 
society … It must take into account the needs of those that have not reached a state of mind ready to 
forgive, and who demand retribution in theological as well as legal terms, people who have a need to 
see that justice is done. The Truth Commission cannot achieve healing and reconciliation if it denies 
the role of punishment as a form of redress in the process.” 
174 De Kock was sentenced to more than 200 years in prison – which indicates that others had to carry 
the can for politicians who refused to accept responsibility for their actions. In October, Eugene de 
Kock, who started his studies in journalism in prison, started writing for an Afrikaans tabloid, the Son. 
His first article in a series was published on 14 October 2005. There is little doubt that this series will 
unearth quite a lot about corrupt and power-hungry politicians and senior officers who tried to hide 
behind other “culprits” (like Eugene, dubbed “Prime Evil” by the media). At the time of his court 
hearings, the Afrikaans media were remarkably silent about the contradiction of a police officer being 
sentenced to years in jail while no single top politician, i.e. Ministers of Police and Defence, persons 
involved in biological and chemical warfare research or for that matter the President(s) of South Africa 
under apartheid, was treated in the same way. 
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I have already mentioned the choice made by the incoming government in Zimbabwe not to 
deal with the past. In retrospect this choice did allow for levels of impunity with regard to 
what happened soon thereafter, when government forces suppressed dissidents in 
Matabeleland opposed to the Mugabe government. Whether this approach also allowed the 
perception of continued impunity for President Mugabe in his recent dealings with political 
opponents remains an open question. 
 
The SATRCR, though, argued the option of “let bygones be bygones” was “rightly rejected 
because such amnesia would have resulted in further victimisation of victims by denying their 
awful experiences” and that “Those who forget about the past are doomed to repeat it” (the 
words emblazoned on the gates of the concentration camp at Dachau). Dealing with the past 
was knowing what happened (SATRCR, Vol. 1: 7). 
 
4.3.6. Mixed approaches 
 
A mixed approach was followed in the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and France (following the 
WW II) and Rwanda following the genocide. In this category any of the above approaches 
can be combined. It may occur because of internal pressures changing circumstances, revenge 
or external pressure or evolve on the way as public opinions change. 
 
Chile, for example, had a TRC but steps to extradite Pinochet, the exiled dictator, were also 
taken. Argentina brought military leaders to court and sentenced them while deploying a 
TRC. Rwanda opted for the Cacaca process, an international tribunal and some internal 
criminal court cases. 
 
4.4. The SATRC: A case among cases 
 
The South African version of a TRC did not develop in isolation (so unique we are not!). 
Rather, it was the result of an internal and international discussion on how to deal with the 
past during the transition to democracy following authoritarianism and repression – a 
transition that one hopes will lead to the consolidation of a young democracy in South Africa. 
 
Between 1974 and 1994 15 countries (among them Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Uganda, 
Chile, Chad, Rwanda, and El Salvador) had to deal with their past by means of appointed or 
commissioned bodies (Hayner, 1994: 597–598). 
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I will take a look at countries that did or did not take steps to deal with their history of 
oppression. Regarding those that did not take official steps to deal with their past, I will refer 
to Namibia, Spain and Zimbabwe. Regarding those that did (attempt to) deal with their past of 
oppression through TRC approaches, the argument will entertain Argentina, Chile, Nigeria 
and Rwanda (I will also reconsider some of these cases, especially Rwanda, later in chapters 
to follow). 
 
4.4.1. No official steps to deal with the past 
 
Namibia 
 
Some will argue that the case study of Namibia is somewhat problematic, because an 
occupying force illegally occupied the country and subsequently left in its entirety. I argue 
that the withdrawal of the occupying force was not the only matter to consider. 
 
Namibians were deeply divided on a political (and some say ethnic basis), with SWAPO 
mostly supported by the population in the north of the country. Seegers in her important work 
on the military in the making in modern South Africa, reports that in 1982 30 percent of 
troops deployed in Namibia and Angola formed part of the South West African Territorial 
Force (SWATF) and were thus Namibians. White Namibians born and bred in the territory 
were conscripted into the SADF. So were many people of colour. “Ethnic battalions” 
consisting of Namibians also played an active part in the war. They were organised into so-
called ethnic battalions, i.e. 21 Battalion, 61 Battalion, 62 Battalion and 101 Battalion. The 
majority of these people/soldiers remained in Namibia or returned there after their military 
service or studies at universities. By 1989 SWATF counted 30 000 men or roughly 72 percent 
of the forces deployed at any given time (Seegers, 1996:221). Needless to say, this deepened 
cleavages in Namibian society. SWATF was seen as part of an “occupation force” bent on the 
destruction of legitimate opposition (Du Pisani, 1988: 7; Gottschalk, 1988: 500). The South 
African government’s use of Namibia as a springboard to launch cross-border activities, “pre-
emptive” strikes or hot-pursuit (hakkejag) operations in which SWATF was used did not 
improve the situation. SWATF with its Namibian members was deployed against SWAPO 
guerrillas and cadres – in some cases causing civilian casualties among others (the attack on 
 196
Cassinga being one example).175 In effect Namibians were deployed against their own people 
in the South African attempts to neutralise or destroy SWAPO. 
 
 
 
 
Vehicle destroyed by landmine, Sector 10 in the vicinity of Onayena, northern Namibia. 
Source: Author’s archive. 
                                                 
175 Cassinga involved the largest airborne operation undertaken by South Africa in Angola. For the 
South African military and its political leadership it was a “resounding military success” and Cassinga 
a legitimate military target. For SWAPO and the international media it was a massacre that caused the 
death of numerous civilians. There is little doubt that civilians bore the brunt of the massive attack. 
Future research will have to demonstrate where the truth lies. Cassinga Day is today celebrated as a 
National Day in Namibia.  
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SADF propaganda poster against SWAPO.  Note the men on horseback, the trampled guerrilla, and 
hammer and sickle. Posters distributed circa 1980 in the operational area, Namibia (author’s archive). 
By 1989, the men on horseback had left Namibia … 
 
 
Parts of the population were openly against South African occupation, yet were equally 
vociferous in their condemnation of SWAPO. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) is 
one example of this. The DTA itself was internally divided, with some in favour of and others 
wary of further occupation. The Turnhalle experiment had little success. It was tainted with 
apartheid and excluded SWAPO. Large parts of the so-called Basters (or Rehoboth Basters) 
were equally wary of SWAPO and entered the first free elections with their own distinct 
political party. Hence, even after the departure of the South African frontier army – as Du 
Pisani referred to it – some divisions remained. However, these differences did not lead to 
violent conflict and seem unlikely to do so in the future. An observer later referred to the case 
of Namibia and “its missing TRC” as a “dog that did not bark in the night” (Saul, 1999). Saul 
critically also points out that “a policy of national amnesia” was partly caused by “the 
SWAPO leadership’s uncomfortable awareness of the skeletons in its own closet …” (Saul, 
1999: 3). 
 
SWAPO as a liberation movement also incarcerated what was believed to be informers or 
counter-revolutionaries. The resistance by a minority of Namibians to these actions of the 
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SWAPO leadership and SWAPO’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN), is described by Beukes et al. (1987). Some theorists observe the same realities 
(Dobell, 1997; Saul, 1999). It has to be mentioned though that SWAPO’s incarceration of 
dissidents, combined with whatever abuses took place, is dwarfed in numbers by the deaths 
caused by SADF and SWATF operations in Namibia and the more or less continuous 
presence of these forces in Angola. 
 
 
 
For some the battle of Cassinga (Operation Reindeer by the SADF) was a well executed airborne and 
ground operation preceeded by a massive airstrike. For others it was a massacre of civilians of which 
there were about three thousand in and around the town. Up till today the number of guerrillas killed is 
disputed while little information is available on the number of civilians killed. 
Source: Cuban Military Archives, 2007. 
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A different perspective on Cassinga as held by others. Graffiti on a wall at the entrance to Katatura, 
Windhoek on the eve of the first free elections in Namibia, 1989. 
Source: Author’s archive. 
 
 
Given these complexities, even after the occupying army left, SWAPO adopted a cautious 
approach to reconciliation. “In the government’s considered opinion, resurrecting the past 
would serve no constructive purpose. A successful transition, it was argued, required co-
operation between former enemies. Delving into past injustices would only incite a desire for 
vengeance and distract a still fragile nation from the paramount tasks of reconstruction and 
development” (Saul, 1999: 2). 
 
The year 1989 became a historic milestone for Namibia. A cease-fire, beginning in April, 
heralded the end of a drawn-out war between the occupying South African security forces and 
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SWAPO/PLAN. After one-person-one-vote elections in 1989, following the implementation 
of UN Resolution 435, Namibia became independent in 1990, having elected a constituent 
assembly and written a constitution. 
 
The legacy of the war was ominous. Namibian exiles totalled 75 000. Hundreds of Namibians 
fought and died on both sides. While some became combatants for PLAN, others were 
recruited by the colonial force to bolster the defence of the colony against the liberation army. 
South African security force units such as Koevoet, a mobile counter-insurgency unit, for 
example, became notorious for their vicious activities (Cliffe, 1994: 24). 
 
The Namibian government chose not to deal with the past by means of a commission of truth. 
Other reasons that could have contributed to the Namibians not dealing with the past by 
means of a truth commission include the fact that similar commissions had yet to come into 
existence in Southern Africa (Angola was caught up in a civil war, Mozambique was slowly 
moving away from one, and Zimbabwe did not set up such a commission after the Smith 
regime departed from the corridors of power). In the rest of Africa, it was only Uganda that 
attempted to unearth the truth through two government-sponsored commissions – in 1974 and 
1986 – but the reports of these commissions were far from complete and contested – and 
above of all never released (Hayner, 1994: 618–619). In a panel discussion, Nabudere made it 
clear that in effect Uganda had no such commission (Nabudere, 14/08/2003). He also 
suggested that such a commission would have had value for Ugandans (Nabudere, 
14/08/2003). 
 
Chad opened a commission by presidential decree in December 1990 to look into “Crimes 
and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-president Habre and his Accomplices and/or 
Accessories”. By the time Chad announced its commission, Namibia was already 
independent, preparing for reconstruction, economic development and regional elections. 
Rather, it was left to historians to (re)write the history of oppression and the story of 
liberation in Namibia (see Cliffe, 1994: 13ff; Gupta, 1990: 13ff). 
 
Spain 
 
Du Toit (1994: 64) points out that a recurring problem for the new democratic governments in 
Spain, Brazil, Argentina and other countries was how to deal with the legacy of political 
atrocities and human-rights abuses committed by the previous military and/or authoritarian 
regimes. Moreover, different countries, given different political contexts, acted differently. 
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As in South Africa, there was no overthrow of power or a complete military defeat in Spain 
(Colomer, 1991; Royo, 1994). However, problems tended to arise in the negotiated and 
incomplete transitional process. “[T]he quest for justice in transition had to be tempered by 
the need to consolidate a still insecure democracy” (Du Toit, 1994: 64). 
 
Du Toit points out that in Spain, one of the more successful recent transitions to democracy, 
the issue of dealing with abuses of the past was, by tacit agreement, kept off the national 
agenda during the transitional period and in its immediate aftermath. Placating the right wing 
and the still-influential military elite enhanced democratic consolidation. The death of 
General Franco left Spanish society without the initiator of the dictatorship and might have 
assisted “collective forgetfulness” and a focus on consolidating a democracy in a country 
where communities demanded separate autonomies. The Spanish economy, compared to other 
European economies, was at the time also in need of increased growth, which may have 
detracted from an imperative to punish past rulers. The new government was also aware that 
the need to consolidate democracy and to enhance economic growth would take a lot of 
energy. The international debate on truth commissions was also not very advanced in 1977, 
thus having little or no impact on the Spanish internal political debate. 
 
What Colomer calls elements of “transition by cooperation”, “agreed reform”, “controlled 
opening and collapse” (Colomer, 1991: 1291)176 may have played a role in this choice. 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
Kollapen quotes Richard Carver’s article, “Zimbabwe: Drawing a line through the past”, to 
point out that the new Zimbabwean government opted for not unearthing the history of 
oppression under the Smith regime (Kollapen, 1993: 2). According to Kollapen: “Carver 
concluded that ‘it [general amnesty] allowed a culture of abuse and impunity to permeate the 
security structures’. Many observers were surprised by the ease with which former Rhodesian 
personnel worked side by side with Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas (1993: 2). 
 
One of the less important reasons why the “truth could not be disclosed” in Zimbabwe was 
the large-scale destruction of security files just prior to the hand-over of government to the 
                                                 
176 In his analysis of what he calls transitions by agreement with Spain as a case study he also deploys 
insights from other cases, among others Argentina (1983), Brazil (1982 – 1985), Chile (1989 onwards), 
Greece (1970s) and Uruguay (1983 – 1984) efficiently (Colomer, 1991: 1297 ff). Constitutional 
changes in Spain’s transition are dealt with by De Villiers (1993) and Royo (1994).  
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new authorities. More importantly, there was very little international debate that penetrated 
discourse in Africa on how to unearth the truth. Consequently, the responsibility to (re)write 
the history of oppression and resistance was left to Zimbabwean historians (see, for example, 
Johnson & Martin, 1981). 
 
After President Mugabe came to power in Zimbabwe, resistance to his government developed 
in the Matabeleland region of the country. The government dealt harshly with resistance. 
According to church and human-rights organisations, approximately 1 500 civilians were 
killed in the resultant state action against “dissidents” (Hayner, 1994: 617). In 1985, two years 
after the Matabeleland debacle, a commission of enquiry was established. However, the 
government neither published the report, nor admitted to the killing of large numbers of 
Zimbabwean citizens, or committed itself to compensate the aggrieved (Hayner, 1994: 617). 
Moreover, strict security legislation, for some reminiscent of Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, came into 
being and the two-party state evolved into a one-party state headed by Mugabe, his rival 
Josiah Nkomo being sidelined. 
 
The actions of the Zimbabwean Defence Force in Matabeleland were not only to undermine 
Mugabe’s magnanimous and widely quoted speech at independence when he encouraged 
Zimbabweans to forget the past and embark on a policy of national reconciliation (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2003: 23). It also alienated support from ZANU-PF. But, perhaps most important 
for the purposes of this study, it was to set a precedent that undermined CMR and civil control 
over the military, resulting in human-rights transgressions that still occur in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003: 23, 26, 28–31). 
 
As observed by Kagoro (2003: 7): “Any (future) solution to the Zimbabwe (situation) will 
have to achieve a delicate balance that will have to include economic and political exigencies, 
on the one hand, and justice and reconciliation concerns on the other”. But Kagoro was 
writing in 2003. His article was published 13 years after Mugabe came to power uttering 
reconciliatory rhetoric. If a negotiated settlement between contenders should now be reached 
– say between 2007 and 2009 – the position will be that Zimbabwe has choices. (In fact 
Zimbabwe after the Lancaster Agreement had the same choices …). Will the choices translate 
into a government enquiry into past violence – even if a negotiated settlement is achieved? Is 
there a reason to justify a TRC-like process, given what happened in Matabeleland and since 
then? Or should Zimbabweans forgive and forget after the demise of Mugabe? Mogobe 
Ramose, a philosopher in exile during the 1980s in Belgium/the Netherlands argues that 
forgetting about the past is problematic, if not a betrayal of reality. “(To) forget about the past 
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is the main message of acquisitive and extinctive prescription (from the West – my insertion). 
The problem with this message is that it makes an unequal and unjust demand. The conqueror 
is asked to forget about the past on the understanding that the benefits of conquest in an unjust 
war shall accrue exclusively to him. On the other hand the conquered is asked to forget about 
the past on the condition that they renounce their right to seek a remedy to the injustice of 
conquest in an unjust war” (Ramose, 2001: 17). 
 
Ramose’s argument comes close to the arguments of South Africans sceptical of a TRC. What 
if only the victims tell their story? What if there is no revenge, compensation, or 
reconciliation? What if the new and old elite agree not to enter criminal charges against each 
other? What if people over a broad spectrum want to punish the previous elite, or those that 
govern now, without due respect for the lives of their citizenry? What if one unjust war, the 
opposite of justum bellum, evolves from or is manipulated into another (the same applies to 
one unjust government that replaces another, even if the incumbent claims justice for all – and 
then diverts from its promise).177 Mogobe’s argument should be weighed up against the 
forgive-and-forget approach taken by a new regime, the incumbents to the new house of 
power politics. 
 
I mentioned that political personalities can play an important role in choices made about 
reconciliation or retribution. In South Africa P.W. Botha and Magnus Malan demonstrated 
that political leaders, if powerful enough – even if they are not charismatic – can influence the 
choice between peace or war, accommodation or exclusion, oppression or democratisation. 
The role of political leadership in building accommodative societies or launching 
communities into civil strife is discussed in detail by various theorists (Van Wyk, 2007).178 
                                                 
177 In her contribution to a democratisation study Botha (1996: 163) argues that there are common 
factors between Senegal, Namibia, and South Africa. Firstly, a dominant party won the first free 
elections. Secondly, these countries to an extent represent “Presidentialism”, that is, the political 
system that evolves places great value on the personality of the leader. She remarks that such leaders 
are frequently seen as popular, charismatic and father-like figures (with some qualifications she added 
at the time [1996] Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe). Thirdly, and closely linked to the phenomenon of 
Presidentialism, is that the first elections revolved to a great extent around the personalities of these 
“founding fathers” (Botha, 1996: 163). In the above cases – and I include Mugabe here – the 
importance of leadership should not be underestimated. I agree with Botha that workable political 
systems cannot be sustained by leadership/ presidents alone. Somewhere the inculcated values of 
democracy and the accommodative praxis by leadership and civil society should become the living 
practice and shared attitude of the citizenry in an evolving democracy. If not, fault-lines will develop; 
Zimbabwe and the USA are recent examples where executive leadership slowly but surely undermined 
the values of democracy and the rule of law. 
178 Literature on the role of leadership in politics and the negative or positive results of such leadership 
is not new. See among others Migdal (1988), Keren (1988) and Dror (1988, 1990). In South Africa the 
issue received some attention (see Van der Merwe & Liebenberg [1991 and 1992], Liebenberg & 
Lortan [1993, 1996] and Liebenberg [1992, 1994]). 
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In the case of Zimbabwe the questions remain: Have “social reconciliation/ accommodation” 
and human rights protection been achieved since 1980? Was the choice against a TRC type 
process at all beneficial? The verdict is still out. I will return to this in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
 
4.4.2. Steps taken to deal with the past 
 
Argentina 
 
Argentina was the first country in Latin America to throw off colonial despotism when it rid 
itself of Spanish rule in 1810. In 1883 the country adopted a liberal constitution. Habeas 
corpus formed a constitutional element of the Argentinean constitution (Guest, 1990: 12). It 
seemed for some years that the country and its people were finding themselves in a restless, 
sometimes emotionally laden, but stable democracy. Things were to change. 
 
Argentina experienced military rule five times between 1930 and 1983.179 The coup by Videla 
and associates in 1976 was for many people but one more when the new junta took power 
(Guest, 1990: 5, 12). Between 1930 and 1976 Argentina experienced 30 years of military rule, 
out of 46 years of government (Guest, 1990: 12).180 One has to mention that between 1930 and 
the Videla coup the military grew in influence and power in both politics and the economy and a 
widening gap between civilians and the military evolved (Guest, 1990: 12 – 13). 
 
The coup of March 1976 saw the overthrow of the government of Isabel Martinez de Peron. 
The stated intention of the military government was to “stabilize the economy and to suppress 
leftist subversion” (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 605). Argentina became the quintessential 
praetorian society. The ruling junta embarked on a proceso de reorganization nacional. The 
system implemented by the military was to produce a “new” Argentina without socialist 
                                                 
179 A political scientist, Jordan (later Kirkpatrick), described the Argentinean situation in 1971 as 
‘neither democratic, nor totalitarian’ (Guest, 1990: 13–14). 
180 The military seized power in 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976. USA political scientists glibly 
referred to Argentina and others as “coup-prone” countries, as if Latin American countries were unable 
to conceptualise and implement democracy – “as if Latin America was somehow incapable of true 
democracy” (Guest, 1990: 5). It was at a time that modernisation theory dominated in North America, 
following the growing collective delusion that only the USA has the gift of living, understanding and 
exporting “its” democracy. For many the analysis presented by conservative modernisation theorists 
was the only working analysis (read: “true perspective”): Developing countries are coup-prone (read: 
less civil), modernisation theorists argued. Perhaps military rule is the best way for these types of states 
to go – with the added benefit that military leaders’ loyalty could be bought off in the perceived East-
West conflict, as the USA frequently did, I suggest. 
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perversions. The military’s “dirty war” (or guerra sucia) against leftists resulted in roughly 9 
000 “disappearances” (read: extra-judicial executions, deaths and persons “eliminated from 
society”), which predictably eventually provoked first public outrage and subsequently 
resistance (Zagorski, 1994: 424).181 
 
Argentina experienced grave human-rights abuses between 1976 and 1983 as the “dirty war” 
ravaged the civil community.182 While Argentina is relevant to this discussion, other Latin 
American countries, such as Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay, also experienced military rule. 
Mendez (2000: 127) rightly remarks that “although Latin America had witnessed repressive 
governments, the cycles of revolutions and repression in the 1970s and 1980s had exceeded – 
in number of victims and the quality of atrocities committed – everything the region had seen 
before” (see also Nunca Mas [English: Never Again], 1986: xii ff). 
 
By 1980 the military regime in Argentina was already in difficulty. The rulers placated 
international bankers and supported a free-market system (both unpopular and probably 
unsuitable to Argentinean circumstances). Like apartheid South Africa, the leadership in 
Argentina placated international advocates of the free market and kept borrowing money from 
them. By 1976 foreign debt had risen from $9 billion to $43 billion (US). Interest rates rose 
by 30 percent and the real income of the salaried sector fell by 40 percent. Despite oppression 
and torture, resistance continued. 
 
In March 1982 the Argentinean junta, already under threat of an economic collapse, took a 
gamble. Perhaps its members relied on the spirit of the Argentinean people to follow them in 
retaking the Malvinas (a group of islands occupied by the British in 1833 and known to the 
British public believing in their colonial “rights” as the Falklands ever since). Perhaps the 
junta hoped to divert attention away from growing trade union activity despite harsh 
oppression inside the country, or perhaps the military despots after a successful visit of Gen. 
Galtieri to the USA, where he dined with the US Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger in 
1981, was convinced that the USA saw Argentina as a friend and ally, not a proxy.183 
Whatever the reasons for the attempted re-taking of the Falklands from Thatcher’s Britain 
apart from a spirit of nationalism, the war turned out disastrously for the ruling junta. Despite 
                                                 
181 Ramon Torres Molina, a civil-rights lawyer, himself jailed for seven years, estimated that up to 20 
000 or 30 000 people could have disappeared in the guerra sucia (Putnam, 1994: 104). The civil-rights 
movement Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo is still gathering data about those who disappeared. 
182 For this study I interviewed an Argentine exile living in South Africa. See Chapter 6.  
183 The apartheid government was to discover, like the Argentinean junta, that in dealings with the USA 
proxies should not be confused with friends or allies – especially when called friends publicly or 
privately by US political leaders. 
 206
the junta’s strategic evaluation that Britain would not tolerate a violent confrontation, the 
hawk-like British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did go to war and retook the occupied 
Malvinas from their rightful owners (compare Guest, 1990: 335, 336, 339 ff). Thatcher took a 
gamble too. In Britain Thatcher’s privatisation programme was highly unpopular and the 
British economy not as strong as expected. Going to war was for her one way to divert 
attention away from home-town unpopularity – and perhaps regaining that popularity.184 
 
Despite their resistance and the Argentinean air force pilots with obsolete aircraft inflicting 
“one of the darkest days in the history of the Royal Navy” (Cicalesi & Rivas, 2007: 30)185, 
Argentina lost the war and with it the military lost the gamble. Following defeat in the 
Falkland/Malvinas War, the position for the Argentinean military became untenable (Du Toit, 
1994: 64). The ill-fated Falkland/Malvinas debacle led to a military commission of enquiry 
and court martials for senior generals (Zagorski, 1994: 424). 
 
In 1983, following free elections, a democracy under President Alfonsin re-emerged. Among 
one of the final acts of the military government, shortly before its demise, was the 
announcement of the Documento Final (Final Document) that amounted to the promulgation 
of self-amnesty for military staff involved in human-rights abuses. This law, also known as 
the “national pacification law”, made it impossible to punish anyone regardless of the nature 
of the transgression (Varas, 1989: 49). The national pacification law shared some 
characteristics with South Africa’s 1992 amnesty: It was one-sided, it was promulgated by the 
outgoing political leadership, it was aimed at the protection of military and security personnel 
that were involved in human-rights transgressions and there was no public debate on it. Ipso 
facto it also protected politicians that tacitly or openly supported the wide-scale perpetration 
of human-rights transgressions. Post-authoritarian Argentineans thus faced similar problems 
at the time to those South Africa was to face some years later. 
 
The new democratic government under President Alfonsin had to deal with the legacy of the 
“dirty war”. As Varas puts it, the end of the military regime left human rights in the arena of 
civil-military confrontation (Varas, 1989: 54). Among others, the new ruling party repealed 
the military’s self-amnesty through a nearly unanimous vote. Many senior military staff were 
                                                 
184 In my view Thatcher and Blair as political leaders of what is portrayed as opposition parties (the 
Conservatives and the Labour Party) in the UK share at least one communality: One may regain 
popularity or become part of  political posterity by taking “one’s” citizens to war – even if close to half 
of the population disagree/express sincere doubts. A military junta and colonisers as mirror images?  
185 The Argentinean pilots impressed the world. In a letter to the Argentinean pilots that flew in the 
war, almost against outrageous misfortune, Pierre Clostermann states: “Never in the history of war 
since 1944 did pilots have to face such overwhelming odds” (Cicalesi & Rivas, 2007: 34). 
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dismissed, retired or forced to take up other positions (Varas, 1998: 55–58). Court cases 
against more than 800 officers were instituted (Varas, 1989: 56). 
 
The new government appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate and expose the 
organisation and methods of the Argentine security forces in the oppression period.186 The 
Comision Nacional para la Desaparicion de Personas, or Sabato Commission as it became 
known, produced a detailed report on human-rights violations and the related systems of 
oppression. The Sabato Commission consisted of ten individuals who enjoyed “national and 
international prestige” and were chosen for “their consistent stance in defence of human rights 
and their representation of different walks of life” (Hayner, 1994: 615). The commission 
identified 8 961 persons who had disappeared between 1973 and 1983 and whose fate had not 
been ascertained by November 1984 (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 605).187 
 
The final report of the commission was forwarded to President Alfonsin in the second half of 
1984, together with the names of 1 300 military officers implicated by testimonies received 
and research done by the commission. The report was published in 1986 as Nunca Mas – 
Never Again: The Report of the Argentina National Commission for the Disappeared, and 
scrupulously documented the fate of the disappeared. 
 
Alfonsin decided not to publicise the names of the implicated security personnel, but the 
names were leaked to the press. The document raised high hopes among the Argentine 
victims, their families, church groups and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The 
government proceeded with the public hearing of leading military figures, which included key 
members of the military junta. Strong resistance from the military ensued. Three internal 
revolts by middle-ranking officers (April 1987, December 1987 and December 1988) forced 
the new democratic state to make concessions. These concessions included an end to trials of 
human-rights abusers and the appointment of a new military high command that was 
sympathetic to the rebels (Zagorski, 1994: 425). 
 
Fraser and Weissbrodt point out that although hundreds of prosecutions were initiated, the 
Documento Final and the Law of Due Obedience during Alfonsin’s presidency ultimately 
                                                 
186 Bolivia was the first Latin American country to establish a truth commission, just days after the 
return to democracy in 1982. Only disappearances were dealt with by the eight commissioners, while 
torture and illegal and prolonged detention were overlooked (Hayner, 1994: 613). Argentina and others 
then followed. 
187 The statistics provided by Fraser and Weissbrodt (1992: 605) differ from the Sabato Commission 
statistics by one person, namely 8 960. Fraser and Weissbrodt do not explain why. 
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created a condition that prevented action against some officers and other perpetrators of abuse 
(Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 606). Perhaps the statement by August Varas best sums up the 
situation in Argentina towards the end of Alfonsin’s rule: “This policy of ‘pruning the Hydra’ 
(the thousand heads of Argentine gorilismo) has its limitations. It is limited to the degree that 
punishment for brutalities during the dirty war is confined to the leaders of the three military 
juntas. The government’s lack of resolve in pushing for the prosecution of the many persons 
implicated in the atrocities has had another consequence: it has provided the groundwork for 
an unusual civil-military coalition that (eventually) opposed the very idea of human-rights 
investigations” (Varas, 1989: 59). Guest remarks that “Argentina’s new democracy has gone 
further than any nation to punish the military … But has it gone far enough?”, the author 
wonders (Guest, 1990: 6). Was Alfonsin right, is the question? “Is compromise the proper 
response to a crime so deliberate and gross as the disappearances?” (Guest, 1990: 6). Guest’s 
moral question is important and touches the human soul and the ethics of being. The question, 
apart from his loaded rhetorical question on the ethics of punishment, has longer-term 
implications. It leads to another question: Will future steps taken to reconstruct a civil military 
and restrain hawk-like politicians in and out of uniform prevent a reoccurrence of such 
events? Nunca Mas in its recommendations had a lot to say about bringing the guilty to court, 
declaring abduction a crime against humanity (which in various previous conventions is 
implied already), and repealing of oppressive legislation (Nunca Mas [English Translation], 
Never Again 1986:446). The report did mention that there is a need to provide ample support 
for the teaching of human rights in state institutions such as the military, policing or 
reprofessionalising the security arms of the state, (1986: 446). The nagging question posed 
earlier in this study remains unanswered. Are single references to the need to subscribe to 
international conventions, without venturing into concrete proposals for future CMR, enough? 
 
President Carlos Menem, who succeeded Alfonsin in 1989, pardoned the military officers and 
civilians who had been prosecuted. In December 1990, for instance, 39 military leaders who 
had been in prison since 1985 for acts of oppression in the “dirty war” were pardoned. 
 
Some observers believe that the new democratic government should have been more resolute 
and swift in trying the military and security personnel involved in gross abuses. As time 
passed, the officers closed ranks and the new democratic government had to attend more to 
economic and administrative issues. “In the eyes of some observers, the Argentine attempt to 
achieve justice for past abuses had overreached itself, endangering the democratic transition 
and eventually forcing the civilian government to legitimise the self-amnesty of the previous 
military rulers” (Du Toit, 1994: 65). 
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Notwithstanding this criticism, the truth commission in Argentina was the first to receive 
widespread international attention and some look toward Argentina as an example to other 
countries searching for truth and justice in times of difficult political transition (Hayner, 1994: 
614). While the commission succeeded commendably during the “truth phase” in unearthing 
and exposing the past, it fell short during the “justice phase” in dealing with the perpetrators 
of human rights abuses and in providing restitution for victims. Moreover, it lacked the 
foresight to address in more detail future CMR and civil control over the military. 
 
Some positive results followed the release of the report even if no detailed recommendations 
were made. Attempted reforms that began under President Alfonsin, and were furthered by 
the Menem government, included downsizing of the military, changing doctrinal perspectives, 
professionalisation of forces and modernisation of the army. The result was that “it became 
illegal to engage in the surveillance of civilians or exercise governmental authority over 
them” (a defence law passed under Alfonsin made this a policy matter). 
 
Furthermore, a civilian director was to control national intelligence and civilians were to be 
responsible for strategic planning and control of the defence ministry (Zagorski, 1994: 433). 
The net result was that the fears about the future of the military diminished (they still played a 
professional role), but they became less tempted to enter politics and were under civilian 
control. While this reprofessionalisation had positive effects, Zagorski, although tentatively 
optimistic, at the time warned that it was too early to predict the end results (Zagorski, 1994: 
435). It seems that there are some lessons to be learnt here for South Africans about 
upholding democracy in future.188 
 
The military, if judged by one statement, learned something about the experience. General 
Antonio Balza of Argentina sums up the bottom line for military disengagement: “No more in 
political business! No more in politics!” (Putnam, 1994: 104). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
188 In social-democratic states, such as Denmark at the time, intelligence and surveillance were also 
policy matters – with checks and balances provided. For more detail, see Ravnborg in Minnaar, 
Liebenberg and Schutte (1994: 90ff). 
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Chile 189 
 
Chile’s political history has been marked by ebb and flow. However, these developments 
were mostly bloodless and marked by the absence of large-scale civil disturbance and civil 
war, while occasional violent altercations are not excluded (Oosthuizen, 1996: 37).190 
Between 1810 and 1830 seven presidents took office. However the 1812 constitution set a 
trend. Executive powers were balanced by the senate – so much so that one president 
attempted to dissolve it in 1822 (Oosthuizen, 1996: 38). A new constitution was written in 
1833. This constitution established a firmer separation of powers and lasted for nearly a 
century – until 1925 (Oosthuizen, 1996: 38). It has to be mentioned that authoritarian trends 
in the executive in Chile were not absent. In the 1890s it led to bloody conflict. The 1925 
constitution favoured a balance between the President and congress. This constitution allowed 
for far greater powers for the President, i.e., congress could not veto the President’s choice for 
the cabinet (Oosthuizen, 1996: 38). Allowing a president so much power leverage was to 
invoke the atmosphere for a political precedent. 
 
Allende, the socialist president, tried during his term (1970–1973) to deal with the 
predominance of landed estates, attempting to introduce policies that benefited the poor and 
landless/disadvantaged communities and a programme of nationalisation (Oosthuizen, 1996: 
39–41). Labour unrest that coincided with the 1970s oil crisis and a strike by truck drivers – 
on many accounts with USA financial backing – were to worsen things (Oosthuizen, 1996: 
42).191 
 
Allende found himself under siege, having alienated the financial elite and upper middle 
classes and foreign indirect intervention. On 10 September 1973 a coup took place and a four-
man junta constituted by the heads of the army, the navy, the air force and the police took 
                                                 
189 For more detail, the reader is referred to Du Toit (1994: 63–69); Fraser and Weissbrodt (1992: 
601ff); Aguero (1993: 130–135); and an article in the Unisa Latin American Report, 10(2), July–
December 1994: 77–78, entitled “Chilean journalist speaks on the Truth Commission”. Manuel 
Cabieses, editor of the activist Chilean weekly, Punto Final, pointed out that civil society strongly 
supported the struggle against oppression. Three groups were particularly active: (1) human-rights 
orientated lawyers, many of whom acted courageously; (2) the Catholic Church; and (3) families of the 
victims who acted in an organised way. For an excellent insider-outsider (or participant-observer) 
perspective, see Gabriel Garcia Marques, Clandestine in Chile: The adventures of Miguel Littin, 1989, 
Cambridge: Granta Books. 
190 Chileans frequently referred to their earlier experience as a “proud democratic history” (Oosthuizen, 
1996: 38). 
191 During 1970 and 1973 the USA through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spent approximately 
$8 000 000 to destabilise the economy of Chile, aimed at the collapse of Allende’s socialist 
government (Oosthuizen, 1996: 43; Keen, 1984: 337). 
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power. Allende was killed in the course of the coup (Keen, 1984: 339–341; Oosthuizen, 1996: 
44). Civil liberties were suspended, congress dissolved, left and centre parties suspended or 
outlawed, union activities banned and strikes prohibited. Thousands of Chileans were to be 
jailed, tortured and killed in the years to come – even abroad (Keen, 1984: 339ff).192 
 
It is said that Pinochet “was always a profoundly authoritarian figure who soon prevailed over 
less undemocratic rivals” (Philip, 1985: 139). If this statement is true, Pinochet shared 
interesting communalities with Francisco Franco, Benito Mussolini, J.B. Vorster and P.W. 
Botha.193 
 
If Pinochet was authoritarian in his presidential rule – not unique to authoritarian societies – 
his rule shared generic tenets with top-down governments across the globe and the attitudes of 
their leaders/elite. Pinochet had the support of right-wingers (some would say, as Philip 
[1985] “semi-fascists”), and I would argue a percentage of “Liberals” (who still advocate 
today that society is about merit, security, private property and eventual equity – equity as 
term here not to be confused with equality. No liberal leader anywhere commits him/herself 
to pronounce when equality will prevail over equity). In Chile, as in Argentina and elsewhere, 
these ruler types privileged their intelligence organisations despite the rivalry between the 
intelligence bodies and security advisors, and the main element of support was predictably 
“civilian”, the financial elite (on Chile see Philip, 1985: 139–140).194 
 
Authoritarian states survive on autocrats, but no autocrat comes into power and remains in 
power without the support of the financial movers and shakers, formal and informal 
intelligence structures and the leadership/command of a close-knit group of insiders – call 
them the elite if you wish.195 Chileans were to experience this, with the logical consequences. 
If one criticises the state, one is counted and registered as such. If one acts as opposition (even 
if not involved in violence or taking up arms) one has become the enemy and liable for 
elimination or ostracism from the “good order”. The effect over time was a rule that aligned 
itself with the electric prod, the fists, the sinking of bodies into a silent river and extracting the 
                                                 
192 Compare also Arriagada (1988). 
193 With reference to the statement above, if J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians is to be 
extrapolated, it would bring us in this case to “sociologically imagining” leaders such as Ronald 
Reagan, George Bush (Sr), Tony Blair, Bush (Jr), Idi Amin Dada or the pigs in the well-known Animal 
Farm of Orwell. 
194Another common characteristic shared with apartheid South Africa’s National Party and its AB 
advisors and the financial sector. 
195 It is argued that Pinochet’s rule became very personal, like that of most authoritarian rulers (Philip, 
1985: 141). South Africans in my view experienced this in increasing degrees, starting at the latest with 
John Vorster and then P.W. Botha. 
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teeth of opposition or subversives. It leads to painful death, not of a society but within a 
society. It spells the end of human equality, free bodies and human conduct within or outside 
the country (in South Africa it became the rule of the rubber bullet, the Casspir, the 
“permanent removal from society” of activists and “liberal” critics suggesting a farewell to 
apartheid [Afskeid van apartheid] and in parliament some questions carefully phrased about 
the possible abuse of power). 
 
Ruling elites (always, it seems) have some support. If the support is not from the internal 
population and the internal support in time declines, they usually have sponsors. In the case of 
Chile support was provided to the elite and the ruling politicians. One analyst noted that the 
Central Intelligence Agencyy, with authorisation from the US Secretary of State, spent 
$8 000 000 in a US budget of two and a half years (1970–1973) to destabilise the Chilean 
economy. The funding was meant to lift a “Marxist leader” from government (Oosthuizen, 
1996: 43). For Chileans some action following Pinochet and his associates’ rule was to be 
considered, if not imperative. This was to lead to a TRC. The TRC exercise that followed in 
Chile achieved international recognition. 
 
“Compared to the failed Argentina efforts to achieve both justice and truth and compared to 
the counter-productive Uruguay attempts tacitly to avoid dealing with the past, the Chilean 
case proved considerably more successful. In part this was because some valuable lessons had 
been learned from these comparative experiences” (Du Toit, 1994: 66). Of similar opinion is 
Aguero (1993: 131ff). 
 
Patricio Aylwin took office as the new Chilean president in 1990, ending almost 17 years of 
military dictatorship under General Augusto Pinochet (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 601). As 
in Argentina and Uruguay, the military coup that brought Pinochet to power in September 
1973 initiated an era of political repression, human-rights violations and the increasing 
polarisation of Chilean society. 
 
One of the first actions of the Aylwin government was the appointment of the Chilean 
National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation or Comision Nacional para la Veridad y 
Reconciliation (also referred to as the Rettig Commission, after its chairperson). The specific 
brief of the commission was to establish the truth regarding alleged torture, human-rights 
abuses and disappearances (Du Toit, 1994: 66; Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 601). 
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The founding decree of the Rettig Commission stated: “Only on the basis of the truth, will it 
be possible to satisfy the basic demands of justice and create the indispensable conditions for 
achieving an effective national reconciliation” (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 601). An 
important imperative was that the commission serve national reconciliation by truth telling 
and the pursuit of “justice insofar as possible” (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 602). 
 
In selecting the committee, care was taken not to appoint a commission with an apparent 
political bias. Eight respected human-rights figures were selected.196 This signalled that the 
commission was likely to do its work in good faith and as far as humanly possible without 
bias. 
 
The commission worked for nine months to investigate the 3 400 cases brought to it. Of these, 
2 920 fitted its mandate. The commission, staffed by over 60 members, covered each case 
extensively. Hayner is of the opinion that it was one of the most thorough truth commissions 
at the time (Hayner, 1994: 621–622). The report of the Chilean National Commission on 
Truth and Reconciliation eventually consisted of 1 350 pages and comprised two volumes. 
One outlined the personal particulars of many hundreds of victims. Individual perpetrators 
were not named, yet in some cases dossiers were provided to civil authorities (Du Toit, 1994: 
66). In the report 2 115 individuals are mentioned who were subjected to human-rights 
violations and 164 persons who were “victims of political violence” (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 
1992: 618). 
 
The report also dealt with “Family and Social Effects of the Most Serious Human-rights 
Violations”, and devoted the last part to “Proposals for Reparation”, “Prevention of Human-
Rights Violations” and “Truth and Reconciliation”. 
 
Subsequently, a law passed by the Chilean congress in 1992 granted compensation to families 
of victims mentioned in the Rettig Report. 
 
Attention was also paid to preventative measures such as the following: 
 
(1) Modifying Chile’s national laws to conform to international human-rights standards; 
(2) Assuring the independence of the judiciary; 
                                                 
196 Frazer and Weissbrodt go into detail about the selection of the eight-person committee and their 
background. Prominent human-rights personalities were appointed (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 612, 
616ff). 
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(3) Making sure that security forces respect human rights; and 
(4) Opening a permanent office for an ombudsman to protect citizens from human-rights 
abuses. 
 
In assessing the committee, Fraser and Weissbrodt find that it “kept its primary focus on the 
victims”; that it compiled meticulous chronologies of the abuses; and, through great effort, 
obtained authoritative information (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 620–621). For Mendez (2000: 
131) the Rettig Commission was distinctive because of its efforts to document every known 
case and give each family a detailed description of what transpired (read: “an individualised 
truth”) 197. Mendez also mentions that this commission inspired others with some success, 
such as in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala (Mendez, 2000: 131). In El Salvador it was 
not so much a home-grown exercise but a UN experiment of “taking over a sputtering process 
… that produced a truth commission (Mendez, 2000: 131 – 132). 
 
Du Toit (1994: 66) argues that some of the other reasons for its success were its bi-partisan 
composition, the limited terms of reference (mostly tied to the issue of “disappearances”), its 
limited duration (it had to report in nine months), state resources at its disposal, and the 
support of the newly-elected civilian president. The thorough and strong legal tradition in 
Chile, according to Hayner, also contributed to excellent data-gathering because detailed 
records were available in many of the cases (Hayner, 1994: 621). 
 
The Rettig Commission “represents an important step in the evolution of commissions of 
inquiry about human-rights violations”, and other countries such as those in “Central and 
Eastern Europe, Mongolia and South Africa can learn from it” (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 
622). In qualification they also point out that circumstances may differ and that depending on 
political constraints, countries and governments can “modify their approach to achieve the 
desired truth, justice and reconciliation” (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 622). 
 
When the report of the commission became known, President Aylwin appeared on national 
television, accepted responsibility and apologised to the victims on behalf of the state, an act 
that made Du Toit remark: “Chile, much more than Argentina, and Uruguay, had managed to 
                                                 
197 If Mahmood Mamdani’s criticism of the SATRC is to be seen as universal, his argument would 
probably be that the Chilean commission (and by implication that of Argentina) did not go far enough. 
It stemmed from a compromise. It rightly attempted to deal with the past and procured the right to a 
new political system but limited itself to an individualised approach presented as a collective approach 
and sidelined the vast majority of the disadvantaged by smaller-focussed lenses (limited angular 
optics), namely the perpetrators of human-rights violations and victims, which constitute the majority 
of a disadvantaged community (Mamdani, 2000: 176, 177, 180, 181–182, 183). 
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settle some accounts from the past in a way which actually contributed to national 
reconciliation” (Du Toit, 1994: 66). 
 
The commission can be recommended both in its “truth phase” and in its “justice phase”, and 
leaves scope to serve as a model – or at least a launching platform – for other countries that 
are to embark on a similar process. Against this background, a look will be taken at the South 
African truth commission. 
 
Related to the research problem that I am trying to address, especially some areas addressed 
in the report were of value, viz: 
 
(1) Making sure that security forces respect human rights; and 
(2) Opening a permanent office for an ombudsman to protect citizens from human-rights 
abuses. The context within which the military was to operate in the future was that of 
a constitutional democracy, an independent judiciary and related action to affirm 
human rights in the future. It remains to be said, however, that also in Chile the 
military-held influence amounted to what Rial referred to as an “underground actor” 
(see, among others, Aguero, 1989: 92 and Kaplan, 1999). 
 
 
4.5. Closer to home: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
4.5.1. Legislating the SATRC 
 
The promotion of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act (No. 34 of 1995), assented to on 
19 July 1995, was meant “to provide for the investigation and establishment of as complete a 
picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights 
committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated in the 
Constitution” (RSA, Act No. 34 of 1995: 801). The latter was suggested as 8 October 1990. 
The Commission was to look into actions by the oppressive regime inside and outside South 
Africa. 
 
The spirit of the act that established the SATRC (Act No. 34 of 1995: 801), it was said, was 
underpinned by the interim constitution (then called the Constitution of South Africa [Act No. 
200 of 1993]) as a historic bridge between a divided society, rife with civil conflict and new 
attempts at building a post-apartheid non-racial and democratic society. 
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At base it was “necessary to establish the truth in relation to past events” (including motives 
for and circumstances within violations of human rights took place; reconciliation and 
reconstruction (as implied in the 1993 Constitution; to facilitate understanding rather than 
vengeance, reparation but not retaliation, ubuntu, not victimisation (Act No. 34, 1995: 801). 
 
The act set out in detail the relevant committees such as the SATRC, a Committee on Human 
Rights Violations, a Committee on Amnesty and a Committee on Reparation and 
Rehabilitation. Chapter 1 provided the interpretation and application of the act (including the 
terminology used), Chapter 2 explicated the TRC’s objectives, functions and the powers of 
the commission, Chapter 3 dealt with the investigation of human-rights violations (Act, 1995: 
815 ff); in Chapter 4 amnesty mechanisms and procedures were set out. Chapter 5, in 
accordance with the act and the establishment of different committees, their objectives and 
functions, dealt with reparation and rehabilitation of victims (which then and later was to 
become a long-standing debate). Chapter 6 dealt with the investigations and hearings of the 
commission, which were to take place in public, procedures for venues for hearings (to be 
determined by the Commission) the appointment of sub-committees, the status of witnesses 
and the powers to subpoena and search premises if necessary (Act, 1995: 836 ff). The issue of 
a limited witness protection programme was also addressed. Of importance was that the one-
sided Indemnity Act passed by the De Klerk government (Act No. 35 of 1990, the Indemnity 
Amendment Act [Act 120 of 1992] was repealed. However indemnities provided under these 
acts were to remain in force (which understandably led to strong criticism from the public). 
There was one qualification, however: it was implied that such indemnities would remain in 
force for only 12 months (one year). 
 
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Amendment Bill was to follow in the 
same year to clarify matters related to the text and to provide for related issues. 
 
The commissioners met for the first time on 16 December 1995. The South African 
commission differed from other commissions in the following respects: 
 
1. It was the first commission to be given the power to grant amnesty to individual 
perpetrators (in short the state provided a quasi-judicial process through the 
investigative tasks of the truth-seeking body); 
2. In contrast to Latin American commissions the SATRC had the powers to subpoena, 
search and seize, which were much stronger than those of other commissions; 
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3. The South African Commission’s hearings were to be in public, in contrast to the 
majority of other commissions held previously – also in Latin America – where 
proceedings were held in private/in camera; 
4. Special hearings allowed for NGOs and other bodies to make submissions; 
5. The SATRC was the first to implement a witness protection programme, even if 
limited; and 
6. The SATRC was larger in budget and staff than any other preceding commission 
(SATRCR (Vol. 1), 1998: 48–49). 
 
The cut-off date suggested in the act caused debate. Differences of opinion ensued about what 
period should be reviewed by the commission. Some people wanted the review to cover the 
three centuries since white settlers arrived from Europe (Meredith, 1999: 19). Others 
contended that 1910, when South Africa became a union, was an appropriate date. Union 
making was the moment when the land of “Boer against Brit” became the land of “Boer and 
Brit” to the exclusion of black people. It also set the stage for the exclusion of the limited 
representation of people of colour later on. Some made the rather obvious suggestion that 
1948 when Afrikaners swept to power fuelled by nationalism and the AB influenced the 
ideology of apartheid would be an appropriate cut-off date.198 Dates such as 1960 (the first 
state of emergency imposed by the National Party regime) and 1976 (the spread of rebellion 
and its suppression) were suggested (Meredith, 1999: 19). 
 
Meredith asserts that “the debate about a truth commission was pursued at conferences, 
workshops and in parliamentary committees. Much attention was paid to the lessons learned 
from truth commissions that had been set up in Eastern Europe and Latin America, in 
particular Chile and Argentina, to deal with their difficult pasts. Foreign experts were invited 
to give their views on how South Africa should proceed. South Africans (somewhat 
optimistically he argues) became familiar with the words of wisdom from other lands: “Those 
who cannot remember the past”, warned George Santayana, “are committed to repeat it” 
(Meredith, 1999: 19). 
 
The SATRC: a view of a senior commissioner 
 
The objectives of the TRC, according to the interpretation of Boraine, a TRC commissioner 
(2000: 48–49) and vice chairperson of the commission, were the following: 
                                                 
198 In my opinion 1948 as cut-off date made most sense. 
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• To establish, in accordance with the principles of international law and the 
Constitution, as complete a picture as possible of gross human-rights violations that 
occurred during conflicts of the recent past. These conflicts were clearly demarcated 
within a certain time span: acts which took place between 1 March 1960 and 5 
December 1993, as well as their antecedents and circumstances, in order to achieve 
national reconciliation.199 
• To gather information and evidence that would make it possible to identify the 
victims by name and determine their fate and whereabouts. In this respect, the 
SATRC reflected closely one of the objectives of the earlier Chilean TRC. In short, to 
answer the question: “What happened to the victims?” 
• Consequently, to recommend measures of reparation that would lead to the 
restoration of human and civil dignity of the victims of human-rights violations. 
• To receive applications for amnesty and indemnity in terms of disclosure, and at any 
time to make recommendations to the President. 
• To prepare a report that would contain the findings of the investigations conducted 
and offer objective information about what transpired during this period. 
• To recommend legal and administrative measures to prevent future gross human-
rights violations.200 The main interest in this study is focussed on this objective. The 
notion of a TRC, mooted as early as 1992, departed from the pre-amble of the Interim 
Constitution and was captured in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act No 34 of 1995, and provides the framework within which the establishment and 
the mandate of the TRC must be understood (SATRCR, 1998: 48). “The Commission 
was conceived as part of the bridge building process designed to lead the nation away 
from a deeply divided past to a future founded on the recognition of human rights and 
democracy” (SATRCR, 1998: 48). 
 
                                                 
199 Some may argue that the chosen time span (i.e. roughly from the time that the SACP, the ANC, the 
South African Congress of Trade Unions, the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania and the Congress of 
Democrats were banned, and the beginnings of the armed struggle up to the advent of the first free non-
racial elections) was chosen too arbitrarily, and does not deal with the hardships brought to bear on 
South Africans during the preceding colonial times, which also based white supremacy on 
segregationist politics, as did the subsequent Union governments from 1912 up to 1948. Nor does it 
address the Dutch or British colonial segregationist policies, or the Boer Republic policies and their 
outcomes. This, however, is not the place for this debate. 
200 Note at this point that that it was to recommend such measures, not necessarily to suggest the exact 
ways and means how these measures should be implemented. In retrospect, this was a weakness that 
this study addresses. 
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Further aims of the TRC as summarised by Boraine (2000:48–49) were as follows:201 
• To return to victims their civil and human rights; 
• To restore moral order; 
• To record the truth; 
• To grant amnesty to those that qualified; 
• To create a culture of human rights and respect for the rule of law; and 
• To prevent the violations of human rights of the past from ever happening again (The 
principle of “never again” or Nuncia Mas, as also striven for in the Chilean TRC, is 
echoed here). 
 
Three specialised committees, one dealing with amnesty, one with violations of human rights and 
one with reparation to victims, were to be established and would operate under the TRC. The 
Committee for Human Rights Violations, the Committee on Amnesty and the Committee on 
Reparation and Rehabilitation were to be crucial structures in the workings of the TRC (SA 
Yearbook, 1999: 235). Provision was to be made for appropriate staff, administration and a budget 
to guarantee independence from government and ensure the capacity to perform its functions. 
 
The cut-off date for amnesty would be 5 December 1993. The appointed Minister of Justice, 
Mr Dullah Omar, described the intent of the act and the commission flowing from it as 
follows in an interview in late 1994: 
 
(1) Nuremberg-type trials or witch-hunts were not the intent; 
(2) Neither was it suggested that individual action be taken against perpetrators of crimes 
in the categories of crimes committed; 
(3) The intent of the action would be to establish a TRC to enable South Africans to 
come to terms with their past. (“Reconciliation is not simply a question of indemnity 
and letting bygones be bygones. If the wounds of the past are to be healed, if a 
multiplicity of legal actions are to be refrained from, if future human-rights violations 
are to be avoided, disclosure of the truth and its acknowledgement is essential.”); 
(4) The tasks of the commission would include investigating and establishing the truth 
about human-rights violations and their acknowledgement. Gross violations of human 
rights should be fully and officially investigated with due regard to fair procedures. 
There should be both knowledge and acknowledgement, and the events need to be 
                                                 
201 The distinction between objectives and aims as used by Boraine is not always clear, because of an 
overlap between the two concepts. 
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officially recognised and publicly revealed. The commission should perform its tasks 
and responsibilities on the basis of fair procedures, and adherence to international law 
relating to human rights must be ensured; and 
(5) Consideration would to be given to the victims. (“It is the victims themselves who 
must speak. We need to think in terms of reparation or compensation. Whatever form 
it takes is difficult to identify at this stage. All we should do now is think in terms of 
legislation, create the criteria and set up the mechanisms.”) 
 
The hope was expressed at the time that the legislation to be decided upon would be “broadly 
acceptable” (Omar in an interview with Lona McBlain, RSA Review, 7(4): 2–3). The TRC 
started its proceedings. In September 1997 the cabinet approved an extension of the SATRC 
by four months to complete its work. On 29 October 1998, the report of the commission was 
presented to former President Mandela. Although activities were then suspended, the 
Amnesty Committee, in view of the multitude of applications, was to continue its work and a 
report was later to be published as a sixth volume (SA Yearbook, 1999: 235). 
 
In this section I will concentrate on possible lessons for South Africa emanating from the 
Chilean and Argentinean examples. Arguably, there are differences and similarities between 
South African and Latin American authoritarianism. One similarity is the important role that 
security agencies (including the military) played in the maintenance of power. However, in 
South Africa, even with bodies such as the SSC and its concomitant structures, final 
responsibility for repressive action taken by the military, the police and intelligence agencies 
rested with a civilian government that was elected within the parameters of a severely 
restricted democracy. 
 
In Latin America, the authoritarian regimes were all military-ruled and they came to power 
through coups (for an excellent article on Latin American military coups and military rule, see 
Dix, 1994: 439–456). In South Africa there was no coup. Creeping praetorianism eventually 
resulted in a militarised society harnessed in a bunker state or what Lasswell referred to as a 
garrison state (see Cock and Nathan, [1989]) for more detail on militarisation of South 
African politics, political structures, policy-making and the economy). 
 
The military and security agencies in South Africa were structurally brought into the 
maintenance of modernised racial domination by National Party politicians – i.e. civilians – 
and were initially reluctant about their role in upholding a political system. This does not 
mean, however, that there were not those who fulfilled these roles with enthusiasm. 
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Theoretically, disengagement from politics for the military should be easier in South Africa 
(the British regimental tradition and belief that armies and their professional leaders are not 
politicians, being a benefit) than elsewhere in Africa. (See Luckham, 1995: 49ff and 2004: 
91ff, for the problems of military disengagement in Africa. Also consult Onwudiwe, 2004: 
30–31.)202 
 
As there were not many examples of African attempts at truth commissions at the time, the 
Latin American experiences dominated the international discussion. Leading ANC members 
such as Albie Sachs also visited Chile and looked towards the Chilean experience for possible 
clues on how to deal with the past. Other people who advanced the argument that the 
experience would be value in our context were Kader Asmal and Alex Boraine. 
 
At the University of Western Cape interaction between ANC leaders that visited and/or 
studied the Chilean experience, such as Albie Sachs and Kader Asmal, after their return from 
exile, played a role to advance the Chilean experience as a lesson for South Africa. The 
Justice in Transition project established by Alex Boraine, former executive director of 
IDASA, and a conference held by IDASA in Cape Town in February 1994 on “dealing with 
the past” also played a major role in popularising the idea. The conference papers were 
published as Dealing with the past: Truth and reconciliation in South Africa, edited by 
Boraine, Levy and Scheffer, 1994. Interaction and debate between academics and 
practitioners such as Johan Degenaar, André du Toit, Lourens du Plessis, H.W. van der 
Merwe, Kader Asmal and theologians John de Gruchy, Frank Chikane, Mangaliso Mkatshwa, 
Barney Pityana, Dirkie Smit, Jaap du Rand, Johan Botha, Russel Botman and others perhaps 
also played a role in advancing the debate on a TRC – option.203 Not enough about this was 
published and research on such interaction is advisable.204 
                                                 
202 The problems of discouraging authoritarian rule (the democradura problem) and need for 
transparency, however, also confront South Africans, and not only other African states, in our 
attempted “reprofessionalisation” of the military. 
203 For religious justification of such a truth commission, see De Gruchy (1994) and Smit (1995). They 
were by far not the only theologians that advocated the TRC as an option. The extent to which 
Christian thought underpinned the TRC debate in South Africa is insufficiently studied. 
204 A potential area for future historical and sociological research is the extent to which individuals 
propagated the TRC (and why). What were the “feeding sources” for such choices and what types of 
interaction and dialogue took place among those that advocated them? What relationships, experiences 
and views brought about their choice of the TRC option? 
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4.6. Theoretical concepts 
 
A member of the Rettig Commission, José Zalaquett, provided a framework for the Chilean 
commission’s work. In brief, the framework consists of a typology of situations in which 
repressive governments are replaced by democratic governments. The four options identified 
by Zalaquett all relate to the way in which military-controlled regimes/extreme authoritarian 
regimes give way to a process of democratisation leading to democratic rule. These categories 
are: 
 
(1) Situations in which there has been a clear victory over the oppressors with few 
political constraints (e.g. the Allied victory over Germany at the end of WW II); 
(2) A situation in which the defeated forces have lost legitimacy, but retained some 
control of the armed forces (e.g. Argentina, 1983 and Greece, 1974), which restrains 
the process of dealing with past abuses; 
(3) A situation in which military rulers allowed a civilian government to come to power, 
following negotiations or on their own terms. The former military force is thus still 
influential and does not suffer a lack of cohesiveness (e.g. Uruguay, 1984), which 
imposes constraints on how to deal with the past; or 
(4) A situation of gradual transition from dictatorship to democracy with the possibility 
of popular forgiveness in a society where human-rights abuses have ceased (e.g. 
Brazil).205 
 
The reader will note that (2) to (4) above marked the process of transition to democracy in 
most Latin American countries. In Africa some countries had similar experiences. Nigeria at 
various stages experienced elements of the third option. Ghana’s transition to democracy also 
reflects elements of the third option. 
 
In many respects, South Africa resembles a combination of (2) and (3) above. While the 
regime lost legitimacy, it retained control over the armed forces. The military remained a 
“hidden” factor of influence during transition. This could have assisted in arresting the 
process of democratisation or failed to do so. The old regime in South Africa (with the not-so-
hidden hand of the military as possible arresting factor) entered a negotiation process. The 
future was uncertain. The military played an important part. Arguably it had the power to 
influence the outcome of the process. Other factors came into the equation. Although the 
                                                 
205 A detailed analysis of the Zalaquett framework is available in Fraser and Weissbrodt, 1992: 612–615. 
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minority government was deeply unpopular and seen by many as illegitimate, it was a legal 
entity (the issue of legality) and it was a power-reality in the negotiated transition. This 
context played a role in future steps to be taken with regard to human-rights transgressions. 
 
Zalaquett lists three conditions that must be met in dealing with a legacy of human-rights 
violations, viz: 
 
(1) The complete truth must be established in an officially sanctioned way, rendering an 
authoritative version of the events; 
(2) The policy of human rights must represent the will of the people and victims must be 
heard; and 
(3) The policy or actions taken by the commission or the state must not violate 
international law relating to human rights. 
 
As a minimum, thus, the truth about what happened under the previous government must be 
unearthed. For the rest, a “get as much as you can” approach is suggested (Fraser & 
Weissbrodt, 1992: 614). The extent of prosecutions and punishment will vary from one 
political context to the next (the influence of the military, the will of the people, 
administrative capabilities and legitimacy of the new democratic regime and related political 
constraints being important here). 
 
One has to remember that underlying democratisation and democratic consolidation are 
uncertainties, and a return to authoritarian rule is always possible. As Fraser and Weissbrodt 
state: “Fulfilling the maximalist demands of victims and human-rights organisations for 
punishment and revenge may not be worth the risk of a military coup, which might result in a 
return to repression” (Fraser & Weissbrodt, 1992: 614). 
 
It is important to note at this point that Zalaquet is not suggesting as part of the aims (nor the 
outcomes) of a TRC process that CMR or civil (call it democratic) control should be 
addressed. This reinforces what was mentioned before, that TRCs should at least address the 
issue of civil control of the past with a view to preventative steps in future. Future TRCs 
should in my view interpret their mandates somewhat wider by addressing the need for civil 
oversight over the military or at the very least include some relevant policy pointers 
applicable to the country in this regard. 
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Observers argue that South Africa was going further than other countries that set up truth 
commissions (Hayner, 1994: 639 and Ensalaco, 1994. Also compare Gibson & Gouws, 1999: 
501–502 and Amadiume & An-Na’im, 2000: 13ff). 
 
In his foreword to the SATRCR its chairperson, Bishop Desmond Tutu, states that “The work 
of the South African Commission has also been far more extensive than that of other 
commissions” (SATRCR, Vol. 1, 1998:1). The South African commission is “the first 
example of a process officially opened to encourage public debate and input” (Hayner, 1994: 
639). It was also not a commission by presidential decree such the commission set up by 
President (General) Sani Abacha’s National Reconciliation Committee in Nigeria (Amadiume 
& An-Na’im, 2000: 14). It is, in Du Toit’s words, a “uniquely democratic commission”, as it 
is the result of a multi-party negotiated constitution and went through an extended process of 
parliamentary hearings and a similar process of public debate and scrutiny (Du Toit, 1996: 6). 
 
The SATRC was to have more powers than the Chilean commission – such as the powers to 
subpoena. However, even if a democratic process was followed and the establishment of the 
TRC entailed a lot of debate, a compromise was struck between a legal process to deal with 
human-rights abusers (or even Nuremberg-style trials) and “drawing a line through the past”. 
As such it was arguably an awkward compromise, and probably was not debated extensively 
enough, nor planned in advance in enough detail. This could have had a negative impact on 
the revelation of truth and the subsequent application of justice, not to mention issues 
pertinent to this research project.206 
 
It seems that, in foresight (in planning and the composition of the commission), and in 
hindsight (the writing up of the report – inclusive of the minority report restating the case of 
the white Afrikaner oppressors – and in asking for post-commission inputs from the public), 
the SATRC failed to address the civil-military realm adequately. It also failed to provide 
pointers or concrete proposals in terms of civil control over the military – or for that matter – 
security institutions. 
 
 
                                                 
206 On a somewhat different, but relevant point, Madiume and An-Na’im (2000:13) following 
Mamdani, argue that the compromise character of the SATRC as an institutionalised process “turned a 
political compromise into a moral compromise, obscuring the larger truth to serve the purposes of the 
new regime. Such moral and intellectual compromise may backfire. South Africa needs a social debate 
if it is to face the harsh truth about the beneficiaries of apartheid”. I pointed out the need for a moral re-
evaluation and historian’s debate earlier. This thesis is interested in stimulating the debate on future 
CMR where TRCs are at stake. 
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The argument above leads to further questions: 
• Did the initiators and advocates of the TRC not realise the importance of civil control 
over the military and/or security process – even if the Chilean experience earlier 
arrived at some limited suggestions on the future sustaining of human rights and 
controlling the military? 
• Did the initiators and guardians of the process, knowing that it was time-consuming 
and expensive, uncritically accept that the process in terms of the civil-military and 
civil-security realm was independent – or at least, not informative – to Chapter 11 of 
the South African Constitution? If so, why did the SATRCR not report on this 
important matter (at length)? 
• The SATRC and the DRP started almost simultaneously. Why did they proceed 
independently without at least some sharing of insights and experiences? 
• Did this dislinkage, if it happened by oversight or ignorance, fail to re-inforce the 
importance of CMRs in a new democracy (which I argue it did)? The constitution 
informs the leadership (new incumbents and agents of the old order) and the citizenry 
of the importance of constitutional constraints on security forces. The SATRCR, it 
seems, missed the opportunity to reinforce this important message and hence future 
practice. 
 
The argument pertaining to the research question is that whatever other positive outcomes 
there may have been, the SATRC did fail in this important linkage. The reasons for it are less 
clear. Was the commission dominated by academics and theologians not able to imagine the 
value of this linkage or in anticipating the value of policy proposals in this realm? Were there 
people in leadership in the South African government (not necessarily the TRC 
commissioners) who were not allowing the whole truth to be unburdened? Were there reasons 
(say agreements between the old incumbents and the new incumbents) for focussing more on 
symbolic actions rather than concrete foci on the crux of sustaining democracy, namely how 
to prevent the military from becoming “political” or the politicians from becoming 
“militarised” to the extent that it undermines constitutionality and the nurturing of future 
human rights? (It certainly seemed true, at least in my view, that the compromise character of 
the SATRC prevented specific details from being unearthed about the role of the political elite 
and some actions sanctioned by them). Many more questions can be asked, and most probably 
will be, by future generations. 
 
All questions, obviously, cannot be answered in a single exploratory work, but they need to be 
registered for future sociology, political science, criminology and historical research by 
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students and practitioners of military sociology and military history – perhaps also by 
anthropologists and political scientists. 
 
4.7. Previous attempts at unearthing the truth in South Africa 
 
Minnaar points out that previous government commissions of inquiry had proved “almost 
universally unable to establish the full facts, or some would say unwilling to ‘get to the truth’” 
(Minnaar, 1995: 1). Among others, this could be ascribed to the fear of people who could 
have come forward to lay complaints (compare the effects of internal oppression in Cock, 
1990: 88ff, 93; Coleman, 1998: 43ff, 68ff; CIIR Report, 1988). Partly, it could also be 
ascribed to the limited mandates of the appointed commissions; or to the lack of enthusiasm 
of the then current government leadership of the time. The hawkish P.W. Botha had a stroke 
and was replaced by F.W. de Klerk, a rather conservative National Party member, previously 
viewed as a loyal apparatchik, who came to power through an unplanned palace 
revolution/internal coup d’etat). Also, this was perhaps because of tacit international pressure 
from core states such as the USA and UK that favoured a “relatively” peaceful transition 
rather than a government transition collapsing owing to untimely revelations by appointed 
commissions of inquiry. Or maybe it was due to the unwillingness of organisations that co-
operated with the National Party regime, such as Inkatha, or partly because state bodies such 
as the SSC and the intelligence services refused to share (at the least, dragged their feet in 
sharing) relevant information with the commissioner.207 Lastly, the effectiveness of such 
commissions was undermined because of the opposition of organisations representing the new 
incumbents, such as the MDM, to the investigating bodies. 
 
Following the claims of former police captain Dirk Coetzee about hit squads that operated 
from Vlakplaas, the McNally Commission was appointed in 1989. The commission found that 
the allegations of Coetzee and a colleague were unreliable and untrustworthy (Minnaar, 1995: 
1). Yet, as subsequent revelations were to prove, many of these allegations turned out to be 
true (Minnaar, 1995: 1; Minnaar, Liebenberg & Schutte, 1994: 175ff). 
 
The appointment of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence 
and Intimidation, or Goldstone Commission, followed. The Goldstone Commission suffered 
from the same drawbacks mentioned above. Its singular effect and subsequent findings led to 
                                                 
207 It is common knowledge that numerous vital security-related documents were destroyed before the 
hand-over of power.  Some implied sources suggest that it may be several tons if not hundreds of tons 
(anonymous source). 
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the appointment of the Steyn Commission. As a result of the controversial Steyn Commission, 
23 high-ranking officers of the SADF were “retrenched”. More critical members of the public 
suggested that they were “purged” because they did not form part of the “inner circle of 
government elite”208. Cynically put: they could easily be sacrificed, and doing so “proved” 
that the government was trying to get to the heart of the matter. In the words of an ex-
serviceman, then a civilian: “Man, hulle was afskryfbaar sodat die ‘big Brass’ met hulle dinge 
kan voortgaan.”209 (They could be written off so that the big actors could follow their chosen 
ways). While this may have been an overstatement of the case, or a peculiar interpretation of 
the outcomes of the report, this perception existed among numerous members of the public. 
 
The report was handed over to the Transvaal Attorney General. It stated that “no evidence at 
the time was found, with one exception, on which criminal cases could be instituted” 
(Minnaar, 1995: 4). Many stories remained untold, and there was no sign210 of 
acknowledgement and recognition of past abuses. 
 
Following allegations of ANC abuses of human rights, i.e. detaining and torturing dissidents, 
the ANC in 1991 appointed the Commission of Enquiry into Complaints by Former African 
National Congress Prisoners and Detainees to investigate the allegations. In contrast with 
SWAPO in Namibia, which refused to engage the problems of struggles within the struggle 
(Beukes et al., 1987; Saul, 1999), the ANC opted to confront the allegations of torture, 
murder and persons who had disappeared by instituting two commissions. 
 
Hayner (1994) points out that the ANC was the first liberation organisation to venture in this 
direction. In contrast, organisations such as UNITA in Angola and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, 
following its war of liberation (Chimurenga), did not do something similar, although they all 
transgressed rights of compatriots in the struggle. In the case of Zimbabwe, Masipula Sithole 
demonstrates how “struggles within the Struggle” led to the death of Zimbabweans in the 
liberation movement(s). He dedicates his book, Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle, to 
“comrades who have fallen on account of the Struggle and struggles within the Struggle” 
(Sithole, 1979: iii). He points out how ideological differences and differences on strategy led 
to the death of individuals. The work deals extensively with in-fights among the Zimbabwe 
                                                 
208 This view was confirmed by at least one person that I interviewed in the course of the study and 
several others during informal discussions. 
209 Statement made by a person participating in an informal discussion at Eastwood Tavern, Pretoria 
(2002). 
210 One example is the edited work by Brian Rock entitled Spirals of Suffering: Public violence and 
children (1997). See chapters 4, 9, and 12. Two other informative works touching on the area discussed 
are those of Emmet and Bucthart (2000) and Minnaar and Hough (1997).  
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African People’s Union, the Zimbabwe African National Union and others such as FROLIZI 
and the Zimbabwean African National Council. No commission was ever asked to look into 
this rather messy part of Zimbabwean history (see Sithole, 1979). 
 
The ANC in South Africa went through the motions to deal with its abuses of human rights, 
thus, in the eyes of many, attaining the moral high ground in South African politics. The ANC 
leadership stopped short of linking atrocities to individuals, but rather accepted “collective 
responsibility” for the human-rights transgressions.211 
 
While the commission was instituted to do “a full and thorough” investigation and admitted 
that human-rights abuses took place, some felt that it failed to unearth the truth and acted as a 
cover-up (Minnaar, 1995: 2). 
 
The fact that two of the three commissioners were ANC members called the commission’s 
neutrality into question (Hayner, 1994: 626). The report was published and Mr Nelson 
Mandela accepted responsibility for the actions on behalf of the ANC leadership. No-one was 
named or held personally accountable (Hayner, 1994: 626). Although the ANC was the first 
non-governmental and liberation organisation that established a commission to study and 
report on its own past of human-rights abuses, the report did not silence all criticism. 
 
Another commission was established in 1992 to review the cases of ANC human-rights abuses. 
The new commission, the “Commission of Enquiry into Certain Allegations of Cruelty and 
Human Rights Abuses against ANC Prisoners and Detainees by ANC Members”, was headed 
by three commissioners: one each from the USA, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The new 
commission was regarded as more independent than the first one. The ANC accepted the report. 
The report was also positively received by, inter alia, Amnesty International. 
 
The report called for a “process of national disclosure of all violations of human rights from 
all sides”. A call was made for a commission of truth, “similar to bodies established in a 
number of countries in recent years to deal with the past”. The ANC was certainly in a better 
position than the National Party to ask for such a process; not only could it show two attempts 
                                                 
211 This led to some critics arguing about this approach and the following TRC report: “I cannot help 
feeling that our TRC has betrayed a partisan inclination, accommodating … to the ‘popular party’, 
relegating relative unknowns to the periphery of the TRC experiences and services … how can the 
TRC believe that I will be satisfied by the edited report with blotted-out names purporting to be the 
ANC response to my plea? This account merely propagates the vilification of the dead, those who can 
no longer tell their story” (Saul, 1999: 4–5). 
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at investigating its “sins”, but these “sins” also did not match up to the systematic acts of 
oppression of the successive National Party governments.212 
 
Moreover, the Further Indemnity Act of 1992 that followed the Indemnity Bill (Act No. 35 of 
1990)213, one-sidedly enacted by the National Party government under President de Klerk, 
amounted to self-amnesty akin to what the authoritarian regimes in Argentina and Chile did 
following their retreat from political office.214 
 
At the end of 1992, repression and covert operations still existed in South Africa and the 
legacy of an authoritarian government facilitated human-rights abuses. Together with the 
previous decades of abuse (i.e. detention without due legal process, systematic torture,215 and 
disappearances), it compounded the issue. In these cases, the attempts at unearthing the truth 
were not particularly successful. Nor were any concrete suggestions made to deal with the 
prevention of human-rights abuses or civil control over security agencies. 
 
Given the lack of results of the government-appointed inquiries and the ANC reports as those 
of a “government in waiting”, it was not unexpected that the debate about a commission of 
truth and reconciliation gained momentum. In view of the international demand for disclosure 
of past oppression and violence in a variety of countries, and the awareness of state abuses of 
human rights in South Africa, it became imperative in the eyes of many. And the growing 
argument that human rights imply human security in its widest sense also became influential 
(this statement will receive more attention later on). 
                                                 
212 The Sunday Independent, 4 February 1996, for example, reported that the Attorney General of 
Gauteng, Jan D'Oliveira, is in possession of “shocking information about third force activities in the 
Eastern Cape under apartheid”. It follows: “If proved, these activities would amount to terrorism and 
destabilization on a massive scale”. For an analysis of front organisations and dirty tricks, see Minnaar, 
Liebenberg and Schutte (eds), 1994, part two, 170ff. See also Coleman (1994: 130ff) in Minnaar, 
Liebenberg and Schutte (eds), 1994. While vigilantes received attention in past studies with regard to their 
role in the apartheid regime’s “total strategy” against its opponents (see Nicholas Haysom in Cock & 
Nathan, 1989: 188–199; Ian Phillips in Minnaar, Liebenberg & Schutte, 1994: 239–253; and Jozette Cole 
(1987), the vigilante issue is still insufficiently studied and deserves more attention in research. 
213 Ironically – or perhaps planned as a cynical political statement – the Indemnity Bill was accepted on 
the same day by the joint committee on justice of the tricameral parliament that the Grootte Schuur talks 
between the unbanned ANC and the apartheid government took place (compare Hendricks, n.d.: 101). 
214 The Indemnity Act of 1990 did not elicit much criticism, as it flowed from negotiations between the 
ANC and the South African government. In contrast, the Further Indemnity Act of 1992 was seen as 
one-sided action by the De Klerk regime on the eve of the hand-over of power. 
215 For more detail, see the response of Dr Don Foster in Occasional Paper 12 of the Centre for 
Intergroup Studies (now Centre for Conflict Resolution). The report, A Study of Detention and Torture 
in South Africa: Preliminary Report, was attacked by Die Burger, in November 1985. An extended 
debate ensued in the letter columns of the paper. In the final analysis, claims could not be refuted that 
at least in certain areas (e.g. Eastern Cape) torture was applied regularly and even systematically by the 
Security Police. 
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4.8. The structure and workings of the South African commission 
 
Asmal argues that “the truth must be acknowledged, proclaimed and exposed publicly and the 
worst transgressors removed” (Asmal, 1994: 27). Dullah Omar, in an interview with Lona 
McBlain, pointed out that “we do not want Nuremberg-type of trials”; that “there must be 
knowledge and acknowledgement”; and that he hoped that “we can come up with legislation 
which will be broadly acceptable” (RSA Review, 1994: 2–3). 
 
In June 1994, the establishment of a truth commission was publicly announced. In June 1995, 
the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (Act No. 34 of 1995) was 
promulgated. In brief, the nuts and bolts of the Act amounted to the following: 
• The TRC must complete its work within 18 months (to be extended to two years by 
the president if deemed necessary), with a further three months to finalise its report; 
• Operating through three plenary committees (one on human-rights violations, one on 
amnesty, and another on reconciliation and reparation), it was to have a budget of 
R50 million for its first year of work. The latter soon proved to an underestimation 
and was adjusted at least twice that amount; and 
• In essence, the aim of the TRC was to hear the stories of the victims of gross human-
rights violations, consider applications for amnesty from perpetrators of such 
violations, and make recommendations on reparation to the victims as well as 
measures to ensure that human-rights abuses are not committed again. Note again that 
the mandate seemed to exclude the issue of civil control over the military. 
 
At the time, human-rights monitors estimated that over 200 political assassinations took place 
during the apartheid era, while over 15 000 people died in factional violence and dozens of 
prisoners died in custody.216 More than 2 000 applications for amnesty were awaiting 
consideration by the TRC by early 1996. In February 1996, it was reported that the TRC 
committee dealing with human-rights abuses was expecting up to 100 000 cases to be heard – 
a task that proved (almost) impossible (Beeld, 6 February 1996). 
 
 
                                                 
216 The TRC was not to investigate apartheid human-rights excesses in countries outside South Africa, 
such as the destabilisation of Angola and Mozambique or Namibia, nor was it to investigate the 
apartheid regime’s activities in countries outside South Africa. Literature on such activities outside the 
continent of Africa is available (Israel, 1998: 343ff). Some areas on the continent were not covered 
because they did not relate to human-rights excesses as determined by the mandate (gross shortcoming, 
in my view). 
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When the truth and reconciliation bill was passed, the ANC, National Party, Democratic Party 
and the PAC supported it, with the Freedom Front opposing it and the IFP abstaining. At the 
time, the South African public was divided about the bill. This is perhaps worthy of note. 
Minnaar points to research by the HSRC and others that reflects deep divisions in the South 
African society on the bill and its implementation (Minnaar, 1994: 14ff).217 Some of the 
quantitative data available at the time will be referred to. 
 
With the commissioners appointed, the commission could set about its task. Minnaar points 
out that the delay in appointing the commission resulted in growing frustration among victims 
and their families and “increasing public demands for retribution, trials and prosecutions of 
those guilty of gross human-rights violations and abuses” (Minnaar, 1995: 16). On the other 
hand, some ex-military personnel and politicians were apparently mobilising to counter what 
they perceived as a witch-hunt.218 
 
After the release of the report of the Motsuenyane Commission, the ANC called for disclosure 
of all human-rights violations by all parties (Hayner, 1994: 633). However, people like 
Kollapen argue that apartheid crimes and human-rights abuses are qualitatively different from 
abuses committed during the struggle for liberation. 
 
Against these obstacles were pitched the collective experience of past commissions and the current 
argument that reconciliation needs openness and knowledge of the past – even if it is disconcerting 
knowledge. At the time Du Toit (1996: 7) cautioned: “This is not to deny that this kind of democratic 
discourse cannot be a cover for altogether something different, carrying the seeds of a totalizing 
project” (read: legitimising a specific interpretation of the nation-building project and current power 
relations). The process can be misused for propaganda, ideological manipulation and to enhance the 
consolidation of political power, i.e., it can be used by a dominant party to strengthen its position, 
thus enhancing the establishment of a one-party dominant system and ipso facto undermining the 
consolidation of a pluralistic multi-party democracy. 
                                                 
217 Since 1998, the HSRC has never repeated any surveys on public opinion about the TRC. The reason 
for this is not clear. Other studies did survey South African opinions, such as Gibson and Gouws (1999, 
2003). 
218 The Uruguayan, but especially the Argentinean, experience had shown that the military can 
successfully close ranks and put pressure on a new unconsolidated democratic government to water 
down the truth-revealing process. Especially the “justice phase” could come under pressure and 
concessions could be demanded, i.e. a stop to possible legal action against perpetrators of human-rights 
abuses (Hayner, 1994: 614–615; Zagorski, 1994: 425. Also compare Gillespie, 1992: 208 ff on 
Uruguay and Cavarozzi, 1992 on Chile and Argentina). Experience has shown, however, that usually 
the military does not have enough control over the political dynamics in a particular country to prevent 
at least a “truth phase” with (partial) revelation and public exposure of the past. 
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Chad can be cited as one example of a country where a committee was eventually misused to 
legitimise a new regime that was guilty of human-rights abuses and did disconcertingly little 
to establish structures for a sound future human-rights environment. This had a negative 
impact on legitimacy for the new regime, had few positive outcomes for better human rights, 
and failed to address the crucial issue of civil control over the military. 
 
4.9. The SATRC: Clashing perspectives 
 
I took part in one survey of the HSRC that included questions on the SATRC at the time. The 
data, released in October 1996, illustrated that there were indeed some divisions among South 
African respondents. Sixty percent of the 2 241 respondents in the random, representative 
sample of all race groups felt that the TRC “will promote reconciliation in South Africa”. 
When broken down in racial categories, the differences were sharper: 70 percent of black 
respondents felt positive towards the TRC, while only 53 percent of “coloured” people and 59 
percent of Indian people believed that the TRC would assist in national reconciliation. 
However, white people were most sceptical, with only 26 prcent of the respondents in the 
sample believing that the TRC would contribute to national reconciliation. 
 
When asked whether they would have preferred “drawing a line through the past” (“let 
bygones be bygones”), or a public TRC-type process, or amnesty, nearly a third of the 
respondents (32 percent) favoured a general amnesty, while a further 45 percent were in 
favour of a qualified amnesty. Those favouring an amnesty of some kind thus amounted to 
nearly 80 percent of the sample. When respondents were asked about their choice of the TRC 
versus other approaches, 22 percent saw the TRC process as their first choice, 17 percent saw 
it as a second choice, with 60 percent opting for the TRC as a third choice (Press release 
prepared by the researcher, HSRC, October 1996). 
 
The above is illustrative of the different perspectives and opposing arguments among South 
African citizens at the time. Unfortunately, the HSRC terminated the TRC-related part of its 
national surveys at the time, so no longer-term (longitudinal) data were collected. In this 
regard, the HSRC missed an important historical opportunity to monitor a process that was to 
have a profound impact on South African lives. 
 
 
 
Other researchers embarked on quantitative research related to the SATRC. Towards the end 
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of 1998, research was undertaken by Gibson and Gouws on the attribution of blame and the 
struggle over apartheid (Gibson & Gouws, 1999: 501ff).219 
 
In their 1999 study Gibson and Gouws found that black, coloured and Asian South Africans 
were relatively optimistic about the SATRC, while whites held decidedly different and negative 
views on the entire process (Gibson & Gouws, 1999: 513). They argue: “The truth and 
reconciliation process clearly has divided South Africans and promises to do so in the future.” 
They also mention that the release of the SATRCR generated controversy and protest – 
including from the ruling ANC elite. They point out especially the diametrically opposite 
position of “whites” and “blacks” in a proclaimed non-racial democracy (Gibson & Gouws, 
1999: 513–514). The two researchers conclude with an interesting and relevant point: “At some 
point, many South Africans want justice, not reconciliation, and justice within the fractured 
political landscape of the country is an extremely volatile concept” (Gibson & Gouws, 1999: 
513–514). What their extensive study found is common knowledge when one moves around in 
South Africa, rural and urban. For many the question of justice remains. And perhaps more 
importantly; it is unlikely that the insistence on justice delivered will subside soon. 
 
4.10. Conclusion 
 
I argued that the previous regime in South Africa lost credibility but, within the transitional 
state structure, retained some military power (read: influence). Although the new democratic 
regime could take steps to unearth the truth, cognisance had to be taken of political constraints 
(for instance, the relatively influential position of the army, and significant support for the 
previous regime). 
 
I also argued that the TRC option, given the circumstances (i.e. a negotiated transition), was a 
more likely option than some form of ICT. The undertaking of an internal judicial process had 
some support, but was eclipsed by the TRC advocates. Given the emotional impact and 
historical excesses of the apartheid politicians and their cultural allies, such as the Afrikaner 
AB, a “forgive-and-forget” approach also did not hold sway – which is not to say that the 
demand for justice may in future subsume the truth revealed. 
 
I argued that TRC option opened up the past with various measures of success, but that, when 
                                                 
219 At the time, the TRC received roughly 15 000 statements from victims and nearly 7 000 applications 
for amnesty. By December 1998, 216 amnesties had been granted, 160 rejected for applicants denying 
their guilt, and 3 031 rejected because the crimes were committed for personal gain or no political 
motive could be established (Gibson & Gouws, 1999: 502). 
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it came to resetting the stage for future civil control over the military, it seemed to be less 
successful. The limited success gained in the area of CMR should not be overestimated, 
according to the various observers and theorists quoted. 
 
I also implicitly argued that, given the hindsight of other comparable TRC processes – and 
hence being in a position of having more foresight than the others – the TRC advocates in 
South Africa missed the opportunity to address the crucial nexus of CMR, reprofessionalising 
the military, and civil control over the military (some refer to the democratisation of the 
military – a somewhat more problematic concept). 
 
Did the other TRCs in the case study fare better in establishing sustainable future CMR and 
the subservience of the military to elected politicians and the democratic constitution? 
Marginally, it seems, or not at all at this stage, but this question will be explored in chapters to 
come. If the TRC advocates were aware of this, why did they not use the hindsight of others’ 
experiences with more foresight in our case? 
 
These questions underline the research question in my study. In the next chapters, this will be 
addressed. However, before going there it seems necessary to take a closer look at the above 
cases, introduce the broader casing to make some comparisons, and bring the issue of truth 
and reconciliation processes closer to our continent. And most important of all, to re-search 
the necessary link between TRCs and CMR that have been achieved. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DELVING DEEPER ON THE CONTINENT – TRUTH, RETRIBUTION,  
(RE-)CONCILIATION SHEETS AND CMR 
 
Humans are… variable …(in contrast) a chemist knows that the material he studies will 
always react in the same way … a scientist studying human beings cannot have this security, 
because each person is different from the other; they learn from each other and are 
constantly changing in reaction to their individual and group experiences – Peil, 1978: 3. 
 
Wat wij gemeenschappelik hebben is onse behoefte aan vergeving. Translation: What we have 
in common is our need for forgiveness – Kenneth David Kaunda, former Zambian president, 
1982.220 
 
The very possibility that nemesis will one day strike the perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity, be their names Pinochet, Milosevic or bin Laden (or any other – my insertion), 
most human rights law can be said to exist in the real world as well as in the rhetoric of 
politicians as well as the pipe dreams of professors … the rule is one of law not because it 
can be found in a treaty or a textbook but because there is a prospect that someone will be 
arrested for its breach – Geoffrey Robertson, 1999.221 
                                                 
220  Because of his stature as a great statesman of Africa, President Kenneth David Kaunda’s 
publications were translated widely. In this case, the source is a Dutch translation of his essays entitled 
Kaunda over Geweld (1982). I have fond memories of this edition of Kaunda’s book that I bought in 
“De Rode Rat” in Utrecht in 1988. During a visit to South Africa in 2005 “K.K”, as he is well known, 
signed the copy for me. 
221 The people mentioned here were guilty of human-rights transgressions and breach of law. The 
foreword to this book was written by Kenneth Roth (former federal prosecutor of the USA Attorney’s 
Office in New York). The author of the work uttered some mild criticism against the American 
bombing campaign in Kosovo. Following these bombings the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia is still hunting Milosevicians, as there were no other actors that perpetrated violence before 
the USA entered the scene – as if guilt and murder, unlike a coin, do not have two sides. The other side 
of Robertson’s (1999) argument is also to be considered. Frequently only a selective few are labelled as 
guilty … mostly they are dead civilians or loyal (lower-paid) followers of senior politicians when it 
comes to conviction after the collapse of an authoritarian regime. In other cases the military and 
political victor, the new hegemon, defines who the guilty was/is, in this case Milosevic. Robertson’s 
epigraph at second reading reflects a universal message. Today’s victors and killers could become 
tomorrow’s vanquished. Or a majority opinion from people that stood on the receiving end of the 
powerful may come to a conclusion that the previous dispensers of justice have to meet justice 
themselves. Blowing winds can change things and times may be a-changing … 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
In discussing African case studies Peil makes an interesting point: “African students should 
have a text based on their own society. This is not to say that all African societies are alike, 
for there are many important differences within individual countries and large variations 
between peoples in different parts of the continent” (Peil, 1978: xi). Peil insightfully remarks 
that despite differences between African countries/societies common problems can be 
identified and that the sociologist thus assists in bringing about a greater understanding of 
problems faced by African communities in his/her focus on Africa. (Peil, 1978: xi). Peil’s 
argument holds value for me. Despite differences between peoples and countries on our 
continent, one should be careful not to elevate a specific problem or solution in a specific 
country to something so unique that it cannot hold value – or lessons learnt – for others. 
Frequently communalities arise in experiences, be it past or present. Investigating seemingly 
different cases facilitates insights that may lead to problem-solving in not only one, but also 
other societies – in this case the relationship between the military and the civilian order in the 
aftermath of oppression. 
 
This discussion will deal with selected African cases in more detail. I could have looked at 
other cases on the globe such as the Netherlands,222 France and Denmark after their liberation 
from Nazism, or Italy after the fall of Benito Mussolini’s Fascist rule. Or perhaps, I could 
consider Spain after the fall of Francisco Franco’s authoritarian regime, or Portugal after the 
fall of Caetano’s regime.223 I mentioned why I did not enlarge the chosen casing to East 
Timor or Cambodia.224 I believe that, to the extent necessary for this project, this has been 
dealt with in Chapter 3 and will be dealt with further in 4 and 5.225 
 
                                                 
222 The Netherlands, for example, is an interesting case study. Many Dutch people joined the Nazi 
movement, especially Anton Musasert’s National Socialist Movement, before and during WW II and 
thus contributed to the oppression of their own countrymen. In dealing with these so-called Foute 
Nederlanders (rough translation: “Incorrect Dutch”), the post-Dutch society used mixed approaches. 
Some were put on trial and executed, others were interned, families were split in order to “re-educate” 
the young, and later a forgive-and-forget approach was followed, with the blame on the incorrect 
remaining … (Romijn, 1995: 311ff; Romijn, n.d.: 101ff).  
223 Excellent materials were published on how the Netherlands dealt with Nazi collaborators following 
WW II (Romijn, 1995a, 1995b). On Spain and Portugal, see for example Graham (1993).   
224 For a useful discussion on East Timor see Tanter, Selden and Shalom (2000). The suggestion of a 
global  or “international truth commission”, as an alternative to the ICC suggested by Niebur Eisnaugle 
(2003), however relevant,  I skirt here. 
225 At this moment it is too early to look at Zimbabwe “after Robert Mugabe”, or for that matter to look 
outside Africa. (Compare Kramer [2005] on the criminality of the most recent war against Iraq and the 
occupation of Iraq by foreign forces and the outcomes thereof.) 
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I follow the track further, or delve deeper here, because the selected case studies from the 
African continent are “closer to home” – in a way “more close-up and personal”. 
Consequently, the investigation as demarcated may yield insights, or pointers, aimed at 
“problem resolution” (or policy-making to that effect) in the area of research. 
 
So far the broad context of the SATRC and its workings have been outlined. I also scrutinised 
some selected international TRC approaches. The reader was introduced to some countries 
that chose not to follow the TRC option (by necessity and in cases because of personal 
interest I limited the case studies in both categories to ones that are more “close-up and 
personal”). I referred to the interface of TRC options and non-TRC options vis-à-vis CMR 
and civil control over the military in (new/emerging) democracies following transition from 
authoritarian rule; thus matters for further consideration. 
 
Since the conclusion of the SATRC, various other states on the continent have considered 
and/or chosen the TRC process, or processes that could be likened to the SATRC.226 In the 
case of Rwanda, at least one element of the approach in dealing with the genocide, namely the 
cacaca process, resembles a TRC approach (necessary qualifications attached: Admission of 
guilt or regret in the cacaca could lead to a prison sentence or forgiveness. The SATRC did 
not, despite powers of subpoena, have the authority to impose prison sentences). The broader 
interpretation of the mandate of the SATRC did allow for the prosecution of transgressors that 
did not apply for amnesty, one has to add. In any event, since the first TRCs were embarked 
upon nearly a quarter of a century ago, many followed. It is not surprising that, within the 
international context, the debate touched Africa, where, as in many other parts of the world, 
countries experienced major transgressions of human rights.227 
 
I concluded the previous chapter with broad inferences. Less detail was provided on the effect 
of TRC and non-TRC approaches on bettering CMR and civil control over the military. This 
chapter delves into these issues. 
 
The sociologist as a learner – if immersed in available data – and agent in the school of life, 
has a responsibility to co-assist in constructing a better world through his/her field of interest 
– even if others would call it human subjectivity. One trusts that the qualitative researcher, as 
but one research tool, will be able to do so without losing sight of the concrete as opposed to 
                                                 
226 I dealt with the case of Sierra Leone in an earlier conference contribution, ISA Congress, Durban, 
July 2005, a topic to which I will most likely return in further research later on.  
227 It can by argued that in their fierceness many of these social experiments far surpassed the botched 
apartheid experiment in social engineering or transgressions by a ruling group. 
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ivory-tower analysis.228 In such an involved approach a humanist approach to science and 
insights from critical theory has a contribution to make, I argued earlier. At this point I cannot 
help but be reminded about one (peer) reviewer that remarked to me that the subjectivity of 
the researcher should be minimised (I think the person meant, “eliminated”). I beg to differ. 
 
Numerous research approaches emerged with a critique on this type of machismo – the 
omnipotent muscular Academic-Researcher-Observer and Fieldworker (field-commander?). 
The scenario of the cool and calm, supremely collected detachment of the professional 
academic, a sort of 007 of Academia that takes it stirred not shaken, does not hold (compare 
Crang & Cook, 2007: 8–9). The detached research account, or what I call the DIS-tant or 
DIS-stanced researcher/academic, implores that the researching being is “a detached head – 
the Object of Thought, Rationality and Reason (much akin to a senior administrator/ 
bureaucrat, a bureaucracy or an aloof senior manager – my insertion) floating from research 
site to research site (or managing site to managing site – my insertion again)229 thinking and 
speaking, while its profane counterpart, the Body, lurks unseen … in the Great Hall of 
Academy” (Crang & Cook quoting Spry, 2007: 9). 
 
Herman Hesse is quoted as saying the task of the individual in violent conflict situations is 
“To help mankind as a whole to make some small advance, to better a particular institution” 
and in so doing (perhaps) “to do away with one particular mode of killing” (Hesse, 1972).230 
In this particular case, institution(s) that enhance CMR and civil control over the military are 
at stake. Some may say that Herman Hesse was too much of an idealist. It may be true. What 
                                                 
228 Somewhere I recall a former professor who referred to “mental aerobics”, which seems to be closely 
related to a type of ivory-tower thinking that does not aim at solving or alleviating social problems (or 
an attempt to do this) – the social “pain”, if one considers Karl Popper, or turning around society if one 
considers Saint Simon, Marx, Che Guevara and endless streams of people after them. 
229 Such a belief, to be “the objective”, could be compared to where the objective assertion and belief 
infuse the rhetoric with a world view that ignores realities on ground level. For an interesting 
contribution, see Kotzee (2007: 163ff), in the South African Journal of Philosophy entitled, “Our vision 
and our Mission: Bullshit, Assertion and Belief”. In such a case elements of lying enter the picture as 
“transacting in fake truth” (Kotzee, 2007: 167). Kotzee’s work also reflects a worthwhile critique of 
ideological discourse, bureaucratic and business discourse and “post-modernist” discourse. See also 
among others an article that applies in this case (Stewart, 2007: 4-6). In his article Steward looks 
through the spectacles of one person at the rhetoric used by the management of the University of South 
Africa (Unisa). His analysis is not so new but so to the point and applicable to the “old” and the “new” 
South Africa’s managerialists (both capitalist and racially orientated elites). Managerialists insist on 
benchmarking and performance evaluations, while ignoring involved society, equality and human 
interaction (such as ubuntu or humanity). Through their top-down self-imposed “transformation”/ 
”brand-making”/”strategic re-alignments” instead of bettering the human condition by personal 
example, they impose again the Object of Thought in service of elite self interest.  
230 I believe Hesse at the time of this work had not read Foucault. If he had, his statement in 
considering the State or Senior Management or Bureaucracy or politicians out of control, especially if 
backed by the coercive arms of state, assumes an ominous meaning that is worth contemplating and 
reacting against. 
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can be denied with more difficulty is that, at some level, idealism underpinned by conscious 
analysis and concrete action may assist in bringing about a better quality of life for some that 
are disadvantaged or even in danger. The same “idealism” can be blamed on the statement of 
President Kaunda above.231 Idealism in action, I contend, may have positive consequences if 
filtered through critical analysis and human compassion … 
 
5.2. Writing/Reading a chapter without imposing the Object of Thought 
 
In delving deeper we need to un-puzzle the research problem and questions further in context. 
Past experiences are closely knit as shared experiences into facing challenges concerning civil 
control over security institutions, nurturing human rights and the achievement of a just society 
where conflict is not solved by violence but deliberation and critical approaches to 
reconstruction of a society232 Here the need for sociological imagination arises. I concur with 
Mills when he implores the USA to see that as images of human nature become more 
problematic, there is a greater need for imaginative attention to social problems and 
catastrophes (Mills, 1972: 12). The contention by Mills is relevant: “Sociological imagination 
is not merely a fashion. It is a quality of mind that seems most dramatically to promise an 
understanding of the intimate realities of ourselves in connection with larger social realities” 
(Mills, 1972: 12). His observations strike home and they certainly play a role in this chapter – 
as indeed in the whole study that I undertake.233 
 
                                                 
231 Perhaps idealism is part of the “human condition”. However, if one is to assist through qualitative 
and applied research to better life, to assist in problem-solving and better conditions for people, one 
cannot escape some moral point of departure. The words by the logos therapist (himself a survivor of 
concentration camps and thus more than an observer-participant) are worth pondering: Work, 
involvement, research is “Thus not so much concerned with the sufferings of the mighty, but with the 
crucifixion and the deaths of the great army of the unknown and unrecorded victims” (Frankel, 1964). 
Again, the role and the values of the researcher and the research “subject” are closely interwoven.  
232 Compare Villa-Vicencio (1992) on South Africa and reconstruction. Villa-Vicencio deals with 
socio-political reconstruction following past violence in a Christian framework. I addressed issues 
about dehumanisation and coping with past injustices, and the potential role of democratic structures 
and attitudes in an earlier article (Liebenberg, 1999). 
233 David Gray makes a telling point in one of his sociological contributions. Sociology is not (should 
not) be value-free. His rebuttal of the “value free” theoretical intellects (demagogues?) is sharp and 
uncompromising. “Neutrality”, or to be a “value-free subject” (and included here is the notion of the 
ethically neutral sociologist) serves little purpose. What is more, such an attitude amounts to a doctrine 
of hypocrisy and irresponsibility (Gray, 1972: 14 ff). Needless to say Gray’s argument invites degrees 
of social activism. I agree with his argument unequivocally.   
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5.3. “They were all killed”: Generic insights and the “Five Choices for Africa?”234 
 
I would add to the heading, “What thereafter?” Communities in search of tolerance, a good 
human-rights record and constitutional stability – inclusive of civil control over the military 
and civil conduct of the military – are faced with various options to deal with a past of abuse 
and human-rights excesses. 
 
Necessarily, when discussing the five options, values and morals, civil attitudes, institutional controls 
and deliberative processes of interaction between civilian politicians, the military as the “violence-
holding experts”, and the citizenry or civil society (or what I prefer to call the civil community) are at 
stake. Least of all, individuals are involved. More accurately, they are the recipients of what went 
before and what transpired afterwards in moments of oppression and suffering. And they are the 
agents that may have an impact on future decisions to assist in solving problems.235 
 
Apart from values and norms, notions such as civil control, public civility, citizen-
participation and the pragmatics of achieving sound CMR underpin this chapter. One of the 
challenges in a study such as this has to do it with the awareness that, “The dilemma of 
democracy is that it demands a well armed military establishment that is at the same time 
subordinate to civilian control” (Hutchful, 1997: 48). This awareness, or knowledge, is crucial 
and I will return to it frequently in this chapter. In the realm of qualitative research it is also 
about “knowing” (getting immersed/experiencing/taking part in) the chosen field to the extent 
that a subjective human being, the researcher (assuming that she/he is but a research tool), can 
contribute to embodied understanding aimed at achieving, besides understanding, a 
contribution to problem-solving in the field of civil control over the military.236 
 
                                                 
234 The sub-title reminds me about a Leonard Cohen song that I once knew. The words paraphrased 
shares the following line: “ … and the captain said, most are dead, the others in retreat, the rest (are) 
with the enemy … here’s a medal, now you are in command”. The new appointee asks: “Captain where 
shall I stand … and the captain said to me: There’s no decent place to stand in a massacre.” 
235 In consulting the appendix on key concepts the reader will recognise that the above forms part of a 
civil community, which cannot be harnessed in a single definition of democracy. 
236 Again, Thomas Hanna and his reflections on the somatic being (“me the bodily being”) become 
pertinent – especially when one considers the evolving nature of qualitative research: “To learn is to 
adapt to something. To communicate is equally an adaptational interchange. To give or receive 
information is adaptation … what we have to understand is this: The accommodative is another form of 
learning, of communicating and of receiving information. It is (just) another mode of human 
experience” (Hanna, 1970: 237–238). Though he was foremost a philosopher and an existentialist, not 
a qualitative researcher, Hanna grasped the close linkage between body (soma), experience, critical 
thought and action as well as living-changing context. For this reason, I find both Hanna and Louis 
Liebenberg informative and part of a life-like subtext in this research project. In the exercise of 
tracking an animal or human being, sun and darkness, shadow and reflection play a role; without these 
elements tracking would stall in a simple trace not to be unravelled, nor worthy of following. 
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Communities in the past (and now) have had five options to deal with events after regime-
change from authoritarian rule to forms of democracy:237 Let us briefly reflect on these 
choices again, in this case keeping the African setting in mind. 
 
5.3.1. To forgive and forget, or to draw a line through the past (pejoratively labelled 
amnesia). This option was followed by Namibia and Zimbabwe after their regime changes. 
Southern European examples would include Portugal and Spain in the 1970s.238 
 
5.3.2. To allow or request the “international community” to impose an international 
judicial process upon the defeated dictatorships or leaders of the previous authoritarian 
regimes. In other words, ICTs such as those imposed on the Nazi leadership at the end of 
WW II (the Nuremberg Trials), or the “International Tribunals”239 against Milosevic, and 
perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda. The institution of the ICC adopted in Rome furthers the 
concept (Rubin, 1999; Mendez, 2001; Green, 2004).240 The issue of international tribunals is 
far more complex than it looks. For example, as a result of an asymmetry in international 
relations, not all that are guilty of crimes against humanity are brought to book. 
 
“The case of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was supposed 
to judge criminals on all sides, but was from the very beginning ‘hijacked’ by the West” (e-
mail correspondence, 7 November 2005). The bombing by NATO in Yugoslavia and its 
organisers were not on the agenda, nor was anyone charged (e-mail correspondence, 7 
November 2005). While some argue that the case against Milosevic was rather weak, others 
do not doubt that Slobodan Milosevic should have been on trial, as Robertson (1999: 454) 
argued in the quoted epigraph. But, should he have been the only actor from only one side on 
                                                 
237 I have already implied that forms of democracy lie on a continuum of public and civil participation, 
and do not necessarily have to be blueprinted on multi-party democracy or “election politics” (see 
Liebenberg, 2002: 20–25). 
238 The roles of military regimes are relevant. I found Thomashausen’s short article in which he 
compares Portuguese and Brazilian mechanisms for transition quite informative. Brazil was governed 
by an essentially military dictatorship from April 1964 and saw transition and acceptance of a new 
constitution by 1988. In the end a democratic constitution of 254 articles was accepted. “Both in Brazil 
and in Portugal, the necessary compromise on the constitution-making procedure was finally reached as 
a reaction to sharply increased public resistance and the immanent risk of a complete lack of 
governmental control, compounded by the risk of economic collapse” (Thomashausen, 1994: 15). 
239 The trial of Milosevic is more complex and merits a discussion elsewhere. 
240 On modernisation theory in practice, urbanisation and conflictual elites using “ethnic mobilisation” 
to achieve or hold on to power, which arguably played a role in the “Serbian case”, consult Olzak 
(1983: 355 ff). So-called “ethnic struggles” are not as ethnic as they seem when deeper socio-economic 
reasons for conflict and violence are investigated, despite what adherents of the ethnicity theory claim. 
For the dangers that limited thinking or “practical nationalism”(i.e. nationalist states that act 
unilaterally as “peace-makers”) pose to global justice as an imperative, consult Rodrigues (2007: 176 
ff). 
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trial?241 It was only later that others from this complex conflict were brought to trial (Mendez, 
2001; Sieff & Wright, 1999). 
 
International tribunals may want to achieve some form of post-oppression retribution and, in 
doing so, achieve some form of social justice. Thus, the issue is deeply underpinned by moral 
values that are supposedly universal.242 However, these tribunals cannot be disassociated from 
simple power.243 It is often the conqueror that puts the vanquished on trial … 
 
Gigliotti argues that the genocide in Rwanda stands acknowledged, prosecuted and 
commemorated as genocide (Gigliotti, 2007). Given the date of publication of her article, 
these statement have relevance for the debate here. However, the genocide in Rwanda went 
largely unnoticed for a long time compared to what the world heard about what happened in 
Nazi Germany and Cambodia. The same is true of what the media shared with the world 
about apartheid oppression or what happened in Chile (these two cases not to be confused 
with attempts at genocide). Hutchful correctly remarks that African cases under study (by 
1997) stand in contrast to Latin America, where the issue of bringing security agencies under 
democratic control has spawned a growth industry among academics, political parties and 
strategic research centres (Hutchful, 1997: 49). Fortunately in the past ten years the situation 
in Africa in terms of directed research in the area has been changing for the better, with 
research in this field becoming more salient. 
 
One acknowledges the complexities of post-oppressive justice and morals in dealing with the 
choices to be made. What remains under-valued by sociologists is a continuous and increased 
direct focus on ways to deal with the armed forces and the politicians assisting or inviting 
them in terms of future control over the armed forces. Taking one of the options for reasons 
for unearthing the truth, retribution and punishment or reconciliation (at least social 
accommodation) is important. What needs attention in its wake or simultaneously is the 
foresight to address future CMR. To this we will return. 
                                                 
241 Robertson makes an extensive argument that International Law and the UN Charter’s Chapter 6 and 
7 and its application in the case of the bombings of Yugoslavia were unclear – if not inapplicable. In 
fact, the whole bombing exercise “re-invented” the just-war concept (Robertson, 1999: 433). For his 
full argument, see Robertson, 1999: 427ff (especially 429–436 and 437–448). 
242 For more detail, consult the ICTY’s website: www.un.org/icty/. In broad terms, the ICTY aimed at 
many of the things that TRCs also attempt to do. These are: (1) facilitate a move from impunity to 
accountability; (2) unearth facts about past transgressions; (3) give past victims a voice and bring about 
(some) justice; (4) “re-orientate” the current country/people, including the security forces within 
international law; and (5) strengthen the rule of law. 
243 Following the creation of ad hoc tribunals, the Rome Statute followed to ensure that at least in 
international law, genocide and war crimes do not go unpunished. A permanent International Criminal 
Court (ICC) will have to see to that (Mendez, 2001). 
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5.3.3. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as introduced in Chile, Argentina, Bolivia and 
South Africa that I discussed earlier. Other countries that established their own commissions 
to investigate past atrocities were the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Colombia, Bolivia and 
the Philippines (Aldana-Pindell, 2002). However, not all these commissions mirrored the 
TRC type model and contextual differences have to be kept in mind. These approaches are 
relevant to this chapter as more and more countries, also on our continent, see such processes 
as of value, or at least introduce elements of such approaches in the ways they choose to deal 
with the past. 
 
5.3.4. Government-sponsored commissions by ruling governments to investigate and report 
on the abuse of human rights by security forces. This happened to take place in most cases 
where governments remained in power following incidents of human-rights transgressions. 
This approach is distinct from “forgive-and-forget” approaches, ICTs and TRCs or what is to 
be expected from the more recently created ICC. Examples here would include Zimbabwe 
after the Matabeleland debacle and widespread abuse of people by Zimbabwean armed forces 
(1985),244 or Uganda with the commission appointed by Idi Amin (1974). In both cases, 
reports never appeared or were not released to the public. 
 
Other examples include the commission appointed in Israel after the mass killings at Sabra 
and Chatila. This commission (1982/1983) was headed by Ariel Sharon, himself a person 
from a military background. In South Africa the McNally and Goldstone Commissions were 
appointed by De Klerk in South Africa to investigate violence and possible third-force 
involvement during the period of transition (1990s). See Chapter 4 for more detail. 
 
5.3.5. Mixed approaches: A number of varied examples can be mentioned in this regard: The 
Netherlands after WW II, where court cases and internments of human-rights violators took 
place, violators were executed, some attempted “re-education” of “Foute Nederlanders” and 
their children took place, and later re-integration into society coupled with attempts at 
forgiveness formed part of the scenario; Italy following WW II – the summary execution of 
Mussolini and his mistress, Fascist civil servants denounced and fired from their positions, 
                                                 
244 At the time it was alleged that most of the abuses were perpetrated by a North Korean-trained 
Zimbabwean brigade. Part of this was propaganda, but the military played an important role in 
suppressing the alleged revolt. No doubt, other security forces were involved as well, i.e. police and 
intelligence services. As frequently happens, personalities also played a role. ZANLA/ZIPRA forces 
had a common enemy but Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo seldom saw eye to eye … 
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and later drawing a line through the past; Russia after the 1917 Revolution – execution of the 
Tsar and his family and revolutionary, centrally directed attempts to restructure society; 
Rumania – execution of Chesescau after by a hastily appointed parliamentary commission of 
enquiry; Surinam, the suggestions in 1996 of a low-profile truth commission after the fall of 
Bouterse’s rule and commitment sought for future tolerance, coupled with the forced 
retirement of some bureaucrats. This was all to be followed by an attempt to forgive and 
forget. In Iran the Shah and his collaborators were exiled, action was taken against loyalists 
that ranged from the loss of jobs to executions (1977), limited “integration” of previous 
supporters of the Shah took place but there was little attempt to forgive and forget. Chad saw 
the naming of perpetrators and used the report to discredit ex-President Habre and associates 
without a significant improvement in the human-rights situation of civil control over the new 
security commanders and structures. Eventually a case was made against Habre.245 
 
5.4. Choices and outcomes 
 
Different choices lead to different political options. Any action following a political choice 
will have in its wake the reframing or re-modelling of attitudes, structures of oversight and 
civil control over (as well as civil conduct by) the security forces, inclusive of the military. 
The African case studies under discussion fall within the parameters of the categories 
mentioned above. For example, Namibia did not have a TRC, while in Nigeria the Oputa 
Report followed very much the lines of a TRC in its process. But the proceedings of the 
Oputa Report, while fairly in the open, suffered from the restriction that the commission by 
virtue of its appointment resembled a government commission. Rwanda represents a mixed 
approach were elements of an internal judicial exercise, coupled with TRC-type public 
hearings (the gacaca process) and an ICT complement one another. 
 
The implicit argument here is that steps to unearth the truth can be taken earlier (pre-
emptively or pro-actively) or reactively (i.e. in hindsight). Steps can be taken earlier rather 
than in hindsight, simply because we share a warehouse of earlier experiences. These issues 
intertwine (even mesh), dovetail, and are relationally linked. It reminds us that the macro- and 
micro-levels of analysis are more complicated in practice than in stated theoretical definitions 
and in-detail-demarcated concepts. What remains, I argue, is that whatever steps taken now or 
in future, on the continent and elsewhere, should reflect on the warehouse of experiences 
                                                 
245 The epigraph by Robertson at the start of the chapter is worthwhile recalling here.  
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(including limited mandates) and venture into providing pointers, if not proposals or policy 
suggestions, for future civilian control over the military. 
 
While doing so the researcher has to keep in mind that the forms of democracy that emerged 
on the continent differ in quality and depth and that caution is advised when assessing the 
significance of such transitions (Hutchful, 1997: 43). One area where awareness is necessary 
is where elections have merely been “constitutionalised” as legitimating for continued 
authoritarian regimes “military as well as civilian, with former dictators donning a thin mantle 
of democracy” (Hutchful, 1997:43). In the African case studies that I address the above needs 
to be kept in mind and I will return to references in this regard. 
 
5.5. African case studies: Up close and human 
 
For the purposes of this study, three African cases were selected to be investigated in more 
detail, viz Namibia, Nigeria and Rwanda. There are obviously other worthwhile topics of 
investigation, such as Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and an earlier commission in 
Chad, but I limit the discussion to the afore-mentioned cases.246 There is a need for a cut-off 
point in a thesis! A case such as Zimbabwe would have been interesting following the post-
Smith regime and a need for reconciliation and civil control over a newly integrated military 
(Alao in Bhebe & Ranger, 1995: 104ff). In terms of potential for a TRC, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 
following the rule of Ian Smith could have been a candidate. TRCs were already a known 
phenomenon. The Smith regime was guilty of human-rights abuses on an extensive scale. The 
new defence force had to be created out of previously opposing forces (Ginifer, 1995). The 
same applied to the new to-be security organs, other than the military and relationships with 
the legislature. At the time a line was drawn through the past. (In the near future the rule in 
Zimbabwe after President Mugabe’s demise may become another study of value for some.) 
 
Recent tendencies towards dictatorship, numerous reports of human-rights transgressions, and 
the role that the state is playing in overruling courts/the independent judiciary will not 
disqualify Zimbabwe from further discussions.247 Some critical observers in discussions 
pointed out that I should have included Zimbabwe as a case study exactly for the reasons 
mentioned above, rather than opt out of the challenge. But by that time, my research had 
                                                 
246 In an earlier contribution I discussed the commission in Chad in the aftermath of Habre’s rule 
(Liebenberg, 1996). I discussed the case of Sudan in an earlier unpublished paper (2004). 
247 Future fault lines in Zimbabwean politics were observed earlier. Masipula Sithole pointed out 
already in 1979 the internal power struggles, clashing personalities and tendencies to authoritarian 
leadership approaches from the times of the Chimurenga or war for liberation (Sithole, 1979). 
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progressed too far to reconsider Zimbabwe, on which I wrote elsewhere (for illustrative 
purposes I referred to Zimbabwe in Chapter 3).248 
 
5.5.1. Namibia 
 
I cannot help, nor will desist from reconsidering Namibia here. As a child I experienced many 
visits to Southern Namibia with my parents. Small towns like Karasburg and farms in the 
vicinity became known territory. I spent time with family in Keetmanshoop, played around 
with cousins in the koppies and the dry river beds there, better known as umarambas. Few 
people did not know some family in the Northern Cape where an “Owambo” worker from 
northern Namibia worked part-time or full-time. Few children had no member of the extended 
family or friends that lived in Namibia. With my parents I visited one of my father’s brothers 
in Gobabis, friends in Karasburg, camped at Ai-Ais, a hot spring then with very few 
amenities, or travelled there frequently. The area, people and landscape left a deep impression 
on me. A hike through the Fish River Canyon, a large wound in a rough landscape, dry, 
intimidating, yet majestic as only Africa can be, followed in 1978. The river banks and the 
deep brown-greenish water-snake were countered by soft, deep sand and round stones, 
beautiful to touch, yet hard to walk on for a few hours. Halfway through the canyon palm 
trees marked a hot water spring, palms said to have been planted by someone that stayed there 
in the hope that the mineral-rich water would cure an incurable disease (hope seems to be a 
human condition; it springs eternally). After days of walking, the canyon opens up into a 
valley of rocks and an endless stony, sandy landscape and the warm water springs of Ai-Ais 
on its way to the Grootrivier (Gariep or X-ariep), a source of life for human and animal 
through millennia in this barren land. For me Namibia is up close and personal. 
 
In the Fish River canyon (the third day, if I remember correctly), one passes the grave of a 
German soldier, Lieutenant Thilo von Trotha, a family member of the notorious German 
governor of Deutsch West, Von Trotha. Ironically, Thilo died not storming the enemy as bold 
soldiers are said to do, but during crossfire between German colonial troops sent by his uncle, 
Governor Lothar von Trotha, and the Bondelswarts tribe led by Cornelius Christiaan. Thilo 
                                                 
248 For an interesting analysis of the evolvement of mirror images of power, consult Grundy (2005). In 
an in-depth article in The Zimbabwean, he argues that the once-principled Robert Mugabe gained from 
the farcical “détente” that Vorster attempted in order to settle the “Rhodesian problem” with Ian 
Smith’s regime’s minority rule. Grundy concludes with a quotation from Mugabe himself about the 
1975 failed détente: “Power hungry despots cannot be talked out of existence, only blown away.” 
Grundy, pondering on this remark, states: “These (are) words of wisdom. Perhaps a new generation of 
Zimbabweans will read, mark and learn and inwardly digest them as they try to remove another 
unhinged, power crazy despot who lives in a place called Harare” (Grundy, 2005: 4).   
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died in a last-ditch attempt to prevent violence (Van Huyssteen, 1984: 57–58). In his own way 
Thilo von Trotha enacted military professionalism; to attempt to make peace, rather than 
enforce violence. 
 
I saw Northern Namibia as a conscript and Citizen Force officer three times. Sectors 10, 20 
and 70 it was. Commanding a platoon, 18 years old … I have seen Namibia several times 
since then and return there regularly, by choice. In 1989 I went as an observer for IDASA 
during the Namibian elections with a friend, Daniel Malan. We met up with old friends such 
as André du Pisani, a Namibian to the bone, Chris Coetzee and foreign visiting researchers 
such as Heribert Weiland and rejoiced in the end of war. In 1990 I saw the South African flag 
in Windhoek lowered to be replaced by the flag of an independent Namibia. I could not help 
but feel relieved that the flag of white South Africa was finally being replaced by a new one. I 
bumped into a legendary story-teller, Jan Spies, who supported Namibian independence, but 
was vilified for supporting an “internal” solution”, which was contaminated by apartheid 
involvement. As a true Namibian he was clearly relieved at the end of war and attained 
independence, whatever differences he might have had with the SWAPO leadership. We 
exchanged a few words. I had a lump in my throat and a silent good wish for the people of 
Namibia in my mind. On this visit we were a bunch of university friends, Amanda Gouws, 
Marina Pretorius, Lizl Fichardt, Tanya Hichert, Stevie Dreyer, Dries Liebenberg and others – 
an odd 11 of us. Namibia, like the western part of our sub-continent, where my roots lie, 
never leaves one. One always returns … if not, this vast land beckons one back. Its sands 
cannot leave on’s shoes or one’s shoes its burning sand … 
 
From the above experiences it is but a small step to become interested in Namibian politics 
and military history. 
 
The Namibian people fought for decades against South African occupation and for their 
independence. The country became independent in 1990 as a multi-party democracy (though 
dominant-party) under the leadership of Sam Nujoma of SWAPO.249 Resistance to 
colonialism started much earlier, with the Nama people, Damara people, Herero people and 
the Bondelswarts resisting German colonial occupation250 and later the Smuts regime that 
                                                 
249 For an excellent article on the salient features of South Africa’s Namibian policies from 1971 
onwards, see Du Pisani (1989: 26–43). 
250 I referred earlier on to the German colonialist’s genocide of the Herero people. Genocide remains a 
contested term. At least today it is recognised that the action taken against the Herero can be classified 
as genocide, whatever the terminological nuances of the continuing debate (compare Abun-Nasr, 2005 
and Melber, 2005). 
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ruled South West Africa as a Class C mandate under the League of Nations (Katjavivi, 1988: 
2–4). White Namibians, at the time following their loyalties to the white leadership in South 
Africa, started referring to Namibia (then Suidwes) as “our fifth province” (Afrikaans: ons 
vyfde provinsie). Namibia and its people, through sheer perseverance and the single-
mindedness of one determined to rebuild ones own hearth, became a fifth column striking out 
at the extended frontiers of colonialism, even if arguably it was a “colony of a special type”. 
 
The Namibians continued their resistance when the Union of South Africa gave way to the 
apartheid republic of Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd, Vorster and Botha. Despite resistance by 
unions and a fledgling SWAPO, Namibia’s status remained that of a mandate. This happened 
despite protest by African states. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in a controversial 
first ruling on the mandateship of Namibia, denied Liberia and Ethiopia “any legal right or 
interest in the matter of the SWA mandate” in 1966 (Du Pisani, 1988: 6). For the moment, 
South Africa’s mandate over Namibia “was confirmed”, as the ICJ could not hear the case. 
For SWAPO, this ruling by the international court confirmed the need to fight back through 
an armed struggle. At that time, the SWAPO leadership believed that there were few 
international cards to play. The only choice was to fight for the liberation of Namibia. 
SWAPO stepped up the armed struggle. At Ungulumbashe the first contact between South 
Africa and SWAPO guerrillas took place.251 Ungulumbashe was the first of many. In a 
struggle in which the South African security forces time and again achieved a numerically 
superior “killing rate”, SWAPO continued its struggle. As we know, wars are not won by the 
highest killing rate or necessarily by the strongest or most sophisticated force … 
 
In December 1971 and January 1972, Ovamboland and the rest of Namibia experienced 
extensive labour unrest (Du Pisani, 1988: 7).252 The Tanga Consultative Congress in Tanzania 
in December 1969 and January 1970 resulted in increased SWAPO activity. Infiltration of 
guerrillas, agitation and labour unrest made the point: SWAPO was poised to fight rather than 
flinch. 
                                                 
251 In a pro-National Party newspaper, Die Burger (29 August 1966), the then premier of South Africa, 
B.J. Vorster, tells the public about the spoils of war taken at the “terrorist” base: In the SWAPO 
arsenals were among others “two submachine carbines, automatic pistols, hundreds of live rounds, 
assegais, bicycles, torches, ‘guerrilla documentation’ and bow – and – arrows”. The newspaper assured 
the public of Namibia (then Suidwes) and South Africa that “everything was under control”. 
252 See also Katjavivi, 1988. 
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SWAPO’s Political and Military Structure 
From the time of the first battle between SWAPO guerrillas and South African security forces in the 
1960s the organisation became honed for the armed struggle which was to last until 1989. The military 
wing, PLAN, operated under the political leadership. Source: www.mod.gow.na 
 
South African authorities responded with emergency regulations in the Ovamboland area that 
allowed for detention without trial (Du Pisani, 1988: 7). Large-scale detentions followed. 
South African security laws were made applicable in what the white regime and its 
supporters, as well as many white Namibians (Suidwesters), believed to be “theirs”253. 
International criticism continued, in fact increased. “South Africa maintained its position by 
force – underpinned by its powerful security forces and stringent security laws” (Namibian 
Peace Plan, 1987: 9). In 1969, the UN Security Council confirmed the revocation of South 
Africa’s mandate in Namibia (NPP, 1987: 9). 
 
By 1971, the ICJ had re-affirmed that South Africa was illegally occupying Namibia and that 
it was in contravention of international law (Du Pisani, 1988:7). The Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Owambo-Kavango and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South West Africa 
wrote a letter to South African Prime Minister Vorster, in which they protested against the 
                                                 
253 I cannot but be reminded of a university friend who is a staunch Namibian. If people referred to the 
colloquial term Suidwes instead of Namibia, he would retort: “Praat met my oor Namibië, suidwes is ’n 
windrigting.”  (Talk to me about Namibia, south-west is a wind direction). 
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unjust policy of apartheid. They were in support of the ICJ 1971 advisory opinion that the 
revocation of South Africa’s mandate ship over Namibia was valid (NPP, 1987: 9).254 
 
The scales were slowly – and excruciatingly for Namibians – shifting. A shock came for the 
South African occupiers. The UN General Assembly in 1973 declared SWAPO “the sole and 
authentic representative” of the Namibian people (Du Pisani, 1988: 7). Against this backdrop 
the SADF took over responsibility for counter-insurgency operations … “from the perspective 
of a frontier army, it is important to reiterate that the SADF was introduced into an already 
highly charged political arena” (Du Pisani, 1988: 7). In Western Europe, the Scandinavian 
countries and others countries, SWAPO increasingly gained recognition (Bushin, 1989).255 
 
Local government elections orchestrated by the occupying power in 1973 registered only 3 
percent of the vote and sharply underlined the perception of illegal occupation. South Africa’s 
later invasion of Angola and its use of Namibia as a springboard for regional destabilisation 
did not make things better. On the contrary: it was to enhance the regional cycle of violence 
and invoke increasing military involvement, also from non-African states. In 1978 the UN 
adopted Resolution 435. This time around, the so-called Western Five (the USA, the UK, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and France) were in agreement that Namibia’s 
independence should be granted, and that a UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was 
to assist in the process to ensure free and fair elections. 
 
An attempt at an internal settlement that excluded SWAPO faltered. It was tainted with 
apartheid. The Turnhalle Beraad (Turnhalle Consultation) failed, despite people such as Dirk 
Mudge that left the National Party and established the Republican Party among Namibians. 
The Turnhalle consultation itself, which evolved into the DTA, itself became fragmented. 
South Africa’s involvement in Namibia, despite a tug of war between internal parties, 
remained an overshadowing spectre. A Namibian journalist interviewed in 1987/1988 in 
Windhoek pointed out how the South African government abused the DTA, especially the 
Republican Party of Dirk Mudge, for its benefit. There is also evidence that Mudge himself 
was deeply dissatisfied with the role of the apartheid government for not ushering in a 
political settlement. Mudge convincingly argued, even while strongly anti-SWAPO, that the 
movement would have to be a part of the eventual political solution. At the time Mudge used 
                                                 
254 In 1974, the UN adopted the name Namibia for South West Africa. 
255 The slowly evolving increase in international support (even if at times qualified) for SWAPO is 
discussed in great detail by Bushin (1989). This theorist also gives extensive attention to the role of 
social-democratic parties in various countries in garnering gradual support for SWAPO, the MPLA and 
the ANC.  
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a simple but striking logic: “You cannot win a guerrilla war. If you win it (the guerrilla war) 
by 51 percent, still 49 percent of the people will continue to fight. If you have (… an election) 
… and you end up with these percentages (normal) politics can continue”. Mudge made it 
abundantly clear that the National Party did not have support in Namibia despite what it said 
and predicted that the National Party, like smaller ethnic parties, would end up with virtually 
no influence in future Namibian politics (author’s archive).256 
 
Military action took place between the SADF (as the colonial military force or “frontier 
army”) in conjunction with the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), and the 
PLAN of SWAPO. The war was fought mainly in the northern war zone, where more than  
12 000 people were killed and tens of thousands dislocated and forced into exile as refugees 
(Nathan, 1992: 1).257 
 
“The struggle assumed the character of a civil war as Pretoria sowed divisions between ethnic 
groups and conscripted Namibians to serve in its security forces” (Nathan, 1992: 1).258 Nathan 
overstates the point somewhat. Bushin (1989) argues convincingly that the struggle in 
Namibia should rather be seen as anti-colonial. Since it was a war against an occupying force 
(South Africa), the war had more of the characteristics of an anti-colonial war (Bushin, 1989: 
46ff). The fact that Namibians were conscripted and recruited by the frontier army to fight 
against the liberation movement does, however, resemble some elements of a civil war. (On a 
side-note; then and even now the struggles for liberation in Africa were frequently seen and 
analysed through a myopic Cold War perspective, which firstly was an over-rated concept, 
enhanced in mostly Western media, and secondly detracted from proper analysis of the 
historical origins and social processes related to the causes of inter-state regional, inter-state 
conflict and liberation struggles.) 
 
In 1980 the South African government created the SWATF and conscripted Namibians one-
sidedly. It also inaugurated the South West African Police (SWAPOL) in 1981 to assist South 
African forces in maintaining “law and order” – the euphemism for absolute political power 
(Du Pisani, 1988: 9–10). 
 
                                                 
256 Sources require anonymity.  
257 For the moment, I will not discuss the Angolan war and the impact of the war on people north of the 
Namibian border/the Cunene. Again the micro and the macro meshed … 
258 Where colonial powers interfere or rule, elements of civil strife gravitate to a war between brothers 
and sisters. Many thousands of Africans fought on the Portuguese side in Angola and Mozambique, on 
the French side in Algeria, on Ian Smith’s side in then Rhodesia. 
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During the 23 years of war, some of SWAPOL’s sections operated in northern Namibia as 
paramilitary COINS, rather than as a regular police force. The activities of the police counter-
insurgency unit, Koevoet, created mistrust, fear and animosity. Hard-handed action and abuse 
were commonplace (UNTAG, 1990). The Koevoet operations, it was said at the time, 
accounted for up to 80 percent of war deaths in Ovambo and Kavango.259 SWATF units such 
as 101 Batallion contested Koevoet’s efficiency and claimed greater efficiency in war against 
“terrorists” and the race to bring “ears” home.260 
 
One observer remarked: “According to some accounts, the SADF was relatively restrained in 
comparison to Koevoet units”, implying that Koevoet was more likely to waive the rules and 
not observe good conduct when dealing with civilians. This helped little, because many 
civilians and the media did not make a distinction between the police counter-insurgency 
units, special forces (recce’s) and the military (mostly conscripts) deployed in Owambo. It 
has to be mentioned that moonlight operations were frequently undertaken in Owambo by 
South African special forces (recce’s) and that frequently abuses were blamed on them (the 
current South Africa has not yet released/unclassified the outcomes or extent of these 
operations or civilians losses that occurred as a result of them). 
 
The extent of the social disruption in Ovamboland261 (discounting for the moment the 
negative consequences of apartheid’s destabilisation and the CIA’s involvement in the 
Angolan theatre by supporting Savimbi’s renegade forces) can be judged from the following: 
                                                 
259 In the notorious “nine days” of war when SWAPO moved into northern Namibia just prior to 
elections, Koevoet was to gain further notoriety. It was one of the first units to deal with the incursion 
that inflicted heavy losses on SWAPO (Engelbrecht, 2005: 11). Somewhat more recently the 
“discovery” of mass graves in northern Namibia hit the headlines again (Pretoria News, 22 November 
2005; Sunday Sun, 20 November 2005: 4; Son, 18 November 2005: 10). That the graves were there 
because of the “nine-day war”, is not new. In the aftermath of the discovery, accusations started flying 
around. The UN representative at the time, Marthi Athisaari, blamed the apartheid forces. Magnus 
Malan et al. argued that Athisaari and UNTAG knew – which also happened to be true. The SWAPO 
leadership also knew about it, it was said. There are many questions about the then “invasion” and the 
recent (re-)discovery of the mass graves. Did SWAPO instruct armed guerrillas to move south? Did the 
SWAPO troops do so on their own accord believing that, since there was a ceasefire, nothing would 
happen? Were SWAPO detachments, perhaps through dirty tricks (such as the one that led to Samora 
Machel’s death), connived into moving south? Did UNTAG know about the earlier movement 
southward? If so, why not act earlier to prevent bloodshed? In the aftermath: Who stood to gain from 
the new “discovery”? Some already speak about a TRC on the issue. If so, how will SWAPO escape 
questions about its own detention, torture and disappearance of followers during the struggle years? 
And if the issue is re-opened, will South African politicians and military commanders of the time step 
forward to give a picture of the scenes behind the scenes? As always, politics remain volatile and 
unpredictable. So do its (un)intended outcomes. 
260 Sources to remain anonymous.  
261 Like Ungulumbashe/Omgulunbashe/Umgulumbashe, Cassinga (Kassinga), Ovamboland/Owambo-
land are/were spelled differently by different sources or persons. The sound lies on the tongue, not 
necessarily in the writing. I chose Ungulumbashe here.  
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Many Namibians fled during the war. Some fled to Angola, where the situation was not much 
better because of South African and UNITA activities in large parts of Southern Angola. 
Estimates ranged from 50 000 to 70 000 Namibian people who became refugees (UNTAG, 
1990). Most of the refugees went to Angola, Botswana and Zambia. Refugees were airlifted 
back to Namibia on 452 flights in 1989 (UNTAG, 1990). In the final stages of the UN airlift, 
excluding Namibians that made their way home on their own, 42 736 people of all ages 
returned (UNTAG, 1990). 
 
Thousands of Namibian (mostly Ovambo) people were forcibly removed from a strip between 
one and four kilometres in breadth to ensure a no-go zone along the Angolan border (SACBC, 
1989). A dawn-to-dusk curfew was imposed, resulting in civilian people who broke the 
curfew being killed.262 One has to mention that SADF incursions frequently forced refugees to 
become refugees again, Operation Reindeer (Cassinga) being one example. 
 
People forced off the land by the raging war were “urbanised” in sprawling townships. Lack 
of services increased the occurrence of typhoid, tuberculosis, measles and other diseases 
(SACBC, 1989). Among others, the spread of bubonic disease was reported (SACBC, 1989). 
In one year in the late 1980s more than 400 cases were reported (CDNIG, 1988. Namibian 
Resource Package: Social costs of the war. Soutrivier). At some stage, shanty dwellers 
accounted for more than 200 000 people in the immediate areas of Ondangwa and Oshakati, 
nearly a quarter of the Namibian population (SACBC, 1989). 
 
After years of struggle the tide changed and South Africa finally withdrew from Namibia in 
1989 following the implementation of UN Resolution 435.263 
 
Before the implementation of the political settlement, Swapo’s executive committee 
formulated a broad plan for reconciliation. It motivated this policy as necessary to heal the 
wounds of war and a precondition for peace, stability, economic reconstruction and 
development (Nathan, 1992: 4). During the election campaign a “general pardon” was issued 
and “a hand of reconciliation was extended to those who were misled and misused by the 
colonial powers to prevent independence” (Nathan, 1992: 4). 
 
                                                 
262 Even today, it is difficult to get to exact numbers about civilian deaths. Neither the previous 
apartheid government nor the current government has “de-classified” this important information. 
263 The last contingent of 1 500 South African troops withdrew in 1989, one week after the certification 
of the November elections. 
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NAMIBIA: THE BAD, THE UGLY AND THE GOOD … Above: The Soviet danger from the north 
via Angola. South West Africa as the last bastion. Propaganda pamphlet of the Defence of Tradition, 
Family and Property Foundation. The booklets were printed in Johannesburg funded by secret funds 
aimed at strategic communication. 
 
 
 
 
From the same series of propaganda pamphlets of DTFPF. The mindset of apartheid resulted in 
peculiar views on the United Nations and in this case SWAPO. Note the symbolism of Hyena feeding 
Hyena. Source: Author’s archive. 
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SWAPO represents the symbol of ultimate evil. Virtually no references were made to SWAPO’s 
origins as a nationalist movement fighting colonial occupation. DTFPF Booklet – Author’s archive. 
 
 
 
 
 
The GOOD … Those that protect the Namibians and South Africa and Christianity. Buffel armoured 
personnel carriers (APCs) of the SADF heroically depicted in northern Namibia/Ovamboland. Source: 
DTFPF Booklet – Author’s archive. 
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SWAPO’s election manifesto (1989) did not say much about the future defence policy, or the 
armed forces, or civilian control. The issue was dealt with only in three brief paragraphs. The 
main points were that a national army would be established and that the new government 
would pursue a policy of peaceful co-existence with its neighbours. It was mentioned that 
soldiers of PLAN – SWAPO’s armed wing – “will form the core of the new army” (SWAPO, 
1989: 23). The general pardon issued at the time was a clear indication that no internal 
judicial process or a TRC-type exercise would follow. Criticism against general pardons was 
addressed in Chapter 4. Therefore, it will not be repeated here. 
 
The Namibian constitution was unanimously adopted by all parties that were represented in 
the Constituent Assembly, and guaranteed an independent and sovereign Namibia. “The 
constitution provided broadly the parameters for the rights of persons and groups. It 
guaranteed a democratic society, a multi-party system, a state policy that strives for 
reconciliation and reconstruction, fundamental freedom and rights, a non-tribal, non-ethnic 
and non-sexist society and equality before the law” (Tötemeyer, 1991: 66). 
 
When it came into power, SWAPO upheld this principle. People who held public office were 
to “hold this office unless and until he or she resigns or is retired, transferred or removed from 
office in accordance with law” (Nathan, 1992: 4). Nathan argues that: “Despite problems, the 
policy of reconciliation had considerable and numerous positive effects. It has promoted a 
sense of nationhood and increased the confidence of opposition parties, minority ethnic 
groups, foreign investors and the business sector who feared the consequence of SWAPO 
coming to power” (Nathan, 1992: 4).264 The fears of the minority political parties were 
understandable. Despite a liberal constitution SWAPO came to power as a dominant party and 
fear of what Hutchfull describes as “strongmen that donned a thin mantle of democracy” 
played a role (Hutchfull, 1997: 42). For some minority parties, despite a multi-party system, 
the potential problems associated with a dominant ruling party remained a spectre. However, 
things turned out for the better, rather than for the worse at the time. 
 
Most importantly, the military was integrated peacefully and showed an attitude of principled 
co-operation under the new constitution after the departure of the occupying powers. This was 
far more amicable than the previous dispensation, where extremely unhealthy relations 
between the citizens and the occupying and top-down-created “indigenous” security 
                                                 
264 Nathan’s argument should be weighed against that of Saul, mentioned earlier about the need for a 
TRC in Namibia.  
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establishments existed. Ironically, SWAPO’s coming to power as a dominant party may have 
assisted in the peaceful integration of the Namibian armed forces. 
 
The debate on reconciliation, however, remained more problematic. Nathan, in his evaluation 
of the Namibian situation, sidesteps the negative perceptions about such reconciliation 
pointed out by Dobell (1997), Saul (1999) and Beukes et al. (1987). Much of the unhappiness 
relates to the chosen mode of reconciliation (“forgive-and-forget”) vis-à-vis other options, the 
above-mentioned authors argued. 
 
The choice against a TRC-type process was not an unqualified success. Some groups inside 
Namibia and external observers remained dissatisfied about the so-called torture camps and 
human abuses committed by SWAPO. One example is the members of the SWAPO Youth 
League who returned from SWAPO internment camps and took to publishing accounts of 
their trials and tribulations, and their attempts to make public the SWAPO leaders’s actions 
against their own members (Beukes et al., 1987).265 
 
The argument about the detention camps and that the “truth was not unearthed” by the 
SWAPO leadership can be looked at from different angles. Simplistically speaking, someone 
may argue that Beukes et al, just wanted to discredit the new incumbent government and that 
their arguments benefited the apartheid rulers. Some others, going further, but in the same 
vein, may argue that such persons knowingly played into the hand of the racist apartheid 
coloniser. Secondly, it could be seen as an appeal by aggrieved people to the new government 
to start with a clean slate after acting with liberatory intolerance during its anti-colonial 
struggle266. Thirdly it could be viewed as a demand/appeal or assumption that new leaders in a 
new democracy should be willing to discuss past problems openly. Fourthly, it could relate to 
the instinctive foresight that past transgressions by a liberation movement would not be 
repeated if its future use of the armed forces as coercive arms of the state should be discussed 
early. In other words, it could be seen as a public proposal by critics to implement, civil 
control over the military in a newly declared democracy early. Whatever angle the analyst 
                                                 
265 Beukes and others were allowed to return to Namibia, according to an observer, “with the blessing 
of South African authorities” (private discussion, 7 November 2005). Under such circumstances, many 
people doubted their allegations and witnesses. 
266 The term liberatory intolerance was coined by Pallo Jordan, ANC member during the Dakar 
Conference in 1987. In resistance to structural and oppressive violence, liberation movements 
themselves become violent and intolerant and this leads to loss of life. Such violence that is enacted 
against violence that leads to the death of informers (“impimpis”), pro-government leaders and/or 
innocent persons or the incarceration of members of the guerrilla movements by the leadership of the 
movement is termed liberatory intolerance.  
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takes on this, the issue is complex. It holds moral as well as practical implications for civil 
control over the military, hence the application of and operationalisation of future CMR. In 
the case of South Africa the ANC appointed two commissions to investigate its past of 
liberatory intolerance; SWAPO as (new) incumbents did not do this. Some may argue that the 
ANC was forced by realities to declare past abuses to retain the moral high ground when 
coming to power. Others may argue that the ANC itself and its older generation of leaders, 
such as Oliver Tambo, Walter Sizulu, Nelson Mandela, Wilton Mkwayi and Raymond 
Mhlaba (“Oom Ray”) and persons like Beyers Naude (“Oom Bey”) may have exerted 
influence on some of the returned exiled leaders of the ANC to come into the open. Others 
may argue that the influence of prominent church leaders, such as Bishop Desmond Tutu, or 
ANC aligned practitioner-scholars, such as Albie Sachs, played a role. Whatever the case, the 
ANC ended up with two “internal truth commissions” and SWAPO none. 
 
Saul argues: “Despite the best efforts of former detainees, relatives of the victims, and human-
rights activists in Namibia to get the full story of those Angolan days on the table, not much 
happened during the early years of independence” (Saul, 1999: 5). The matter was 
complicated by the fact that the Namibian Patriotic Front (NPF), on the eve of the first free 
and fair elections, jumped on the bandwagon of the “camp abuses” while being secretly 
funded by the South African regime.267 The fact that “international societies”, vehemently 
anti-communist and conservative and receiving foreign funding (if not internal South Africa 
funding), such as the Society for the Defence of Tradition, Family and Property, published 
endless streams of newsletters and pamphlets against the “Marxist and atheist” SWAPO did 
not help much to create a favourable atmosphere for open discussion and rational discourse.268 
To criticise SWAPO at the time was tantamount to supporting the apartheid oppressor. Thus, 
                                                 
267 The South African regime meddled in Namibian affairs up to the last moment, for example by 
financially supporting, with covert funds, political parties that otherwise would not stand a chance to 
gain seats, one being the NPF. Pik Botha, then Minister of Foreign Affairs for South Africa, on this 
particular issue was involved in/aware of this funding and transfer of support. Since then, Botha has 
retired and has become a member of the ANC, like many other National Party and AB (now 
Afrikanerbond) members. In politics, memories are frequently short and highly selective when new 
opportunities beckon. 
268 At the time publications by the “The Societies for the Defence of Tradition, Family and Property”, 
which called itself “an international network of sister organizations whose prime goal is the defence of 
these three basic values of Christian Civilization against the communist and socialist offensive” 
appeared. The booklets, distributed en mass in Namibia, were printed in Johannesburg. Many people 
assumed that the funding came from foreign sources. Some suggested the CIA. Others saw 
involvement of SA government funding in it. According to these publications, among others the UN 
was an organisation hell-bent on revolution, the Council of Churches in Namibia was SWAPO’s 
religious arm (SWAPO being a willing partner in “international Soviet strategy”. Namibian church 
leadership was compared to the Ayatollah Khumeini in one leap of imagination (SDTFP Booklets, 
1988/1989). The propaganda spread by organisations was crude, but bedeviled social relationships 
further. 
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not much resulted from pressure to open up the past. This choice certainly benefited the 
politicians and military commanders of apartheid that left Namibia. Human-rights 
transgressions by the occupied forces certainly took place, and the Namibians’ choice not to 
unearth the past must have left them with sighs of relief. 
 
In my view, Saul correctly argues that: “It is hard not to feel that Namibians have been denied 
an important opportunity to learn from their own history, not least the story of their movement 
in exile, by the failure to instigate a TRC-type process in their country. Whether other turns of 
the political wheel will eventually allow the full story to be told remains to be seen” (Saul, 
1999: 8). Saul’s argument should be balanced by the phenomenon that the newly created NDF 
did not at any time attempt to take over the government, nor dictated to the politicians. From 
an observers’ perspective, it confirmed to a military establishment that was at the same time 
subordinate to civilian control (compare Hutchful, 1997: 48). As always, one trade-off which 
for some is negative may have borne some positive fruit. Namibia, it seems, is not set for 
praetorianism despite criticism of its government and style of governance from left or right. 
 
During the late 1990s and early 2000, some unrest occurred in the Caprivi Strip and the NDF 
was allegedly involved in human-rights abuses against Caprivians. Court orders and 
injunctions forced the security forces to abide by the Namibian constitution and the Bill of 
Rights (Dzinesa & Rupiya, 2005: 227). 
 
Namibia registered progress, starting with the successful integration of the armed forces and 
the acceptance of a multi-party constitution and a Bill of Rights. Arguably there have been 
downsides. The closeness between the dominant party (SWAPO) and the military echelons 
tends, at least in the case of the Caprivi, to allow for some interpretational boundaries being 
overstepped by the military. In the case of the Caprivi, it led to a clash with the espoused 
values of the constitution. Hence, courts had to interfere to re-direct CMR (Dzinesa and 
Rupiya, 2005: 227). Much of this “closeness” relates to previous relationships between 
SWAPO’s political leadership and PLAN. Again one has to mention (as can be seen from the 
two figures above) that PLAN did not have the independence, much like MK in South Africa, 
to overstep the control of its political masters. Arguably there was political oversight and 
where power was overstepped it could be ascribed to the political leadership and not the 
“armed” forces or armed wings. Thus, some form of internal control and checks over the 
armed forces existed from the times of the liberation struggle and was carried into the new 
political regime. 
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Lamb (2002: 35) reports that these were a marked reduction in human-rights abuses since 
independence, but abuses were still reported. Some of the abuses at the time relate to Angolan 
refugees and people in the Kavango and Caprivi regions (Lamb, 2002: 35). 
 
The attempted seccession of the Caprivi by the Caprivi Liberation Movement in 1998 resulted 
in retaliation by the NDF and the Special Field Force or SFF, an paramilitary force. 
Numerous human rights abuses took place under a declared state of emergency (2 August 
1999–25 August 1999). The Namibian Police (NAMPOL) was also implicated. Some of the 
people that suffered abuse took to court action. In some cases successfully and in some not at 
all (Lamb, 2002: 37). Abuses reported ranged from assault, rape, torture and extra-judic ial 
killings. 
 
In Namibia there are a handful of institutions “whose primary role is to ensure that citizen 
rights, as enshrined in the Bill of Rights, are not violated by government” (Lamb, 2002: 38). 
These are the Office of the Ombudsman and the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee for 
Human Rights (IMTCHR). The office of the Ombudsman finds itself limited in autonomy 
because it resides under the Ministry of Justice. Likewise the IMTCHR are based within the 
same ministry. Both institutions are under-staffed and under-resourced (Lamb, 2002: 38). 
Thus much of the monitoring human rights and advocacy of citizen’s rights are within civil 
society such as the Legal Assistance Centre, and others. Consistent efforts are made to 
provide human rights training for members of the security forces (Lamb, 2002: 40). 
 
These observations also relate to the current situation in Namibia. It is a one-party-dominant 
system within a constitutional democracy that has had a multi-party basis ever since the first 
elections, yet current structures allow for oversight over the military as a coercive arm of the 
state in Namibia. 
 
The forgive-and-forget approach had the advantage that, to a degree, it prevented previously 
divided Namibians (divided by foreign occupation and interference to a great degree) from 
going through a public process of truth and reconciliation. For a young nation such an 
exercise may have been divisive and sparked further mistrust, while alienating more 
conservative or radical elements. If the fault-line of divergent opinions had been opened, such 
divisions may have had a negative impact on the military and relations with civil authorities 
or vice versa. 
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Despite criticism of the lack of a TRC in Namibia, the choice can be rationalised. Namibians 
were caught up in the politics of a frontier army and an occupier/colonial power and primary 
agent of oppression that left Namibia, and a different process may have unjustly pitched 
Namibian people against one another. After all, the “collaborators” were technically also 
victims of apartheid domination, or in a longer-term view Western colonialism. For some the 
choice not to deal openly with the past was a good one. For others, what transpired was not so 
positive, as they was felt it lacked the “truth”. 
 
 
Organisational chart of civil-military control of the NDF 
 
In following a policy of national reconciliation the Namibian government did not investigate 
human-rights transgression after apartheid forces left Namibian. The Namibian government 
also rejected a request by the SATRC to hold hearings in Windhoek, arguing that it will “not 
contribute to our own efforts to bring about reconciliation” (SWAPO communiqué, 1999 
quoted by Lamb (2002: 37). 
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However, if one compares Namibia with, for example, apartheid South Africa or 
contemporary Zimbabwe, Namibia did not fare at all badly in the realm of civil control over 
the military and social reconciliation. One may be tempted to argue that the Namibian 
integration process proceeded with less racial tension than those of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe or 
South Africa. In my view, the Namibian civil-military situation appears to be workable and 
fairly stable/sustainable. A look at its constitution, Bill of Rights and the relationship of the 
legislature, the judicial system and civil-society to the military and vice versa presents a rather 
positive picture. 
 
Dzinesa and Rupiya (2005: 216) argue: “The Namibian Constitution has been largely upheld 
since independence and is regarded as one of the most liberal and progressive constitutions 
worldwide. Institutionalised checks and balances have enabled Namibia to preserve stable 
CMR since independence. Democratic values and respect for civilian institutions by the NDF 
are evident.” Structures of civilian oversight can be sketched as follows: 
 
The elected president of Namibia is commander-in-chief of the Namibian Defence Force 
(NDF). The president appoints the chief of the defence force, who in turn is charged with the 
maintenance of a balanced force, discipline and efficient administration of the armed forces. 
The chief of the defence force is answerable to the president. A civilian-led and dominated 
Ministry of Defence supervises the NDF. 
 
All this happened without, or even despite the lack of, a TRC. Did the Namibians do 
relatively well in these areas exactly because they chose against a TRC and in favour of 
drawing a line through the past? 
 
In my opinion Namibia fared well in establishing civil control over the military in the absence 
of a TRC. Seen in the context of my argument related to the research question, working CMR 
and civil control over the military were established in Namibia, despite moral criticism about 
the failure to “unearth the history”. 
 
5.5.2. Nigeria 
 
I mentioned that, in the early phases of my studies of TRCs and non-TRC approaches, I 
focussed mostly on Latin American states and the Southern European states, the latter being 
part of the “third wave of democracy” that transition theorists refer to. These states and their 
democratic transitions provided a source for a multitude of publications (Aguero, n.d.; Giner 
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& Sevilla, 1984; Linz, 1993; Higley & Gunther, 1992; Graham, 1992; Graham, 1993). The 
changing status of the military in democratised states also deserved ample attention (Cruz & 
Diamint, 1998; Hutchful, 1997; Koonings, 2003). Comparative studies in the areas of 
transition and truth and reconciliation attempts, including some by South African theorists, 
also deserved attention (Du Toit, 1990; Thomashausen, 1994; Du Toit, 1994, Liebenberg, 
1996). 
 
I mentioned that reading about one case called up another in order to strengthen the 
comparability of the cases. As I progressed on the case study of South Africa, I became 
convinced that the comparative insights would have more value if I exploited more than just 
one, two or three. Presumably, it could also provide some potential for generaliseability or as 
better known in contemporary qualitative approaches, transferability. However, the above and 
simple curiosity are not the only reasons that caused further tracking of the African spoor). 
Tracking over the globe may bring one back to one’s own territory, not necessarily home but 
to areas known/more familiar. 
 
Someone once remarked that “theories, like beer, do not travel well”.269 Strangely, this 
observation, or rather platitude lurking somewhere in the back of my mind, has to take part of 
the responsibility for starting to read “closer to home”. A friend and well-known Africanist 
also pointed out that a study such as this one, in order to have added value, should give more 
attention to African case studies, thus bringing the experience close to home270. 
 
Interaction with scholars such as Dani Nabudere, the Director of the Afrika Studies Centre 271 
in Mbale, Uganda, also confirmed this weakness in my study. 
                                                 
269 I cannot remember when and where I heard it the first time. However, the analogy struck me as 
quite a true observation. I happen to think that the person that coined this, or then at least used this 
rather vividly, was Jannie Gagiano, a colourful political science lecturer who taught me at the 
University of Stellenbosch in our pre-graduate years during the 1980s. 
270 This experience is an example of what intersubjectivity entails. We have known each other for about 
18 years. She/he is an African scholar, not from Africa but in solidarity with Africa. I am an African, 
yet I was trained (in contrast to educated) to think that knowledge should be obtained from the 
Harvards, Essexes, Stanfords, Cambridges, Princetons et cetera and that one should feel inferior when 
the these learned persons “pop around” as esteemed academics and scholars to interpret on one’s behalf 
what one experiences and knows by living it daily. Interaction with persons such as this Africanist 
confirmed that knowledge is not limited to the selected (Western) few. 
271 Nabudere chose to name the institute Afrika Study Centre rather than Africa Study Centre. 
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Various discussions with a trusted friend and colleague, Michael Cloete, and earlier Ruhr 
Martin and Rocky Williams over a fair period further accentuated this.272 By that time, after 
all, TRC-type exercises were known and debated in the African context. Also, the SATRC 
was discussed from time to time when Rocky, Solly Molo (MK friends integrated into the 
new SANDF), a journalist friend of mine, Dries Liebenberg, Margot Pienaar and others met 
one another. 
 
I mentioned that Rocky and I wrote an article on the possible effect of the SATRC on the new 
SANDF. Journalists interviewed me on various occasions and invariably asked questions on 
other African cases. This also served as a pointer that the developments (or then, rather, future 
developments on the continent) in this area had to become a pertinent part of my studies.273 I 
set about reading and tracking further on the spoor of comparable cases on the continent. In 
doing so I picked up on the cautionary note of Hutchful (1997: 49) that armed forces and 
security institutions and democratic control over them need research with more depth and 
consistency in our endeavours to understand developments on the continent. Research and 
qualitative research more so, is a journey, but in travelling afar one does invariably return to 
one’s “home turf”. 
 
The study progressed (or completed a circle?) back to our Africa. Nigeria became another 
focus in a broader casing or setting. 
 
Nigeria and its tortuous history with military regimes, coups d’état and counter-coups 
represent a challenging and rich case study. Other theorists much earlier not only remarked on 
                                                 
272 The discussions between Michael Cloete and myself touched on “indigenous” knowledge and the 
role of philosophy in the African context. Obviously the imperative of principled non-racialism as a 
basic core of humanity (South Africa is an interesting country where Europeans that inherited euro-
centrism and as added value racism, are mirrored  in the reflection by “new” Africans (our “elite”) 
educated in Europe that espouse racism towards their country people that did not go into exile. Current 
political leaders and the economic elite still stick to racial categories (apartheid racial categories are 
still retained on official documents.) The likes of these people also perpetuate the myth of South Africa 
consisting of a “rich white nation” and a “poor black nation”.  In their adherence to an ideology of 
inherited racial discourse they have not noticed that that the rich-poor gap in South Africa has become 
non-racial since 1996. On another point: it is not strange that some of the then exiled leadership and 
students from universities when in “exile” supporting the current government, still talks about “white 
racism” and deny that other forms of racism still flower – or indeed exist. In my own experience the 
then black consciousness persons and Pan-Africanists are far more non-racial than the current 
government elite (especially those that went into exile without having experienced military/guerrilla 
training and deployment as such). From there it is but a small step to reflect on the value of possible 
application of this study if we talk about a humane society and the role of politicians and the military. 
273 I remember Willem Pretorius, a journalist from the Afrikaans newspaper, the Beeld, who made an 
appointment for an interview. It was one of those rare cases when someone interviewed one for more 
than half an hour, made no notes, went to the office and quoted the interviewee correctly without 
putting words in his mouth. It was indeed an experience that one does not see repeated every day. 
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the need for analysis of the case, but ventured into solid studies in this regard. (See Nagel 
[1981] on the politics of collective action in Nigeria between 1960 and 1975 and Adebayo 
and Otite [1997] on case studies contributed by various authors. Lewis [1997] on the role of 
civil society, political society and democratic failure(s) in Nigeria is also of relevance here.) 
Nigeria as a case study cannot be dealt with in full. That would call for a second thesis! Nor 
can I do justice to all the complexities of Nigerian politics, here except where relevant to the 
arguments put forward here. 
 
The role of military involvement and attempts to unearth the truth through among others the 
Oputa Report in Nigeria, do have relevance for this study. As far as this study is concerned, I 
will highlight main themes and then deal with the issue of human rights and the 
military/civilian interface in contemporary Nigeria. I will deal in more detail with a recent 
attempt to deal with past excesses in Nigeria, namely the Oputa Panel Report. 
 
The spectre of military rule and coups is not new to post-colonial Africa (Khadiagala, 1995: 
61). Nordlinger points out that, by 1966, civilian governments had been overthrown in Togo, 
Congo/Brazzaville, Zaire, Ghana, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta 
(Burkina Faso) and Nigeria. “By 1976 coups had occurred in more than half of the African 
countries, and in that year the military occupied the seat in government in half of them” 
(Nordlinger, 1977: 6). Kieh, in looking at coup statistics in Africa from 1950 to 2000, points 
out that Africa suffered 85 coups. Fifty-eight coups were against civilian regimes and 27 
against military regimes (Kieh, 2004: 44–45). Hutchful also cautions that coups may seem to 
re-arrange politics rather than transform to democracies and that the struggle against military 
authoritarianism has often spawned not democracies, but particularly debilitating new forms 
of militarisation and militarism (Hutchful, 1997: 44). Moreover, many military regimes, he 
cautions, were ousted to be replaced by a parti militaire that only partly realised democratic 
freedoms (he quotes among others Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mauritania as examples – 
Hutchful, 1997: 43). Hutchful’s remarks need to be kept in mind in the case of Nigeria. 
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Not all succeed: Pathways from military rule – Africa in 1997 
Cases differ. (1) In some cases complete demilitarisation took place, such as Benin and Mali 
by 1997. (2) In others regime rearrangement took place with the military remaining 
influential. Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mauritania are examples of this. The new civilian 
leaders are frequently ex-military men in civilian clothes. (3) Aborted transitions occur, such 
as those in Algeria and Nigeria by 1997. (4) Successful regime resistance and deflections of 
democratic pressure may occur, with Zaire and Togo as examples. (5) Transitions take place 
that involve a partial collapse of the central state and the emergence of new political entities, 
such as Eritrea and Somaliland.274 (6) Transitions sometimes regress into the emergence of 
warlordism (Somalia and Liberia) and (7) Peace pacts and constitution writing could be 
followed by an election with victory for former liberation movements, such as in Namibia, 
South Africa and Mozambique [Derived from Hutchful, 1997: 45]. 
 
Lewis makes a telling point: “Since independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has been 
ruled by the military for a total of twenty five years (Lewis wrote this in 1997). Following the 
overthrow of the First Republic in 1966, there has been only one civilian interregnum, the 
short-lived Second Republic of 1979–1983” (Lewis, 1997: 139). In nearly all cases the 
military in power have, in Lewis’s view sought legitimacy for their rule by promising a 
transition to a democratic order (Lewis, 1997: 139). In this regard Nigeria is an interesting 
case. Military strongmen regularly justified their role as midwives to democracy. 
 
Ojo argues that despite military interference, “the idea of democracy is not new to Nigeria” 
(Ojo, 2004: 63). The separateness imposed by colonial rulers, the strengthening of ethnic 
differences caused by it and patronage also contributed to a political economy of separate 
inequalities (Ojo, 2004: 65). Ojo argues: “In that way, colonialism emerged as a disruptive 
force in the evolution of democracy in Nigeria” (Ojo, 2004: 65). Ojo divides Nigerian politics 
into phases: (1) The colonial era spawning patronage and social division through colonial 
administration and these divisions in turn spawning future economic, political and social fault 
lines; and (2) the post-colonial era between 1960 and 2003, marked by coups and attempts to 
get the military to disengage from politics. 
 
The post-colonial era is again sub-divided into the following epochs: (1) The military seizing 
power from civilians in 1966 and the Murtale/Obasanjo Transition Programme (1975–1979) 
                                                 
274And one may add, the continuation of regional conflict and intra- as well as inter state tension. 
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that ended with civilian rule, the military having disengaged from politics. The Second 
Republic came into being in 1979. It seemed that the military was willing to relinquish power. 
However, the influence of the men on horseback remained an important factor (Ojo, 2004: 
66–67). (2) Four years of civilian rule came to an end in 1983 in Nigeria’s fourth coup d’état. 
General Babangida’s Transition Programme followed from 1985 to 1993. Political parties 
were unbanned though in a limited exercise of the “liberalisation of politics”. The election, 
demonstrating only a 35 percent vote, was controversial and was eventually annulled. This led 
to a prolonged crisis and power was transferred from Babangida to an interim national 
government. This was to lead to what Ojo calls (3) Sani Abacha’s Transition Programme 
between 1993 and 1998. National elections followed, but Abadja himself “refused to follow 
his own self imposed program” (Ojo, 2004: 73). A reign of terror followed, which resulted in 
trade union leaders such as Frank Kokori being imprisoned, possible military contenders 
being put in jail and escalating state repression that included the assassination of opponents. 
Press freedom was drastically curtailed, newspapers were closed and media people harassed. 
“In a nutshell the regime simply unleashed terror on the polity and was at the same time in 
self delusion claiming to be mid wifing democracy” (Ojo, 2004: 75). (4) Abubakar’s 
transition programme took place between 1998 and 1999. General Abdulsalam Abubakar took 
power in June 1998 after the mysterious death of his predecessor. It was announced (again) 
that the military wished to exit politics with a hand-over date to civilians promised for 1999. 
Elections indeed followed, with Obasanjo elected as president (Ojo, 2004: 76). (5) Transition 
to civilian rule was confirmed with the inauguration of the Fourth Republic. Possibilities for 
praetorian tendencies or another coup saw more than 100 retirements of ‘potential political 
persons’ in the military hierarchy. In 2003 Nigerians went to the polls for the second time 
since the military gave way to civilian rule and Obasanjo was re-elected. Ojo points out that 
the elections were marred by several irregularities and electoral fraud (Ojo, 2004: 78–79). 
“Nigeria’s march to democracy has been a torturous one” (Ojo, 2004: 79). 
 
Nigeria: A closer look at coups and transition – sides to a disengagement coin 
 
Because of the political and economic influence of the military disengagement from politics 
in not a simple issue, nor a foregone conclusion. Nigeria is/was no different. Amuwo notes 
that, following the return to civilian rule in Nigeria, in 1979 many wondered aloud about the 
longevity of the military-engineered democratic experiment. By 31 December 1983 it was no 
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longer necessary to ponder this, as the military returned as mentioned before275 (Amuwo, 
1995: 1).276 As mentioned, the first “military republic” lasted from 1966 to 1979. Civilian rule 
returned in 1979 amid uncertainties about the future. On New Year’s Day 1984, Nigeria was 
under military rule again. For Amuwo the Nigerian state was classically caught up in a “coup 
d'état syndrome” and the “cyclical mechanism of civil-military rule” (Amuwo, 1995: 6, 12). 
 
Contributors to the work of Kieh and Agbese (2004) note that the issue of military 
disengagement, the man on horseback (referring to the military) withdrawing from civilian 
politics and “returning to barracks” is of relevance in MS (Luckham, 2004: 91ff). Ironically, 
in the 1980s when theorists wrote about the so-called Third Wave of Democracy, the military 
re-engaged again in politics in Nigeria (Kieh, 2004: 121). Like Adejumobi and Momoh 
(1995), Kieh in my view rightly links the coup syndrome to political economic issues such as: 
(1) the state of the economy in the neo-colonial state and the need to transform the neo-
colonial state; (2) the inability of civilian governments to deal with economic transformation 
and equality and a redistribution of scarce resources; (3) corruption or the problem of 
cleptocrats; and (4) lack of a conscious strategy to build public participation irrespective of 
citizens’ backgrounds (Kieh, 2004: 123–124). However, he notes that military regimes fared 
little better once they (re-)engaged with civil politics.277 The Oputa Report of 2004, which I 
will discuss somewhat later, seems to confirm this. 
                                                 
275 There are manifold reasons in the case of Nigeria for the return of the man on horseback. Among 
others, Adejumobi and Momoh state that the civilian administration of the Second Republic (1979–
1983) “displayed brazen economic recklessness, financial imprudence and a general misdemeanour for 
electoral and political processes” (Adejumobi & Momoh, 1995: i). They also remark that the return to 
civilian rule of some and “often created the context for the enthronement of civil regimes which have 
some semblance [to] military authoritarianism and which reflected the praetorian character of military 
regimes” (Adejumobi & Momoh, 1995: i). Agbese, in a chapter in a book written by himself and Kieh, 
considered the reasons why the military in various states argued for interference (or re-interference). 
Comparing quotes of coup leaders that rationalised the overthrow of the civilian governments from 
countries such as Uganda, Ghana, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Liberia and Nigeria, he demonstrates 
that the reasons mentioned by Adejumobi and Momoh seem to be a general prelude for military 
intervention (Kieh & Agbese, 2004: 62–64). The paradox was that: “… these civilian regimes lacking 
the force of arms, the desirable democratic ethos and nuances and the capacity or political will to 
improve the general well-being of the people usually set the context for the return of the military into 
power …” 
276 For more detail on the “Fourth Coup d’état” consult Ikoku (1984; Reprint, 2002). 
277 Kieh mentions several theoretical models as intellectual tools to understand coups. These include the 
personalist model, the corporatist model, the manifest destiny model, the Marxist model and the 
integrative model (Kieh, 2004: 40–43). 
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Nigeria in 1993 was the archetype of acute political instability and the attendant economic 
breakdown that have come to characterise the African continent most pointedly since the 
1980s. At the end of the year the country had its third national government in 12 months – 
two military and one military-inspired. The economy ground to a halt as tension and social 
insecurity attained unprecedented levels … External reserves dwindled rapidly and by the end 
of the year were barely enough to service one month’s imports. Economic growth crashed to 
about two percent (according to the Federal Ministry of Finance, 1994) … extra-budgetary 
spending had pushed the nation into an official deficit of N 75.21 billion … a virtual 
economic standstill (Nahzeem Oluwafemi Mimiko, in Social Justice, Vol. 22(3), 1995: 129). 
 
Muhammadu Buhari’s ousting in 1985 and Gen. Babangida coming to power promised the re-
instatement of democracy and raised expectations in Nigerian civil society. Despite his 
elaborate programme the government kept strict control over the process. Civilian politics 
returned, but under restrictions. By 1991 civilian politicians were allowed to enter the 
political arena subject to various conditions. The political transfer date was postponed three 
times before it was set for the second half of 1993. Babangida also established a civilian 
Transitional Council, partly under pressure, as he was criticised for harbouring hidden 
strategies to uphold power and partly perhaps as a goodwill gesture. The election took place 
“amidst confusion but was viewed as credible and fair” (Lewis, 1997: 141). Although Abiola, 
a wealthy business figure, gained nearly 60 percent of the vote, no transfer of power was 
forthcoming. Widespread protests and strikes followed. Babangida resigned and installed the 
Interim National Government (based on the Transitional Council that he had formed earlier in 
1993). The interim government floundered amid a national strike (Lewis, 1997: 141). 
 
Gen. Abacha took power. Abacha seemingly tried to placate the opposition, among others 
Abiola. However, opposition to the regime escalated and eventually culminated in a nation-
wide petroleum workers’ strike that lasted nine weeks. Abacha, under pressure, resolved not 
to submit to demands. 
 
The trade union leadership was decapitated by mass detentions, media houses were closed and 
anonymous attackers harassed members of the opposition – the usual reaction by authoritarian 
states, even if considering/promising to embark on transition to democracy (the political 
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Rubicon is frequently postponed in many states).278 Abiola was detained. Rumours of a 
counter-coup led to the imprisonment of Brig. Gwadabe, Gen. Yar’Adua and Gen. Obasanjo. 
Secret military tribunals followed. The chill in Nigerian politics deepened when Ken Saro-
Wiwa and eight fellow activists were executed. Indeed, Lewis argues that “Abacha has gone 
further than any previous Nigerian ruler in abrogating basic civil liberties and political rights” 
(Lewis, 1997: 147). The man on horseback was not only on the scene but acted this time like 
a fiery tempest. Before military rule was terminated in 1999, things were to get worse. 
 
The Nigerian military’s re-engagement in politics fortunately came to an end in May 1999. 
Fayemi points out that: “The scale, scope and intensity of conflict in Nigeria since the end of 
military rule challenge the assumed link between military disengagement from politics and 
the demilitarisation of Nigerian politics” (Fayemi, 2003: 57). Rather than recede, social 
violence increased. For Fayemi, this presents the practical challenge of “effective and 
accountable security agencies” (in pursuit of community safety and individual rights) and the 
“effective governance of the security sector through the empowerment of civilian supervision 
mechanisms” (Fayemi, 2003: 57). For Kieh, using an integrative analytical approach, as he 
calls it, the situation demands that the problem be solved through a multi-layered approach 
covering the state, civil society and the military/security institutions. 
 
Some of the issues to be addressed include ways to manage a politicised but de-
institutionalised (read: back to barracks) military, the problems of the personalisation of 
militarist politics and the quest for power. Furthermore, reform and democratisation advocates 
have to deal with the weakened state of accountability and proliferation of intelligence 
agencies as a result of the authoritarian and military rule of the past, the past and current link 
between business elite and military managers/commanders, which has led to widespread 
corruption, and the potential for a large-scale emergence of ethnic-regional tension (and 
presumably religion and class issues as well). In addition to this the legacy of societal 
militarisation and violence remains ever present (Fayemi, 2003: 59–63). 
 
The problem of the militarisation of sectors of civil society and resultant political militancy 
among contenders to the state (i.e. white and black people that grew up and lived through the 
                                                 
278 Even liberal or established democracies may reach a state where they re-cross the Rubicon, back to 
elements of authoritarian rule, and where organised elements of civil society or the civil community, 
such as trade unions and religious groups or movements protesting against government policies that 
leave communities worse off than before are curtailed. Democracy is never guaranteed; it needs to be 
established, enhanced and fought for from day to day under any government, however liberal that 
government may claim to be. 
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1970s and 1980s in South Africa) and the effects of being collectively socialised-through-
militarism among different communities in Nigeria, is potentially explosive much like South 
Africa (at the time). Any attempt at political reform with democratisation and security 
governance will have to reckon with these social fault lines. The scope and extent in the case 
of Nigeria is arguably far greater and potentially more disruptive than in South Africa.279 
 
Following the military’s latest disengagement from politics in Nigeria, the state accepted the 
1999 Constitution and the April 2003 elections followed. Olusegun Obasanjo, himself from a 
military background, of the People’s Democratic Party came to power. The election results 
were highly contested. The opposition attempted to overturn the results legally but did not 
succeed, even though some argued that the judiciary in the new state was somewhat more 
independent (DAWODU, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt). The Human Rights 
Report on Nigeria for 2004 reported on the new state’s record as follows: “While civilian 
authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were some 
instances in which elements of security forces acted outside the law” (DAWODU, 2005, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt). The report does not specify the number of cases and 
whereas it states that “in some instances” forces acted outside the law, it also says that 
“Members of the security forces committed numerous human-rights abuses” (DAWODU, 
2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt). The report refers to the restrictions on freedom of 
the press and speech, and notes that the government’s human-rights record remains poor. The 
report states that security forces committed extra-judicial killings and used excessive force, 
but at the same time states that there were fewer reports of “incidences of torture” 
(DAWODU, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt). Prolonged detention and lack of 
speedy trials are also mentioned. 
 
While the wording of the report is somewhat contradictory, the conclusion that I reach is that 
civil control of the military did not prevent instances of abuse of power and transgression of 
human rights. This does not auger well for the maintenance of democracy and enhancement 
of human rights in the said case. 
 
As can be expected in a previously militarised society, state-inspired vigilante action still 
encroached on human rights. One example is the case where according to various reports 
Kaduna residents discovered ten or more bodies in a grave in 2003 (Country Reports on 
                                                 
279 The linkage between patron-client relationships and corruption as subversive elements that 
undermine a proficient military relationship and professional soldiering is not unique to Nigeria. Nor is 
the comment that such patronage and corruption do not necessarily undermine military effectiveness in 
the short term (see Young, 1997: 133 ff, 143–145, on the case of Zimbabwe).  
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Human Rights Practices, 2004). Residents suggested that the bodies were those of activists 
who had been involved in a fuel strike a week before. The Kaduna State governor insisted that 
those killed were armed robbers and promised an investigative panel. Nothing came of the 
expected report. It is important to note that in this case, it was the police who were implicated 
rather than the military. Also pertinent is that the Country Report explicitly mentions that 
“Police and military personnel used excessive and sometimes deadly force in the suppression 
of civil unrest, property vandalization and inter-ethnic violence”. The report further relates 
that summary executions, assaults and other abuses were carried out in the Niger Delta 
(Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004). Both the police and the military were 
deployed in the Niger Delta region in response to civil unrest and violence. Amnesty 
International estimated that roughly 500 causalities occurred in the Rivers State owing to 
civilians and youths clashing with the military and police task forces in this region (Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004). 
 
On the positive side, the report points out that the Nigerian National Human Rights 
Commission, tasked with monitoring and protecting human rights, was enjoying greater 
recognition and cooperated with other bodies and NGOs. The commission was chaired by a 
judge, had 15 other members and had affiliates in each of the country’s political regions. It is 
said that domestic and international human-rights groups “generally operated without 
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases” 
(DAWODU, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt). 
 
After the killing of 200 civilians in Benue in 2001, the government in 2002 appointed the 
Benue Commission, whose report was to be released in 2003. However, the report held no-
one accountable for the transgressions and proposed no corrective action (this, in my view, a 
fairly persistent problem with government-appointed commissions. Despite various 
commissions in South Africa following violence in the 1990s, the truth did not come out (see 
Chapter 3). 
 
It is important to note that these reported incidents happened under civilian rule and the new 
constitution of Nigeria. Section 1 of the constitution professes respect for the integrity of the 
person, including freedom from arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life. The constitution 
prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (section 1.a). The constitution 
also provides for an independent judiciary. It provides for non-arbitrary interference with 
privacy, family, home or correspondence and respect for civil liberties (section 2). 
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I have discussed elsewhere the complexities of guaranteeing civil and human rights in one-
party states and the resultant challenges (see chapter 3). I referred, among others, to the 
involvement of the ICJ (1978). Rather than focus on this here, I will now discuss the current 
situation in Nigeria, especially with regard to an attempt to deal with past human-rights 
transgressions. 
 
An issue of potentially great importance arose after the transition to democracy and the 
appointment of the new president of Nigeria. Two weeks after his inauguration, Obasanjo 
announced a seven-person commission called the Human Rights Violations Investigative 
Commission (HRVIC). It was to be headed by Justice Chukwudifu Oputa. The Oputa Panel 
was to investigate human-rights abuses dating back to the days of military rule. In October 
2003 formal hearings started (www.rnw.nl/humanrights/html). 
 
Despite some similarities between the mandate of the panel and the SATRC, there was one 
major difference: the Oputa Panel was appointed by the president himself and not through a 
bill. The SATRC Bill was put to the South African Parliament and enacted by Parliament in 
1995. As such, it had a higher stature, being legally enacted by the legislature as outlined in 
the South African constitution. This proved to be an important, if not crucial, difference. The 
Oputa Panel and its activities resided more in the realm of a government-appointed 
commission than a TRC in terms of the earlier typology that I deploy in this study. (For more 
detail see the earlier distinctions made on different approaches in dealing with human-rights 
excesses; Chapters 3 and 4.) 
 
The HRVIC’s report, consisting of six volumes, was completed in 2004. The report was not 
released after its submission to government. The ruling government argued that the Supreme 
Court had found the panel’s mandate unconstitutional. Therefore, government planned no 
further action related to the findings of the report (DAWODU, 2005, http://www.State.gov 
/g/drl/rls/hrrpt). The fact that President Obasanjo refused to release the report in which Chief 
Justice Chukwudili Oputa analysed the contemporary situation caused a public debate, if not 
an uproar (the report was eventually posted on the web on 30 November 2004 as 
http://www.dawodu.com/hrvic1.htm, without being “officially” released). 
 
The Oputa Panel faced difficulties similar to the SATRC: compromises between interests and 
truth, horse-trading and blaming “the other” all had an impact on the outcome of the exercise. 
Like the TRC, the panel summoned previous heads of state, such as Abubakar, Babangida and 
Buhari. They refused summons and did not appear before the panel, like President P.W. Botha 
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in South Africa. Obasanjo appeared before the panel and gave his testimony on 11 September 
2001 (http://www.dawodu.com/hrvic1.htm and http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt). In South 
Africa, horse-trading and compromises between the National Party as previous incumbents 
and the ANC as future rulers, some argued, ensured that for example President P.W. Botha 
(the Groot Krokodil of Total Onslaught fame) did not have to appear before the TRC.280 There 
is no doubt that he, together with some others, such as the “political generals” and AB 
advisors since at least 1972, should have been prime witnesses in an exercise of the intended 
magnitude of the SATRC. One crucial difference remains between the two reports: despite 
dissatisfaction expressed by the ruling government in South Africa and the previous National 
Party incumbents, the SATRCR was released. 
 
To a large extent South Africans were short-circuited when it came to revealing the past 
because of the political compromises (or is it consensus based on mutual benefits and self-
interest?) But, South Africans had their report. It came about by legislation, it remained a 
more or less open process and the report was released into the public domain. The Oputa 
Panel’s Report is not yet in the public domain to the extent that it may influence policy-
making. In not releasing the report, the potential impact of the report on public discussion and 
debate (and hence potential influence of future policy decisions) on civil control over the 
military was drastically watered down. 
 
In view of my earlier arguments this was not surprising, perhaps it was even predictable. 
Government-appointed commissions suffer three shortcomings or restrictions: (1) as the 
commissioners are appointed by the government of the day, they have less freedom to unearth 
the truth, or may succumb to pressure not to “let all out” by some degree of self-censorship; 
(2) frequently their mandate and powers are limited by the incumbent government that 
appoints them; and (3) despite work done by the commissioners, the reports may not see the 
light. At least on this level it seems to me that TRCs hold more potential to unearth the truth 
about past abuses than government-appointed commissions. In taking a look at cases in 
Africa, this seems quite clear. As a result, despite criticism of TRCs, it seems that at least 
marginally “more” truth can be unearthed and the likelihood of these reports reaching the 
public domain is greater. 
 
What about a new civic culture and renewal of CMR for Nigerians? Agbese refers to a 
statement by Obasanjo: “We are at the dawn of a new era where the military is subject to civil 
                                                 
280 For more detail, consult Wilson (2001: various pages). 
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authorities. At all times, your (referring here to the military) obedience to civil authorities 
must be unquestionable. The 1999 Constitution clearly states the goals and objectives of the 
Nigerian Army and I expect all of you will adhere to the relevant provisions therein in all 
your undertakings” (Agbese, 2004: 183).281 
 
Indeed, the new civilian government brought about some changes: 
 
(1) Military persons in political appointments were retired, 
(2) Corrupt military staff were dislodged from their loot and corrective action taken in 
some cases; and 
(3) Attempts were made to reprofessionalise the armed forces through training and 
seminars. 
 
It may still be some time before Nigeria can claim civil control over the military; or the “new” 
constitutional military can claim “reprofessionalised” attitudes and civil conduct, 
notwithstanding the progress made so far.282 With or without the Oputa Report, the new civil 
order still faces gigantic challenges in terms of civil control over the military and likewise 
civil control by the military over themselves as bearers of the arms of the state. The man on 
horseback may be out of politics, but not yet into principled civil conduct by the military. 
 
Again the question remains: did the Nigerian attempt at truth and reconciliation succeed in 
enhancing the situation, as is the perception of some observers and theorists? Would the 
situation not be better, in any case, because of the transition and the new constitutional 
imperatives, whether the Oputa Panel was appointed or not? 
 
If the two approaches were complementary, why does it seem that the Oputa Report was not 
well received by the powers that be? Many questions remain unanswered. The Nigerian case 
does not give conclusive evidence on either side when the research question is posed. Neither 
has the civil-military situation made a complete around-turn, yet. Many difficulties remain. If 
                                                 
281 Interestingly, Agbese notes that Uganda’s 1995 constitution goes further than Nigeria’s in that it 
states that the government may not be removed or ousted by non-constitutional means. Similarly, he 
suggests that Ghana, Ethiopia and Eritrea have similar explicit utterances in their constitutions 
(Agbese, 2004: 195ff). 
282 Agbese contends: “Ali Mazrui categorises Nigeria as a coup-prone country … Ihonvbrere argued 
that ‘the military coup has become part of the country’s political equation’”. In short, in a country like 
Nigeria, the military frequently intervenes in politics and “while soldiers in such countries may 
relinquish power to civilians, they do not stay away from politics for long. In effect, transferring power 
to civilians does not guarantee that the soldiers will stay put in their barracks” (Agbese, 2004: 203). 
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Nigeria is to achieve stable CMR and civil control over a re-professionalised military, would 
it be due to civil society action, the constitutional imperatives, the military staying out of 
politics, the politicians refraining from inviting the military (again) into politics, or the Oputa 
Panel experiment? Or would it be by the vigilance of concerned citizens, the media and 
principled approaches by politicians in opposition or government? 
 
In my view, it is simply too early to predict the long-term outcome. The case study of Nigeria 
does not yet seem to provide enough concrete evidence to either side on the research 
question(s) I posed earlier on. At the same time one can argue that the Oputa Report, owing to 
its relatively public stature, may have kindled reflections that could lead to the enhancement 
of civil control over the military. 
 
On a more positive note: The Oputa Panel may well have contributed to greater awareness 
among military and political leaders that their past actions may be investigated eventually, 
thus putting a secondary control measure in place – albeit as a re-active measure rather than a 
pro-active process. Secondly, the level of disruption of civil liberties and the negative effect 
of this on the image of the military through the extremities of Abacha’s rule may have made 
Nigerians and the military conscious of the dangers inherent in interfering in politics. Lastly, 
civil society in Nigeria may have been strengthened through its experiences, which may 
create favourable conditions for vigilance and action to keep military strongmen out of 
politics. Things may have taken a turn for the better despite Hutchful’s warning that Nigeria 
resembles a rearrangement of politics rather than full-blown democratisation. 
 
Frequently positive notes are confronted by the less positive or perhaps an a-tonal note: 
Following the latest elections (which were contested from various corners) a new president 
was elected, but again a person with connections to the military. The second contender, 
Buhari, was a former military ruler (I referred to him earlier). Thus civil control with or 
without the Oputa Report seems to be de facto, but not a reflection of a democratic body 
politic where the military may remain in the barracks or politicians may be tempted to invite 
them “back in” – on the continuum of what I will call invited praetorianism or perhaps more 
direct intervention, even if rationalised as upholding the newfound democracy. 
 
5.5.3. Rwanda 
 
There is no doubt that the Great Lakes region had, and still has, a critical impact on Africa. 
Even more so it has a crucial effect on the current human-rights debate. What happened in the 
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Rwandan genocide surpasses many other abuses of human rights in Africa and elsewhere.283 
Some theorists relate the triggering of this conflict to the issue of economy, exploitation and 
neo-colonialism, rather than ethnic conflict (Pritvorov, 2002: 25; Nabudere, 2003: 10). 
 
Magubane, a historian and sociologist, offers a considered argument on conflict in Africa: 
“The structural cleavages based on racial, ethnic and cultural differences are built into 
colonial situations just as much as neo-colonialism as a system of economic, political and 
ideological control is woven into the colonial situation at independence.” He continues: “… 
From the above it is obvious that the roots of modern conflicts in tropical Africa reach very 
deep. The present outbreak of conflict cannot be attributed to primitive identities like 
tribalism, but should be traced back to the socio-economic structure inherited from long 
periods of colonial rule and exploitation” (Magubane, 2000: 53). 
 
Others, like Dani Nabudere, link the colonial past to current capitalist exploitation. Nabudere 
refers to a UN report on illegal exploitation of natural resources and enduring conflict in the 
Great Lakes region. The report makes it clear that some African elite “had done this in league 
with a dozen reputable foreign companies and financial institutions registered in Belgium, 
Germany, Malaysia, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Britain and others (Nabudere, 
2003: 10).284 
 
Peter Uvin makes a similar argument. He contends that the international community played, 
and still plays, a major role in the current conflict – either intended or not.285 Uvin suggests 
                                                 
283 Maogoto illustrates a telling point about the 1994 massacres in Rwanda: “The dead in Rwanda 
escalated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient 
mass killing since (the USA) bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (Gourevitch, quoted by Maogoto, 
2003: 66). As in the case of the Holocaust and the bombing of the two Japanese cities, the genocide 
was well organised, aimed mainly at civilians, co-ordinated and administered with precision. It was not 
spontaneous or random (Maogoto, 2003: 66). 
284 Nabudere goes further. He points out that Yoweri Museveni (Uganda) and Paul Kagame (Rwanda), 
two close allies of the USA during the Clinton administration, were “on the verge of becoming 
godfathers of the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the conflict” 
(Nabudere, 2003: 10). 
285 In a popular work, not highly controversial and in no way theoretical, written in an auto-
ethnographic style, Perkins points out how capitalist companies or what he calls corporatocracy, 
through their targeted involvement to ensure profit, cause social alienation and war (Perkins, 2005). For 
an early South African view, again popular in nature, about the conflict over scarce resources aimed at 
profit and its role as cause of WWI and WWII, see Scholtemeijer (1950). Scholtemeijer’s arguments on 
resource wars for capitalist profit, though less succinctly argued, reflect later conjectures of theorists 
(see for example Pritvorov, 2002). For the role of Western capitalism in the continued conflict in 
Namibia under South African occupation, see a work edited by Cooper (1988). 
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that in the majority of cases it is intended (Uvin, 1998).286 Uvin’s argument is supported by 
Nabudere (2004). Nabudere, however, goes into the background and the sustained reasons for 
the conflict in much more detail by analysing the political economy of the Great Lakes region, 
a conflict that has become known as Africa’s First World War (Nabudere, 2004: 1). He points 
out how Western interests, primarily those of the USA, created instability by maintaining the 
dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in power for years, how enforced structural adjustment 
programmes played a role and how exploitation of scarce resources in the area under the glib 
mantra of globalisation enhanced the conflicts in the region (Nabudere, 2004: 5–7).287 He 
points out the involvement of large transnational corporations (i.e. Sominki held by USA and 
Belgian magnates) that fuelled conflict through their resource exploitation. Concurring with 
Nabudere, Unwin and Magubane, Juma goes further in tracing what he calls ‘shadow 
networks’ and ‘transnational conflict networks’ that in furthering international markets cause 
greater conflict, with specific reference to the Great Lakes region (Juma, 2007: 2–5). His 
article makes for telling if not chilling reading.288  Neklessa is to the point in his analysis. He 
relates much of the conflict in areas such as the Great Lakes region to “the risk that real 
control over social and economic activities on the African continent may in the long run pass 
on to foreign donors and international organisations thus (forming) the context of a rather 
peculiar north centric macro-colonialism” (Neklessa, 1997: 5). 
 
But, back to the issue of trials and crimes against humanity: the genocide in 1994 where 
conflict between the Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority resulted in the genocide of roughly 
800 000 Tutsi people (Stremlau, 1998: 32).289 This number is disputed, with some suggesting 
many more victims. Ferstman puts the number of people eliminated in the course of the 
                                                 
286 See a book review by Bonny Ibhawoh (2000: 321–322) on Peter Uvin’s publication, Aiding 
Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (1998, West Hartford: Kumurian Press). 
287 Observers will recall that SeseSeko’s regime also played a crucial role in the destabilisation of 
Angola following the failing of the Alvor agreements between the MPLA, FNLA and Unita. Zaire 
acted as the launching platform for CIA and South African military incursions into northern Angola 
(1975/1976). Roughly 1 500 Zairean troops also formed part of the invasion force, which was 
eventually repelled (Ciment, 1997: 13; Gleijeses, 2002: 252, 290ff). 
288 Juma’s academic work confirms what other works, such as the auto-ethnographic tale of Perkins, 
Confessions of an Economic Hitman, tell us about what shadow networks and transnational capitalist 
interference caused in Latin America and the Middle East – alienation, conflict and poverty.  Earlier 
research that links exploitation and trans-national capital worth reading includes Engdahl’s A Century 
of War (1993). A more recent work that analyses trans-national capital, exploitation through the market 
and the much coveted glibspeak/newspeak, globalisation, is Eric Toussaint’s Your Money or Your Life 
(2005). 
289 In general, Western observers see the conflict as an ethnic one. Analysts tend to overlook the issue 
of asymmetrical power, class and status, as well as the struggle to control scarce resources and foreign 
involvement for profit through exploitation. The conflict took, one may argue, the form of extremists of 
one group against moderates that represented both Tutsi and Hutu. More research is necessary to 
understand the root causes of conflict in terms other than ethnic analysis. 
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genocide at 1 000 000, that is, one seventh of the population of Rwanda (Ferstman, 1997: 
859).290 
 
The earlier mass murders in Burundi in the 1970s are overshadowed by the Rwandan 
genocide. Lemarchand argues: “Nowhere is this more cruelly evident than in contemporary 
Rwanda and Burundi, the only states in post-independence Africa to have experienced 
human-rights violations on a genocidal scale. Though largely overshadowed in public 
attention by the magnitude of the carnage in Rwanda, the 1972 Burundi genocide, causing the 
deaths of anywhere from 100 000 to 200 000 Hutu, must not be forgotten. Not only because 
of the appalling nature of the crime – that it occurred on a lesser scale than the killings of 
Tutsi in Rwanda, and 24 years earlier, does not make it less offensive …” (Lemarchand, 
1996: 1–2). 
 
The UN National Assembly approved the Genocide Convention (full name: UN Convention on 
the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide) only in December 1948. The 
Convention’s decision came into effect in 1951 and described genocide as “acts committed 
with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group” 
(Laska, 2001: 82).  
 
Lemarchand argues that “To this day however, and despite subsequent efforts at clarifying the 
essence of the phenomenon, considerable ambiguity clings to the term” (Lemarchand, 1996: 
1). Stremlau argues that lack of intervention by the international community in the Great 
Lakes region resulted in a comprehensive and complex refugee crisis, apart from the 
incredible loss of human life. It is estimated that approximately 50 000 refugees had died in 
Eastern Zaire by 1994 from cholera, dysentery and dehydration alone (Stremlau, 1998: 33). 
Another uprising of Zairian Tutsi with evident assistance from Rwanda, Uganda and other 
neighbouring states against the militia of Hutus (Interahamwe) forced them to flee, which led 
to the return of many people. Ferstman argues: “The international community, despite 
desperate calls for assistance, proved either unable or unwilling to take the necessary 
measures to halt the genocide” (Ferstman, 1997: 859). 
 
As late as 1997, campaigns of ethnic cleansing were still reported. The armed forces of Zaire 
were implicated in these activities that were meant to eliminate many refugees before they 
                                                 
290 The term genocide was coined by the legal scholar Raphael Lemken (1900 – 1959), a Polish Jew 
who escaped the holocaust (Laska, 2001). 
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could return to Rwanda (Stremlau, 1998: 34). Rwanda, apart from appalling loss of life, 
suffered the incapacitation of institutions, the death or refugeeship of most of the skilled 
people and being regarded as a state without legitimacy (Sidiropoulos, 2002: 77). 
 
Among the institutions that suffered virtual destruction was the Rwandan justice system. The 
absence of such a system exacerbated conditions in Rwanda. The UN Security Council 
established an international tribunal for Rwanda, formally named the International Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons responsible for Genocide and other serious Violations of the 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda, in 1994, with the 
acceptance of Resolution 955 (Ferstman, 1997: 860). (If the above holds true for political 
institutions and the legal system, it is not too difficult to imagine what it meant for the civil-
military dimension.) 
 
In broad terms Resolution 955 aimed at restoring justice, maintaining peace and ensuring that 
similar occurrences of mass violence directed against all or part of a community were 
prevented (Unwin & Mironko, 2003). Unwin and Mironko (2003: 219 ff) argue that the 
tribunal with nearly 800 staff members had mixed success. A slow rate of bringing people to 
trial was one problem (by 2003 seven trials out of 17 were in process and two appeals were 
pending at the time). Some argued of that the tribunal was a hypocritical show (the imbalance 
between the extreme evil of genocide and the “refined judicial afforded to perpetrators”), 
while some observers suggested that it was merely a show of Western disapproval and lay in 
the realm of symbolic politics driven by guilt feelings about initial and shameful inaction by 
the West and belated attempts to be seen to be involved in humanitarian matters in the Great 
Lakes region (Unwin & Mironko, 2003: 219). The authors also point out the relative lack of 
interest in Western media and from researchers in general to become involved in investigating 
the genocide. 
 
In Rwanda, the Organic Law (Number 08/96) passed by parliament in September 1996 also 
tried to constitute institutions for an independent special tribunal. The law purported to 
preserve the rights guaranteed by the Rwandan Constitution, Code of Criminal Procedure and 
the international agreements to which Rwanda was a party. The first domestic trials began in 
late 1996. By the end of 2001 approximately 6 500 people had appeared in court and a few 
thousand had been freed because of lack of evidence. Unwin and Mironko echo the arguments 
of Wolters (mentioned elsewhere) that it may take dozens of years to try the more than 115 
000 persons involved (Unwin & Mironko, 2003). 
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Ferstman argues that a long and difficult road lies ahead and that numerous hitches have 
occurred. “Clearly, changes in many areas beyond the legal arena will be required to bring 
about lasting reconciliation in Rwanda” (Ferstman, 1997: 876). She further argues that the 
long-term success of the trials is predicated on their legitimacy and on whether they can 
facilitate fair procedural justice (Ferstman, 1997: 877). Unwin and Mironko, in a sobering 
note, state that” the quality of justice” may be lacking (the skills levels of judges, their 
payment, possibilities for corruption, neglect of exculpatory evidence, file processing, etc). 
They also point out undue “silent pressures” by sponsors that deal with the issue in a 
technocratic approach, such as the number of cases completed (“measurable outcomes”) and 
require stress on “results” rather than the quality, efficiency and justness of the process 
(Unwin & Mironko, 2003). In contrast, Rwandans are divided on whether justice (including 
punishment for a severe transgression), nation-building or community reconciliation should 
be prioritised – similar to the choices faced by other post-conflict societies. After all: “Post 
genocide justice of course, is deeply political, not technical” (Unwin & Mironko, 2003). Of 
course the commentary by these two theorists is relevant. Human-rights transgressions are 
immanently political. I was somewhat taken aback when a South African journalist asked me 
earlier this year (2007) whether the renewed attempt to prosecute a former apartheid minister 
(Adriaan Vlok) and a senior police person “is not politically inspired” (especially since the 
SATRC has completed its proceedings). Politics cannot be divorced from justice in the 
aftermath of a reconciliation process, because abuse of the polity, human beings and 
individuals stem from political ideology and structures. Moreover, some see reconciliation as 
a unifying process of nation building, others seek vengeance and most of all, attempts at 
managing post-conflict social reconstruction can be interrupted by unintended political 
dynamics (in this case South Africa and Rwanda share the same challenges).291 
 
The Rwandan trials are one identifiable process. Establishing long-term stability and 
protection is another. The genocide started as a result of the action taken when extensive 
planning was carried out by the Presidential Guard, the Gendarmerie, local police force and 
other civil servants. The Interahamwe, the youth wing of the president’s political party trained 
by the Presidential Guard, was responsible for a large number of the killings. One has to note 
here as military sociologists that CMR and human-rights transgressions become much more 
complex in a society where local militia, self-defence units or youthful militias (some forcibly 
co-opted) enter the picture. The last groups mentioned are not necessarily under military 
                                                 
291 Wilson (2002) in his case study on the SATRC argues convincingly, in my view, that there were/are 
social pressures (then and now) on the SATRC to be a totalising symbol of unity and/or a mechanism 
for state legitimating in post-apartheid South Africa. All post-oppressive societies, whatever process 
they choose, face this calamity.   
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command, or nominally so. They may be loosely or closely affiliated to political and/or 
regional loyalties, or simply in it for their own gain or vendettas. This adds a multi-layered 
and technically complicated dimension to the restoration of sound control over the military 
because the “military” is not exactly the military. 
 
To complicate the situation, following the genocide, all was not quiet between Rwanda and 
Burundi. In 2003, an African peacekeeping force was dispatched to Burundi to monitor a 
fragile ceasefire. Troops were despatched from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique (The 
Citizen, 28 April 2002: 1). Let us return to the case of Rwanda. 
 
Given the historical context, Rwanda could choose to forgive and forget.292 Given the 
magnitude of the transgressions, this would have been difficult. A TRC would have been an 
option. But again, the micro- and the macro-contexts meshed. Many of the perpetrators left 
the country. Others would not have come forward if a TRC were the choice. Scharf points out 
the options for Rwanda. His alternatives closely resemble the typologies that I developed 
earlier on, namely (1) assisting internal legal processes to prosecute offenders, (2) TRCs, or 
(3) amnesty, in other words drawing a line through the past (Scharf, 1999: 621ff). To an 
extent, the Rwandan people were forced to choose a mixed approach: for perpetrators that left 
the country an ICT, for those still inside the country who refused a TRC-type process, internal 
judicial proceedings and for those that were willing to come forward, the gacaca process. 
 
The ICT for Rwanda (ICTR) came into being when the new regime in Rwanda requested the 
UN to bring perpetrators to justice. Thus the ICTR came into being when the UN invoked its 
powers based on the concern that the severe and extensive human-rights transgressions in 
Rwanda would disrupt international peace and security (Maogoto, 2003: 57).293 
 
To re-iterate: “Although the trials of genocide suspects have been under way since 1996, 
according to some estimates it could take the Rwandan judicial system up to 150 years to try 
the over 100 000 people already detained on charges of genocide” (Wolters, 2005: 67). Faced 
with this problem of no small extent, the Rwandan government also embarked on the gacaca 
process. It was first introduced in a small number of pilot areas in 2002 before it was 
introduced on a national level during 2005 (Wolters, 2005: 67). The process is aimed at 
                                                 
292 Maogoto describes in great detail the historical background to the 1994 massacre, colonial 
influence, the role players and the subsequent challenges faced by the ICTR. It is impossible within the 
limitations of this thesis to go into this at length. The case study as I deal with it here will have to 
suffice.  
293 Serious human-rights violations relate to Chapter VII jurisdiction of the UN. 
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eradicating a culture of impunity that many argued would persist if perpetrators of the 1994 
genocide were not punished. If impunity is not addressed, justice and reconciliation will 
remain impossible. According to Wolters, the gacaca process is based on a traditional form of 
community conflict resolution; gacaca courts are essentially grassroots courts presided over 
by nine judges elected by the relevant community. The court meets once a week. The judges 
gather, collate and to an extent verify information about what happened during the genocide 
(Wolters, 2005: 67). Thereafter, the court goes into a trial phase. 
 
Since then, the two trial phases have moved on to a national process, making the gacaca 
process part of a TRC-like experiment. The gacaca process that started off with a draft 
document distributed in 1996, when the scale of the judicial process became clear, was to 
become “an unprecedented community based conflict resolution mechanism” (Unwin & 
Mironko, 2003). The idea is that eventually all over Rwanda courts/communal gatherings 
would come into being – some say thousands. The process clearly breaks with other domestic 
and international formal systems. 
 
There are various fears about the process. What if people became involved just out of 
curiosity? What if people abuse the process for furthering personal vendettas? What if it 
exacerbates tension, rather than resolving conflict and helping to attain a measure of justice 
and reconciliation? If one is aware of the unpredictability of socio-political dynamics in any 
sensitive context, these issues are realistic fears. There seem to be more questions than 
answers in tackling the past. 
 
What about possible misgivings among participants – or even judges? What about human-
rights excesses committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front against Hutu post-1994?294 What if 
people came to the process to reduce sentences, rather than showing remorse and commitment 
to a new, more just and reconciliatory social order? What if (and it is a real risk) the gacaca 
cannot deal with the numbers of people to try? Wolters argues that informed guesstimates 
suggest that it may take up to 20 years to complete the gacaca process only (Wolters, 2005: 
68). 
 
Many of the questions and fears are similar to the type of fears that any society experiences 
(as well as individuals in such a society, living in the aftermath of mass violence) when 
embarking on a historical project where the unintended consequences cannot be foreseen. For 
                                                 
294 The process, like the SATRC, had a cut-off date for transgressions committed. 
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example, when South African respondents in 1996 were confronted with similar questions in 
a national HSRC survey, 60 percent of 2 241 respondents believed that the TRC would 
promote reconciliation. Forty percent of the respondents did not. A political party analysis 
was even more revealing: 75 percent ANC and SACP supporters believed in the 
reconciliation thesis, 68 percent of PAC respondents felt likewise, but the National Party 
respondents295 followed behind the DP’s 39 percent with a score of 37 percent. Supporters of 
rightwing parties were more sceptical, with only 15 percent of them believing that the TRC 
would contribute to reconciliation (author’s personal archive, 1996).296 Another predictable 
point of contestation enters the picture; would people rather see reconciliation than justice? A 
pertinent question is whether admission of guilt would terminate the tendency to blame others 
and not act in revenge against the “blameworthy”297 
 
Given the early stages of the Rwandan project, other questions remain. Will the process have 
a positive effect on CMR and civil oversight over the military and other security institutions? 
Will it lead to a reprofessionalisation of the new military? Will politicians and the new 
military in future abide by the rules of the game in which the gacaca process will presumably 
make a contribution? 
 
Clearly, in the aftermath of the genocide a major impetus was, and still is, to realign, 
(re)professionalise the military and paramilitary in such a way that CMR are improved and 
civil control over the military and constitutional and civil behaviour from the military are 
soundly established. 
 
Malan offers a cautionary note: “When analyzing CMR, it has become essential to distinguish 
between political systems that are integrating and those (systems in) the process of 
disintegration … (only) so long as there is a recognisable institution that is military, the 
problem of civil control arises” (Malan, 2000: 155). The Rwandan case is complicated in that 
the military was not exactly the military during the genocide. Civilians, communities and 
youth groups, as well as paramilitary groups, were being declared as, or chose themselves to 
                                                 
295 It would be interesting for future research in the South African case, for example, to do qualitative 
interviews or focus-group interviews with then National Party/New National Party (NNP) supporters 
about their current feelings about the SATRC and reconciliation, given that the NNP was absorbed in 
the ruling ANC – or rather the leadership of the NNP under Marthinus (“Kortbroek”) van Schalkwyk 
chose to enter the ANC fray pragmatically.  
296 At the time, I was working at the HSRC and responsible for the analysis of the TRC-related 
questions. 
297 For an analysis on truth and reconciliation in South Africa and the links with attribution of blame 
following the struggle for liberation, consult Gibson and Gouws (1999). 
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become arms of the state. Clearly, the challenge for Rwanda lies in exactly how this legacy 
can be overcome in hindsight and in partnership with other states and governments in Africa, 
and within the international community. 
 
In view of a variety of institutions being created, such as a National Human Rights 
Commission, the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, and the government’s emphasis on 
Rwandan nation-building, there is a long way to go. Previous schisms still exist. The 
transformation of the military has been attempted, but, warns Sidiropoulos, “senior elements 
of the military and intelligence services continue to feature prominently in government 
decision making circles …” (Sidiropoulis, 2002: 83). The integration process has not been 
completed yet and it is unclear whether it will create a military that serves the constitution, 
rather than a political party. 
 
A new police force was trained and established. Again, the outcomes are less than clear. 
Security (or rather, intelligence) services were streamlined and integrated into a central office 
during 2000. However, some reports of abuse by the intelligence services came from the 
Human Rights Commission (Sidripoulus, 2002: 86). Rwanda remains a polarised society and, 
seemingly, not yet on the verge of becoming a stable, human-rights-orientated democracy 
where civil control is instituted in structures and attitudes. 
 
The mixed approach that has been followed clearly aims at national reconciliation, but with 
the emphasis on nation-building (the critical reader may remark that social reconciliation/ 
accommodation may differ from nation building). Will this three-headed animal set in motion 
in post-genocide Rwanda achieve its goal? Could civil control over the military perhaps be 
achieved without these pathways? 
 
In short: while Rwanda has shown some successes on the path of reconciliation (yet too early 
to provide a verdict) and on armed-force integration as well as instituting bodies of oversight, 
there is a long march ahead. It is too early to say whether the Rwandan experiment of mixing 
an international tribunal, an internal judicial process and a TRC-type exercise will bring about 
stable CMR and civil control over the military. 
 
On a more positive note, it should be mentioned that it seems as if the potential for future 
mass conflict has decreased, the military has become more prone to be in a subservient role 
and the human-rights context more favourable. Rwanda may turn out to be a positive lesson 
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learnt, rather than be relegated to a warehouse of negative and destructive lessons on the 
continent. 
 
5.6. Reflecting on the case studies 
 
The project started off by suggesting a sub-text of “systematic thinking that (aims to) maintain 
and improve the conditions of life of some human population” (Meehan, 1988: 8). This 
particular chapter started off with a quotation from President Kenneth Kaunda on 
reconciliation and a remark by Hesse that suggests that to do away with one particular 
(potential) mode of killing and to improve a single institution is a good starting point. In 
tracking answers to various questions, I frequently reflected on issues such as this – in a way, 
a track within a track: the latter track being the betterment of some societies somewhere, also 
on our continent; to strengthen democracies by instituting CMR that allow for civilian 
oversight or control of the armed institutions through the contribution that an involved 
researcher can make. A society is formed by institutions and society in turn spawns 
institutions. The challenge is to make them humane and through this, to affect attitudes and 
actions that benefit a democratic order. (This also applies to policy conceptualisation, 
planning, implementation and evaluation.) 
 
The epigraph by Robertson implies that one possible constraint in human-rights 
transgressions, whether we discuss international humanitarian law or human rights within a 
state, is that those responsible will be brought to justice. Robertson’s remark is worth 
reflecting on in this research. 
 
The reciprocal influence mentioned above leads one to the contribution that I as researcher 
can make to the construction of a socially evolving entity that accommodates people and 
restricts violence against others. In other words: to reconstruct a society upon a mode of 
societal accommodation and tolerance advances human rights and assists in restraining abuse 
of power and inculcating control over those who were/are constitutionally appointed to 
protect the people of that self-chosen nation of citizens.298At the heart of the matter are 
methods of controlling and inculcating attitudes concerning the purpose and use of the 
coercive arms of the state – and vice versa to nurture the attitudes of current and future ruling 
politicians to ensure that they are committed to keeping the armed forces out of partisan 
politics; in short, for politicians, to abide by the rules of the game, namely to deploy the 
                                                 
298 I borrowed the term from Habermas. 
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military in its primary and secondary functions only as outlined in the democratic 
constitution. 
 
My focus then turned to three African case studies, namely Namibia, Nigeria and Rwanda. I 
detailed, as far as possible, in each study the historical setting and the context of human-rights 
abuses and came to tentative conclusions. 
 
These case studies inform us that in Namibia some progress has been made. Namibia, as far 
as this study is concerned, is in the process of inculcating a reasonable measure of civil 
control over the military. It can be argued that CMR – with the exception of the Caprivi 
incident – are generally seen as workable and mutually beneficial for the civil and military 
stakeholders, upholding the constitutional values and the maintenance of human rights. 
 
On the other hand, it remains clear that not all participants in the liberation struggle were/are 
satisfied with the lack of reflection on human-rights abuses (Beukes et al., 1987). But it is not 
only participants and participant observers who noted this. I referred to Saul (1999) who 
observed the same, and questioned the lack of a TRC-type exercise in post-liberation 
Namibia. I pointed out, however, that despite the lack of a formal process in dealing with past 
transgressions in Namibia, the country currently exhibits a good human rights record and 
boasts CMR that preclude military interference in politics. The case of Namibia reflects a 
positive lesson learnt in civil control over the military in a young democracy on the African 
continent. 
 
The case of Nigeria – a large and densely populated federal state – is more complex. The 
military intervened several times in civilian government in the past, thus postponing 
democratic evolution. Moreover, the military remains in an influential position in the Nigeria 
of today. Some arguments were made in the past for military rule. Current research that I 
consulted seems to be unanimous in disavowing military rule and typifies it as a negative 
development. The Oputa Report, submitted on 21 May 2004, was meant to address human-
rights excesses of the past. This HRVIC and its members heard over 11 000 petitions during 
an extensive decentralised process. Hearings took place in Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt, Kano 
and Enugu. Despite the timely submission of the report, the Nigerian government did not 
release it. The government argued on legal-technical points that it should not be released. In 
this case I argue that government-appointed commissions to investigate past human rights 
afflictions have in numerous other cases been stalled; either not all the truth comes out, or the 
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report itself is suppressed. In this regard I mentioned several other examples earlier, such as 
Zimbabwe, apartheid South Africa and Uganda. 
 
Perhaps the problem resides with the mandate of government commissions, namely searching 
for the truth and pointing out culprits, or maybe none of the aims of the commissions was to 
make clear to people what their rights were in relation to security agencies that previously 
oppressed people. Or the shortcoming may lie in the principal or sponsor of the report. Who 
guards the guardians? If a ruling government investigates itself by appointing a panel or 
commission, it remains likely that if the report unearths too much, implies neglect or abuse of 
power, the principal would be less likely to make the report public. The Oputa Report 
suffered the same shortcomings. Whatever the reasons, the report and whatever value it could 
have had are not in the public domain – it cannot yet become part of public discourse or 
civilian pressure to be exerted on policy-making bodies. 
 
The military in Nigeria remains in an overtly influential position, or as elsewhere argued, 
remains a notable “underground actor”. Some of the action taken by the military against 
civilians after transition to democracy testifies to this. Similar to Latin-American cases, the 
new democracy is limited by what action it can take against the military – which because of 
its “underground” influence, cannot simply be dismissed, particularly in a vast, regionalised 
state such as Nigeria with its complex class, religious and ethnic composition. 
 
While the freedom (call it a liberty or an opportunity) was granted for a report on human-
rights abuses, the new government did not open up space for the report to enter the public 
domain and civic discussion. Hence, the recommendations in the report are also prevented 
from “filtering” through to the military, the public and regional governing institutions. This, 
arguably, happened to the detriment of nurturing and sustaining human rights and deepening 
the Nigerian democracy. In following through earlier arguments, if a problem is not identified 
and recognised as a problem, decisions cannot be deliberated. Without consultation, 
deliberation – even contestation – policies cannot be formulated and implemented to ensure 
civil control over the military (and other security institutions). Without policies being 
formulated and implemented, it is unlikely that working structures for civil control over the 
military can be installed and attitudes changed in order to attain what Hutchful calls “a well-
armed military that is at the same time subordinate to civilian control” (compare Hutchful, 
1997: 48). Without clear-cut policy decisions and implementation, it is unlikely that 
structures/conditions can be set to prevent future interference. It is also unlikely that past 
prerogatives of the military can be adapted to new democratic standards and values and that 
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political behaviour can be changed and a commitment be honed for a subordinate military. In 
such conditions accountability and security governance in terms of democratic practice 
remain problematic (Luckham, 1996: 11–13). 
 
In this context, there is an observable need to expand civil influence and civil control over the 
military in general, despite the advances made; as I pointed out earlier. In reference to 
Nigeria, there is still an asymmetrical power relationship between the Nigerian citizenry 
through their legislative bodies vis-à-vis the military. Future policies, programmes and civic 
actions will have to address this in pursuance of proper civil control over the once powerful 
and still highly influential Nigerian military machine. Added to this, as the Oputa Report 
convincingly argues, “politicians must accept the rules of the game”. This statement by the 
panel is perhaps the crux of the matter. Just as the military as a professional constitution-
bound force should abide by the restraints set out in the constitution, so the politicians should 
refrain from placating the military – or worse – inviting them into politics. (In this respect the 
Oputa Report went further that the SATRCR; it openly urged the incumbent and future 
military, but even more so, civilian leaders and future politicians, to abide by the rules of the 
game.) 
 
However, at the moment it seems as if the situation remains as described in the words of a 
petitioner to Obasanjo, “You still appear to be refusing to condemn publicly (the military) or 
to give a firm, unambiguous commitment to bring those responsible to justice” (Peter 
Takirambudde, 2002: http://.dawodu.com/nigeria3.html). An attitude such as that described 
by Takirambudde is to the detriment of human rights, the deepening of democracy, and the 
development of a sustainable social constitutional contract on CMR in Nigeria. 
 
“It is clear that post-colonial democratic experiments in Africa do not reflect a proud and 
successful history. Instead waves of democracy have (frequently) been countered by counter 
waves” (George, 2003: 7). George further cautions that the African human-rights system still 
lacks enforcement capacity within states and wider (George, 2003: 3). According to all 
available literature, as well as interaction with observers and Nigerian academics, this is 
especially true of Nigeria. 
 
The more recent transition to civilian rule is an important step. It may lead to eventual 
consolidation of a democratic system and civil control over the military. However, incidents, 
as pointed out earlier where security forces were involved in human-rights transgressions. 
leave little to be content with. The election of ex-military persons into civilian political 
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positions in democratic elections, including the president, also leave much to be desired. In 
such a case, it seems that military leaders through a mechanism of election politics, merely 
exchange their uniforms for civilian suits. 
 
With or without the Oputa Report, Nigeria is still far from the envisaged state where CMR are 
operationalised to the extent that civil control over the military is guaranteed. My conjecture 
is that Nigeria remains relatively coup-prone, perhaps even more prone to regression than 
Rwanda. In this regard Nigeria stands in stark contrast with Namibia, which formed part of 
the casing in this study. In comparison with South Africa, which I discussed earlier, this 
contrast is also notable. 
 
Assuming that Rwanda did not have the choice of forgiving and forgetting because of the 
magnitude of the genocide, which in numbers surpassed the Namibian and Nigerian 
experience, and had to choose a mixed approach, future outcomes for civil control over the 
military, much as in Nigeria, remain uncertain. The case is complicated because the 
transgressions by the military included more than the military, but also the active involvement 
of self-formed (or declared so by powers to be), paramilitary, armed and youth groups. Not 
only the military enacted transgressions, it was “the armed”, solidified by the objective to 
exterminate opponents. The mixed approach of internal legal proceedings, the gacaca and the 
ICT for Rwanda is in process. Attempted reforms in order to oversee human-rights protection 
and actions by security institutions were put in place. But the process is a long-term one, 
especially when dealing with the number of transgressors and the limitations/lack of resources 
within the judicial processes. Social and political dynamics are unpredictable when redressing 
of past injustices is at stake. Unintended consequences may come into play. The stable social 
contract that will inculcate and sustain democracy, human rights and civilian control over the 
military and vice versa keeps politicians from of tempting the military back in still beckons in 
the future rather than being a fait accompli. 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
Referring to the case studies on the African continent, it was argued that with or without 
TRC-like options there is a need for consistently addressing CMR, reconstruction and re-
designing civil control over the military. From the discussion above at least, it is not clear that 
on the continent TRC approaches resulted in better CMR and democratic control over the 
military. Nor does it seem that government-appointed commissions such as the Oputa Panel 
(or the appointed commissions in South Africa before the advent of democracy) assisted in 
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achieving civil control over the military. The counter-side remains: there is no certainty that 
truth and reconciliation approaches (even mixed approaches) will result in better civil control 
over the military and sustaining human rights. 
 
Conversely, there is (so far) not an unqualified argument to be made that non-TRC/ICT/mixed 
approaches cannot attain civil control over the military, or for that matter better civil control 
over the armed forces. 
 
One has to mention that case studies from outside the continent, i.e. Spain and Portugal, seem 
to suggest strongly that TRC-like processes are not necessary to achieve stable CMR. 
 
On the African continent it seems, at least as far as I could ascertain in this study, that there 
are no qualitative differences between countries that had TRC processes and others that did 
not. Rather, the difference lies in the form of transition that the countries underwent from 
authoritarian rule (or civil war) to an emerging democracy. 
 
This tentatively supports the research question’s assumption posed in Chapter 1 that the 
choice of TRC or non-TRC approaches (at least as derived from data in this study) does not 
have an effect on the quality of post-transition CMR and civil control over the military. Stable 
CMR are to be realised by both institutional practices and a change in individuals and the 
collective (read: the citizenry, the politicians, the community and soldiers as servants of the 
constitution). This seems to be possible with or without TRCs. Differently put: in the absence 
of a TRC approach, stable CMR can be achieved. 
 
Luckham argues that, “The relationship between the military and democracy is inherently 
problematic, even in advanced democracies, but more so in developing countries, including 
those where transition to democracy have recently taken place. Such transitions usually were 
speeded up by the fracturing of authoritarian regimes and their military and security structures 
– which are seldom monolithic” (Luckham, 1996: 1). 
 
Necessarily, this problem is exacerbated by African conditions where a weak state – or even a 
suspended state (read: an under-resourced state prone to unpredictable political dynamics) – is 
an arguable phenomenon. Foreign interventions, especially by market forces aimed at 
exploiting scarce resources and human capital, worsen the issue. Add to this the lack of 
economic capacity of states on the continent, and the collage is set for a complex 
configuration of socio-political conditions when it comes to CMR, the protection and 
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enhancement of human rights and institutionalising attitudes to civil control over the military 
or the armed. In my view it is not clear yet whether TRC approaches (even ICTs or mixed 
approaches) will guarantee civil control over the military and, conversely, the professional 
soldier telling politicians to abide by the constitution or the social contract of the established 
democracy. 
 
The implication? “Democracies (or the transition to some form of democracy – author’s 
insertion) remain at risk so long as the manifold legacies of authoritarian rule are not 
confronted, including privileged, non-accountable military and security bureaucracies. The 
dangers of authoritarian rule within a formally democratic shell may be as great as, and more 
difficult to detect, than those of direct military intervention” (Luckham, 1996: 1). 
 
The preliminary findings of this chapter are that the three case studies leave little to be 
complacent about (also for me, the “I” of the project). CMR and civil control over security 
institutions – whether these go hand in hand with TRCs or special courts, or even attempts to 
establish international tribunals – have not necessarily contributed to the civil conduct of the 
military, nor civil control over the military in the long term as yet. This strengthens the 
argument that the focus should be on institutionalising civil control over the military and 
establishing attitudes that facilitate this. 
 
Parsons argues: “A definition of a problem is part of the problem … The fact that we share 
the same data, or at least believe that we share the same data, does not mean that we see the 
same thing. Values, beliefs, ideologies, interests and bias all shape perceptions of reality” 
(Parsons, 1995: 88). This chapter leads me to recognise that truth and reconciliation 
processes, special courts and ICTs, in aiming to affect either retribution or “national 
reconciliation”, are instituted reactively (after human-rights violations have occurred). It does 
not prove that civil control over the military depends on a TRC or ICT. 
 
This chapter may tentatively question whether TRCs do necessarily translate into workable 
CMR. I suggest here that future CMR that work in a “young” democracy do not depend on 
TRCs or ICTs or mixed approaches of retribution. CMR and civil control can be attained 
without TRCs/ICTs. It also seems clear, at least to me, that government-appointed 
commissions seldom open up the past and do not translate into the substantial curbing of 
military influence. It seems that forgive-and-forget approaches stand as good a change of 
success in establishing civil control over the military than mixed approaches (ICTs and 
TRCs). Negatively put, forgive-and-forget approaches face similar challenges when it comes 
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to the institutionalisation of civil control over the military. Southern Africa boasts one 
positive example of this, namely Namibia. Unfortunately another example, namely 
Zimbabwe, is contrary to this one. 
 
Ensuring that human rights are enhanced is necessary; more so, it is an imperative in any 
society. It does not matter whether a society (as I argued earlier on) turns against ’the other’ 
or turns against its own population. The protection of a sustainable democracy in whatever 
format runs hand-in-hand with CMR that work and civil control over the military that works. 
It also implies that politicians stick to civil politics that work and accept that the military 
should NOT work for their partisan ideals – and likewise, a military leadership that tells 
politicians that military involvement on behalf of politicians does NOT work. Attitudes have 
to be nurtured collectively and individually within the community of citizens to enhance civil 
conduct. Moreover, the last two can be facilitated proactively – in other words, before human-
rights abuses occur.299 
 
The cautionary note that Galbraith directed to the USA political leadership nearly 40 years 
ago is relevant here as much as there. “The goal is not to make the military power more 
efficient or more righteously honest. It is to get it under control” (Galbraith, 1969: 74).300 
Galbraith’s main criticism against what became a real scenario of evolving USA militarism 
remains important. It conceivably also applies to the macro- and micro-contexts, namely 
within and among states. For this reason, the sociologist and, specifically, the military 
sociologist should not only be interested in grand theory. And, I dare to contemplate, not 
                                                 
299 I will not add my view to the above. Why not? The reader will recognise my earlier argument (or its 
implication). Human-rights abuses can be stopped, with or without TRCs and ICTs or even mixed 
approaches. Human-rights abuses are not restricted to governments and a constitution of people within 
a geographical area that deploy violence against “the other” in the (pre-) determined state. Human-
rights abuses can also be deployed against “the other” by a self-chosen nation of citizens as defined by 
their elite in an outward projection of violence usually manifested in foreign policy. The difference is 
that the more powerful (those with arms) is likely to continue projecting military power. In short: if 
there are universal laws or sanctions that can be applied to all, most imperial states (at least since 1880) 
should be requested to submit themselves to an ICT or at least an international TRC-like process … 
300 Galbraith’s work – even from his rather conservative liberal framework – proved to be prophetic. 
Following American aggression and defeat in Vietnam, the USA embarked on overt and covert 
operations worldwide to enforce its notion of liberal democracy and the free market. Governments 
were toppled at will or isolated for the greater good of “good” American values. Afghanistan and Iraq 
are merely examples in a seemingly endless “democratic operation” to install a new global order of 
authoritarian liberalism.  What about the outcomes of such actions? “… The USA will also use every 
economic, technical, political, psychological, and subversive method that can be contrived. This nation 
must refuse to be bound by the dogmatic principles of statesmanship while its enemy lives by the law 
of the jungle. The stakes to humanity (sic) are too high” (Gen. Nathan Twining (Ret), quoted by 
Galbraith, 1977: 93). These words sound hauntingly close to apartheid-time securocrats and politicians. 
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build models too early, or export untested models uncritically despite the temptation to do so. 
Conversely it implies dealing with prevailing problems case-by-case and step-by-step. 
 
The sociologist has to have a concern with power – its use and abuse, as I interpret Mills 
(1977: 35) and others (Marshak & Andrejev, 2006: 40–42). Dominant sets of institutions can 
control a whole society and superimpose even its values, violence and the threat of violence 
on it (Wright Mills, 1977: 39). In this lies the challenge and the art of establishing sound 
CMR and the continuous maintenance of civil control over the military (and in fact all other 
security agencies), established by the constitutional law of the citizenry in a specific country. 
 
“The challenge of a sustained oversight capacity remains an unresolved issue” (Ngoma, 107). 
The conjecture made in this project is that civil control (or call it democratic control/control 
by civil society) over the military need not be an unresolved issue. On the contrary, one 
should resolve that such controls can indeed be developed and honed to the benefit of a 
democratic society and sustaining human rights – even ubuntu, if you wish.301 The involved 
researcher as agent and learner has a responsibility to co-assist in constructing a better world 
in his/her field of interest and expertise. 
 
In the following chapter, as a critical reflection on my reflections here, I will deal with the 
structured interviews, e-mail schedules and unsolicited data in delving deeper (or immersion) 
into the topic. I will further demonstrate an attempt to enter the life-worlds of people that 
lived through these experiences, or to return to an earlier metaphor to read into the sand, 
rather than just read in the sand in the tracking process. For the qualitative researcher, the 
chapter to follow may provide the researcher (one of the tools of research) with insights or a 
potential life-embedded heuristic key to answer some of the questions set. It may perhaps also 
illuminate some of the subsequent questions that evolved in the course of the study. 
                                                 
301 On agency and responsibility in sociological theory, see Barnes (2000: 82ff). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DISCUSSING HUMAN INTERACTION: (RE-)CONSTRUCTING – NOT 
CALCULATING – PROCESSES, EXPERIENCES AND COLLAGES OF CIVIL 
CONTROL 
 
So long as logic is given absolute pre-eminence in philosophy, and the logical mind placed 
first in the hierarchy of human functions, reason seems inevitably caught up in the fascination 
of static and self-identical essence, and existence tend to become an elusive and shadowy 
matter … So far as he logicizes, man tends to forget existence – Barret, 1961: 271. 
 
I am convinced that autoethnography as a “blurred genre” has much to offer researchers and 
graduate students who are also researchers socialized into different communities of practice 
– Maguire, 2006. 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The spoken word in our view on, and feeling into, the experiences of fellow humans, where 
we live, what we reflect upon and contribute as material human subjects to a better the 
concrete world stands central. So does sharing, writing up and interpreting the spoken word. 
As Ricoeur (1982: 208) rightly remarks: “A work does not only mirror its time, but it opens 
up a world which it bears within itself … the meaning of human action is itself something 
which is addressed to an indefinite range of possible ‘readers’… It is because it opens up new 
references and receives fresh relevance … human deeds are also waiting for fresh 
interpretation which decide their meaning … All significant events and deeds are in this way, 
opened to this kind of practical interpretation through present praxis”.302 It is here that human 
interaction, context(s) and intersubjectivity become relevant. And this relevance ties in 
closely with this chapter on the interviews and feedback received from research participants. 
 
Pondering on Barret’s statement in the above epigraph and the implied critique against 
objectivists and quantifiers or for that matter persons that relate political developments only to 
                                                 
302 Ricoeur in this context makes another interesting observation: “”The judges (of a text or texts or 
living works and human praxis) are not the contemporaries, but … history itself.” (Ricoeur (1982: 
208). 
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institutions and structures is relevant too.303 His statement then begets meaning relevant to this 
chapter. Especially if one replaces the terms “logic as pre-eminent in (social) philosophy” or 
the human sciences in the first sentence, with human life, life attitudes or life-styles and social 
processes. More so if the latter concepts are seen to be woven into social processes in which 
human agents take part through experience, his critique levelled so skilfully against “hard” 
logics is relevant. In doing a study such as this with modernist, humanist and socio-critical 
qualitative elements, the researcher is confronted by, or more so, immersed in a rich collage304 
of personal and human histories and experiences. As Maguire correctly remarks auto-
ethnography has much to offer for author and reader as being part of and woven into 
socialised communities (Maguire, 2006). One’s own life experiences as individual and as part 
of communities play a part.305 Against this background, the logistics of this/any study 
stumbles upon and yet investigates and represents (il)logical events, views, perceptions and 
life-practices that confront each other, dovetail, mesh or intertwine with each other, or even 
contradict each other.306 Despite this we define, and redefine problems and also attempt to 
offer solutions to problems. The above statements and the epigraphs, I contend, applies to 
both individual and social experiences when trying to “feel” a way (in contrast to The Way) 
into the life-world of role players, and the convolutions and permutations of social contexts 
and processes, the trials and tribulations of being a human animal within ever-changing 
contexts.307 In doing so the researcher needs to be aware and reflect upon his/her actions and 
writings (narratives, if you like) because the outcomes of the study need to despite of, or 
perhaps exactly because of the above, reflects what Maguire calls answerability and 
                                                 
303 Barret makes a choice against positivism in the social sciences. During the 1960s and 1970s a 
positivist approach dominated the articles in major sociology journals in the USA. While this trend 
declined sharply in Europe “the approach remained in position of dominance in North American 
journals” (Compare Gartell and Gartell quoted in Neuman, 2000: 66). In contrast to positivist 
approaches alternative approaches such as interpretive social science (with its roots in hermeneutic 
approaches such as Dilthey and Weber’s thought) and critical social science (with roots in the works of 
Marx, Freud, Adorno, Fromm, Marcuse, Freire and Bourdieu) came to the fore (Neuman, 2000: 70 ff; 
75 ff). Innovative works in critical social science which impacts on human sciences appears regularly. I 
found Hanna’s (1970) work on the somatic being and bodily revolt referred to earlier and Gay’s work 
(1987), Freud voor Historici informative. Notes by Collins (1952: xii, 29, 129,134, 196 – 197, 229, 
243, 235 – 236) are relevant too. Consult also Collins and Makowsky (2005:  242ff). 
304 We were taught that collage is a loaded term. It may be as collages fade more quickly than rock art … 
305 It is among others in this context that the notion of thick description plays a role (Neuman, 2000: 73, 
348, 377, 521). 
306 Genres, complementary and conflicting, are of relevance here. Compare the Maguire epigraph on 
the previous page. 
307 Experiences within various cultural contexts play a role here. So does the existence – or the 
observation of – social identities (on social identities see Mathebe and Liebenberg, 2007). 
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responsibility in, and towards the authoring self and others in the social sciences and 
humanities (Maguire, 2006).308 
 
Answerability and responsibility as used here need also to be seen as influenced by the mode 
of what Velazquez calls transformative research: “Transformative research is not (strictly – 
my insertion) a methodology. It is an orientation toward research that is defined by its 
outcome: producing a more just and equitable world. It begins with a problem posing phase 
characterised by a process of critical reflection about the problem [in order to define it]” 
(Velasquez, 1998: 65). Perhaps more important is that experience plays part in the definition 
of the problem, as with traditional research data that is gathered, but unlike traditional 
research the process does not end after the findings are reported. There remains the “excess” 
value (added imperative rather, I will suggest); to stimulate a critical awareness of power 
relationships and empowers researchers and participants to enter an emancipatory praxis 
should they so wish (Velazquez, 1998: 65–66). In this sense qualitative research is not a 
panacea for all social ills but “give attention to human rights, social justice, reconciliation, 
and the preservation of … sustainability … it is directed towards ethical ends in the public 
interests” (Velazquez, 1998: 66). It remains an ongoing process in a world of practical 
challenges and arising crises underpinned by a desire to make things better – at least as far as 
humanely possible within the constraints we live in as human and historical agents. 
 
One has to keep in mind though, as Walsh argues, that the qualitative narrative, the research 
reflections and outcomes of what we bodily “author” remains incomplete. [“Our stories will 
always necessarily be incomplete”] (Walsh, 1998: 193).309 He applies this statement of his 
with special references to face-to-face interviews, and suggests that the “necessary 
incompleteness” invites the continuing dialogue on betterment of society through critical 
engagement and social orientation. It is here that Velazquez, Walsh quoted from deMarrais 
(1998) holds value, not only for this study, the literature review and the interviews discussed 
here as well as other human interactions referred to. It also holds hope and advice for future 
researchers in the qualitative research exploration. 
 
                                                 
308 See Maguire (2006) on the answerability and responsibility of the authoring self and others in social 
sciences and humanities. Also consult Wiesenfeld (2000) on the interactive linkage between theory and 
practice in qualitative enquiries. Also relevant is Lincoln’s article on emerging criteria for quality in 
qualitative (and interpretive) research (Lincoln, 1995: 275 ff). 
309 As historians like Geyl and Mansergh remarked (Van der Westhuizen, 2005: 300; Snyman et al, 
2005: 8) history and socio-political processes are part of an unending experience. 
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The afore-going arguments explains the initial choice – and confirmation of this choice in my 
view – for the approach I chose for this work. I choose not to opt for the quantitative “snap-
shot” approach. Studies on TRCs and the SATRC in South Africa and by outside observers 
are replete with these approaches. In many ways, the “snap-shot” cannot hope to go beyond 
(despite the sincere efforts by such theorists) number-crunching and immediate (but rather 
static) interpretations that tend to lack the immersion in political dynamics.310 In qualitative 
research it is required that the researcher/social interrogator tracks human experiences and 
social processes. It demands more from the “I” of the researcher and participant. I mentioned 
earlier the stated preference (need for?) by various researchers for the qualitative approach 
and others (including in some cases sociologists and political scientists) for the auto-
ethnographic approach (De Burnier 2006). Examples of involved sociologists in socio-
political life in South Africa were mentioned (Gelderblom & Liebenberg, 2003: 6, 7 and 9). I 
did so to lay stress on the inextricable interwovenness of the questioning researcher in 
concrete social processes, also in this field under study. 
 
It is no surprise that in a study such as this, the involved human agency leads to the necessary 
complimentary meshing of induction and deduction. And, as many a time in life, such a 
venture imposes the realisation that the micro and macro is far more intertwined than we tend 
to think when we theoretically demarcate them (or shall one say impose a static – and likely 
pre-determined – discriminatory intellectual framework on them). By the nature of the 
research approach, this work in “deleting positivist nuisance variables” remains exploratory 
although I believe the study holds the necessary elements of transferability or validity.311 
 
Being in contact and interaction with other subjective human beings, the researcher (sometimes 
observer, sometimes observer-participant, sometimes participant-observer and sometimes active 
                                                 
310 I have no written source for this statement except my observation of, participation in and co-
ordinating of quantitative research projects between 1991 and 2003. Yet the attempts that I partook in, 
co-ordinated or experienced had some impact on my choice for this study. I missed in these 
quantitative exercises the living being and frequently felt that these approaches resembled recipe-like 
or worse, technocratic simulations by detached beings. Even in interpreting a quantitative study 
(longitudinal or not), very little understanding of the life-world of people(s) and the real impact or 
outcomes of social dynamics comes to the fore – at least in my view. Neither social dynamics, nor the 
history or consequences of being human, can be imprisoned in regular snap-shots frequently computer- 
assisted if not determined (dictated). 
311 On criteriology and its limits consult (Schwandt, 1996). See also relevant notes on analytic auto-
ethnography (Ellis & Bochner, 2006, as well as Denzin, 2006). I also would like to remind the reader of 
the work by Holliday (2007) on doing and writing qualitative research, and again Lincoln’s work on 
the emerging criteria for quality in qualitative and interpretive research (1995). The contributions by 
these authors enriched qualitative research immensely. 
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living participant) remains but one of many subjectivities, and him/herself a research tool.312 
The “I” of research cannot form or mould the study. On the contrary, many a time the study 
forms and moulds the “I”. This applies to this chapter, in which I analyse the interaction with 
many people over time such as the selected interviewees, unsuspected interaction with role 
players during the research process, colleagues, peers, peer debriefers, promoter and co-
promoter and literature (secondary and primary) or observers and theorists and even insights 
gained through friendships or in comradeship, or perhaps in sharp difference with some313. 
 
6.2. Living and interacting with – not looking/staring at … 
 
The data for this chapter was obtained over an extended period. My earlier experiences 
existentially inform this study. I will briefly recall these here as I believe that these 
experiences set the context and re-emphasise for what I discuss in some detail in this chapter. 
 
Frequently politics enter the individual’s world, and not the individual politics. Before I went 
to primary school I observed the resettlement of so-called coloured people in Keidebees as the 
result of the notorious Group Areas Act.314 The “Rooi Lokasie” a small township two 
kilometres from us were also removed to the west of the town (some years later a drive-in 
theatre was erected there. When drive-inns fell out of business with the introduction of 
television in the late 1970s the area became derelict, the lonesome empty projector room and 
the large screen whitewashed by the sun standing for a while against a backdrop of read 
Kalahari sand and steppe grass until demolished piecemeal for the bricks, metal and wood it 
held. Today there is a truck stop in the vicinity). Our next-door neighbours, the Du Randts 
were moved without choice from Keidebees where we lived because they were “coloured”. 
The old Indian uncle, Mr Surtee and his wife had to give up their café in Scott Street (my 
                                                 
312 I mentioned earlier that the philosopher Wilfrid Desan pointed out that human beings can only grasp 
– or get a hold on – angular optics of a highly subjective nature and, thus, generally live in a realm of 
“angular truths”. For him, absolutisation of a singular vision, one angular truth, leads to war and/or the 
destruction of the environment (Desan, 1987: 66). He qualifies this statement later in his work. 
However, the above insight seems to be relevant for this study and the areas under study. 
313 As Walsh so strikingly remarks: “Going face to face presents different challenges from those 
confronting my colleagues who do their research at a more comfortable distance. Computer terminals 
are not always friendly, but they never yell …” (Walsh, 1998:188). 
314 The Group Areas Act was passed by the National Party following its coming to power in 1948. A 
racial classification act passed in 1950 formed the bases for separate living areas for separate groups. 
Other acts passed by the white Christian Nationalist parliament prohibited marriage or sexual 
intercourse between white persons and persons of other racial classifications (1949, 1950). The Group 
Areas Act to which I refer above was passed as part of an extensive social engineering program based 
on racism and superiority. It confined different racial groups to different living areas. Black and 
coloured people were allowed in white areas as part of the daily labour reservoir and had to get special 
permission from the authorities to stay over in “white” designated areas (See Horrel, 1982 & 
Liebenberg, 1990: 30–31).   
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farther used to buy his Sunday newspapers there after church. The first Easter Bunny – dark 
rich brown chocolate – that I ever got was bought at Surtee’s Café). 
 
As to other personal experience, I mentioned earlier involvements as a school cadet and 
commando member (i.e. growing up in a racialist and militarised society with all its 
contradictions); military service and some “camps” (in some of these deployed on the 
“border” in Sectors 10, 20 and 70, Namibia). As a child seeing assaults by police or white 
citizens on people of colour with little provocation, during military service before becoming a 
candidate officer and later junior officer hearing a permanent force major lecturing/preaching 
to us that there are good “Kaffirs” and bad “Kaffirs” (the good ones are on our side). When 
two of us after the lecture expressed our reservations, he dismissed us with the words: Julle 
sal nog groot word” (English: “You will still grow up”, i.e. become mature). Sitting through 
lectures on the Geneva Convention and then being told by an officer that SWAPO guerrillas 
when captured are not prisoners of war is another vivid experience. I have to add that I also 
trained under a company commander in 1979 that was the living example of a professional 
and ethical soldier (He is a general today in the new South African National Defence Force). 
Our company sergeant major at the time (we nicknamed him “Vaalvalkie”) was a 
compassionate person with as far as I know no racial biases.315 
 
I had three operational deployments, none in Angola or in “townships” inside South Africa – 
all of them in Northern Namibia. Eventually I objected to further military conscription on 
political terms, not universal Christian pacifism. My personal experiences are not necessarily 
comparable with those of long-term, exposed-to-war-and-struggle guerrillas and soldiers 
deployed outside South Africa/Namibia, but brought me in close contact with the soldiers 
experience – especially in the mustering deployed as infantry – workhorses of armies they 
say. I met MK members, in cases closely associated with them – one of them assassinated in 
early 1991 another one murdered in the Eastern Cape in 1987 by security police. Myself and 
other fellow activists received our share of mud-slinging, death threats, etc. 
                                                 
315 Roughly translated as “a small grey falcon”. 
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I mentioned becoming increasingly politicized316 and taking part in the One Million 
Signatures Campaign initiated by the UDF in 1983 and involvement with Aksie Sosiale 
Geregtigheid (Action for Social Justice); the National Union for South African Students; 
playing a role to establish the United Stellenbosch Front (USF)317; objecting to further 
military service on political grounds and some involvement with the End Conscription 
Campaign (ECC) in Stellenbosch. 
 
“Student radicalism” was followed by working for a democracy-advocating group, IDASA. 
Later I remained active in union activities in my workplaces. I was able to further link up with 
various people in the liberation struggle and visit several countries becoming exposed to other 
societies. In between, I wrote popular and other articles critical of apartheid policies and 
(racial) capitalism for publication. These appeared in newspapers, bulletins and accredited 
journals (frequently I gave preference to the popular media, because such writing has – at 
least marginally – more potential to contribute to the public discourse and possibly effect 
policy debates). I completed my first and only sole-authored work on South African politics 
during this time and co-edited a few works. As for radicalism, I guess one never loses that 
part of your somatic being … 
 
During my term at the HSRC and lecturer at the University of South Africa (Unisa) my 
interest covered the SATRC, democratisation and public participation and to an extent what I 
would call “democratic nation-building”. In 1992 I became involved with research on the 
TRC and CMR. With others I investigated/published on covert operations, civil-military 
issues and others. Policy studies also entered the picture partly as a result of my earlier 
activist occupation, my research at the HSRC318 and later part-time lecturer at the University 
of Pretoria for masters students and earlier at the University of Johannesburg for second and 
third year students (the same applies to my interest in public participation that frequently 
formed part of research undertaken). 
                                                 
316 Strangely enough, this had it roots during school (which is another story) and during my two years 
of military service and immediately thereafter, because of exposure to critical-thinking conscript 
officers such as Bob Fülscher and Bruce Durham, then fellow junior officers. My interaction with 
highly competent permanent force members of the then South African Cape Coloured Corps (SACC) 
also played a role. Prominent was then-Lieutenant van Scalkwyk (Skallie), with whom I did my 
officer’s course at Infantry School, Oudtshoorn during 1979. The SACC men were professional 
soldiers, patriots, (com)passionate about their work and other people. Most of all these officers, even 
while serving in the apartheid army, were critical in their observations about the social processes 
around them. They lived under apartheid rule and could relate their experiences as second-class citizens 
in detail. One border-stunt with the SACC also played its role, but that is a story for another day …  
317 Not a very innovative name, for the UDF a national popular movement had virtually the same 
acronym. And we espousing the same ideals, chose USF. 
318 At the HSRC we were frequently involved with reports for stakeholders that related to policy issues. 
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Heading a research project on public participation in politics in South Africa and research on 
demobilised soldiers and policy options to re-integrate veterans into civil society also played a 
role. It all forms part of a narrative that brings one to this chapter. 
 
6.3. Structure of the chapter 
 
I will highlight main themes here, amongst others, the origin and value of interviews and take 
a closer look at each of the interviews. I will also discuss the e-mail feedback. Following this, 
I will reflect on the “qualitative moments” and insights gained and “lessons learned”, 
including critical reflections. In conclusion, the chapter deals with the insights gained and its 
application to the study and the set outcomes as a prelude to the conclusion in Chapter 7. The 
structure of this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
• The use of interviews in social science 
• A report-back on the interviews, contents and insights gained during interviews. I will 
firstly discuss the responses of the South African interviewees and secondly the 
international responses. In dealing with each interview, I will discuss the question of 
truth and reconciliation processes first. (The interview schedule is provided in the 
appendices.) 
• A report-back on issues pertinent to CMR and civil-control over the military. In this 
case, as above, I will firstly discuss the South African case and secondly the 
comparative (international) units and interviewees selected for the study. 
• A report back on the e-mail feedback received. Here I will follow the same order as 
above. 
• A discussion of unsolicited materials received. This will also firstly deal with South 
Africa, and secondly the other cases and again be demarcated on the topics of 
SATRC/TRC issues and then civil-military related issues. 
• Following each discussion in each category I provide a short summary of the main 
insights gained and eventually will revisit them in the conclusion of the chapter. 
 
I will entertain the main themes and insights of the qualitative data and its possible 
application. Where applicable, I will make references to the possible replication or 
transferability of the study as well as future research possibilities and/or imperatives, again as 
a prelude to the last chapter. In the process I will touch upon emerging criteria for quality in 
qualitative and interpretive research (Lincoln, 1995) and answerability and responsibility 
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related to the authored self and others in the human sciences (Maguire, 2006). [I will deal 
with foreseeable policy implications for other societies faced with challenges similar to South 
Africa and the other cases in the last chapter of this exploration]. 
 
Before I deal with the interviews per se, it is relevant to note the following regarding 
qualitative interviewing and field research. 
 
6.4. Social science, participants and interviews 
 
Field research which in many – if not most cases – include interviews in various forms (in 
many cases unstructured or loosely structured or probing) in addition to observation has a 
long history. Neuman links it to reports of travellers to distant lands. Academic field research 
started off with anthropology in the 1890s (Neuman, 2000). What I would call “unintended 
field research” by becoming observer, later observer participant and eventually participant 
(observer) through human commitment is apparent in a memoirs of Sophia Izedinova, a 
Russian nurse in the Anglo-Boer War, A Few Months with the Boers, published in 1903 in St. 
Peterburg and translated by Moody (1977). The work provides examples of verbal 
interactions and questions posed by Izedinova. She did not set out to study another land or 
culture, yet through her human praxis and verbal enquiry/involvement/curiosity/passion her 
book became a study in itself.319 In some cases such as Malinoski other cultures were mainly 
studied. In cases people studied their own societies such as Booth and Webb (Neuman, 2000: 
346). The Chicago School of Sociology was to give a further impetus to field research 
(Neuman, 2000: 346–347). Neuman suggests that participant-observer approaches in the 
social sciences may have originated in 1890 when Gohre provided detailed descriptions of his 
experiences as an apprentice in a factory (Neuman, 2000: 346). 
 
The tradition of interviews used in qualitative and even quantitative research work goes back 
quite a while. Platt (2001: 33–34) points out that in the USA several works following 
application of the interview as part of methodology appeared such as Garrett’s (1942), Gallup 
(1944), Goode and Hat (1952), the Survey Research Centre at Michigan University (1954) 
Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin (1948). Earlier guidelines for interviews stem from Young 
(1939). Young stressed the importance of the interview as a “living source” and advises that 
where possible an interview should be completed in one sitting, the latter which are not 
                                                 
319 In the same vein, but a different and much later example: In his work on the origins and practice of 
karate Masutatsu Oyama frequently made use of his practical exposure in, and enquiry into the martial 
arts, much of these being shared with him by masters – and he points out, numerous students – as part 
of the book-making (Oyama, 1965: foreword). 
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always advised in more recent approaches (See Platt, 2001: 36–37).320 Cannel and Kahn 
around 1953, following their war-time experiences as researchers suggest that where data or 
the call for information is beyond the individuals power, “the interview is often an effective 
means of obtaining the desired data”. They pointed out that Theodor Adorno also used the 
interview as technique in his studies on anti-Semitism and the authoritarian figure (Platt, 
2001: 38). 
 
It is important to note that not all works done on, or application of interviewing falls in one 
genre, nor fits a clear historical pattern, although as early as 1930 the distinction was made 
between interview and questionnaire (Platt, 2001: 49). Platt reminds us that the interview 
reflects areas of diverse activities and the interview in all its applications remains rich a 
practice where few convincing generalisations can be made (Platt, 2001: 51). Gubrium and 
Holstein makes a point well worth remembering by the qualitative researcher: “The interview 
has created as well as tapped into, the vast world of individual experience that now constitutes 
the substance of everyday life … (more so) the modern template gives us the interview as a 
significant means for realizing that subjectivity and the social contexts that bring it about” 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2001: 8–9). Taylor and Bogdan argues that interviews offers the 
researcher access to peoples ideas, thoughts and memories in their own words rather than in 
the words of the researcher him/herself (Platt, 2001: 41). Perhaps this is the strongest 
argument for an interview in qualitative research and within an auto ethnographic approach, 
not only because it offers the researcher, rare personal insights and a feeling of “living into” 
the experience of the interviewee. Moreover, for me the interview with a person or various 
persons act as a corrective on views that I as researcher hold, assists in verification and 
certainly has the potential to facilitate self-critical analysis and reflection. Added to the 
interview as a human endeavour at understanding and empathy: “We have to deal with our 
own emotional responses and how these fit into the story we are telling” (Walsh, 1998: 188). 
 
Related to the “comparison” or broader setting (interrogating various cases), the following is 
relevant: Comparative research in qualitative research is not new. While little comparative 
research was executed between WW I and 1950, there were exceptions such as Bloch, Homan 
and Merton (Neuman, 2000: 380). Between 1960 and 1980 comparative research, including 
historical comparative research “grew into a vital force” (Neuman, 2000: 383). In many cases 
it was historians and economists that (re-) introduced comparative approaches. In sociology it 
became one of the important sub-fields (Neuman, 2000: 383). The comparative approach as 
                                                 
320 See also Warren on qualitative interviewing (2001). 
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pointed out in Chapter 3 is also far from new in military sociology. The same applies to 
qualitative research approaches such as I use here. I pointed out my choice for a broader 
casing, or comparative moments, as I refer to it. The interviews here within this tradition, 
reflect comparative moments. 
 
6.5. “Venturing in …” 
 
6.5.1. General notes on interviews 
 
As indicated earlier, there are two practical limitations to the study. Due to a lack of funding, I 
could not do research on site in all the countries mentioned in the case studies.321 Although I 
was fortunate to visit some of the countries that I refer to Namibia was the only country 
forming part of the case studies that I frequently visited. I had opportunity to visit Portugal 
once, Spain twice and Zimbabwe three times during the 1980s and 1990s. In the case of South 
Africa, I had ample experience and immersion in the area under study. I was in loco, even if 
and when in transito or involved with other teaching and research duties or projects. 
 
Another limitation of the study (hence also having an impact on the selection of interviewees) 
that I frequently regretted and became frustrated about was my inability to speak French, 
Spanish or Portuguese, even if with difficulty I read some basic Spanish and Portuguese – not 
significantly enough I believe to fully understand and interpret dense academic texts. These 
languages are the lingua franca in some of the cases in question, i.e. Argentina, Rwanda, 
Spain and Chile322. Necessarily, this shortcoming cut out very important ways to enter the 
                                                 
321 When I started preparing for the study (in fact, part of my then research proposal referred to it), I 
intended a quantitative element. Lack of funding made this impossible. In retrospect, I am content (if 
not happy) about it. If I embarked on such an approach where the qualitative and quantitative 
complemented one another, I would most likely have spent a lot of time on the latter and “entering the 
life-worlds” of subjects would have received less attention. In the end, the study reflected less of a 
mechanical or imposed content, and more of people’s involvement, their hopes, fears, failures and 
successes. I believe the study was enriched by “dropping” the quantitative element. 
322 In Southern Africa if one intends to understand socio-political dynamics over many years, 
Portuguese reading abilities are essential. The previous colonial rulers of Angola and Mozambique 
inculcated the lauguage in these areas. South African military “advisors” fought/acted/interacted with 
the Portuguese colonial soldiers in Mozambique and Angola. Many of the ex-Portuguse speaking 
soldiers became integrated in South African units, i.e. 32 Battalion. The Portuguese community, in this 
case “white people” (refugees from Angola and Mozambique) became integrated in small business in 
South Africa following the 1974/1975 collapse of Portuguese colonial rule. While, many of them are 
conservative, conceivably even racist, valuable insights escape the non-Portuguese speaker in our daily 
interaction in South Africa. 
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socio-cultural environment of informants and actors in the political processes. It denied to 
some extent the “write of passage” that Noy refers to (Noy, 2003).323 
 
The face-to-face interviews were conducted between 26 August 2003 and 29 September 2005 
with further ones during 2006 and 2007. I would like to share some general remarks and 
feelings with the reader before I discuss the interviews in detail. 
 
My first interview (“venturing in”), in which I tested the schedule, was with a noted 
international academic Prof. Dani Nabudere from the ASC in Mbale, Uganda. He pointed out 
that I was free to use his name, which I do here. He was a vice-president of the International 
Political Science Association; twice in exile (under the rule of Obote and Amin). Following 
the fall of the Amin regime, during a brief Ugandan period of (attempted) democracy, he 
became the Minister of Justice. He is a prolific author on issues pertaining African politics, 
war and conflict, as well as a jurist. He also had an intense interest in the SATRC. My 
interaction with him, while acting as coordinator of a one-month visit to Unisa during August 
2003, allowed ample access and opportunity for discussion. I also participated in panel 
discussions with him on issues of truth and reconciliation and civil-control over the military 
(some of them I tape-recorded and used in this study. I will refer to this amongst others in this 
chapter). 
 
During an extensive discussion with Nabudere, I developed a tentative schedule for future 
interviews. I was to refine the schedule as the project progressed. Critical remarks by 
colleagues and interviewees (in one case Prof. Deon Fourie, a military expert and academic, 
in another case a peer from the military academy and also one of the peer debriefers 
mentioned earlier on) assisted me to reflect on possible weaknesses in my approach and 
enabled me to adapt the schedule when necessary. 
 
                                                 
323 Noy deploys a linguistic “trick” here: Rights and/or rites of passage becomes “the write of passage”. 
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Above: Professor Dani Nabudere played an important role during earlier discussions on the topic. A 
much younger Nabudere appears on the far right, during the Non-aligned Movement Summit in 
Havana, Cuba in 1979 (Source: D. Nabudere, Centre for Afrika Studies). 
 
In order to make up for possible weaknesses in data-gathering, I attempted to find persons to 
interview who were from some of the countries in the selected case studies. For obvious 
reasons, they had to be English or (in the case of South Africa) Afrikaans speaking. The 
selected interviewees had to have knowledge of their countries, or preferably personal 
experience in the field. I chose as far as possible persons with practical exposure. Some of 
them straddled the world of practical expertise as well as academic training, while others 
lived as human subjects through oppressive regimes. 
 
I interviewed persons from Argentina and Rwanda amongst others. In the case of Argentina, I 
was able (more by co-incidence, as I gave up hope on the matter) to find a person that fitted 
the profile. By personal experience she was more than just an observer/observer- participant 
during the “dirty-war” against activists and leftists when Argentina was under military rule. 
For the purposes of this study I will call her Maria. She had exposure to the extreme 
dehumanising side of military rule. Her partner, a medical doctor, was killed by the military. 
She herself as well as next-of-kin were threatened with death (she had a small daughter and 
her family lived close to her). As a further form of victimisation she was denied a job in the 
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country until a friend of the family interfered on her behalf by stressing to the relevant 
authorities that she was not a “leftist”, and probably became “unknowingly associated” with 
them. This landed her a junior clerical position, though under constant surveillance324. 
 
It was a time in Argentina when friends and family would come together knowing that one of 
them disappeared, yet would not mention it (interview, 27/09/2005). Maria eventually left 
Argentina, and settled in a managing position in a different country. She is a kind and open 
person. I had the opportunity to interact with her in 2003, when we discussed her experiences 
during an informal and incidental meeting. I requested an interview that she kindly granted. It 
was only in 2005 that we were to have the “formal” interview. The interview for her, must 
have been a painful experience. As interviewer, I myself was emotionally deeply touched. For 
her it must have been far more painful and disturbing. 
 
In the case of Rwanda, I attended a talk by a researcher on the gacaca process in Rwanda 
arranged by the ISS in Pretoria, and was able to meet the then Rwandan Ambassador. He 
agreed to an interview. The interview was very valuable as I could first-hand check my data 
in this area that was mostly of a documentary nature and discuss at length the unity and 
reconciliation process in Rwanda.325 It also allowed for reflection on this case study. 
 
While I did not “formally” interview one person that I interacted with, the experience proved 
more than fruitful. He was Raphael Banon, a civil-military expert during a visit to Spain 
(Ortega y Gasset Institute, Madrid). We discussed extensively the transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy in Spain and the role of the (new) military. However, I could 
not interview him afterwards in the period 2003–2005 as no further visit to Spain was 
possible. I found the then discussion with Banon useful and it left some impressions that I 
could clearly recall, even still today. Most important, Raphael provided me with unsolicited 
materials that proved helpful and highly informative. These materials are reflected in the 
source list. 
 
                                                 
324 For the political situation under military rule in Argentina consult Philip (1985: 128 ff), Makin 
(1985: 151ff), Dunkerley (1985: 171ff) and several contributions to Varas (1989). For a vivid reflection 
of similar experiences see Uruguay – Nunca Más: Human Rights Violations in Uruguay, 1972 – 1985. 
This report makes for disturbing reading and is not advised for bedtime reading in contrast to the 
analytical approaches by Makin, Dunkerley and others. 
325 While South Africans referred to truth and reconciliation, Rwanda refers to unity and 
reconciliation. This semantic difference is of no small importance. The objective for the Rwandans is 
to affect a united nation once the “blaming” stopped. National unity, as envisaged, would follow the 
unburdening of the past as far as possible.  
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The age or gender of the selected participants were of less importance to me. I was interested 
to interview people with military experience, civil-military expertise, practitioners or keen 
and informed/involved observers and persons that lived through oppression in countries 
where the military played an important role. Some was to be from countries outside South 
Africa selected in the casing and some from South Africa. 
 
In the case of South Africa, I approached South Africans that had experience of the pre-and 
post apartheid South Africa and which kindly shared their experiences with me. I was less 
successful in interviewing current top politicians, partly due to their busy schedules and 
perhaps partly due to some disinterest in the interface SATRC and CMR. Or, perhaps due to 
other pressing matters, some of a controversial nature that regularly crops up in South African 
politics.326 
 
The South African persons selected for interviews had to be from the pre- and post 1994 era, 
in other words, the time of apartheid rule and after the institutionalisation of the Interim 
Constitution and the new Constitution in 1996. In the case of South African interviewees I 
had ample success, mainly because of my political involvement during the 1980s, and post-
1992 involvement with various role players, theorists, military people and comrades. The 
persons approached whatever their background, were more than willing and sincere to share 
their views, experiences and expertise. I remain thankful to all of them, though for the 
purposes of this study they will remain anonymous. Thus, access was not a stumbling block. 
 
I conducted one interview with a retired senior staff officer of the SADF. Another interview 
was conducted with a military practitioner, then and now active in the military, and also well 
known as a theorist in the field. The former provided close insight into the apartheid times, 
and the latter actually breached the past and present (the transitional stage and the current 
period of transformation included). 
 
I had the opportunity (again access was no problem) to interview an old colleague who came 
from a military background, lectured at the Military Academy in Saldanha, and was for a 
while attached to the Defence Secretariat. This interview proved to be of great value. 
 
                                                 
326 Perhaps for the better, as I may have received official standpoints (read: party political views) as 
feedback. And for these views/standpoints and criticisms of such official positions, I had ample access 
to other data i.e., accredited articles, non-accredited articles, monographs, in-depth newspaper articles, 
pamphlets and other sources (oral or written). 
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In one case, I set up an interview with a trusted colleague. He is a senior staff officer in the 
SANDF and an ex-MK commander. We agreed to meet in his office in Pretoria. Due to 
interruptions, we concluded that the interview situation was far from ideal and terminated it 
after 20 to 30 minutes. We rescheduled a few times, but work and other pressures made it 
impossible to fulfil this. However, at a meeting in Cape Town we succeeded in fitting in a 
rather free-flowing discussion related to my (and his previous) research/experiences in the 
field. It lasted an hour. He also provided me afterwards with unsolicited material including his 
unpublished Master’s Degree mini-dissertation that he completed in the USA on CMR in 
South Africa.327 Reflecting on this aborted attempt at conducting an expected more-than-
useful interview, I concluded that the interactions and unsolicited materials added value to my 
data-gathering process (One does not get despondent about “losing” an interview and then 
slogging to attain another one. For qualitative interviewers such experiences are run of the 
mill). It all turned out for the good as he eventually read parts of an earlier draft of the thesis 
and commented on it. 
 
Eventually I substituted this attempted interview with a top-ranking official from a “struggle” 
background closely involved with CMR and civil control over the military. He also had a 
good background on the establishment and workings of the South African Defence 
Secretariat. Again it proved to be an extremely useful interview. 
 
A further interview was with a previous member of the parliamentary opposition in the 
tricameral parliament. In this case I was more interested in his experiences around the shifting 
locus of power from parliament to the security minded political leaders of the apartheid 
regime (the so-called securocrats). As this person was and still is a well-known public figure, 
we knew each other for years and I greatly valued his insights, I requested that he kindly 
consider that his name be used. He agreed without hesitation. The added value in this case 
was that the person was not only intimately involved with South African politics and an 
advocate of a negotiated settlement; he was also a sociologist by training.328 I will deal with 
this interview later in the chapter (the Afrikaans version of the interview is supplied in the 
appendix, while in the text I use the English translation). 
 
 
                                                 
327 Though it was classified as “open distribution” at the particular war college, I did not pick it up in 
my literature searches. 
328 For more detail on the organization that the participant established in 1986 to further a negotiated 
solution to the cycle of violence and repression that marked South Africa in the 1980s, consult Carlin 
(1989). 
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6.5.2. Data solicited from experts, practitioners or informed observers through e-mail 
 
During the course of the study, I sought a way to complement the interviews. This idea was 
strengthened by the advice of a then peer-debriefer who was involved in previous qualitative 
studies on a regular basis. I sent out the schedule, slightly adapted for e-mail use together with 
a letter of approval from the Chair of my Department. 
 
As the majority of the selected national and international participants for this exercise were 
persons who had an open public profile (such as military sociologists, political scientists, 
journalists versed in the field and retired military officers), I gave them a choice on whether 
they want to respond anonymously or whether their names could be mentioned. The majority 
chose the latter option. Their insights added value to the study I eventually treated them 
anonymously. 
 
6.6. “Getting into detail”: Face-to-face interviews 
 
Interview 1 
 
The interview was held during 2005. The officer had more than 30 years’ experience in the 
SADF, having been trained in infantry, later parachute battalion, and later a lecturer at the 
military academy at Saldanha. Among others, he did several military courses outside South 
Africa and was exposed to the then Portuguese commando’s who fought in Angola before 
Angola’s independence. Thereafter, he became a serving officer in military intelligence. In 
this capacity, he was responsible for interaction with inter-departmental workgroups (the 
latter referring to civilian-state bureaucracies). He was also responsible, during the 
Namibian/Angolan war, for the submission of information and situational reports to the 
Administrator-General of Namibia. 
 
The person selected was an excellent choice. I provided him with the schedule beforehand. 
We partly followed the schedule and in other cases, as he knew the “territory”, he provided 
well-informed answers to questions simultaneously linking it up with other questions. I could 
not have hoped for a better person to interview in this case. 
 
His views on the SATRC will be discussed first and civil military relations in South Africa 
second. 
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The research participant’s views on the TRC 
 
The respondent argued that, for the majority of South Africa, the TRC-exercise may have 
been necessary and useful. It perhaps had (could have had) an element of catharsis and 
healing. However, he made a very interesting argument suggesting that without a TRC, South 
Africa would have been able to develop and hone workable CMR and efficient civil control 
over security institutions because South Africans had the capacity to do so. 
 
Instead of the SATRC which comprised of an extensive public process with all the costs 
involved, he reflected that large public investment of funding by the new government into 
social reconstructive programs would have been more beneficial rather than spending the 
money on the SATRC. Such projects (be they educational, health orientated, upgrading of 
residential areas or in the form of bursaries for victims’ children) could have been termed a 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Project and the completed projects accredited to this, 
he suggested. 
 
The interviewee commented that he had mixed feelings about the SATRC. However in 
retrospect the TRC-exercise may not have been worthwhile: “I have mixed feelings about the 
TRC. It looks to me as if the exercise was not worth it. Let us forget (the TRC/the past) and 
build this new South Africa (Afrikaans: “Oor die WVK het ek gemengde gevoelens, dit lyk 
my die oefening was (dalk) nie die moeite werd nie. Kom ons vergeet dit en bou ’n nuwe 
Suid-Afrika”). Regarding the abuse of human rights and transgressions such as torture and 
assassinations, it must be made clear that, in his view, these could be dealt with through two 
approaches. The first: to bring transgressors to the civil-criminal court/the civil-criminal 
justice system to stand trial, being heard and sentenced appropriately if guilty. Secondly, since 
– or if – some of them were military persons of high rank who clearly transgressed the norms 
of professional and ethical military action, the military code of conduct applied at the time. As 
such, these persons could appear before military courts and tribunals and sentenced 
appropriately if found guilty.329 
 
For him, the TRC did not necessarily contribute to the future upholding of civil oversight 
regarding the military and security institutes. It is also unclear whether it will be able to do so 
in the future. 
                                                 
329 The South African military, like other militaries, had a regiment of discipline (“Regiment van 
Dissipline”), which clearly provided for disciplining members of the armed forces who overstepped the 
set code of conduct. Like the civilian criminal justice system, the “Regiment van Dissipline” provided 
for minor and major cases to be heard. At the time, in extreme cases, the death sentence would apply. 
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The participant’s view on CMR 
 
The research participant had a good knowledge of the history of CMR in South Africa, 
especially civilian oversight and control. He made interesting comments to this effect. He 
argued that the notion of a Defence Secretariat as a possible institution to oversee the military, 
was largely undermined by the way in which the apartheid government treated the issue. He 
referred at length to the fact that the Defence Secretariat that existed before 1960 was 
drastically downscaled during the 1960s. 
 
It has to be mentioned that, following the coming to power of Erasmus as the first minister of 
Defence for the National Party, the then Union Defence Force was “cleansed” from the 
majority of English speaking and/or loyal United Party-members in favour of Afrikaans 
and/or loyal National Party officers, inclusive of men belonging to the AB.330 
 
According to the interviewee, the diminishing role of the Defence Secretariat under the 
National Party government was revisited by a Ph.D. thesis by a then a lecturer at the military 
academy of Saldanha. This lecturer wrote on the military economy of South Africa 
(Afrikaans: “Die krygsekonomie van Suid-Afrika”). The thesis argued for re-structuring and 
cost-saving measures related to security issues. Some pro-government people viewed the 
arguments offered in the thesis as ground-breaking. Following the completion of the thesis, 
lobbying occurred in favour of downscaling the Defence Secretariat. Some of the then officers 
in favour of the downscaling were, for example, Magnus Malan.331 
 
Following this insider-lobbying, the Defence Secretariat was replaced by the Comptroller-
General (Afrikaans: “Komptroleur-Generaal”). He argued following these developments, it is 
not difficult to see that CMR was to take an essentially different pathway in the future. A 
civilian defence secretariat as a link between the military and the electorate through their 
parliamentary representatives disappeared for all practical purposes. South Africa’s 
government was now in the hands of a white minority that came to power under the slogan of 
Afrikaner (Christian) Nationalism. 
 
                                                 
330 Military sociologists such as Rocky Williams referred to this National Party restructuring of the then 
defence force as the “Erasmus purges”. In Afrikaans lingua it became known as “Die nag van die 
rapportryers”, as motorcycle drivers departed from military headquarters immediately on receiving the 
letters of resignation of the “old guard” to be delivered to those who became “redundant”.  
331 The author of the dissertation was Ernst Pienaar.  
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The interviewee argued that despite the demise of the then defence secretariat, the military 
leadership in a restricted democracy following the 1948 takeover by the National Party and its 
cohorts, still saw themselves as obedient to the ruling government: “We remain(ed) obedient 
to the government of the day. If there is a change of government we follow the same rule” 
(Afrikaans: “Ons is/bly gehoorsaam teenoor die regering van die van die dag. As die regering 
verander volg ons dieselfde reël”). 
 
However in the view of the informant, the SADF leadership as an interest group would 
continuously increase pressures to have control over their funding as well as their slice of 
funding from the national budget. Direct quotation: “Die weermag wou volle beheer hê oor 
bedinging vir fondse uit die nasionale begroting. Die Komptroleur-Generaal was afhanklik 
van die militêres.” (English: The military wanted full control over bargaining for funds out of 
the national budget. The comptroller general became dependent on the military). 
 
The Defence Secretariat was no more by 1960 and even the comptroller general was 
pressurised into a position of lesser influence. Whatever limitations the comptroller-general 
could impose or propose to the military in terms of policy, budgets and forced usage, 
diminished progressively in favour of the Minister of Defence. The research participant 
summarises the effect of this eloquently: “Mense was geneig om te dink dat die Minister van 
Verdediging die persoon is vir burgerlike beheer.” (people tended to think/believe that the 
Minister of Defence was responsible for civil control [over the military]). This was no 
surprise, because the Comptroller-General was no longer in a position independent of the 
military, but in service of the military. In the words of the respondent: “Wiens brood ik eet, 
diens woord ik spreek.” (He used a archaic Dutch saying here as a matter of irony, which 
implies that “who pays you/feeds you, demands your loyalty”). 
 
“Both the politicians and military structures tended to look towards the Minister as advisor 
and executor and saw the minister as in touch with civilian feelings and demands. One has to 
keep in mind that the Minister, in all cases, happened to be a loyal servant and supporter of 
the National Party and held an influential position in the South African cabinet”.332 
 
The participant remarked that Magnus Malan was extremely ambitious and that it was no 
secret to people who interacted with him. In the view of the interviewee Malan did not only 
                                                 
332 The influence of the Minister of Defence would increase following the institution of the National 
Security Council (NSC) in 1972, and more so the 1975/1976 involvement in the Angolan war and the 
1976 Youth Rebellion in South Africa. The NSC to become the SSC steadily rose in influence. 
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have political support, but most likely was earmarked for later senior positions. More 
specifically, it was not a matter based on military considerations but rather political 
imperatives.333 
 
During the interview the interviewee pointed out that it was clear that the military, many of 
them at the time having had experience of the Angolan war or being deployed there, had 
reservations about the deployment of the SADF inside South Africa. For them, the 
deployment of the SADF inside South Africa (be it in quelling township conflicts or in the 
later para-military security arm, the Civil Cooperation Bureau – CCB) was not acceptable for 
the interviewee. The military’s purpose and main obligation rested with defending the country 
and its people against foreign aggression. He pointed out that he himself (according to him he 
was not the only one) warned against the internal involvement of the SADF. He shared an 
interesting anecdote about a senior staff meeting where he complained about this tendency, 
and one of his seniors retorted: “Ons het jou nou gehoor meneer” (English: We heard your 
story, mister”.334). Referring to a person with the rank of General as mister could be seen as 
condescending or intimidating. 
 
The CCB, established to “minimise” internal unrest and resistance, became involved with the 
assassination, poisoning, and murder of political opponents. This was not only unacceptable 
for the interviewee, but bedevilled line and command functions and tarnished the image of 
other professional military people. The CCB was a structure that did not fit under the military, 
nor the security police, and as such a hybrid with a problematic, if not unacceptable mandate. 
Apart from their unacceptable role, according to the informant the introduction of the CCB 
brought about a structure that confused and sidelined the standard lines of command and 
control leading to abusive politics. Direct quote: “Dit was nie ’n tipiese militêre organisasie 
nie … (daar is) foute gemaak met bevel en beheer.” (it [the CCB] was not a typical military 
organisation … mistakes were made in command and control). In cases the CCB had carte 
blanche (this also applied to Project Coast, the nuclear and biological warfare program) with 
regard to funding, and they reported directly to Genls Magnus Malan and Kat Liebenberg. He 
pointed out that it caused tremendous frustration, in his own words: “Die ding het wollerig 
                                                 
333 I have referred earlier on to the notion of political generals (Afrikaans: “politieke generals”). This 
term became widely used amongst ex-conscripts and Afrikaans-speaking people critical and left of the 
government during the 1980s. During our interview the discussant was more direct: “Constand Viljoen 
was die laaste van die Boere-Generaals: Hy het die etiek van oorlogvoering verstaan en dit uitgeleef.” 
(English: General Constand Viljoen was the last of the Boere generals. He understood the ethics around 
warfare and lived to it). 
334 The colloquialism “mister” should not be confused with “Sir” which is used with a measure of 
respect towards the addressed person. 
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geword en uitgerafel … dan soek jy moeilikheid.” (English: It became woolly/disentangled … 
then [in such a case] you are looking for trouble). 
 
With regard to the future, he made several comments. The main one being that it is not 
advisable to get hooked on models. Civilian oversight is necessary, but hard-and-fast 
blueprinting of models is not advisable. With regard to intelligence gathering, he pointed out 
that any state (also a democratic state), will have to utilise the element of intelligence 
gathering for purposes of national defence. However, it is important that a successful structure 
is institutionalised that prevents confusing channels of command and control that circumvent 
such command and control channels and lead to duplication. By doing so, one could ensure 
that clear and accountable lines of command (“bevel en struktuur”) are maintained, 
duplication prevented, and with it the waste of human capacity, energy and money and 
overstepping of boundaries by security personnel in a democratic state. 
 
He made it clear that the above lacked under the previous regime. “(Daar is) nie ’n goue reël 
oor hoe om oorvleueling uit te skakel nie.” Further: “Daar is nooit ’n suksesvolle struktuur 
daargestel wat besparing aangehelp en oorvleueling uitgeskakel het nie.” (English: There is 
no golden rule on how to neutralise duplication of tasks … [In the SADF] there was never a 
rule on how to minimise diffusion of roles. There was never a successful structure to assist in 
cost-saving and (duplication) of roles)335. 
 
With regard to the relations between military command and leadership structures and 
politicians he made an important remark. In simple terms, it meant that (for various reasons) 
there were not enough senior military commanders (i.e. those amongst the political generals 
and politicians who made their voices heard when they started doubting the way in which the 
military was increasingly used by political leadership). “In die top struktuur was daar nie 
mense wat die guts gehad het om dit te sê nie.” (English: In top structures people did not have 
the guts to say it.) 
                                                 
335 Compare Dombroski: Apart from the SAP’s Security Branch (SB), the Bureau of State Security 
(BOSS), the Department of National Security (NIS), there were the Department of Military intelligence 
that conducted intelligence functions including counterintelligence operations. “Overtime elements of 
the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau/Department of Information … and Prison Service also 
took up intelligence tasks” (Dombroski, 2006: 44). It takes little understanding to see thepotential of 
duplication here. Add to this the SSC and a hawk-like Prime Minister later to become president (P.W. 
Botha) and the issue becomes even more complicated. The later CCB also came into the picture. The 
CCB, if ever there was a misnomer, was a hybrid organisation, frequently making use of bogus 
companies and organisations (in some cases employing persons with a criminal record) that undertook 
intelligence and operational actions against the opposition, including assassination, murder and 
kidnapping (Africa & Mlombile, 2001. Unclassified document received from an unnamed colleague, 
October 2007). 
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If people had the will to speak out, there were structures in place to question military 
leadership and even politicians, he asserted. He stressed that in a new/post transitional state, 
there remains the imperative to look and re-look (with an open mind to structures, channels of 
command) at the right of military top-structures to question political decisions. Acts that 
could undermine the balance between the civil and the military in the sense that the military 
are forced to become “politically obedient” should be observed with vigilance. It is also 
important that sanctions are built by law into structures and processes to discipline politicians 
in this regard. In very descriptive terms he suggested that should even the Minister of Defence 
overstep these guidelines, he should be sanctioned: “Tot die Minister se gat (moet kan) klap.” 
(Even the minister should receive a kick under the ass, if he oversteps the rules). 
 
Another important remark was that the South African demobilisation process was highly 
unsatisfactory. Quotation: “Daar was geen demobilisering nie en dit is waar ouens soos 
Willem Ratte uitgeklim het … daar is potensiaal beskikbaar. Hope van daai ouens sit 
werkloos, doen f*k*l … hy behoort nêrens nie … no sense of belonging. Sy wêreld en sy 
weermag het uitmekaar geval.” (English: “There was no proper demobilisation process. A lot 
of those guys sit around jobless, they do f*ck*ll, they have no sense of belonging … His 
world and his army fell apart). For the respondent, the fact that the demobilisation process 
was speeded up without long-term planning and gradual reinsertion into civil society, forms 
part of current tensions and alienation from government by demobilised military personnel, be 
they ex SADF or non-statutory forces.336 In short, the flawed post-apartheid demobilisation 
process was not seen as significant enough to receive full attention from the political 
leadership. Thus early on during transition the civilian-military interface did not receive the 
human focus that was needed during such a social process. 
 
For the interviewee, a significant part of the problem lies in the non-realisation by politicians 
that the military (like civil communities) should be treated as a national asset and based on the 
principle of a non-racial and a non-partisan approach. If leadership fails, the failure is likely to 
have further repercussions in society. He pointed out that in social structures: “’n Vis word 
                                                 
336 I have argued elsewhere that very much the same applied to returned cadres from the ANC, PAC 
and Azanla. In these cases, the discontent is becoming increasingly clear. On another level the ragtag, 
muddling through turbo-charged demobilisation process led to many cadres becoming involved in 
small crime, now evolving into syndicate crime with extremely negative consequences (see Gear, 2002 
and Liebenberg et al (2001) as well as a report by All Africa Consultants for the ISS funded by the 
European Union (2001). This view was confirmed again during a recent conference in the Western 
Cape that I attended (July 2007) where an MK veteran said that deep dissatisfaction with the 
demobilisation is bound to lead to more problems (Source to remain anonymous).   
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van sy kop af vrot.” (English: A fish becomes rotten from his head). He quoted a previous 
SADF General who said that if you keep yourself constantly busy with the past, you lose the 
future. For him, there are many “brainy people” and many of them would be prepared to form 
part of a new reconstructed military, provided that it nurtures non-racialism, military 
professionalism, merit and creates an environment of belonging337. 
 
In conclusion, I asked whether there is anything else that he would like to mention. He said: 
“I will make one brief comment. In terms of civil military relations, we are nowhere there”. In 
the direct words of the respondent: “We are nowhere … ons is nie eers naby nie”. 
 
To summarise: The informant had doubts about the SATRC process and suggested that 
another pathway, namely that of a national reconciliation project based on providing services 
and training, would have been more beneficial. He pointed out that since the time of the 
Union Defence Force and especially after the National Party came to power the role of the 
defence secretariat diminished until the secretariat and whatever influence it could have had 
disappeared. With it the crucial linkage between the electorate via their representatives in 
parliament became problematic. The military, although loyal to the government of the day 
became more salient in their influence. This eventually led to diffused lines of command, 
duplication of roles and allowed for transgressions in terms of the use of security forces – 
especially inside the country. Looking at the demobilisation process he offered the criticism 
that it alienated people and led to the loss of skills of people willing to contribute. If the 
demobilisation process was an example of how CMR are to be approached in the new 
democracy it was not a good start. Moreover, despite the establishment of current defence 
secretariat, he felt that the achievement of sound CMR in the South African democracy was 
still a long way off. 
 
Interview 2 
 
My second interview was with a past staff member of the Defence Secretariat. He previously 
served as an officer in the SANDF and as staff member of a military research centre before 
moving to the civilian defence secretariat. He received his PhD related to this area with high 
accolades. As I knew the participant and had frequent interaction with him since 1995, access 
was no problem. It was a relaxed interview in ideal interviewing conditions. He ensured that 
there was no interruptions and that we could talk for an amenable time. I will divide this 
                                                 
337 An implicit criticism of current racial based affirmative or corrective action. 
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interview, as with the previous one, in issues dealing with the SATRC and issues dealing with 
civil control over the military. 
 
The interviewee’s views on the TRC 
 
On the question of the necessity and value of the TRC he commented: “It was a very good 
way to deal with pent-up anger, unfinished business and to close the loop on what happened 
to our people … it brought back some sanity … to start with a clean slate.” And further, the 
SATRC was groundbreaking in its own way in that it alleviated potential for future unrest and 
had a rehabilitative function. He added that, should he be confronted with the same choice, he 
would take the choice again because the TRC was a good model in dealing with a past of 
oppression. 
 
In reflecting on the TRC, he pointed out that it had potentially wider consequences in 
preventing social conflict. “I do believe that the problems and the questions like the land 
question would have been a lot worse if we did not have the TRC.” For him, the SATRC 
debate and process penetrated the military discourse sufficiently to have a positive impact on 
CMR in the future. The TRC revelations “created an atmosphere to be more receptive”. By 
doing so, it succeeded in opening avenues for civil control over the military. “I believe there 
was a cross pollination between the two processes.” In referring to two processes, his 
reference is made to the SATRC and the South African DRP. It accentuated for future 
military reformers “that we have to keep the armed forces under control”. 
 
The SATRC process implied that “there was a national involvement … amongst others the 
defence industry” that succeeded in making people aware of future challenges. He qualified 
his argument that the TRC “unfortunately had to limit them to a framework that was victims 
based”. As such, the TRC had perhaps the weakness that it could not expand at length or give 
guidelines on civil control over the military in future democracy in his view. For him, the 
DRP and the institutionalisation of the Defence Secretariat evolved somewhat differently 
from the SATRC. What both shared was that it pointed out the need to prevent security 
agencies to become “ the law unto themselves”. 
 
The interviewee’s views on CMR 
 
“We (the new government/political leadership) tried to go all the way … maybe too much. 
(Then again) it was good for being absolutely transparent … We tried to set the pace for other 
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countries.” He compared the case of Argentina and Chile, suggesting that their TRC processes 
did not influence CMR sufficiently: “Argentina and Chile are way behind us.” 
 
Related to this, the DRP and the South African institutionalised model of a Defence 
Secretariat was not only meant for internal reconstruction and regeneration. It was and is 
based on good/best practice. He commented that “South Africans felt that others should see 
that ‘you guys are doing a good job’”. In other words, the DRP and Defence Secretariat were 
both meant to set an example of best practice for countries outside South Africa. “It was 
meant to allow others to see what is happening in the towers of power. We projected 
ourselves as benchmark material – all we can do (now) is to improve ourselves rather than to 
go backwards.” 
 
“The military is the mirror image of what is happening in broader society … (South Africans) 
have inculcated a habit of fighting … we have those things … cases where people does not 
adhere to what is expected.” But there are reasons for optimism: “People with such views are 
on the way out and new ones coming up through the ranks.” In referring to this, he mentioned 
that this applied to the post-war generation of rank and file in the new SANDF – people of all 
races. In conclusion he mentioned that: “we have opened up the wounds with the hope of 
reconciliation.” 
 
There are possible frictions because of trade-offs and the transition with its uneven influences. 
But he commented, “these are ongoing issues that should be solved”. In terms of future 
modus operandi, he argued that “any policy will have little effect if there are no sources 
behind it, if the policy is not out there. The challenge for South Africans is to provide policies 
that are out there”. 
 
Perhaps more important, the respondent stressed that the current process and structures need 
to bring on board other people from other orientations. Apart from this, the following areas 
deserve close attention and continued action: 
 
• The optimum use of resources and the allocation of the necessary resources; 
• Inclusiveness of the process, the institutions i.e. the Defence Secretariat and the 
SANDF; 
• He cautioned against the possible pitfalls of (1) allowing processes of decision 
making and implementation to be haphazard; and (2) “gallop” processes, i.e. conceive 
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of and implementing decisions or plans in haste without considering and measuring 
the possible outcomes. 
 
Continuous facilitation of inclusive decision-making and implementation processes, coupled 
with civil control and military professionalism, will have to remain high on the agenda with 
vigilant stakeholders. 
 
In summary: The informant shared that given South Africa’s historical inheritance, the 
SATRC was the only viable option. Also, that because of the TRC process other potential 
future social tensions may have been minimised. In his view, while the SATRC and the DRP 
were distinct processes there was some cross-pollination. 
 
He argued that the South African DRP and the establishment of the Defence Secretariat 
followed best practice and achieved for example more than some Latin American countries 
that democratised before South Africa. He suggested that the positive elements achieved, now 
need honing to ensure consistent CMR for the future. 
 
The participant’s views on the current state of affairs with regard to CMR as well as the 
SATRC reflected optimism in contrast with the first participant who had his doubts about the 
SATRC and suggested that South Africa has a long way to go to inculcate good CMR. 
 
Interview 3 
 
The third interview on the South African situation proved to be of immense value. I held the 
interview with a person versed in the “politics of the military” and security-related issues 
inclusive of security-sector reform. He was an academic who held a post as a professor in the 
a social sciences department at a prominent South African university for several years. Apart 
from being an academic, he had intimate knowledge of South African defence issues before, 
during, and after the transition to democracy. He served since the 1950s in the Citizen Force 
and the Reserve Forces, where he held a senior rank. 
 
He kindly responded immediately to my e-mail, returning it with his feedback. More 
importantly, he pointed out some weaknesses and shortcomings in my schedule. He also 
provided unsolicited feedback in the form of submissions and memos which he and others 
drafted to authorities related to CMR, civil control over the military and the (new) Defence 
Secretariat. I have to add that he also provided valuable materials and shared insights on the 
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weaknesses of South Africa’s earlier attempts to develop a functional Defence Secretariat, 
especially the years before 1948 (in other words between the two World Wars). He was also 
extremely knowledgeable about the demise of a Defence Secretariat after the National Party 
came to power following the 1948 elections and the Nat’s victory over the United Party 
headed by Smuts. 
 
We had a long interview. The interview amongst other connected CMR with the role of the 
professional military – which in the case of the apartheid military, were pushed into roles that 
most military persons disliked. But, like in many other societies, the professional military 
people have but two choices: to obey or not to obey the interviewee pointed out.338 
 
The research participant’s views on the SATRC 
 
Because of the wide-ranging knowledge of this participant on civil-military issues, we spent 
less time on the SATRC in the interview compared to the other interviews with South African 
informants. The reader also has to keep in mind that I did receive extensive e-mail-feedback 
regarding the interviewee’s perspective(s) on the TRC. I will refer to these views here and 
discuss it also in more detail in the section on e-mail feedback. 
 
The participant pointed out that the SATRC did not concern itself with the military forces, 
except for sections of Military Intelligence and top commanding personalities. He believed 
that the SATRC was valuable/necessary, “but mainly for the police who ran wild because of 
absence of command and control processes and because of the influence of Chief 
Commissioners chosen from the ‘Security Police’” (interview, 29/09/2005). 
                                                 
338 Whatever choice the professional military person in a highly politicised atmosphere would make, 
they face trouble. They seem to be set to be blamed. If they questioned the incumbents (the political 
elite of the regime that they served) they would be fired or retired. Coming any new regime, they would 
be blamed for what went wrong. This phenomenon is human, all too human. The goose-stepping 
political elite (with apologies to Breyten Breytenbach, South African poet) in transition will blame the 
professional soldier while they (the elite) move from one ruling order to another expediently and with a 
remarkable ability to forget. Ex-military representing the old regime and/or cadres from the liberation 
struggle may find themselves ignored, despised and finally blamed and forgotten. If power amongst 
elites comes into the equation, a lot of the past can be wiped under the carpet of consensual “elite 
forgetfulness”.  
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Cartoon reflecting popular views on the SATRC and possible court cases against apartheid political 
leaders political and military September, 1996. Note the politicians, military leaders and police chiefs 
depicted. F W de Klerk can be seen on the far right together with Pik Botha and President PW Botha. 
 
 
The participant also mentioned that the SATRC process was better than those in other 
countries, where the relevant commissions’ roles were too restricted. The choice for a TRC 
made more sense than criminal proceedings against top military and political leadership. As 
the SATRC was a choice made by parliament it also excluded in realistic terms a forgive and 
forget approach. 
 
The participants view on civil control over the military 
 
This part of the interview was invaluable and we spent much of the time on the issue of civil-
control, the role (or perceived role) of a Defence Secretariat and civil control and oversight 
over the military. In this part of the schedule interview, I stuck in detail to the civil-military 
issue.339 
                                                 
339 One of the advantages of qualitative research and face-to-face interviewing is exactly this: to be able 
to widen the scope to allow for other angular optics based on the experiences of the persons involved 
(and even projections based on his/her contextual habitat) – and by doings so, to enrich the overall 
picture. 
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The interviewee had access to, and experience of, a wide range of data and experience. Due to 
his participant-observer role and participant’s advantage, he provided argued points for 
discussion. More so, he could back his arguments up with very illustrative examples from the 
past and the present. The shared information was of value and I asked several probing 
questions, engaged towards the end of the interview in the discussion in a more fluid style. 
This approach assisted me to recap many of the things he said and I gained new insights. 
Because of the exposure of the interviewee and his practical and theoretical knowledge, he 
frequently anticipated questions and responded to them pro-actively and in such a way that 
one argument flowed automatically into another. Small wonder then, that I felt highly 
satisfied after the interview. I was looking forward to write up the interview, reflect on it, 
report on it and analyse it. 
 
As researcher I have to restate some background here for the reader: Between 1912 and 1966, 
South Africa had an independent Secretary of Defence. The post of Secretary of Defence was 
instituted by, and the functions of the post described in, the Defence Acts of 1912 and 1957 as 
well as the Permanent Force Regulations (Staff) at the time340. While the position was 
established, it reflected numerous shortcomings during these years, some of which the 
participant highlighted (Also compare the first interview above). The Secretary was described 
at the time as the Permanent Head of the Department. 
 
The participant suggested that, “However, in practice, this was not entirely true. After the 
establishment of the Chief of the General Staff (later at various times called General Officer 
Commanding the Union Defence Force, Commandant-General, and Chief of the SADF) the 
position of the Secretary of Defence waned in influence. A specific weakness of the defence 
secretariat’s position was that the meaning and characterisation of the post was never clearly 
defined …a minefield of prerogatives and consequent overlapping of duties developed 
between the two office holders and their staffs. Attempts at solutions all ignored the 
fundamental constitutional principles behind the establishment of the Secretariat as well as the 
principles of organisational theory”. 
 
The result? “After years of conflict worsened by the Second World War, and 
recommendations by several committees and the Public Service Commission, the Secretariat 
was taken into the SADF, initially in a civilian capacity under the Comptroller General. 
                                                 
340 Elsewhere I earlier read a similar argument meticulously set out problems around civil-military 
shortcomings in apartheid South Africa (See Fourie, n.d.: 1 ff). 
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Between 1966 and 1968, it was absorbed into the various staff sections at Defence 
Headquarters. The demise of the Secretary of Defence, whose role was not clear and whose 
duties overlapped consistently with the Chief of General Staff/Commandant-General/and later 
Chief of the SADF, was perhaps a mixed blessing. In some areas it was successful. But here 
were defects too”. 
 
The participant made it clear that the following defects within South African civil military 
relations including the notion of defence secretariats then and now are clear: (1) undefined 
roles and jurisdictions; (2) inability to understand the role of the institution, and lack of policy 
guidelines; (3) ignorance of the various secretaries of the nature of modern war; and (4) 
wasteful duplication of administration. Apart from these reasons for absorption, it is argued 
that some underlying defects lead to the demise of the position as instituted. The cause of 
these defects one finds in: (1) the absence of sophisticated training and the poor comparative 
development of officials in the Secretariat; (2) the absence of a well trained administrative 
class and lack of academic skills; (3) the neglect of potential amongst staff; (4) the neglect of 
a legal framework which led to misunderstanding of the role of the secretariat; and (5) the 
lack of, if not ignorance of, military affairs by staffers. 
 
With reference to the Secretary of Defence in South Africa between the World Wars, during 
the WW II and immediately thereafter, the participant commented that the Treasurer 
(“Tesourie”) tasked with finances frequently complicated relations between the military and 
the government. In turn, “the Secretariat of Defence acted as if they were an extension of the 
Treasurer. This phenomenon, including its weaknesses, was not entirely unique. South Africa 
followed the British model of a Secretary of Defence, and in Britain frequently the same 
happened”. Between unclear roles and duties, many a time “muddling-through” became the 
standard modus operandi without the fault lines being addressed and corrected. The 
interviewee was quite emphatic in his judgment: “(Hierdie mense) was net rekenmeesters 
klerke met geen verstaan van die omgewing waarin hulle gewerk het nie” (interview, 
29/09/2005). (English: These persons were just accountant clerks with no understanding of 
the environment in which they worked). 
 
He provided an important insight regarding the then Secretary of Defence and the new post-
1996 Defence Secretariat when it came to the provision of policy inputs to civilian and 
military leadership: “Die idee dat beleidsinsette gegee moet word bestaan nie … die ouens is 
net amptenare” (interview, 29/09/2005). (English: “The idea that policy inputs need to be 
given, does not exist … these guys are just bureaucrats”). 
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He also pointed out that the Defence Secretariat finds itself between, for example, 
Parliamentary Committees for Defence that would request a briefing on a report that in some 
cases the Minister of Defence had not yet seen or approved. These potentially role-confusion 
could lead to sub-optimum role-fulfilment on both sides. 
 
On the other hand, the Defence Secretariat has to deal occasionally with military structures 
that guard their own territory of influence, hence trying to limit the influence of the Defence 
Secretariat. Obviously, this is to be expected within any inter-and intra organizational body or 
bodies. It forms part of organizational “politics” in any state or big corporation. It is necessary 
to manage this effectively to attain optimum outputs. 
 
An important part of the interview (often taking the character of a dialogue or ongoing 
discussion), became the references to the role that different personalities played within the 
then Secretary of Defence and the current Defence Secretariat. In reading for an article that I 
wrote for a journal on arms procurement and acquisition during the 1930s and 1940s, I 
recalled that one source mentioned the fact that Gen. Jan Smuts as Commander-in- Chief, in a 
variety of instances, communicated with the then minister responsible for arms production, 
Van der Bijl directly. Decisions were taken ad hoc with less involvement (even no 
involvement) of the then Defence Secretariat. In such cases the Secretary of Defence – even if 
consulted – had a minor role to play. 
 
We discussed the participant’s views on this. He referred to the Smuts years and the 
Secretaries for Defence: “Persoonlikhede was altyd ’n probleem. Roland Warn en Collier was 
goed. Toe hulle waai en Andries Brink daar inkom … het dit ’n splitsing veroorsaak. Dit sou 
altyd ’n probleem bly …” (English: “Personalities was always a problem. Roland Warn and 
Collier were good [at their job]. When they left and Andries Brink came … a feud developed. 
This would remain a problem”). He provided an example: “Van Ryneveld en Brink het 
uiteenlopende dinge gesê.” (English: “Van Ryneveld and Brink said clashing things”.) 
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In the view of the respondent, the reasons for this were clear: “’n Vlieënier en kommando-
offisier wat nie (werklik) geweet het hoe ’n weermag gedryf word nie.” (“One from an air 
force background and one a commando officer341 with not enough knowledge on how to 
handle a defence force”.) Despite these clear shortcomings, very little was done to rectify the 
situation. “Nie Smuts of Erasmus of P.W. het ’n werksgroep opgestel om die regte ding te 
doen nie … die Sekretariaat was altyd net ’n geldsak” (interview, 29 September 2005). 
(English: “Not Smuts, Erasmus or P W Botha appointed a task group to do the right thing … 
the Secretariat was always just the bag of money”.) 
 
The interviewee then linked some of the past experiences (or rather “lessons not learnt”?) to 
the current situation. “Die amptenare toe en nou nog, het nie die opleiding om te weet wat 
hulle moet doen nie.” (English: “The staff then and now did not have the [appropriate 
training] to know what they are doing …”.) He pointed out that staff of the Defence 
Secretariat, for example, do not attend senior military staff courses. Doing so would give 
them exposure to the environment within and the people for whom they play an important 
role, namely the military. It seems to be the accepted thing that if the top people say a thing, it 
should be so. The participant applied a vivid description: “Die baas het so gesê, en daarom 
moet dit so wees.” (English: “The Boss said so, therefore it must be so”). Such an attitude 
earmarked the decline of the Defence Secretariat before and during the Second World War. 
And, presumably, at this stage the same challenges await the new Secretariat, the informant 
suggested. 
 
The participant made an interesting statement not devoid of dry humour: “Dis daarom dat ek 
sê die Boere was rebelle in die 19de eeu, maar absolute konformiste in die 20ste eeu.” 
(English: “That is why I say, the Boers were rebels in the 19th century, but conformists in the 
20th century”.) And this phenomenon led to the decline of an efficient Secretary. The 
respondent’s implication was clear. Unless these past lessons learnt are studied, and creative 
corrections made in the environment in which the current institution functions, the new 
Defence Secretariat may follow the same route to some extent or the other. He cautioned 
                                                 
341 The commando system is an old institution in South Africa. Unlike in other countries a commando 
or commandos here refer to (mobile) home-defence units, not special forces or elite-troops 
(Commandos). The commando system developed in the 1700s as a form of mobile home defence and 
evolved after the WW II in South Africa into a citizen force element that was constituted out of part-
time soldiers and officers (To an extent it is comparable with what is known in other countries as a 
gendarmerie. After 2000 the commando system was scrapped by the current government in South 
Africa among great discontent and commando members offered the choice to join police reservist units. 
Few did. In some areas informal home defence units or neighbourhood watches came sprang up – an 
understandable reaction in a country plagued by wide-spread crime. 
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against, for example, the view of some staff in the Secretariat related to roles, functions and 
understanding the lines-of-management: “The minister is the leader, not the parliamentary 
committee” (interview, 29 September 2005). The latter committee represents the elected 
parliament’s oversight and should enact consistently its constitutional powers. 
 
The participant argued that one should perhaps study the way in which Britain deals with the 
issue.342 “Die Britte het ’n helse lang pad geloop om dit te doen … (ons kan baie by hulle 
leer). Daar moet mense wees in die Sekretariaat om beleidsrigting te gee, want top militêre 
strukture, die generaals, het nie die skoling nie. Die leiding het kortgekom in apartheid Suid-
Afrika.” (English: “The British came a damn long way. There must be people in the 
secretariat to provide leadership, because top military structures … the generals, does not 
have the schooling. This leadership lacked in apartheid South Africa”.) The issue was 
worsened by personalities such as P.W. Botha as Minister of Defence he suggested: “P.W. se 
diktatoriale persoonlikheid en boelie-wees soos baie ander mense boelies is/was, het sake 
gekompliseer” [English: “P.W. Botha’s dictatorial personality and style of bullying like 
(many) others complicated things”] (interview, 29 September 2005). 
 
The research participant mentioned that no one stood up against P.W. Botha during his rule. 
In this case, the participant echoed the same sentiment encountered earlier. “As iemand teen 
hom opgestaan het, sou dit dalk gewerk het. Maar daar was niemand nie” (English: “If 
someone stood up to him [PW Botha], it may have worked. But there was no one”) 
(interview, 29 September 2005). The earlier participant (Interview One) vividly stated: ” No 
one had the guts … [to complain/stood up against PW Botha’s style].”) 
 
The issue of personalities played a prominent (and conceivably, negative) role. With regard to 
South Africa. The first participant’s views discussed earlier in this chapter also referred to it 
and he provided some examples. It was significant that, in this interview, the issue again 
became prominent and that both interviewees had agreement on this issue. 
 
I referred elsewhere to the symbiotic role that P.W. Botha and Magnus Malan played. The 
interviewee confirmed what was far more than a mere hunch, since studies of their 
personalities and reading material also made it clear. “Die dag wat Magnus Malan minister 
geword het het baie van die kolonels en generaals gesê, ‘Hy het ons in die rug gesteek’. Hulle 
wou nie hê ’n (voormalige) generaal moet ’n minister word nie” (interview, 29 September 
                                                 
342 The past and present model that South Africa follows is based on the British model. Hence, in 
refining its model and minimizing flaws in the system, South Africa can learn much. 
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2005).343 Mense was teleurgesteld dat hy politiek toe gegaan het en hy was ’n interfeerder.” 
(English: “People were disappointed that he (Magnus) entered politics. They felt that he 
was/may become an interfering factor”.) Some even felt they were stabbed in the back by the 
move of Magnus as Chief of the Defence Force to Cabinet Minister. One has to keep in mind 
here that as frequently mentioned elsewhere P W Botha and Malan were seen to be hawks and 
reflected an obsession with the Total (communist) Onslaught. In fact one of the interviewees 
(I obtained permission to use his name and the interview is reflected later in this chapter) 
mentioned that Magnus Malan, when he complained in parliament about how security issues 
were handled at the time, said that “you are singing in Moscow’s choir” (Interview, 25 July 
2007, Johannesburg). 
 
It was no secret that Magnus Malan was extremely ambitious. The participant suggested: 
“Magnus was ontsaglik ambisieus. Baie van die Boere offisiere het hom gehaat omdat hy 
hulle gedreig het. Hy het nie nee vir ’n antwoord gevat nie …” (interview, 29/09/2005). 
(English: “Magnus was incredibly ambitious, many officers hated him because he threatened 
them. He could not take no for an answer”.) 
 
It was not the first time that people with whom I had been in interaction, said this. The 
respondent merely confirmed what others argued in their experience. Magnus amongst others 
became OC (“Kommandant”) of the South African Military Academy at a rather young 
                                                 
343 An issue that is seldom addressed or studied (with exception of the work done by, amongst others, 
Annette Seegers at UCT and Philip Frankel, University of Johannesburg), was the unique nature of 
praetorianism in South Africa – if it can be described as praetorian at all. I chose the term praetorianism 
of a special type because the military were pulled into politics by political and influential political 
people and National Party gladiators – in many cases against their will. It is no secret that Generals 
such as Gleason and Constand Viljoen did not like the idea of the military pulled into the politics of 
upholding the state in the least. In many respects, senior officers (from the rank of colonel upwards) 
saw themselves as professional soldiers for a professional and supposed non-partisan national defence 
force. In my view, two things lead to the negative images around the SADF (apart from the fact that 
they were unpopular because they operated in a minority regime). Firstly, the role of National Party 
ideologues – perhaps rather strongmen – who went into National Party politics in support of minority 
and authoritarian rule. This led to the SADF being seen as a praetorian military. Secondly, the masses 
of people in South Africa other than white people exposed to the structures which they understood, 
made no distinction between the police (including the security branch), the police units deployed 
during unrest (onluste polisie), and the military (especially the “army” mostly conscripts) who were 
deployed in the townships more or less permanently after 1984. In 1984 by decree of P W Botha a 
declared state of emergency lead to a security clamp-down. Sebokeng became the first township to be 
entered by military units. Most of these units consisted of conscripts and/or citizen force members. 
Several conscripts (including junior officers) objected to this – even if some of them did not object to 
being deployed in Namibia or even Angola. Fault lines were beginning to show within the white 
community. The minority of “objectors” publicly did so on political grounds, facing a six-year term in 
jail. Others, in not so insignificant numbers, started to duck-and-dive reporting for “national service” 
after a call-up for “township duty” while becoming involved in internal resistance. The numbers of 
people objecting on “universal christen grounds”, which involved several years of community service 
was increasingly growing at the time. The Board for Religious Objectors dealt with the latter cases.   
 330
age344, and reached the rank of general also at an early age. According to the interviewee, 
Magnus was well known. His father was a parliamentarian for the National Party. Although 
his father was not a cabinet minister, he held influential positions within the National Party 
structures. 
 
But Magnus and P.W. were not the first of the interfering types with authoritarian approach 
post-1948. The participant pointed out that “P.W. en Magnus (se bewind) was ystergrepe … 
dieselfde met Erasmus en dieselfde met Jim Fouche, al was hy nie ’n draak nie” (interview, 
29 September 2005).345 (English: “PW and Magnus’s rule was iron-fisted, the same with 
Erasmus and Jim Fouche, even if (Fouche) was not a monster”.) 
 
The participant took pains to point out the difference between military engagement in politics 
in Argentina and Chile, compared to the South African case. “Die SAW was nooit 
beleidmakend nie.” (English: The SADF [in itself] did not make policy). Unlike the military 
juntas in Latin America, the SADF never made policy. “They had to execute unpopular tasks, 
whether they liked it or not.” 
 
What about the current situation? His remarks on the current condition of CMR were 
interesting: “Ek dink nie dit het verbeter nie, omdat die sekretariaat nie weet wat hulle doen 
nie. Maar dit het ook nie erger geword nie.” (English: I do not think it got better, because the 
secretariat does not know what it is doing. However it did not became worse). As then, he 
suggested that, because “the Defence Secretariat does not always know what it does, the only 
real control lies with the Minister”. He mentioned that potentially this (as well as the lack of 
policy expertise and too little exposure to the military affairs) may lead to the demise, or at 
least the weakening, of the role of the DefSec. He mentioned in quite graphical terms that he 
said to one of the current staffers at the Secretariat: “Ek is bevrees julle gaan presies terug na 
1966 en iemand gaan die moer in raak en voordat julle julle kan kry, sit julle weer terug in die 
weermag” (interview, 29 September 2005). (English: I fear that you are going back to 1966; 
someone will get the hell in and before you know, you will be back in the military). 
 
                                                 
344 See Visser (2000: 553).  
345 Erasmus, the first Minister of Defence under National Party rule, became notorious for “firing” and 
retiring top military officers who were rightly or wrongly associated with the United Party or Jan 
Smuts’e rule. Some, like Rocky Williams, referred to the “Erasmus purges”. Others in Afrikaans-
speaking circles referred to “die nag van die rapportryers” because it was said that as the notification 
for termination of serves were typed up, motorcyclists that very same evening were dispatched 
immediately to deliver the notifications. Note that under Jim Fouche, South Africa still had a Secretary 
of Defence, even if its role was diminishing progressively. 
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However, the participant had high regard for some attempts that the SANDF and the DefSec 
engaged in, like the new program of civil education for the military. In reality, these entail an 
attempt to reprofessionalise, or perhaps rather educate and prepare, the military to act out the 
new democratic ethos. Modules in this course include international law as well as the law of 
armed conflict, constitutional law, military professionalism in a democracy, and CMR. 
 
He also had positive comments on the current Minister of Defence, Lekotha, for his open-
mindedness, his ability to carefully listen (hear out the side of his juniors) and then act 
purposefully on it. He mentioned that under a former post-apartheid Minister of Defence, 
there was a measure of politicisation – something that changed under the new minister who 
stresses professionalism, efficiency and a non-partisan approach in terms of staff development 
and careering. 
 
It is perhaps fitting for a conclusion that he pointed out that, in the past, most theoretical 
analyses on CMR focused on “how to control the military” (in other words, politicians should 
control the military). For him, new theoretical approaches (should) focus on the reciprocal 
influence and the importance that the military can have and that politicians should be reigned 
in if they undermine the quality of the democracy by partisan actions or deploy the military 
outside the parameters of the democratic order and the South African Constitution. 
 
In short the participant advised that future research should focus less on the conditions under 
which the military step into politics and more on how to control/influence the politicians to 
undertake to keep the military out of politics and not bringing them into the upholding of a 
partisan state. Having lived through, and seen this, the effects of such a failure under 
Apartheid, the participant’s words of caution and advice on new approaches are worth noting. 
 
In summary: This interview was more than just worthwhile. It was extremely valuable, 
especially with regard to socio-historical background on CMR and past mistakes. The vivid 
illustrations around the demise of the previous attempts at creating and maintaining a civilian 
defence secretariat greatly assisted in making linkages between the past experience in South 
Africa and the current civilian-military interface. It also pointed out the challenges that the 
current defence secretariat faces if they do not understand their role or allow themselves to 
diminish their role as link between civilian rule and military authority. It also points out the 
need for a strong sense of mission, the role it should play and the need to play a continuous 
role in policy formulation. 
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Interview 4 
 
This interview took place with a senior staff member of the Defence Secretariat. The 
interview as in other cases was confidential and conducted according to mutual agreement to 
be used for research purposes only and in terms of qualitative ethical conduct. 
 
The person was well versed in the area as he had previous military experience and then joined 
the defence secretariat where he spent the last few years. The person experienced the 
transition process. Personal experience with military affairs dates back to pre-democracy 
period of the armed struggle as member of the ANC’s armed wing, MK, which was in 1985 
(one has to keep in mind that in the 1980s actual MK membership was a technical issue; 
usually it was seen when one joined the underground structures). The research participant was 
already active before 1985 in the “political” underground (as opposed to guerrilla activities) at 
that point and then went into exile. 
 
The participant became an activist at a young age and was quite active in the student 
movement. In the 1970s he was at boarding school in Soweto when the Soweto uprisings took 
place. “I was there too. So I have that experience and the memory of that and lived through it 
and became more sharply involved when I was at high school, immediately after 1976. I 
stayed part of that right through to the period of what I would call, the turbulent 1980s, the 
process leading up to the formation of the UDF, youth formations and other movement 
formations. I was mainly involved in the student movement.” He continued, “But to get to 
your question related to military affairs: I arrived in MK via involvement in the student and 
youth movement. Then I got involved in the underground struggle and (had some exposure) 
to the underground structures of the ANC – until I went into exile. The 1980s saw increased 
resistance. The trade union movement and others in resistance were redefining itself in 1985 
and that prompted by a clamp down by the (apartheid) state.346 The clamp down became quite 
sharp and significant by the middle of 1985, in or around June. At that time I had information 
that they (the security police) looked for me – I left at that point. I then joined Umkhonto We 
Sizwe, became a commander and later I became a political commissar/instructor as well in the 
camps. I trained in Angola and went on to train even in the Soviet Union. Ja, so that’s the 
experience I had of course (also) working together with other militaries or other liberation 
militaries. Of course after training I (became) an instructor. I became responsible for our 
                                                 
346 During 1983 the UDF was established as a popular movement resisting apartheid and especially the 
Tri-Cameral Parliament. Trade union activities also revived en masse. Here especially the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) became noticeable. 
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military co-ordination, assistance and also (had to link up) with the diplomatic missions, 
German Republic, Yugoslavia in terms of arranging training for troops and liaising for them. 
So that’s the pre-1994 period.” 
 
Following the unbanning of the ANC and other liberation movements? “My involvement) of 
course (was) right up to the period of secession of hostilities, first the cease fire in August 
1990 with the signing of (the cease fire)… then subsequently … after Grootte Schuur minute 
and then August of 1990, then the announcement of the suspension of the armed struggle (in 
reality that happened before the actual signing of the accords) took place … and then later 
came the Pretoria minutes. So ja, my involvement has been on that side too. And then of 
course in the period running up to the democratic elections involvement with the various 
structures such as the TEC … ” 
 
In the short period of initial phases of transition between 1990 and 1993 the TEC shouldered 
much of the responsibility of running the country. The interviewee had some involvement in 
the sub-structures of the TEC related to military affairs: “We had a Transitional Executive 
Council … In that period, the involvement that I had was with the … remember the TEC was 
a product of CODESA347 … My involvement was in the sub-council of defence. I didn’t sit in 
the sub-council of defence itself, but there were then sub-structures of the sub-council on 
defence, specifically what became called the Joined Military Co-ordinating Committee, which 
was a joint structure because it was made up of the armed formations of both the state and the 
statutory formations and also the non-statutory formations which MK was the only party at 
that time.348 The PAC declined to come in. So I got involved in that (JMCC). But also at a 
more technical level, with some of the sub-workgroups that were then established, specifically 
the army sub-work group of the JMCC, I got involved in that too. Especially in the period 
1993 all the way … well until the final agreement on the signing of the interim constitution 
which was then implemented”. 
                                                 
347The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was convered together in the early 
1990s. It was a multi-party convention, including the unbanned ANC. An attempted process of 
transition through negotiation started. Despite several setbacks and internal strains it played an 
important role as one of the cornerstones of transition in South Africa.  
348 The apartheid and homeland defence forces were called “statutory forces” and those of the 
unbanned movements “non-statutory forces” The PAC as one of the unbanned liberation movements 
declined participation in the transitional process and vowed to continue the liberation struggle. 
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The participant’s views on the SATRC 
 
I asked him about the SATRC and its bearing on South Africa and other countries and the 
choices we had on treating past transgressions of human rights, i.e. (1) a TRC (2) internal 
legal proceedings or (3) a forget and forgive process. 
 
His answer as to the choice was clear: “I am convinced that the TRC was necessary so that 
you have a process of healing taking place and you bring closure on both sides. You bring 
closure on a whole range of unanswered questions that people have or people have had and so 
on. We still don’t have full closure but it was a necessary process, almost like … what do the 
religious people call it …, a catharsis. So it was quite necessary, it was necessary on all fronts, 
on the fronts of the victims, which is most important because they were the most affected. 
Also on the side of the perpetrators and also on the side of those who may not have been 
victims directly but who knew somebody who was a victim or who had a family member as 
(victim) – so I define victim fairly widely. So it (the SATRC) was necessary to do achieve 
this. We are still not fully there but it did help. It was painful but it was necessary. I recall the 
first hearings, Tutu and all of that, it was quite necessary … also for the operatives, either 
side, because it is also important … (that) you become part of dealing with the post-traumatic 
stress of the process. Post traumatic stress of the victims, post traumatic stress of even the 
perpetrators. Put yourself in the shoes of somebody let’s say on the apartheid side. Somebody 
who actually goes and carries out a secret operation, I mean by virtue of the fact that only a 
handful of people knew about it. He carried it out successfully, it happens and all of that, the 
results are there, but you then have to live with that (results) – you and sometimes you are 
alone, sometimes it’s you and others and so on. So when you have a process of the TRC you 
have (some) “freedom” to talk about it. Such an opportunity will give you a chance to reflect 
on it, reflect on it in a public platform or whatever and that .., it then has that effect. If you 
look at a range of instances – if you look at de Kock for instance, if you look at (Dirk) 
Coetzee … this opportunity was necessary349. Let me take Coetzee first, Dirk Coetzee, when 
he came to the ANC and actually spilled the beans and all that, it became a healing process 
for him, having been part of these operations. You take de Kock, the same thing. I still 
haven’t read his book but from his testimony … I can’t get myself to do it but I should … It 
became part of that process and … ja, the same also on the side of the people who were 
executing the struggle. It became that process. As to whether it was full 100 percent 
(exposure) on either side, I don’t believe it was, but then time will tell. As we are conducting 
                                                 
349 Dirk Coetzee was a former security policeman that went public with his involvement related to the 
liquidating of anti-apartheid militants. 
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this interview now, it has come back again (the respondent referred to the case of Vlok, 
previous apartheid minister to be hauled before the court for apartheid transgressions of 
human rights350). That is something we are going to live with, we decided on that process and 
as I say again it was necessary.” 
 
He continued: “As to the other two options: Forgive and forget? It would not have worked to 
forgive and forget. It would have had a very explosive outcome, very explosive because 
people would not have had the opportunity to talk about it, to ventilate, to cry, to go and 
exhume their loved ones, which exhumation would have been only possible with a TRC 
process. So it would have been like putting a lid on something that is cooking and you put a 
lid on it and then you put a brick on the lid, and then you put another brick. In the meantime it 
is cooking. It will explode. Forgive and forget is not the path we could have followed – 
especially also against the background of the kind of negotiated settlement that we reached”. 
 
He explained that: “The origins of the TRC is in the negotiations which also set the terms of 
reference for what should be then a TRC, what should be its boundaries, what are the time 
limitations they are looking at and how (it will be executed and) … which groups or entities 
or whatever do you look at (should) to be able to approach the TRC and so on. And how small 
or how big the particular event should be … So that was all necessary.” 
 
Regarding the route of criminal proceedings against apartheid transgressors his following 
remarks are relevant: “We could not have followed that. (At the time) the legal route to deal 
with (past transgressions) was/is just as explosive.” 
 
“What about the issue of the TRC, while simultaneously some court proceedings took place in 
the 1990’s?”, I asked. He answered: “Yes it’s true that more middle and lower ranks, your 
foot soldiers so to speak, are the ones who were nailed. But it may have been a result of some 
form of limitations set by the leadership (or the nature of the settlement) that preceded the 
SATRC”. (Maybe) the political leadership played a role …I think it was a form of (self) 
preservation on their part not to have a full disclosure. And you see the problem with this 
route is, even if the TRC is good, or has been good and was the best option of the three … 
                                                 
350 During 2007 the National Prosecuting Authority in terms of regulations for the prosecution of  
apartheid era crimes, promulgated in January 2006, decided to prosecute amongst others Adriaan Vlok, 
a previous cabinet minister for Law and Order and General Johan van der Merwe, former police chief 
for earlier crimes. Some media speculation had it that their witness might implicate former president 
FW de Klerk (Mail & Guardian, 3–9 August 2007). The case ended in a plea bargaining (Mail & 
Guardian, 17–23 August 2007). 
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The question is always: ‘Where do you stop in terms of the depth or the extent of the 
disclosure’. I think that, having come now 13 years down the line, there’s still some feeling 
that certain things were not disclosed on either side, by the apartheid government, some gets 
stumbled upon but also as part of ongoing developments. Now, admittedly yes, if or for those 
who did not disclose, yes there should be sanctions for that. It was an agreement that you 
disclose and there was that interrogation process to be entered – but, how far do you go? I 
don’t think that the leadership of the apartheid government disclosed sufficiently. Even if 
some of them or maybe all of them may not have necessarily been the perpetrators 
themselves; but the orders came from them. They definitely knew what was happening and 
you cannot claim ignorance of that because … I mean if you look at the way, in general terms, 
the way state machineries work and all of that: Instructions are given, orders are given, these 
(instructions and orders) are executed. Now even if in the instruction of the order, there was 
never a thing that says how you do it. Yet, the order went out. There was either an explicit or 
an implicit understanding about what should happen to execute such an order. So some of 
these orders were written, some were unwritten. There’s always that … I think they did know 
… they knew to a greater degree. I mean (for) those who were in the security establishment; 
there’s no way that they would have not known, they may not have known some of the gory 
details of what their foot soldiers were doing, but they knew the implications … the outcomes 
of such actions. But sometimes they (also) knew as a result of the outcome. For instance I 
think, if you see a report on the situation, in a particular area of the country or region or 
province or all of that and they say “okay, we need to neutralise that situation”. One (the 
politicians and top security advisors) can read a lot into that. What is “neutralise”, what does 
that mean, in what way do you do it, neutralise by what means? Kill those people who are at 
the core of this thing, you’ve got to arrest them; you’ve got to silence them? How?” 
 
We discussed the issue of political leaders claiming that they were not “in the know” or “in 
the loop” around decisions that led to human-rights transgressions. He responded that, “If the 
minister had access, as a cabinet minister, to security meetings – or even briefings – even if 
they were not always, specifically notified about the State Security Council meetings, they 
could have asked for the minutes or outcomes of a meeting (even if no minutes were kept) … 
should they not have inquired about the minutes and find out what was the last decision and 
what became of it? 
 
If one reflects on the TRC and the defence review process, shouldn’t we have had more 
interaction between the two I asked? Not only (between) the commissioners, but also people 
on lower levels talking to what the other one is doing and in a way trying to assist? For 
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example, people with military experience saying “we know your mandate is limited to that, 
but why do we not write two or three chapters on how do we deal with CMR issue for your 
report and submit it? 
 
The participant: “Yes, look inevitably that becomes or should become an integral part of it… 
the military but in and the security forces … because at the end of the day that is the entity 
which the state was using and used to be able to retain itself in power. In a limited way, I 
think that did happen. It could have been much better or more extensive, but I think that it 
happened. If you look on the one hand, that is what the defence review process was about … 
to an extent they did (interact), I think they did, as I was saying – part of the defence review in 
a certain sense covered what the TRC was to do”. 
 
The participants views on CMR 
 
Probing I asked about the future of CMR and civilian control: 
 
“There is a (recent) report, I recall about continued vigilance on democratic civil rights and 
relations. It (CMR) should stay entrenched … not just CMR because you have that anyway, 
even in undemocratic state, but with the emphasis on democratic CMR that are guarded 
jealously through a range of civil oversight mechanisms … in parliament, financial 
accountability and all of that and even with the executive itself, and to basically keep the 
armed forces where they should be, which is in the barracks.” The participant also pointed 
out that having a continued education process of the armed forces in this regard is important. 
 
I probed about the role of politicians. 
 
The participant: “Education is important: The armed forces in terms of them understanding 
civil military relations in a democracy, but also knowing their place, that’s the one side. The 
other side, is to also do the same for the politicians, MP’s and all of that … because at the end 
of the day, however educated we may want to make the armed forces, or even the security 
forces, if the elected authority has no understanding of democratic civil military relations then 
we will of course have abuse because (of) the behaviour of our leaders … the armed forces is 
not in and of itself of their own making, it’s a result of political decisions that leaders take – 
that things should happen this way or that way. So there is a need for education all over. And 
also that education should also include a full understanding of the role of the armed forces by 
politicians, also by the public so that they (the public) can also blow the whistle when these 
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guys are overstepping their limits, they are interfering with our freedom. So that 
understanding has got to be all round by all … the armed forces themselves, the elected 
political authorities and the public in general. If you don’t have that vigilance and those 
checks and balances, we may very well go back to what they had before or even worse a 
situation”. His next remark was important: “And also such an understanding will enable the 
politicians and even the public to be able to give the capacity and resources that are required 
to insure that the armed forces do the job they are assigned to do. Because it does not help to 
say that the armed forces must stay in check within the barracks and then you sit back and not 
accord them the necessary resources that they should have. Because then you are sewing the 
seeds of discontent and so on. So you look after them, and at the same time you are making 
them accountable for what they should do. What is the balance and what are the resources and 
what are the socio-economic needs of the country and all of that (needs consideration).” 
 
Question: We instituted a defence secretariat; it seems to be in most countries an important 
measure. What is your opinion on instituting a defence secretariat? 
 
The research participant: “I think that’s something that should happen. It’s sad that you can’t 
have an international constitution (or rule) on this; but broadly there is acceptance for the 
need for now – it serves as a good measure of checks and balances in good measure of civil 
oversight and not all – not many – countries have an equivalent or defence secretariats in the 
shape and form as we have in South Africa. Some countries have even more robust ones, 
others have weak one’s but it’s a continuous challenge that you need to have those entities to 
counterbalance and then demonstrate that the armed forces are accountable. So it’s a 
necessary instrument. In fact, with my involvement in the SADC region and on the continent, 
more and more, there is gradual acceptance that you need to have that. But then there’s 
always the issue of the counter balance and sometimes the fear is from the ruling 
establishment. They ask: ‘What is this animal? We don’t want you to look over our shoulders, 
why do they want us to account for every rand and cent and all that?’ In short; the attitude that 
‘we will spend the budget as we like and then not account – the defence secretariat will just 
(should?) give us the money’. So you always have that … and then to explain situations 
where you don’t even have it at all, the armed forces – the armed forces is equal to the 
Ministry of Defence …” 
 
The participant provided some examples in Southern Africa: “(For example) … Namibia has 
what they call the permanent secretary for defence whose role is the same as our secretariat. 
Their model is almost the same as ours. In Botswana, it’s a bit different. They don’t have an 
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equivalent of a secretariat per se, the Chief of the Defence Forces is very powerful – and the 
function is rolled into one. 
 
We concluded the interview and I thanked the participant for the interview. 
 
Summary: The participant was in favour of the SATRC as the most reasonable option, despite 
possible shortcomings or limitations. He was of the opinion that there was interaction between 
the SATRC and the DRP, even if maybe not enough. The participant feels that we have come 
a long way with instituting civil control over the military. He pointed out however the need 
for continued vigilance and education for the military as well as the political leadership 
regarding sound CMR. 
 
FIELD NOTES AFTERWARDS ON TAPE: This concludes the interview with … It was a 
confidential interview and it will be treated as such in this thesis. It was a valuable interview 
and held in a quiet part of a restaurant. There were minimal interruptions, both of us were 
relaxed because we knew each other for fifteen years351. It was quite a problem to get hold of 
… in terms of time, place and openings in his diary. However that succeeded. The participant 
kept the earlier request in mind despite a full schedule and in the end came back on the 
interview. We held an interview an hour-and–a half. We agreed that if needed there will be a 
follow-up interview. We also agreed that I can clarify issues if need be by phone or e-mail. I 
asked some probing questions. The participant had a “good feel” for what the study was 
about and was well versed in this field. The participant was in the know about my research 
project which we discussed in the past. I will request Mary-Anne who offered to type up the 
interview over the weekend to do so. 
 
I completed four interviews with people related to the study of South Africa and discussed 
them above. The fifth interview with a South African, with his permission forms part of this 
chapter, in this case in a different format. This interview, I believe is of great value in 
illustrating the South Africa of especially “then” and “now”. Moreover the interview provides 
real life examples and a closer view of the personalities of previous strongmen/securocrats in 
South Africa. For me this interview has value for its “personal” feel and a real “up and close” 
                                                 
351 In applied research on the issue of relations between Cuba and the USA and Cuban involvement in 
Africa, the historian Piero Gleijesus points out the need for relaxed settings (Gleijesus, 2002: 10). He 
also points out the value of solicited and unsolicited documents. In the course of the interviews that I 
conducted, I cannot agree more with Gleijesus when it comes to optimising the value of face to face 
interviews. The same applies to previous knowledge of the interviewees on a personal level (Gleijesus, 
2002: 10–11). In my case previous knowledge of individuals also had positive outcomes.  
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illustration of the thinking and actions of apartheid politicians within a specific historical 
context and how others experienced it. 
 
IN CONVERSATION WITH A SOCIOLOGIST AND POLITICAL PRACTITIONER: 
 
INTERVIEW WITH VAN ZYL SLABBERT 25/07/2007 352 
 
QUESTION:  Van Zyl, you took part in the old minority parliament and the transition 
to the tricameral parliament. What were your impressions of security issues? 
 
When I became part of it in 1974, the Angola business was escalating353 … PW Botha 
made a great to-do about that at the time ... which is when the Total Onslaught story 
really took off, and Magnus also joined in actively. 
 
Vorster did not take much notice of it (the Total Onslaught). PW became Prime 
Minister and Magnus Malan Minister of Defence and suddenly the entire importance of 
the defence force and security services escalated. 
 
To keep a long story short, in that period and until my resignation in February 1986 one 
could see how the national security system systematically originated and expanded 
until later one had only a small group of military intelligence and security services and 
security police and of course a few others ... at the helm of those was obviously PW. 
FW (at that stage) was not part of the loop. 
 
Where the business gathered momentum? There was no doubt in my mind that if they 
(the National Party) opted for the tricameral parliamentary system, it would politicise 
the country more deeply. Based on the premise that you were going to admit the 
coloureds and the Indians, but permanently disregard the rest of the population, that is, 
the black people ... In other words, there are no black South Africans (laughs). 
                                                 
352 Frederik van Zyl Slabbert gained his doctorate from the University of Stellenbosch. He gave up an 
academic career and became a member of the opposition in the white/minority parliament as MP for 
Rondebosch and eventually leader of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). In the midst of growing 
resistance and militarisation of South Africa the tricameral parliamentary system was implemented in 
1983 with coloureds and Indians as minority partners and black people permanently excluded from the 
constitutional dispensation. The system was sold to the voters as a form of consociational politics, on 
the strength of a report by Dennis Worral. National Party ideologists such as Professor Willie 
Esterhuyse and Julius Jeppe strongly propagated the report, but in various respects it deviated from 
consociational tenets, among others the concept of an executive president advised by the state security 
council and the asymmetric relationship between the powers of the three chambers of parliament. At 
the same time Stellenbosch academics such as Johannes Degenaar, André du Toit (even Hermann 
Giliomee at the time) pointed out that reforming apartheid while maintaining white power amounts to 
continuing structural violence. The president, for example (and the white chamber in most cases) 
retained veto rights over legislation put forward in any of the three chambers of parliament. In 1986 
Slabbert resigned from this parliament, which he regarded as an exercise in mock reformation amid 
greater repression. Alex Boraine, a PFP member, resigned soon afterwards and they established the 
Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, to which I referred elsewhere. Apart from 
dozens of articles in the popular media, Slabbert is the author of the following books: The Last White 
Parliament (1985), South Africa in transition: The quest for democracy (1992) en The Other Side of 
History (2006), as well as various monographs, including, The Dynamics of Reform and Revolt in 
Current South Africa: Three Tanner Lectures (1987). He remains active in empowerment projects and 
the business environment and plays a prominent role in the media industry. 
353The Caetano regime in Portugal fell in a bloodless coup on 25 April 1974 and there was talk of 
independence for Portugal’s colonies in Africa such as Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. 
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Then, of course, the result was the domestic upheaval – the ungovernability story354 – one 
also started getting an interactive relationship between repression and resistance ... civil 
control had gone ... there was nothing. 
 
Well, one can protest, I made a few dissident sounds, as did others, such as Helen 
(Suzman) and so on. 
 
However, most of the decisions on security were taken outside the parliamentary 
dispensation. 
 
 
Question: In Vorster’s time, was the state more dependent on the police than on the 
military? 
 
I experienced that personally [in] 1981 for example, my study was blown up in ‘81. By 
that time it was PW already, but my feeling was that it was rather the security police in 
this case. Man, everything was burnt down: photo albums, documents, my entire period 
in theology, all those things. Domestically the security police were more active ... 
externally rather the defence force ... 
 
And then the chief of the security police came to see me. And I told him I had brought 
in experts to see what was going on. They told me: “Doctor, this is no ordinary fire that 
started ... extraordinary substances were used here.” He then left ... 
 
Later, old General Coetzee came: “I only want to tell you, we did a thorough 
investigation and came to the conclusion that your eleven-year-old son burnt down the 
place by accident.” 
 
I looked him right in the eye and said, “General, I’ll buy you three dozen boxes of 
matches right now and give you a telephone directory and I dare you to put the place on 
fire.’ 
 
And he (only) said, “Yes, well, this is the conclusion we (the police) came to.” 
 
“I don’t accept it” ... I then said. 
 
Since that time one was conscious of being followed, in Vorster’s time as well, but 
after all, I also helped to get quite a few chaps, the so-called lefties, out of the country 
... Neville Curtiss and others... 
 
Verwoerd was the ideologist of apartheid. Vorster was the policeman of apartheid. He 
had to see to it that it was implemented. That required more policing. Vorster was 
always a policeman rather than a defence force man. Moreover, there was always a 
touch of tension between him and PW Botha, but that there was intensification of the 
role of the profile, from the military to Vorster ... I have no doubt about that. 
                                                 
354 In 1980 South African militants decided on a strategy to make the country ungovernable until the 
fall of the National Party. 
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QUESTION: Van Zyl, in your opinion, did the earlier competition mentality between 
the security forces (eg NI, MI and the security police) that existed under Vorster 
diminish in the time of PW? 
 
Yes, I am convinced of that. 
 
QUESTION: Could the parliamentary opposition attend meetings of the State Security 
Council? 
 
It was made very clear that you didn’t have access to that thing ... (laughs) they 
sometimes sent somebody to inform you. 
 
I’ll never forget the first time after they appointed poor old Niel Barnard as chief of 
intelligence; he came to me and gave me a sermon on the Total Onslaught ... we have 
to realise we are subject to the Total Onslaught ... the opposition as well ... 
 
But I made a point of chatting to the chaps ... Constand for example. I talked to him 
quite a few times and told him: “You are busy with something that is not going to 
work.” Magnus, of course, always told me I was singing in Moscow’s choir and he was 
not interested.” 
 
You see the watershed, the illustration of lack of civil control over the military, came 
for me personally when PW signed the Nkomati Accord with Machel (of 
Mozambique). They invited us (to the conclusion of the Nkomati Accord); there is 
peace between us and Mozambique now... and I thought, “Wow, maybe the tide is 
turning here.” I went up to him (PW), congratulated him and said it was an admirable 
step in the right direction. 
 
... a while later ... one Colonel Wass was in the news (I think he was involved with 
RENAMO) ... in a contact his diaries were seized ... I saw this short report. I 
immediately phoned Constand and said I have to talk to you ... because that short report 
states that it is perfectly clear that you are still destabilising Mozambique. 
 
Constand gave me a look and said: “No man, no, that’s propaganda.” I thought, to hell 
with that, and I phoned Machel’s office and flew to Maputo, where Sergio Vieira met 
me. He gave me some of the documents. It was quite clear! We destabilised 
Mozambique during, before and after the Nkomati Accord! 
 
And one sits in parliament. When I got back there I went to our spokesman for 
defence355, “Tell the caucus.” He said no. He wouldn’t believe me. I said: “But good 
grief man, I talked to the people myself – Pik was there two weeks before me and as 
old Sergio Vieira told me, Pik had the fright of his life.” Now Pik says he never knew 
about anything. 
                                                 
355 Entry in the diary of the interviewer: Harry Schwartz was the spokesperson for defence for the 
opposition party in the white parliament at the time. 
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QUESTION:  Regarding South Africa’s destabilisation of neighbouring countries: Were 
many politicians outside the loop like that? 
 
I can confirm that to you. Take South Africa’s involvement in Angola in 1976. I was 
spokesman for defence issues for the Progs (PFP – then the opposition party in 
parliament). That was before Harry Schwartz. 
 
He was the man for the reformists ... in the UP. Unfortunately the moment he (Harry) 
saw a uniform, he jumped to attention ... and I then went to Namibia. The first time I 
realised we were fighting in Angola, was when we crossed the river at Calueque. That 
evening I saw PW at the commissioner general’s house. That was when he heard about 
Kissinger (his statement about the USA’s withdrawal from Angola). 
 
And he really got his dander up because then he realised: It was only them left and the 
Cubans were escalating, the MiGs were also coming in. 
 
And he grabbed me around the waist and said: “Van Zyltjie, come and sit down here.” 
He said: “You know, if it hadn’t been for these bloody Americans, we would have 
taken Luanda tomorrow; in fact we would have taken the whole bloody Africa.” He 
spoke like that ... 
 
When we were flying back, Constand (Viljoen) told us on the aeroplane everything we 
had heard there was classified intelligence. We were not allowed to use it. 
 
In front of everybody there I answered: “I don’t accept that at all, I am an MP for a 
constituency (Rondebosch) and must do my duty to my constituency and to the 
children and young people who do military service. ... They are being brought under a 
wrong impression.”  Constand gave me a look ... because then I was becoming more 
dangerous (in the eyes of the security people). It was after that that Magnus started 
telling me I was singing in Moscow’s choir. 
 
No, I can tell you without any doubt, parliament was out of the loop ... had no idea of 
what was going on ... Harry (Schwartz) could perhaps have known because he was 
kow-towing to the military. 
 
 
QUESTION: Van Zyl, just after the visit of the Eminent Person’s Group (EPG), a 
delegation of the British Commonwealth in the mid-1980s visiting South Africa in an 
attempt to effect a negotiated settlement in South Africa between banned organisations 
and the minority government, South African security forces attacked targets in 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Botswana. The EPG had hardly left the country ... was the 
odd cabinet minister by any chance left out of the loop when such decisions were taken? 
 
I think so ... you see my point is: There was Magnus, Meiring, Coetzee, those fellows 
together with PW were the inner circle – even in the State Security Council. 
You see, Pik had a seat in the SCC. De Klerk had a seat in the SCC. But they were not 
part of the executive authority ... That executive authority ... Jannie Roux ... he was the 
link between the politicians and the security people ... old JR .... They sat there taking 
decisions. 
 
(But) my whole argument is: Pik and FW can say ‘we had no part in these decisions’ ... 
you are compromised by your participation in it ... you had the right to ask questions. 
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You had the right to say, “What is going on here?” ... in the Total Onslaught (regarding 
action in the townships, for example. And they never did that.356 
 
Pik Botha (Minister of Foreign Affairs at that stage), two weeks before I went to 
Mozambique ... and the RENAMO/SADF documents were seized, visited Maputu. 
Sergeo Vieira told me. Hy said: Pik went as white as a sheet. He said: Phone Neil 
Barnard, I want protection ... he was that frightened. 
 
On my return I went to see Pik – Do you know what is going on there? I know you 
were there. “”No, but that cannot be suggested,” Pik told me. I just looked at him ... 
what on earth can you say in a situation like that? 
 
Pik then said we had to go to his office. Magnus was also there. “We have a good 
relationship with them (Mozambique)” Magnus said among others. Pik then said: 
“Why don’t you find say 200 farmers to go and plough the land there?” 
 
Magnus then answered: “But I think they’ll shoot my men from the bushes”. Jonas 
Savimbi walked in while we were still sitting there. “I just want to thank you for all the 
help.” He said that in front of me!” Now Pik says he knew nothing about it ... They are 
lying, man! 
 
QUESTION: FW’s speech in 1990? The unbanning of the liberation movements and the 
TEC/Transitional Council? Was a coup d’etat a possibility? 
 
That is a very interesting question. I was in Oxford and when I got back I heard that 
FW wanted to talk to me. I returned and made an appointment with him. 
 
When I saw him I asked him: Why did you do it (the unbanning of the liberation 
movements that fought against apartheid)? He said: “Two reasons: Firstly, I took a 
moral leap and secondly, I would have been a fool not to take the gap created by the 
fall of the wall.” But then I asked him: “Have you any idea of the security system you 
inherited?” His face became beet red and he said: “What are you talking about?” I said, 
“Never mind FW ...” 
 
I (later) had a long conversation with Meiring, the last chief of the defence force under 
Mandela: “George, but why did’nt you chaps go for a coup d’etat?” He said, “Man, we 
followed the British tradition. We were loyal to the government of the day.” Now what 
that told me (Slabbert) was that these chaps – and Jan Breytenbach confirmed it 
afterwards – saw themselves as professional soldiers. They kill when they are told (by 
higher authority) to kill. The most extreme example is probably Eugene de Kock ... 
 
But the one that fascinated me here was Constand, because in those first three months 
after the negotiations started and the run-up to ’94, Constand phoned me one day and 
asked, can you come and see me ... because he had then broken loose with Buthelezi 
                                                 
356 In a recent media debate on the prosecution of apartheid leaders who are accused of human rights 
transgressions, De Klerk argues “that I don’t feel morally culpable for human rights transgressions”. 
Among others, he argues that he and the Department of Foreign Affairs were in some instances out of 
the decision-making loop. At the same time he admits that he attended meetings of the Security 
Council and had the opportunity to enquire about decision-making and its consequences: “As I have 
said, in retrospect, I should perhaps have asked more questions during the rule of P W Botha …” (Mail 
& Guardian, 3 – 9 August 2007). 
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and kept saying, “I have 35 000 men, I have 35 000 men”.357 And I went to Constand. 
We discussed it. And he told me: “I don’t know if these men ... are going to listen ... 
because they want to shoot, they want to make war.” That was Terreblance with that 
abortive attempt and Boputhatswana ... and not only Bop ... but when he moved in here 
at CODESA358. I then told him: “Constand, you can start it, but I think it will end in 
disaster ...”359 
 
He then held back a little. I then asked Braam 360, his brother (to talk to him) ... 
Constand held back ... 
 
In fact, I (much) later arranged for Constand and Tutu to have a meal together. Tutu 
saw him – it was right before the TRC was instituted. And Constand looked at him 
(Tutu) and he said, “Archbishop, I have killed people, I have killed people in the line of 
duty and I make no apologies for it, so if you want to take me on, feel free.” 
 
The really interesting thing, the one that fascinates me and to which I refer in that book 
of mine is the transition from repressive stability to consensual stability. Where are the 
chaps who wanted to fight in those days? Where are they today? They fight elsewhere; 
high-ranking officers have left. The current defence force may be a joke. 
 
So the real question then, given the disappearance of the [old] security system ... in the 
days of PW (then Minister of Defence) and Vorster (as Prime Minister) you had the 
police and the defence force and in between were the intelligence guys and the security 
police. What happened under PW, Magnus was a combination of all these security 
services in the national security management ... 
 
QUESTION: Do we have the potential for civilian control of the security forces at 
present? 
 
No, that is the thing that fascinates me and I also wrote it somewhere. If you ask what the 
source of stability was at that time, the answer is the security services, the defence force, 
instruments of repression ... You couldn’t move your backside without them knowing 
about it and biting you. 
                                                 
357 Casual note made by the researcher: “General Constand Viljoen, a professional soldier became 
prominent in the Afrikaner Vryheidsfront (AVF). In the run-up to the 1994 elections strange attempts at 
coalitions appeared. The AFV, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), some ‘independent home land 
leaders’, the white Conservative Party (CP) remnants and the self-styled fascist Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) moved into an uneasy alliance. Part of the alliance believed in retaining 
community identities during transition and large segments were against any negotiated compromise or 
“sell-out” and advocated violence (Compare van der Westhuizen, 2007: 55ff). 
358 Convention for a Democratic South Africa, established to reach a multi-party negotiated settlement 
between internal parties and the unbanned ANC, which had broad based support inside South Africa. 
Following the 1994 the ANC emerged as the strongest party. 
359 Entry in the diary of the author of the thesis: “The outcome of the abortive attempt by some 
rightwing supporters to ‘pacify’ resistance against minority rule by entering the ‘independent 
homeland’ Boputhatstwana to restore law and order, which led to several civilian deaths in the local 
community and three Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members (the latter broadcast on international 
television) just before the 1994 elections is well remembered in South Africa. Amongst others 
professional soldiers that were previously part of the SADF ordered the invaders to leave before 
conflict escalated. (The best contemporary – and as far as I know - the only worthy articles about this 
tragic incident appeared in the Journal of Contemporary History  (South Africa) authored by a military 
historian and acclaimed journalist (see van der Westhuizen, 2007: 86 and Van der Westhuizen, 2007, 
forthcoming, December 2007). 
360 Braam Viljoen is the twin brother of Constand. At that stage Braam was involved in IDASA. 
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And suddenly we had “the golden summer”. We loved one another, we won the World 
Cup. Good heavens, I still remember I took a black taxi from Ellispark, everybody 
congratulated everybody else. Mandela did a lot ... and at the time there was what I call 
the height of consensual stability (but) ... one could see the challenge of service delivery 
lying in wait. And when Thabo took over the poor man was confronted with this crisis 
and (today) Thabo sees himself as an international philosopher – statesman, the ... 
philosopher-statesman. He is quite chuffed with that. The challenge of service delivery 
still lies in wait ... 
 
And he (Thabo Mbeki) does not understand the defence force. That is very important to 
me. You had three ANCs: the prisoners, the exiles and the UDF. The people from [the 
ANC-in-exile] don’t understand it. They come in, too used to attending seminars and 
philosophising and suddenly they have to govern. Some chap will succeed Thabo or 
whoever ... he/she will come from inside (not an ex-exile – my insertion) and you will 
then see that perhaps a (better) arrangement will be made about military and security 
issues. 
 
Almost as I said in the Cape the other day: “Consensual stability has the danger to drift 
into anarchy” – but it is not widespread anarchy, it is local people saying, ‘to hell with 
that.’ In the meantime ... “there is a countervailing source of power (needed)”. And that 
must come from civil society – on all levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
Caxton House, Johannesburg, 25/07/2007: Van Zyl Slabbert and the author (Author’s archive). 
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QUESTION: The relationship between civil government and the military? What do we 
make of it? 
 
To take you back: The Second World War was a huge affair, not only security, but 
education, transfer of skills: the government had to depend on civilian co-operation. 
Right now I can’t see the security services being able to deal with the challenges on 
their own. Civilian action, activities, inputs must play a role. 
 
No, I would say civil society in co-operation with the security services. Considering the 
state of the security services, I cannot see them dealing with [the challenge] on their 
won. Civilian action must play a role. But civilian supervision must play an important 
role. We cannot afford to return to an era where the politicians involve the defence 
force in protecting their politically unilateral interests ... and to allow a defence force 
that supports politicians to maintain their power unilaterally in your own country. At 
some point we must start moving ahead. And we can ... civilian supervision is 
necessary, a professional defence force is necessary. Co-operation is necessary subject 
to a constitution on which we agreed. 
 
 
The broader casing: Interviews with persons outside South Africa 
 
Related to cases outside South Africa, I completed three interviews with persons from Africa 
and Latin-America. Two persons were interviewed related to the African situation. Earlier, I 
referred to my very first interview with Dani Nabudere, an expert on African politics (in this 
case with his kind permission I was allowed to use his name). I have referred to the fact that 
since it was my first interview (a pilot), it assisted me in constructing a basic schedule to be 
refined later. Related to a non-African case one interview was with a person who lived 
through the rule of the military in Argentina. The third interview was with a person from 
Rwanda. 
 
It was important for me to balance the case study with what I call a broader casing. I spoke 
about “a tentative hypothesis” which are the research questions and sub-research questions. In 
this case, I have chosen (within the limitations and the strength of people-orientated studies) 
to track the lives of people that experienced, in many cases had no choice, transitions from 
authoritarian rule to democracy. They shared their experiences through interviewing in the 
trust that their insights and experience – also outside academia – may give a richer description 
of context and in providing pointers towards solving problems/challenges in the area under 
study. 
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Interview 5 361 
 
In the case of this interview with the Ugandan scholar I had his permission to use his name. 
Apart from having read some of Nabudere’s earlier works, the discussions we had were 
valuable and more than helpful. I have mentioned earlier that we spent a month together while 
attending to organisational and academic work amongst others conflict in African states and 
the role of the West in it.362 Necessarily, we discussed the case of Uganda, the case of Africa 
and how globalization played it role. Post-conflict situations and how to deal with them also 
entered the picture. 
 
The participant’s views on the SATRC/TRCs 
 
Related to the discussion about truth and reconciliation processes, he mentioned that in 
Uganda, “We had no truth and reconciliation commission”. Following the fall of Amin (Al 
Hadji Idi Amin Dada), Obote, leader before the coup by Amin again “empowered and 
protected the (loyal) militants”. These included the military and militias. I have earlier 
referred to the notion of CMR not related only the controlling the “military”, but the armed in 
a broader sense. These include for example militias, warlords and armed forces in service of 
partisan politicians. In some cases it also includes armed communities as well as child 
soldiers. 
 
Uganda shared the experience of partisan politicians relying on the security arms of the state 
with other states such as Nazi-Germany, apartheid South Africa, Sudan, Rwanda, the DRC 
and Ethiopia.363 
 
The Ugandan experience as negative, painful and truthful (as it was and still is), represents the 
research participant’s statement that “there is no national army (in Uganda). We don’t know 
whether that will ever be possible” (This also applies to Musveni, the current leader’ rule to a 
great extent, he suggested). 
 
                                                 
361 In the numbering of interviews I exclude the interview with the South African theorist-practitioner 
that appears with his permission under his name. 
362 Compare Kimanuka (2006: 19). 
363 For more detail on the problems in Ethiopia, consult the special edition of Africa Insight entitled “A 
troubled Ethiopia looks to the future”, guest-edited by Melakou Tegegn, Pietro Toggia and Abebe 
Zegeye, 34(1), March 2004. On Sudan, consult the Institute for Security Studies Situation Report 
entitled “The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF): A challenge to the Sudan Peace Process”, 8 April 
2004. On Uganda see George (2004). 
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Why do I share the above under the topic of TRCs? Uganda is relevant here for amongst the 
following reasons: Uganda had two state-sponsored commissions to look into human-rights 
transgressions. Neither of them was released; on the contrary they were suppressed. 
Following the current regime, it is unlikely that these reports, or any to follow, will be 
released. Following regime change Uganda chose for a non-TRC approach. It seems that none 
of these succeeded in bettering human rights or civil control over the military. 
 
On a more critical note, one can argue two points: Institutions such as TRCs and ICTs 
frequently succeed in the first case in unearthing the truth and establishing reconciliation as 
far as humanly possible. In the second case it succeeds to a degree in illuminating the past 
through hard evidence and in punishing the perceived guilty (to a greater or lesser extent), to 
establish control, and in some cases, minimizing violence within restricted areas364. Lastly 
hopefully it prevents or at least minimise future occurrences of large-scale human-rights 
transgressions. 
 
My interaction with the informant challenged many of my views and confirmed some of 
them. Especially it confirmed that self-appointed (read: internal) commissions of enquiry 
seldom unearth the truth and furthermore that in many cases such reports are not released and 
does not impact on the attitudes of current/previous political rulers, the military or policy 
change – Uganda under Amin in this case a particularly disconcerting example. The 
interviewee also points towards the need for TRC like approaches in post-oppressive 
situations in Africa. This was mentioned in the interview as well as during the panel 
discussions that I shared with him in 2003. 
 
The interviewee clearly pointed out that given conditions, the SATRC was the best possible 
option. For him such an exercise may inculcate – provided that it ethos is nurtured by new 
incumbent politicians – civil control over the military. 
                                                 
364The extent to which these approaches dovetail or may be complimentary or how one approach may 
be eclipsed by another is discussed in detail by Sieff and Wright (1999). Amongst others in their article 
they discuss and compare Rwanda, Nazi-Germany, Argentina, Chile, Bosnia, (former) Yugoslavia and 
South Africa, thus opting for a broad casing. They also mention that at the time Serbian, Yugoslav, 
Croatian and Bosnian authorities claimed that they will also conduct their own domestic trials, of which 
little materialised by 1999. They did not include these cases or their development in their study (Sieff 
& Wright, 1999). In the meantime the ICTY is continuing. At the ICTY Diplomatic Seminar on 13the 
June 2007 the registrar, Mr, Hans Holthuis indicated that the tribunal would run for at least until 2009 
(http://www.un.org/icty/briefing/2007/june-reg-e.htm). 
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The respondent’s view on CMR 
 
The research participant pointed out that Uganda had little, if any, of a truth and reconciliation 
process. The military remained in a problematic situation with regard to civil society. Obote 
before Amin already used the military as a partisan army. The situation was to worsen under 
Idi Amin, where the military became a partisan tool of outright repression and ethnic division. 
Once Obote came to power again, little improvement took place. 
 
Despite a brief experiment with democracy in which Nabudere formed part of the extended 
“cabinet”, Uganda had few attempts to democratize the military and to implement civil 
control over the military. The only time before the experiment following the fall of Amin in 
which Uganda experienced a relative form of democracy and constitutional rule with implied 
control over the military was following independence for about two years (1962–1963). 
 
In Uganda governments relying on the military bureaucracy as experts of power (the coercive 
arms of the state) interfered with elections and their actions impeded the protection of human 
rights. In the words of Nabudere: “There were militias within the army and again militias 
within militias. Obote over-protected the militants” (panel discussion, 12 August 2003). 
 
During the panel discussion (12 August 2003), the participant compared Uganda’s situation 
unfavourably with Kenya and Tanzania at the time. He mentioned that Kenya had some 
successes with CMR and civil control over the military since independence. Tanzania, lead by 
Julius Nyerere, had a military that merged with the community and based on the political 
slogan of Ujamaa, integrated with the civil community (perceiving a society where “all of us 
are one”). Due to this type of civil society, enacted by the political leadership Tanzanian 
society became a more inclusive, and less repressive. When compared to the classical liberal 
and constitutional approach (call it western military cultural norms, if you like), it was CMRs 
of a different type. Yet, Tanzania reflected a relative success. The military was under control 
of a political leadership that approached their nation on an inclusive, non-partisan basis. 
 
The formal interview that took place on the 26/08/2003 confirmed many of the issues above. 
Because of the lack of a TRC process and the fact that the government-appointed 
commissions into human-rights transgression under Amin never released reports (on the 
contrary repression increased), we spent some time on the issue of CMR. 
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Nabudere pointed out that Amin, who served during WW II in the Kings African Rifles, came 
to power in a military coup and depended on the “state experts of violence” (the military 
bureaucracy wielding the sword of the state). He subdued the dissatisfied and critics. 
Especially pastoral communities who resisted Amin’s policies, were punished or harshly 
subdued. Whereas Tanzania took an inclusive approach and the military moved closer into the 
“national project”, they became both an integrative force and guardians of the populace. 
Repression and partisan action were not prevalent. 
 
“This adaptive approach” lead to the Tanzanian Army being “politicized, but mostly friendly” 
towards the populace/the nation (interview, 26 August 2003). The Tanzanian army was 
“never used against its own people … they were both politicised and obedient to the 
constitution that demanded the protection of the people … basically the tradition survived 
under subsequent Tanzanian rulers (interview, 26 August 2003). 
 
The Ugandan case differed dramatically. Obote came to power as a Protestant. The majority 
of the opposition party was Catholic, which instilled some inherent tensions. Later, Muslim 
parties entered the fray. At the time, a general dislike for the French given Uganda’s 
dependence on neo-colonialist rulers also played a role; the leadership and some opposition 
parties were afraid – if not openly antagonistic of the “Ba-Franza” (interview, 26 August 
2003).365 Religion enters the picture as well because some, Catholic-Protestant tensions 
remained. 
 
Obote had to rely on Amin, his junior, but an influential right-hand man in the military. At the 
time Amin, who on the one hand seems to stay outside politics, started recruiting militias 
called ananyas, which strengthened his relative position of political influence. Obote seemed 
to be indecisive. For Nabudere, Amin as military man, this can be viewed from two 
perspectives. Either buying time, raising influence and skilfully observing the Obote 
government where some tensions existed between Obote as leader of the government and the 
then-nominal President, Opolot. The conditions invited an already politically-conscious army 
into the fray of a rather weak state (I mentioned earlier the power of bureaucracies in weak 
states. Bureaucracies, because of the relative absence of civil- and community structures – 
and more so if political control and leadership weakens – become important foci of power). 
 
                                                 
365 The dislike for the French is not confined to Uganda. Kimanuka (2006: 19) points out that it also 
apply to contemporary Rwanda under President Paul Kagame. 
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An African politics researcher provides some background: “Milton Obote abandoned the 
independence constitution of 1962 … (By) 1967 Obote had to increase the power of the 
military then under General Idi Amin’ (George, 2004: 3). Thus as George argues Obote as a 
post-independence civilian ruler began the process of gradually disintegrating civilian 
institutions and opted for a greater role of the “military in the making” (George, 2004: 4). 
From there it was but a small step to, (Amin’s) major contribution to the collapse of 
(democratic) Uganda … the the militarisation of politics” (George, 2004: 3). 
 
Another perspective on Amin is perhaps that of “Amin as (a perceived – my insertion) turned 
coup-leader” (interview, 26 August 2005). Obote’s legacy as political leader left questions 
after his demise. Was he clever, fearful or reconciliatory? Was he a positive element, or 
manipulative? 
 
In retrospect, these questions are interesting. In reality, however, civil-control over the 
military lapsed, and a partisan military used against the Ugandan populace increasingly 
transgressed human rights under Amin after his rise to power. According to Nabudere, one of 
the reasons for the army-turned-a-partisan tool for ethnic entrepreneurs-despots such as Amin 
was, ironically, that Obote tried to have an ethnically-balanced army, thereby playing the 
inescapable ethnic card. The civil-military Catch 22 had unintended consequences by 
politicising the army and the militias, which eventually brought Amin to power on a system 
that was inherited from the past. This is evident even today, under the leadership of Musveni, 
advocate of non-party democracy. The non-party experience aimed at minimising ethnic 
differences and tensions may have hold fault-lines. The non-party experiment has declined in 
influence during the past few years. 
 
After Obote was overthrown and Amin took power with Obote exiled in Dar es Salaam, Amin 
also involved foreign powers for reasons of his own. The Israelis became involved in 
supplying military equipment (for instance, Magistar aircraft) and providing military training. 
For him, Israel could assist against a conceivable Muslim opposition; while the Israelis saw 
the relationship as a unique opportunity to “open a second front” against Ghadaffi, the radical 
anti-Israeli leader of Libya. Necessarily, internal tensions within Ugandan politics were to 
become even more salient. 
 
At the same time, the Ugandan economy worsened rather than improved. Thus, counter- and 
balancing social forces (such as civil-society networks), business and others did not develop, 
and further “pushing and pulling” the military, the dictator and militia into power – with 
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oppression close in its wake. A vicious cycle was to increase in its ferocity with long-term 
consequences for Uganda’s CMR and human-rights record. 
 
Contemporary legacies include that liberation forces/militia who returned with the current 
leader from “the bush”, became the proverbial men-on-horseback steeped in partisan 
attitudes. Nabudere referred to this return of the liberationist movement under Musveni as 
from “following the leader” to “an army of the leader”. There is a High Command, but the 
President occupies the position. The High Command is not mentioned, nor its role outlined in 
the current Ugandan Constitution (interview, 26 August 2003). The President also holds 
control over previous militia who exist beside the military structures, making for a potentially 
problematic duel-power in contemporary Uganda. 
 
When compared with Tanzania, Kenya and South Africa since independence, the research 
participant is convinced that the Ugandan case cannot be compared positively with the 
former. Not only were there few attempts at reconciliation in Uganda following the fall of 
Amin and Obote; there was also no real inclusive army devoted to the country and its peoples. 
The fact that the constitution does not outline structures of civil control worsens the case, as 
the current leadership holds political office and positions of command over the military and 
loyal militias. 
 
The Ugandan economy is growing. Some argue that the non-party system contributed to the 
transformation of Uganda towards a growing economy and some betterment of its human 
rights record (George, 2004: 8, 10–11). But despite the partial opening of space for politics, 
some argue that “freedoms of association and speech is still curtailed” (Ottaway quoted in 
George, 2004: 14). And internal regional tension as well as religious antagonism still remain. 
Apart from it, the conflict in the north cannot be ignored, nor the involvement of the Ugandan 
government in the north. 
 
For Uganda the future road to civil control over the military seems to be a long one.366 
 
                                                 
366 Interestingly, Nabudere, when referring to future needs for a constitutional military, uses the term 
professionalizing the military. Elsewhere, theorists following transition from authoritarian rule to 
democracy use the term reprofessionalisation. The implication being that Uganda’s military was not 
professional in any sense owing to its peculiar usage and still has to be professionalized, while in other 
non-democratic societies the military, although partisan, were professional (i.e. Chile, Argentina, South 
Africa), but had to be reprofessionalised (educated and honed) to become professional servants of the 
people under strict democratic and constitutional imperatives and the upholding of human rights at all 
times. 
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Interview 6 
 
This interview was with a person who lived through military rule in Argentina. As with 
previous interviews, the interview dealt with truth and reconciliation processes (specifically 
Argentinean) firstly, and its effect on CMR in a post-transitional Argentina. The interview 
proved more than useful. In terms of a qualitative study and adding to the reading that I did on 
Argentina, it proved invaluable. More so, because here I interviewed a person who was a 
victim of the dirty war and suffered as a result of the military dictatorship. In this sense the 
experience for me as interviewer and certainly the interviewee, was up close and personal and 
emotionally touching, if not disturbing. It is at this point where information saturation was 
challenged with life-like experiences, even if the researcher read widely on the case.367 For the 
purposes here I will call the respondent Maria. 
 
The participant was more at ease with an interview in Afrikaans – which she learned during 
her stay in South Africa. The interview was conducted in Afrikaans, rather than English. I do 
not know Spanish, so the interview could not be conducted in her mother tongue, which is a 
pity. Therefore, I quote the research participant in Afrikaans and, where necessary, provide a 
translation in English. 
 
 
The participant’s views on the TRC 
 
As the respondent left Argentina shortly after the fall of the junta, we did not discuss the 
commission in detail. She made some references to it, which I share here with the reader. 
 
The relationship between the military and the civilian population was not only negative, 
during military rule, but in human terms, beyond description. The dirty war or guerra sucia 
claimed thousands of lives in a period of unbridled state terror. She pointed out that, apart 
from activists who resisted militantly or sometimes passively, one remarkable incidence of 
                                                 
367 If I were to be able to visit Argentina, no doubt I would have discovered many more nuisances. That 
was not possible. Shaffir & Stebbins, in a chapter entitled “Leaving the field” argue that a study 
represents a metaphor or a puzzle (Shaffir & Stebbins, 1991: 243). “Themes come together and form a 
picture.” They also argued that a study is close to being finished when one can recognize the puzzle 
and how pieces fit together. As I had been in the field for a while and had not gained any additional 
understanding, I figured that my study was coming to a conclusion. This is similar to what Lazer & 
Strauss (1967) referred to as theoretical saturation (Shaffir & Stebbins, 1991: 242).  
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defiance of the military state was the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayor368. They never kept 
quiet in their silent protest at the square. Their voices became important in the broad scheme 
of Argentinean politics and eventually led to the Argentinean TRC. 
 
It is not quantifiable to what extent the protests of the Grandmothers eventually led to the fall 
of the military junta. In fact, no quantitative study would be able to proof this. Quantitative 
studies are not able to answer questions about the past and its influence on the presence when 
such human experiences are at stake369). In this sense historians and philosophers have the 
marginal upper-hand over “quantitative specialists” as they bring the “lived through 
experience” closer to their reader. This is why qualitative studies are not only necessary and 
human. They are an imperative. It takes one into the life world of others, feeling their pains, 
their fears, their loss … 
 
Maria in the very human and sensitive way that I associated with her, was even understanding 
towards the position of the military, especially junior ranks, years thereafter: “Militêres is 
maar ook mense. Miskien was van hulle ook bang.” (Military people are also humans. 
Perhaps some of them were fearful, too). 
 
She recalled that that when the democratic government of Raul Alfonsin came to power 
(December 1983) there was an opening of space to discuss these matters. The role that 
human-rights lawyers and the Madres de Plaza de Mayo played in this regard was not 
insignificant. Alfonsin’s government allowed for limited prosecutions. He advocated a return 
to rule of law. Eventually the National Commission on Disappeared People (CONADEP) was 
established. Eventually the report appeared but prosecutions of the military dictatorships’ 
leaders were stopped later.370 The research participant pointed out that many Argentinians 
were unhappy about this decision/change in government policy around prosecutions. They 
expected more. 
 
                                                 
368 In an unsurpassable act of defiance grandmothers (Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo) gathered 
regularly on  Plaza de Mayo wearing white scarves and circling the plaza with photos of their loved 
ones to demand  information on what transpired.  
369 Sieff and Wright point out that quantitative studies have one positive role in such an environment: 
Through international or trans national advocacy networks they contribute to letting information going 
public, which in the end may shape international perceptions and open avenues for intervention by 
other bodies such as the UN (Sieff & Wright, 1999). 
370 Alfonsin’s government embarked on prosecutions in 1985 and that continued until Easter 1987 
when the military rebelled. Prosecutions of people in the lower levels of the military were thus 
prevented (Sieff & Wright, 1999). 
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In terms of the total control that the military had over state and society in Argentina, the 
respondent argued that no one could escape from that environment. She pointed out that 
people would disappear during the night, as the military operated against leftist activists. At 
universities, people disappeared every day. In her opinion, some of them were brave activists. 
Others happened to be associated with them (rightly or wrongly), or simply at the wrong place 
at the wrong time. These experiences left permanent marks on the population and a large 
distance between civil society and the military. 
 
The effects after the fall of the authoritarian regime? “Toe demokrasie weer inkom is hulle, 
die militêres absoluut geignoreer.” (When democracy returned, the military were absolutely 
ignored [by civilians/citizens]). Reconciliation and reconciliative approaches towards the 
military were not acceptable at all. This is not surprising, as it was difficult to forget-and-
forgive despite a TRC embodied in CONADEP. As Maria remarked: “Ek is van die geslag 
van mense wat doodgemaak is omdat ons wou vry wees … ons weet baie mense is dood 
daarom. Net die waarheid alleen … is nie genoeg nie … ok, ons hou op om te baklei … dit 
beteken nie dat mense lief word vir mekaar en hard werk aan ’n nuwe toekoms nie.” (English: 
I am of the generation of people who were killed because we wanted to be free … (and) we 
know many people died because of that. Truth alone is not enough … yes, we stopped 
fighting … that does not mean that you start loving each other and work together for a new 
future). 
 
The participant’s view on CMR 
 
About the effects of military rule: “Jou hele lewe, jou psige, is deur dit alles beïnvloed … 
amper soos as jy aan ’n sekte behoort. Jy kan nie dink vir jouself nie, assosieer met mense nie, 
jy kan nie boeke of musiek van jou eie hê nie. Dit het alles beïnvloed … daar is nie ’n manier 
waarop jy dit kon misloop nie. Die militêre het ’n merk gemaak op al ons Argentyne … sover 
ek kan sê was dit min of meer soos die Nazi’s … ons het nie daaroor gepraat nie.” (English: 
“Your whole life, your psyche was influenced by it … as if you are forces into a sect. You are 
not allowed to think for yourself, to associate with people or have the music or the books you 
want. It influenced everything. There was no way to get around it …I think it was like the 
Nazi’s … we did not [dare to] discuss it”.) 
 
She remembered what she called “die nag van die swart potlode” (the night of the black 
pencils), in which hundreds of activists disappeared. The effect of this on the individual and 
society was extremely disconcerting and wide ranging. “Jy het nie ’n minuut gehad om dit te 
 357
verwerk nie.” (English: “You did not have a minute to work through [these experiences]”.) I 
have referred earlier to the fact that Maria lost her partner due to the military. He was 
kidnapped, being taken away and presumably, from what they later heard assassinated. At this 
point, Maria started crying. I had experiences with emotional interviewees previously. During 
qualitative interviews in 1992–1993, when I did interviews with Willem Schurink on a project 
where we interviewed commercial sex workers, and in the late 1990s when we worked on a 
series of interviews on social identities in Pretoria before the transitional era (i.e. apartheid 
settlements) and later on demobilised soldiers, I was confronted more than once with deeply 
emotional responses. As then, I think that I was able to show (and feel) deep empathy with the 
interviewee. I think that “empathy” is an understatement for sympathy and the feeling of 
helplessness one feels in such a situation. I later made a note of the interview where I 
commented that, as previously, the feeling of inability to intervene hovers between “I need 
more training” and the personal feeling of “hope abandoned”, as training to become a good 
interviewer cannot turn around what people suffered. We discontinued the interview for a 
while until she felt ready to continue again. 
 
Her next statement confirmed some of the helplessness to the reader and what an interviewer 
feels: “As jy na ’n hof gegaan het, het jy dalk ook verdwyn.” (If want you go to a court you 
may also disappear). Maria confirmed a previous statement that I heard at a lecture early in 
the 1990s by an Argentinian lawyer who, like many people, believes that more than twenty 
thousand individuals disappeared, rather than the nine thousand people mentioned in the 
Argentinian report on lost people. “Daar was nie ’n familie wat nie een of ander verlies gehad 
het nie.” (English: There was no family that did not experience a loss in some or other way). 
She confirmed what I found in literature: that as far she knows, after interrogation many 
activists were loaded into military aircraft and dropped over the sea, and that many were 
buried in mass graves without anyone being informed or the dead identified. At the time, 
according to her everyone hated the military in silence, because resistance was life-
threatening. 
 
Following the fall of the regime some figureheads were put on trial. These included Videla, 
Macera, Nicholios and Galteri. Many of them got sentenced. Did this inaugurate good civil 
military relations? The respondent was unclear about this. Did the military experienced and/or 
lived through a qualitative change and attitude? “Wel ek dink militêres kry geen aandag. 
Hulle is in ’n professionele en morele dekadensie … Hulle het geen doel nie.” (English: “I 
think the military does not get attention. They are caught up in professional and moral 
decadence … They have no purpose”). 
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For Maria the past experiences and memories were to much. She emigrated in order to start a 
new life elsewhere. She does not want to keep track of subsequent political developments in 
Argentina as part of her own healing process … 
 
Looking for themes? Analysis? I would not dare to interpret on her behalf. After such an 
interview, any analysis would detract from the rich and painful/powerful human experiences 
of those who died and those who survived – many a time as walking wounded under Latin-
American military regimes. 
 
I believe that to the extent that her harrowing experience leaves us with lessons learnt, I will 
deal with it in the conclusion to this chapter and the last chapter of the thesis. 
 
Interview 7 
 
I mentioned that the case of Rwanda interested me because of the wide-ranging abuse of 
human rights that surmounted to genocide. The Rwandan experience dwarfed many other 
instances of the transgressions of human rights through the sheer scale and magnitude of the 
1994 genocide (Ironically, in the year that South Africans celebrated our first free elections 
with relative little violence and great festivities, a hellish cauldron of collective violence 
struck Rwanda, a whirlwind that would not spare those targeted.) 
 
This interview was with a previous Rwandan Ambassador in Pretoria, who I met at a seminar. 
I was fortunate that he agreed to an interview immediately. The interview took place two days 
later after work in his office on a Friday afternoon (19/08/2005)371. 
 
The interviewee was not a person with any previous military experience. He earlier worked 
for government structures and the public service. He had 11 years of experience: five years in 
central government structures (dealing with refugee and resettlement issues), and the rest as 
governor of one of the eastern provinces. 
 
The interview situation was ideal. The large office was quiet because it was after five on a 
Friday afternoon. There were no interruptions at all, not even a phone call. I had enough 
opportunity to ask probing and/or clarifying questions where necessary. He allowed me time 
                                                 
371 I have discussed the case of Rwanda extensively. Were necessary, I will illuminate some issues 
again as they became salient in the interview. 
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to tape record and where necessary summarise his arguments on a notepad, and to confirm 
with him that my understanding of his arguments was correct. 
 
The participant’s views on the process of reconciliation 
 
Following the Rwandan genocide, given the large scale transgressions of human rights, 
Rwanda had various options to deal with the past. Forgiving-and-forgetting would hardly be a 
consideration in this instance. Some of the worst transgressors of human rights (i.e. people 
involved in planning and executing the mass massacres), fled the country. Many remained, 
and the criminal justice system could deal with them. But so many were involved that the 
system itself could hardly cope with it (see my earlier discussion of the case of Rwanda in 
Chapter 5). A communal justice system called gacaca existed as part of historic social 
structures in the country. In this system, community meetings were held to dissolve, facilitate 
conflict, and dispense justice where necessary. 
 
Considering the numbers of people involved, Rwanda had little choice but to follow a three-
pronged strategy: (1) making use of the Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (for perpetrators that 
fled outside the country); (2) using the existing criminal justice system (which is still reeling 
from the effects of the genocide that lead to the killing of many skilled jurists); and (3) 
adopting the traditional “peoples-justice system” (gagaca) which people knew and were 
culturally at ease with. 
 
The interviewee stressed that the Rwandan government prefers the term Unity and 
Reconciliation, rather than truth and reconciliation. This is because what happened during the 
genocide was, and still is, well-known. The challenge is to bring perpetrators to book and, by 
doing so, it is to be hoped, contribute to future national unity first and social reconciliation 
second. The challenge is “to enforce and consolidate the government policy of unity and 
reconciliation” (interview, 19 August 2005). 
 
Since colonisation by the Belgians and political independence,372 major massacres (read: 
genocides) occurred in 1959 and 1963. Something could have been – or rather should have 
been – done about it, but it did not happen. “(The) government never did anything” 
(interview, 19 August 2005). The general modus operandi was for government to give 
                                                 
372 As argued in Chapter 5, the notion of political independence does not necessarily coincide with 
economic independence. The political economy of the Great Lakes Region is such that many of the 
countries remain painfully within economic structures monopolized by the erstwhile rulers – Belgium 
and France for example. 
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amnesty again and again, also in 1966 following the massacres of the 1960s. The research 
participant made himself clear: “One cannot go on giving amnesty (time and time again)” 
(interview, 19 August 2005). 
 
Hence, the three-pronged approach that Rwanda now follows was decided upon. The ICTR is 
responsible for human-rights transgressions of those who partook in planning and organized 
or executed the massacres. 
 
As the Rwandan criminal justice system can hardly deal with the 800 000 (alleged) 
perpetrators in prison, the gacaca process acts in support of the laws and the Rwandan 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). The main aim of the Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission and the gacaca process (which I discuss here as part of one 
approach, rather than two), is such that the Unity and Reconciliation Commission focuses on 
unity, and the gacaca process on justice. The gacaca process allows the community court to 
give sentences up to 30 years, with the proviso that people who received sentences can appeal 
to the formal judiciary to hear their case again. 
 
The purpose of the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, but especially the community-
based gacaca, is to “send a strong message to Rwandans that ‘this should not happen again’” 
(interview, 19 August 2005). The gacaca shares elements with the reconciliatory process: “If 
you confess, the punishment becomes lighter” (interview, 19/08/2005). The interviewee 
suggested that “we count very much on the gacaca … the ultimate goal is to sit together … to 
see that under the previous government these crimes were committed … to prevent this from 
happening again … the three processes compliment each other” (interview, 19 August 2005). 
 
In the words of the informant: “The gacaca process started off as a pilot project. It was then 
expanded to an operation on a national level”. The complimentary processes together with 
gacaca are responsible to bring the process to community level and relieve at the same time 
some pressures from the criminal justice system. In the words of the participant because, “The 
option to give total amnesty is not (there) … we want to prevent (people from killing in the 
future) and then run away … (these processes are) sending a strong message to people, also 
those that are still at large.” (interview, 19 August 2005). 
 
He suggested that the process contributes to people becoming influenced to “become good 
citizens”. (He used the term “converted”, but this turned out to be an issue of translation. The 
informant spoke English, during the interview while French is the languages of preference for 
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the participant) The process, on various levels, implies “working together for the common 
good” (interview, 19 August 2005). 
 
The participant’s view on CMR 
 
For the participant, the whole project in Rwanda is meant to deal with four main themes 
aimed at positive social outcomes. These are justice, punishment, reconciliation and unity. 
Having achieved this, the realm of CMR and civil control over the military presents major 
challenges. 
 
I will summarise the research participant’s views here: 
 
The question of a partisan military in Rwanda’s history played a role in CMR in the past. The 
first president of Rwanda was a Christian. He ruled until 1973. He divided the country into 
regions, but was unable to rule without military support. When Kaibanda was toppled in 
1973, the northern regions became stronger and Hutu influence increased. The military coup 
that toppled Kaibanda, lasted until the 1994 Great Genocide. The involvement of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front who fought the government, aimed at removing the dictatorship. 
 
According to the earlier Arushua Protocol signed as an attempt to stop violence, a 
Government of National Unity was to be installed. After 1994, the dictatorship was toppled 
and a government of national unity installed amidst a fragile peace. The new Government of 
National Unity remained in power until 1999, when the first elections were held. The 
elections were declared free and fair; and Rwanda saw its first real democratically-elected 
president, according to the interviewee. 
 
In the new government structure, the military is not allowed to be in politics. The 
constitutional structures allow for a High Command and a Minister of Defence under 
Parliamentary control. 
 
Unlike South Africa, the Rwandan structure does not allow for a Defence Secretariat, but the 
Ministry with the Minister being responsible and accountable to parliament. The interviewee 
suggested that, for Rwanda, “this structure is an improvement, even if it differs from other 
systems elsewhere. Each country has its own history … it is more important to put people first 
… reconciliation is not debatable. This should also apply to control over the military” 
(interview, 19 August 2005). 
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Civil-military structures and outcomes? The new structures represent major improvements. 
The Rwandans “came up with a model that the nation feel is working. The current imperatives 
– including civilian control over military structures – are to promote good governance, justice, 
develop a strong justice system and economic growth.” (interview, 19 August 2005). 
 
The interviewee’s advice to the Rwandan (and by implication, other) militaries: “To be (first 
and foremost) responsible for protecting human rights ….” Further: if the military comes 
between the people and antagonistic militia, it is their responsibility “to protect the people and 
their human rights”. 
 
After we concluded the interview, I recorded my field notes: “The interview was useful. It 
provided further detail and nuances together with those I gained during my study of literature 
on Rwanda. It provided insight on some of the historical factors that lead to the various 
genocides. It demonstrated that the current people of Rwanda decided that amnesty, or rather 
repetitive amnesties, did not work. Hence, the decision for the ICTR; a formal internal 
judicial process; and the complimentary Unity and Reconciliation Commission in tandem 
with the gacaca process.” 
 
My impressions regarding CMR and civil control of the military is that Rwandans presently 
have a system that is an improvement on the past, despite the future challenges. At least there 
are structures for Parliamentary oversight, and the Minister and High Command (even if there 
is no civilian Defence Secretary) are momentarily subservient to an elected parliament. 
 
I have mentioned that the military is also bound to observe civil control, and to remain 
vigilant against politicians that act in such a way that the military are “sucked” or “pushed” 
into internal politics to the detriment of state, society and democracy. At the moment, it seems 
that this situation and the new Rwandan military faces future possibilities that augers well for 
human-rights protection. However, as elsewhere, politics are ever changing and seldom 
predictable. To remain on track, the Rwandan parliament of elected representatives, the civil 
community, and the military will have to be jointly responsible and vigilant in order to 
prevent future transgressions of human rights. 
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6.7. Feedback received through e-mail correspondence 
 
During the course of the research project I initially aimed to conduct at least ten interviews. I 
ended up with eight interviews eventually. 
 
During this time doing the interviews, I started thinking about ways to gain data other than 
reading and interviewing. I was also concerned with a “double-check” on my data gained 
through the face-to-face interviews. One person that I considered amongst others for 
interviews, when approached indicate that due to work pressures there was hardly any time 
for an interview, but that she was willing to look at the schedule and answer the questions as 
far as possible by e-mail. I realized that parallel to the interviews I was in a position to 
strengthen the study by means of e-mail feedback.373 
 
As it was a qualitative study I was not interested in a survey and sending out questionnaires. 
In any case there was no funding available for that. With the e-mail schedule I aimed to 
approach approximately 30 persons, knowing that not all would respond. The requests were 
sent out, accompanied by a letter from the COD confirming that it was for research purposes 
only and where requested, I undertook in advance that the participants’ anonymity would be 
protected as required by qualitative research protocols. The majority of the participants that 
responded, due to their professional stature and their known research skills and output, gave 
me permission to use their names. Some requested anonymity. I decided to treat all feedback 
without using names. 
 
I did not expect all persons whom I approached to respond. However, I was somewhat 
disappointed when after the first round of requests, I received only 15 responses, thus only 
half of what I envisioned. And that despite telephonic and e-mail follow ups. On the positive 
side, however, those who responded were people of a high standing in the professional and 
academic world or active as practitioners in the civil-military realm, past officers and veterans 
or anti-apartheid activists. They satisfied the standard that I set for myself namely to gain 
feedback from highly-knowledgeable units. 
                                                 
373 To an extent, soliciting data by e-mail would also contribute to ”internal validity” or rather 
transferability as it is known in modern qualitative research terminology. I will rather refer to a more 
fluid notion of reliability of the study, which could be seen as a form of “internal validity” (note the use 
of quotation marks). 
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The unsolicited material that accompanied the feedback further strengthened my positive 
feelings about this choice.374 I subsequently sent out a second round of 15 requests by e-mail; 
some to persons associated with the International Association of Sociology (ISA)’s research 
committee on military sociology (RC01). Some I sent out to persons that I met while working 
on a publication on the war in Angola and South Africa’s involvement in the war and 
assisting part-time as a consultant to a television program on the “Bush War”375. The 
responses that I received through both these efforts were satisfactory as eventually I had 22 
useable responses. 
 
The research participants in this exercise held 248 years of experience between them (40 
percent of this representing practical military experience with knowledge and/or participation 
in civil-military issues). Thirteen participants were from South Africa, all but one born and 
bred South Africans. The other one, a competent sociologist, has been living in South Africa 
for many years, and has been active in research of a civil-military nature for more than 20 
years, and had no intention to leave South Africa. 
 
The nine participants from outside South Africa could hardly be better. Some examples will 
suffice. One was Ethiopian with NGO experience in working with demobilization and 
disarmament of child soldiers in Rwanda that observed the post-genocide transition in 
Rwanda (he completed a master’s dissertation in this field). Another was active in NGO 
research in the civil-military realm, an astute researcher-practitioner who started off his career 
as an air-force pilot for the Zimbabwean Air Force. After this, his interests lead him into 
security-sector reform, in which he currently works for a security-studies think-tank. A third 
person with a legal background from Nigeria which formed, like Rwanda, part of my case 
studies. An exiled South African who chose not to return to South Africa following 1990s 
                                                 
374 In one instance, I contacted an elected participant in West Africa. The e-mail request bounced back 
several times. Eventually I posted a print-out of the schedule with a request for cooperation and the 
accompanying letter of the Chair of the Department. After weeks I did not hear from him. I decided 
that nothing from that side would be forthcoming. I was to be surprised. After several weeks, I received 
a rather thick envelope from West Africa. Not only was the schedule filled out in blue pen in minute 
detail, but several unsolicited articles by the person in question and some other articles accompanied 
the schedule. One should never give up hope, I guess. Somewhere out there, there are people who do 
take an interest. In this case, an individual that I only met once at an international conference circa 
1999. Like many of the others who responded and became participants, he also gave permission to use 
his name.  
375 Between 1963 and 1989 the white regime, illegally occupying Namibia, fought what they perceived 
as “an anti-terrorist” war against the nationalist movement SWAPO in Namibia. In the process they 
operated almost permanently within Angolan territory in what amounted to about 120 small, medium 
and large scale operations and the destabilisation of Southern Angola by supporting militarily and 
financially the insurgency movement, Unita, led by Jonas Savimbi. This period became known in 
South African lingua as the “Border War” or the “Bush War”. 
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political developments. Others included Dutch, Indian and Turkish military sociologists and 
military historians that I met as part of a SANDF delegation through more recent career 
involvements (2006/2007). One Namibian that witnessed their transition also responded and 
supplied some references to unpublished materials. 
 
The current and past careers (or duel careers) of those who responded reflect a wide variety of 
influences/experiences: a former attorney-general and commissioner for justice, a professional 
soldier-turned-researcher on African civil-military issues and security sector reform, lecturers 
in politics, sociology and military affairs, a NGO worker in Rwanda, a former Deputy 
Attorney-general in South Africa; a lecturer at the South African Defence College; a conflict 
specialist; an ex-activist, veterans from the “border war”, current and ex-citizen force 
members, a member of the End Conscription Campaign that was sentenced to alternative 
service and an underground member of the ANC, previously detained and tortured by the 
Security Police. He had extensive political knowledge, a serving senior officer in the South 
African Citizen Force, an advocate, a senior military judge, a counter-intelligence officer, a 
veteran now in the publishing business with a specific interest in military history and lastly, 
an international relations expert. I could not have hoped for better inputs from a variety of 
persons to strengthen my qualitative data and enrich the research collage. 
 
I will discuss the South African participants feedback first and then the international 
participants views. 
 
The South African participants’ views on the SATRC 
 
I provided three options for participants to choose from in the aftermath of an era of 
oppression and human rights violations and requested them to comment on it (see the e-mail 
schedule in the appendices). These were (1) to forgive and forget (2) to enact internal criminal 
proceedings and, (3) institute a TRC. In the case of a choice for a TRC or any other option I 
requested them to expand on their reasons for such a choice. 
 
These views varied from unqualified support to qualified support for a TRC, with some 
cautioning against the unforeseen outcomes of such a process. The following quotes by 
various research participants are relevant: 
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• “I agree. There can be no (informed) reconciliation without exposure to the truth.” 
• “… it (a TRC) was important … but it concerned mainly the police that ran wild. I 
think our process was better than in other countries, where it was to restricted.” 
• “I agreed with the process, but had ambivalent feelings about it. It was not a pleasure to 
see various torturers go unpunished and see a process where some people that were 
released went (away) unpunished. Personally I was tortured … one of my torturers 
applied for amnesty, but died before his application was heard. I did not give evidence 
(before the SATRC) … Until I start to write a book on my prison experiences, I 
downplay my own experience of abuse. On the wider notion of the TRC as a choice, I 
think (if) it was a choice for that … rather than (a choice) for a Nuremberg type of 
paradigm. Nuremberg was not an option because there was not a situation where one 
side dictated the peace terms, but a negotiated settlement.” 
• “Yes, I broadly agreed with the specific approach vis a vis an amnesty based on full 
disclosure and acceptance of responsibility with evident remorse … Personally I feel 
that such processes are good for transparency but also may fuel racial hatred.” 
• “Yes, it was considered a necessary step to ‘come clean’ by highlighting atrocities in 
the past and giving those that committed them a change to show remorse (and/or?) 
bring those that committed crimes to book. I agreed with the choice. Although not 
perfect, the process made ordinary people, who were not aware of the scale of atrocities 
committed during apartheid, aware of what had been going on.” 
• “Ordinary people (in contrast with the elite negotiation process for transition) were in 
this instance (the SATRC) ‘negotiating’ new meanings for a post-apartheid era by 
taking part in the TRC process …” 
• “If I have to choose? I will choose the TRC process … as a reconciliatory gesture, to 
address past wrongs, too investigate crimes by the state … so many deaths remained 
unsolved and it (SATRC) exposed the cruelty of apartheid and its implementers … I 
agreed with the decision.” 
• “The majority of South Africans were kept in the dark regarding a system based on 
forced and legalised inequalities … (It was necessary) to open the wounds of apartheid 
and introduce the narrative the oppressed to a free society. We needed to know so as 
not to repeat any of it in the future.” 
• I think there can be no reconciliation without the truth getting into the public”. 
• “It is a pity that no apartheid leader, politician, government decision-maker, cabinet 
minister or President F W de Klerk (or any one of his predecessors) was brought to 
book during South Africa’s TRC process.” 
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• “Commissioners (should have) been appointed from all groupings within the country to 
ensure credibility. South African commissioners were criticised because they were 
mostly ‘struggle’ types”. 
• “The military tends to ‘forget’ – resulting in most people not being able to ‘forgive’”. 
(Researcher’s comment: This statement straddles both choices for TRCs, its value or 
not, and the quality of future CMR. I will refer again to this). 
 
I found the last quote and the view that it expressed especially poignant in our context, 
perhaps because it was uttered by a South African veteran amongst others deployed in 
Angola, reflecting on these issues. As can be seen from the above the majority of the persons 
that the researcher approached, amongst them previous SADF staff, agreed with the SATRC 
as a choice. The minority felt that it was not going far enough and one person cautioned that 
the process may have fuelled racial tensions, even hatred. 
 
The South African participants’ views on CMR 
 
Opinions varied widely on whether there was civil control pre-1994. It also varied as to the 
quality of current CMR and civil control over the military. 
 
Pre-1994 
 
• “(There was) no civilian influence in decision making.” 
• “As I (read it), the upper echelons of the military were tacitly involved in government 
and as a result had substantial influence over the governing function in the context of 
the Total Onslaught.” 
• “There was little real civilian control over the SADF.” 
• “The then SA government through the Department of Defence had control over 
military matters with ultimate control resting with the executive president. There was 
no civil control or input from civil society outside of government/ ministers/cabinet.” 
• “There was close control by civilian authorities, i.e. elected political authorities (such 
as) the Minister and Deputy-Ministers. The civil society ‘control’ before 1967 was 
meaningless and consisted of clerical control over finances. Civilians did not keep up 
with the training of officers, did not go … on courses (internally and externally) and 
made no effort to understand the substantive military problems. (Current civil control) 
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is the same as before 1967. (The roles) are misunderstood – and officials believe they 
should control. Gradually they are slipping back …” 
• “There was no control!” 
• “There was ample control, (perhaps) wrongly applied (under apartheid)” 
• “No civilian influence in decision-making” 
 
The present day: 
 
Related to the current situation (post negotiation and under the new constitution) the 
following responses are noticeable. 
 
• “Military structures were at that stage an extension of (minority) military power. Today 
it is the extension of the political power of the majority. But, political connections (at 
the moment in South Africa) are still too prominent and corruption within the civil-
military network not extinguished”. 
• “Civil society organisations need to be educated on the role of the military” 
• “Some South African civil society organisations tend to criminalise the military. They 
need to be educated on the role of defence forces in ensuring peace and democracy as a 
prerequisite for the democratic tradition. Even the best democracies in the West are 
backed by strong military establishments. In fact, there would be no democracy without 
military backing.” 
• “There is not sufficient debate on security issues – most takes place in the media. The 
SANDF does not enough to market itself. The academic debate? There is a lack of 
interest by civil society in military affairs … (and lack of) funding and expertise is 
undermining the ability of the SANDF to train and install the qualities needed for a 
truly professional force”. 
• I think reprofessionalisation of the military has been neglected. The notion of new 
professionalism has not been brought by the ANC into government in general, except 
through episodic interventions in certain areas of government. The overall security 
order is hierarchical like all parts of the civil service. But a lot of things happen at the 
bottom, which need to be heard at the top … in fact in a democratic state such 
professionalism needs to incorporate space for (such a) debate … I think (this) needs 
consideration in developing new professionalism”. 
• “A stronger public debate (is needed) on issues such as the arms deal, our involvement 
in Africa and especially training” 
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• “Civilian participation and oversight is glaringly absent in the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Defence … Civilian oversight in the SA National Defence Force is 
absent – as is a debate about this (lack of civilian oversight)” 
• “The military tends to ‘forget’ – resulting in most people not being able to ‘forgive’”. 
 
From the above, it is clear that a variety of perspectives ranging from good control; to 
inefficient bureaucratic control to limited; or no control were represented by the participants 
who responded. Lack of civilian oversight despite new structures were mentioned. Current 
parliamentary oversight is not optimal according to some arguments. The (potential) for abuse 
of power, especially finances concern some. Despite the defence review process in the 
previous decade (without such a process ever repeated) public input seem to be under the 
needed standards. One particular worry was despite the constitutional provisions and 
structures created in parliament to oversee the military, the parliamentary committees seem to 
underestimate or utilise their (potential) influential position within constitutional structures. 
The media it is mentioned, has a critical role to play in the new South African democracy (see 
Monare, 2007: 8). 
 
Most of the respondents concurred that, with qualifications, South Africa is better off in terms 
of CMR, but that continued challenges lie ahead and pointed out several weaknesses as 
mentioned above. 
 
The non-South African participants’ views on TRC-type processes 
 
• “Nigeria had a truth and reconciliation process after military disengagement for 
purposes of reconciliation. I agree with the process.” 
• “(In the case of Zimbabwe) a blanket amnesty was extended to all ex-combatants.” On 
the question of whether “your country would have done better if a TRC-type process 
was followed”, the participant answered: “Don’t think so.” 
• “In Ethiopia, my country, almost everything was under control of the military regime. 
The military had control over every walk of life, and interfered in social, religious and 
economic liberty of society. From the president to local military leaders were all from a 
military background, hence there is absolutely no civil control over the military. In the 
case of Rwanda there are some progressive reforms and a truth and reconciliation 
process coupled with other initiatives …” 
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• “Rwanda, where I worked, has chosen for the TRC process to try thousands of 
genocide suspects by means of gacaca which would (otherwise) not be possible 
through formal trials. The latter would simply take at least a 100 years – over 150 000 
genocide suspects (at least). I agree with the choice. For a country battered by ethnic 
hatred there is no other solution but reconciliation. The challenge is to ensure justice to 
the victims of the genocide and freedom to (oppressor and victims) … (That) can only 
be achieved through truth and reconciliation.” 
 
The responses of the research participants sufficiently cover what has been discussed earlier 
on. Therefore I will not expand on it here except for some short remarks. 
 
The first informant commented on Nigeria before the Oputa Report was due to be released. 
However as elsewhere, discussed the report was prevented to enter the public domain. In 
Zimbabwe, indeed, a general amnesty was declared after the fall of the Smith regime and 
President Robert Mugabe initially paid lip-service to post-conflict reconciliation. After the 
incidents of human rights transgressions in Matabeleland in 1985 the appointed commission’s 
report was not released; it was as mentioned earlier a government-appointed commission. The 
research participant from Rwanda points out that reconciliation was/is the only option for the 
Rwandan people. However only some elements of a TRC are used in Rwanda. The Rwandan 
process moved into a mixed approach as I pointed out earlier (See again Sieff & Wright, 
1999). 
 
The non-South African participants’ views on CMR 
 
• Nigeria: “The military (needs to be) adequately funded to ensure professionalism. The 
military should be made to appreciate their role as provided for in the a democratic 
constitution. (Amongst others) this shall be done through education and training.” 
• Zimbabwe: “(Before transition) the Minister of Defence and staff were civilians. The 
Ministry of Defence and staff are still civilians … (but) civil society organizations need 
to be educated on the role of the military.” 
• Rwanda: “I would try to improve and reprofessionalise the military to adopt a 
constitutional state and democratic structure.” 
 
These comments, some related to the case studies or comparable experiences, concur with the 
view that CMR need proper attention. It also stresses that the military needs to accept the new 
democratic order and constitutional structures. And, in my view, it implies to politicians that 
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they are not to manipulate, or invite, the military into partisan internal politics that can (read: 
will) undermine accountability, democracy and human rights. 
 
A discussion of unsolicited materials received 
 
As I discussed the unsolicited materials in Chapter 3 (the literature review) in more detail and 
referred at intervals to it in the thesis I will make only some brief references here. 
 
South Africa: During the course of the e-mail “reach-out”, I received valuable criticisms from 
one of the respondents whom I later interviewed. His criticism assisted in refining the 
schedule and also in me looking/re-looking at the literature review. It assisted in reflection 
and I believe added value to the study. I also received unsolicited materials such as articles 
and memos, which I utilized. These added value to my research. These sources are reflected 
in the source list. 
 
Other cases: I mentioned the unsolicited feedback from a Nigerian colleague. It was a 
pleasant surprise. I made good use of it in the case study of Nigeria and the relevant sources 
are reflected in the source list. 
 
6.8. Conclusion 
 
Two quotes by research participants struck home. They deserve further reflection by political 
leaders, military practitioners and civil-military policy analysts. The first quote relates to 
South Africa while the second holds value for more universal purposes. 
 
• Civil society and the military are becoming increasingly alienated from each other. 
Declining standards and unprofessional behaviour of military personnel – as portrayed such 
as in Burundi – undermines the status and respect that should be associated with professional 
armed forces. Grave concern over civil military control of the armed forces as the 
institutional memory is eroded and armed forces are left to be managed by former 
revolutionary soldiers who have been fast-tracked and have little experience of how to 
manage, train, equip, and deploy professional armed forces. By this it is not meant that they 
have nothing to contribute – but that they lack the experience and tend to rely on old alliances 
to survive in a political system supportive to them due to past loyalties. 
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• War is politics carried out in an abnormal way. Somebody should investigate the crucial 
moment of “coming together” of politicians and their military partners. That is when the 
politicians decide that they cannot solve the political problem (of the day) through political 
means. It is usually then that they opt for a military solution. Why is it that other options still 
often lose out to the military one? Why is it that military structures often accept the political 
suggestion of force with little opposition? Everything seems so obvious, but in the case of 
South Africa we know that the option of force was often taken too easily. 
 
The comments and feedback mentioned in this chapter enriched my study. In cases, it 
provided more nuanced feedback. In other cases, it co-assisted to confirm “hunches” or 
caused me to carefully reflect on the feedback and re-visit the interviews and the literature 
study on the case studies. All in all, in my view it made an important contribution to the 
reliability/transferability of the study. 
 
The feedback received tends to reinforce the notion that TRCs may have value on various 
levels (i.e. bringing out the truth, allow for voices to be heard in public and provide moral 
pointers towards “never again”) But, they may not necessarily contribute to better (or visa 
versa worsen) the achievement of future civil control over the military. And it seems also that 
one can argue that the choice for a non-TRC route does not impede the potential for, or the 
achievement of civil control over military institutions in a post-oppressive society. 
 
The data also confirmed to a great extent that government appointed commissions of 
enquiries that follow human-rights abuses tend not to bring out the truth or put in place 
workable structures for security oversight to prevent a repetition of previous excesses. 
 
Furthermore; the data gathered provides a clear quid pro quo: As much as the military should 
not seek to influence democratic politics as praetorians or taking power themselves, as much 
should politicians be educated, empowered, made conscious of and placed under oversight not 
to depend on the military for partisan purposes or for use against internal opposition or the 
citizenry; thus to strictly abide by the rules of the constitutional state and its checks and 
balances. By implication the data gathered also carries the cautioning note that regression to 
violent, oppressive or partisan rule remains a reality, even in countries that may seemed to 
have reached a high(er) level of sustainable democracy. 
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It also confirmed that in the case of the SATRC there seems to have been somewhat more 
interaction between the SATRC and civil-military restructuring, even if limited (one has to 
keep in mind here that the SATRC ran concurrently with the DRP), something that did not 
take place in others societies that made a transition to democracy and chose for TRCs). 
Hence, it can be argued that future TRCs to be considered should be devised in such a way 
that their mandate allows – at least to some degree – for providing more explicit guidelines on 
civil-control over security institutions as a way to link the unburdening of the past to concrete 
measures to ensure that the “never again” principle is strengthened through the provision of 
some concrete civil-military guidelines. 
 
In writing this conclusion, I realised that the study was reaching an end (not necessarily the 
end). “The question of when to conclude a study cannot be answered definitely, only 
arbitrarily. A study is done when you have gained an understanding of the setting or a slice of 
social life that you set out to study. Because our understanding of the social world is 
necessarily incomplete and imperfect, representing to a degree an approximation and 
oversimplification, no study can ever be considered finished” (Taylor, 1991: 238).376 And : 
“As researchers we work within constraints of time, ours and the readers, and of space, the 
journal article or the book” (Walsh, 1998: 188). This statement by Walsh also applies here. 
 
Given the deadline and given that I started finding information that frequently (re-) confirmed 
data, one realises that the study is nearing its end. Having lived so long – and in many cases 
intensely – with the setting and the people, it leaves one with a strange feeling. 
 
Yes, the data collected showed that comparisons could be made. It showed that there are 
generalities related to all cases, but also certain unique features. It demonstrated that it does 
not seem that either TRC or non-TRC cases necessarily had the upper hand when it comes to 
the long-term institutionalisation of civil-control over the military. 
 
It shows that some cases of countries without TRCs did exceptionally well, i.e. Spain and 
Namibia. It proves that some TRC cases still face huge future challenges differing in 
measurement to a degree, i.e. South Africa did reasonably well, but as problems around the 
arms deal and allegations of spying on members of the ruling party confirms and on the 
“opposition” (some members of the national intelligence services were involved) confirm, 
                                                 
376 This is certainly true for qualitative approaches. But then again, it also holds true for quantitative 
approaches. 
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there is space for improvement. It seems that Rwanda and Nigeria are better of than before. 
Yet, again, there remains space for improvement. 
 
Latin American states that had a TRC, such as Argentina, still have problems 
institutionalising proper civil oversight and reprofessionalising their military. Amongst others, 
the research and interviews suggests that much more needs to be done; that even if the/a study 
reflects transferability, it does not mean that one can export any of the experiments 
uncritically as a blueprint or model. Nor can one suggest that such models can be applied 
without great care, modification and, at times, critical revision. Comments on the unintended 
outcomes of TRCs need to be kept in mind, i.e. that TRCs can increase social tensions, that 
TRCs type exercises (and their advocates) underestimate their possible contribution to 
establishing long term civil control over the military (read: tends to interpret their mandate in 
a limited way, because of lack of foresight, I would add). 
 
Another important finding is that – at least in terms of the qualitative data gathered here and 
seen through the eyes of others’ experience – government appointed commissions seldom let 
the truth out. They tend to be sub-optimal both in unburdening the past and in securing future 
control over the military and in conscientising political rulers not to abuse the military as 
coercive arm of the state to be turned against its own people. 
 
Much has been gained by this study and the accompanying narrative; yet more needs to be 
done. But for a moment we are at a necessary closure. By virtue of deadlines, data-saturation, 
and the time involved from start-to-finish, this study has reached that point. Leaving the field 
also brings about the experience of a certain relief, but strangely enough coupled, with a 
certain sadness. One experienced much, saw a lot, interacted with friends and colleagues at a 
personal level. Some of them you will not see again.377 
 
But then again, such is the nature of life and hence (in academic terms) qualitative research 
and the personal narrative. Somewhere, one study ends with all the experiences accumulated, 
lived, reflected and re-lived; and another one opens up, and that one in turn leads one onto 
new tracks, new territories to live and contribute in … 
 
The next chapter will conclude the study. 
                                                 
377 Milan Kundera, in the Book of Laughter and Forgetting, referred to such an deep longing to what 
has become an irretrievable past, as litost. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH TRACK, RELIABILITY OF STUDY, 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND POSSIBLE POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS378 
 
The academy is as puzzling and full of contradiction as any other field site. At times it 
appears to be steeped in tradition as well as to be both obsolete and impregnable; at other 
times it seems assailable from all sides, subject to whim … too little has been done to unnerve 
teachers and administrators of the humanities, to dismantle their taxonomies and their 
powers. – Meneley and Young, 2005: 1 
 
There is no sharp distinction between the problems of the world and that of the human 
community. – Collins, 1959: 235 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
I found the above epigraphs pertinent to this study, especially if a (any) study becomes a 
metaphor born out of living experiences. 
 
Situated within the ambit of military sociology this study touches on related fields, i.e. 
military history and political sociology, as well as reflecting some (political-) philosophical 
underpinnings mediated by practical exposure to politics. Taking a (late) modernist, rather 
than a post-modernist qualitative point of departure, the process undertaken is embodied with 
humanist and critical-thought elements (Collins & Makowsky, 2005). I tracked both a 
scientific tale (Sparkes, 2002) and a personal narrative of a “self” connected to others and 
related to the SATRC. These reflections went wider in the course of the exploration, as 
represented in the metaphor (or metaphors) of tracking that I deploy throughout the study. 
The living case study informed by other examples of TRC experiments and non-TRC 
experiences is central to my study design and how it guided my execution of the research 
process (in the latter, the terms process and people stand central). 
 
                                                 
378 Some personal notes on how other people and myself experienced “writing” a dissertation or a 
thesis will also crop up here. Reflecting on issues, as in tracking, may call up other issues or tracks on 
the side – such is the human experience … 
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The interactive experiences of individuals and others during these social processes played an 
informative role throughout379. My study grew along the lines of the auto-ethnographic genre 
and I abided by the ethical guidelines and requirements as set for qualitative research. In the 
study I touch on various “moments” – or stages – of the individual tracking experience380, 
namely direct and systematic tracking, indirect tracking, interpretive tracking and speculative 
tracking.381 
 
The study set out to find answers to an evolving hypothesis (see Chapters 1, 2 and 3). From 
the findings I arrived at, I postulate that the context and nature of social transition towards a 
democratic community (rather than a TRC process) determine the quality of future CMR and 
democratic controls over the military in a new democracy. 
 
The hypothesis, or research question, entailed whether new democracies such as South Africa, 
having opted for a TRC process, fared better in establishing working CMR and civil control 
over their military institutions than those that did not opt for such a process. The findings and 
insights obtained from many experiences shared during the study confirmed that TRC options 
followed by young or emerging democracies – inclusive of the SATRC – did not necessarily 
contribute significantly to the improvement of civil control over the military, compared to 
non-TRC approaches chosen by other states. CMR and control over the “armed” were instead 
facilitated by various other influences rather than TRCs. Nonetheless, I argue that TRC-like 
approaches have the potential to improve civilian control over the military, provided that 
there are enough reciprocal influences between the intended TRC process (which has an 
impact on the scope of the mandate set for future TRCs) and the processes of reconstituting 
the civil-military interface in the aftermath of conflictual and oppressive relationships within a 
state. 
 
Flowing from this, I argue that TRC and non-TRC choices could lead in an equal manner to 
working CMR and hence civil control over the military. I believe that my findings can assist 
the military to be vigilant against the dangers of partisan political involvement when 
“invited”, “pulled”, “pushed” or “bullied” into the realm of politics by political leaders. I want 
to hasten to emphasise the need for such an awareness professionally inculcated by a 
                                                 
379 The word “formative” also comes to mind here. 
380 Compare Sparkes (2002: 6–9). 
381 In the course of the literature review (Chapter 3) I pointed out the occurrence of moments within 
qualitative research, such as the re-thinking of research, complementary texts or voices, moments of 
realism and “confession” in the narrative, evocative moments and the interface with social critique 
(compare also again Sparkes, 2002: 2, 6, 8, 16 ff, 39 ff, 56, 72). 
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responsive military to insist towards the political leadership that there are definite “no-go” 
areas for military involvement when it comes to internal oppression in service of partisan 
needs. Likewise I believe the study raises awareness about the need for political leaders to 
abstain from drawing a constitutional professional military force into partisan politics, thus 
undermining democracy, and almost certainly transparency, accountability and the sustainable 
protection of human rights, as happened in apartheid South Africa, some Latin American 
countries, southern European states and some African countries over the past 50 years. 
 
Tracking the evolving research question provided a preliminary basis to test the hypotheses 
and I contend, can contribute to the future formulation of firmer hypothesis and the 
construction of theoretical concepts if not models regarding CMR and sustainable civil 
control over the military. In turn, the latter may hold as spin-off or added value, pointers for 
future modii operandi to control other security agencies in emerging democracies, such as 
police services and intelligence communities – or in some cases civil militia. 
 
In the study I strongly suggest to politicians (as frequent other studies did with regard to 
military leadership) to be aware of their responsibilities with regard to a non-partisan praxis 
in the internal deployment of the security forces in an aspiring democracy. 
 
In achieving a balance between professional armed forces and responsible political leadership, 
the choice of a particular post-transition approach related to or directly linked to a specific 
choice for or against a TRC process in dealing with the past, in my view, does not seem to 
make any decisive contribution – at least not in the cases I tracked in this study. I have 
empathy with people arguing that TRC-related countries seemingly did marginally better than 
non-TRC countries when it comes to the establishment of civilian control over the military. 
However, there are many other issues at stake here. 
 
From the data utilised and experiences shared and gained in this exploratory study, in my 
view an argument can be made that outside the African continent, non-TRC countries that 
transitioned to democracies (see for example the relative success of Spain and Portugal in 
relation to the relative sub-optimum outcomes in Argentina and Chile) fared as well as TRC 
countries despite their different approaches. Moreover, this argument can arguably be 
extrapolated to our own continent as well. 
 
On the African continent – at least in the conclusions that I derived from the study – TRC and 
non-TRC approaches stand an even change of establishing workable CMR and civil control 
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over the military.382 On the contrary, as far as comparative “moments” are concerned, there is 
a plausible, yet tentative, argument to be considered that non-TRC countries on the African 
continent seem to have fared slightly better in establishing stable and lasting CMR than their 
counterparts that chose TRCs. Conversely, on the African continent, that some TRC 
countries, such as South Africa had apparently at least as some of my research participants 
believe, somewhat more success than some countries adopting non-TRC approaches. Other 
countries that had TRC-like processes, such as Rwanda, seem to have the potential to 
establish firmer and workable oversight structures of the military (the “armed”) when 
compared with for example Sudan, Zimbabwe or Ethiopia – or even Uganda, where the issue 
of civil control over the military and militias pose a range of enduring problems and 
challenges. On the other hand, it seems (at least at this point in time) that a non-TRC African 
case studied here, Namibia, is doing as well in the realm of civil control over the military (see 
the chapter on case studies) as others.383 
 
With reference to the above argument; in looking at the African continent, a TRC-like process 
provides neither more nor less guarantee of sustainable civil control over the military and civil 
rule by the elected politicians than non-TRC approaches. 
 
In the thesis I infer that the question whether TRC cases fared better than non-TRC cases with 
regard to stable CMR has been answered within the setting. However there is a need to allow 
for the uniqueness of cases and qualifications with regard to each case in question/under 
study. The “hypothesis” proved to be defendable, as long as regional and case-related 
exceptions are accommodated in a case-by-case qualified approach viewed in a broader 
setting. 
 
The above makes it possible to formulate the following concrete hypothesis: TRC approaches 
(in general, or in one particular case) do not necessarily make any meaningful contribution 
per se to the attainment of stable CMR and democratic control over the military in post-
oppressive/post-conflict/authoritarian societies that transitioned to a new democracy. 
Differently put: whatever the perceived need for a TRC process, and whatever the arguments 
forwarded to justify TRCs on the continent and elsewhere (i.e. Cambodia and East Timor 
                                                 
382 I have pointed out earlier that qualitative approaches frequently make use of inductive and deductive 
approaches. I will not restate the case here [See Chapter 1, page 27 and Chapter 2, pages 99 and 138]. 
383 The same applies to Angola if recent tentative research undertaken by the researcher is taken into 
account. Angola had no process comparable to a TRC, yet registers good progress regarding integration 
of previous adversarial militaries and structures for civilian control over the military. (Compare an 
Angola related article mentioned in Appendix 1, co-authored with Ferreira.) 
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outside the ambit of this study), it is unlikely that TRC approaches will make a more 
important contribution to the inculcation or instalment (even sustainability) of 
civil/democratic control over the military in the new state, and likewise in terms of stable 
CMR. It is also uncertain as to whether TRC-oriented approaches will inculcate through their 
implicit pledge of ‘never again’ a lasting ethos or moral code in the future political 
leadership of the newly acclaimed democracy, namely not to interfere in local politics by 
utilising the coercive arms of the state they inherited. In this regard the need for education and 
inculcating principled values and codes of conduct for politicians remain a challenge to be 
taken on unwaveringly by civil society, military practitioners/professional soldiers and social 
scientists alike in future384. 
 
Because of the qualitative nature of the study, the preceding argument clearly needs to be 
qualified. Among others, it is obviously also open to influences by, and outcomes of social 
processes in post-conflict societies. It thus seems reasonable to argue that there is potential for 
TRC-like approaches to add value to eventual civil control over the military as long as the 
process is directed at (1) continuously affirming workable CMR; (2) institutionalising and 
inculcating an ethos/set of common values concerning civil control over the “armed”; (4) the 
(re-) professionalisation of the military; (5) the persistent nurturing of human rights by the 
state, the military, political leadership, electoral representatives and the civil community, and 
(6) educating/influencing political leaders in new democracies to ensure that they do not 
merely for the sake of power and self-interest cajole the military into the internal military 
arena. In such a case the process of socio-political interaction, public participation, 
communication and education to achieve a civil democratic state is one of the mutual 
responsibilities and obligations of the ruling politician, the civilian community and the man 
on horseback alike. 
 
The preceding six “post-oppressive pointers” (which may also be called conditionalities) also, 
of course, apply to any other state in transition from abusive non-democratic entities to 
democracies, whether new or “mature”. In the case of this study such cases include countries 
that chose not to deal with their past through TRCs. 
 
With this study I believe one advances a critical cautionary notion, namely that attempted 
transitions to democracy, emerging democracies or “established” ones all face the potential to 
regress to authoritarian rule manifesting in internal oppression with a decline in the protection 
                                                 
384 In reference to civil society or the civil community I include the critical notion of free media. 
(Compare Monare, 2007: 8 with reference to South Africa in this regard.) 
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of human rights and a forceful militarist projection of power towards the own/internal/ 
indigenous populace. It may even lead to the forceful projection of military power without the 
input or veto of civilian institutions towards others outside the polis (external aggression), or 
both. It also brings about the realisation that it is not only, as frequently implied, the military 
that “invades” politics, but the political elite that manipulates or invites the military into 
partisan internal politics or forceful projection of foreign policy to the detriment of others, 
human security and human rights inside and outside the state. Again, it should be noted that 
the above instance applies to small or large states, new or established democracies. 
 
7.2. Theoretical implications of the study 
 
I believe that my auto-ethnographic study, by often providing dense descriptions, 
demonstrated that the context and nature of the particular transition determines the quality of 
future CMR and democratic controls over the military in the new democracy. 
 
TRC processes may certainly hold many other positive points entailing “opening up the past” 
and advancing “national reconciliation” (valuable works about this are available), but not 
when these processes are related without qualification to long term inculcation of civilian 
control. The uncritical assumption that civil control will automatically follow a TRC could be 
dangerously erroneous.385 To make future gains in this area, research should couple the 
decision for, implementation of and envisaged outcomes of a TRC process with concrete 
proposals on future CMR in the country for which it is intended, while taking past 
experiences into consideration. In Chapters 3 and 4 I have dealt at length with the potential 
and positive spin-offs TRCs may have for countries that moved from repressive rule to 
democracy, and do not address this here again. 
 
For those interested in advancing theory in military sociology, or for that matter political 
sociology (and perhaps for some political science theorists), the above is worth reflecting 
upon before embarking on such theoretical groundwork. Particularly, this relates to theory-
building or constructing models. 
                                                 
385 However, the notion of the content and outcomes of a TRC in order to effect national reconciliation 
has also been debated extensively by those who argue for and those against the notion of a TRC or 
indeed the very notion of nation (compare Degenaar in Rhoodie and Liebenberg, 1994). In terms of 
discourse analysis and critical notions about nationalism, even the concept “national reconciliation” can 
be questioned. Thus, whether TRCs are effective in the reconstruction of a new democratic community 
and the advance of communal forgiveness becomes a debatable question. After all, the TRC concept is 
set within a certain paradigm or discourse and may be countered by other theoretical arguments and 
discourses or just perhaps, sheer political dynamics unfolding or imploding from moment to moment. 
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An important finding, in my view, and one I did not anticipate that evolved in the course of 
my immersion in the data, is that government-appointed commissions to deal with instances 
of large-scale abuse of human rights face various obstacles. In most cases, these commissions 
tend not to unearth the full truth and in various instances such reports, even when made 
public, did not recommend steps to be taken or successfully ensure and sustain the future 
protection of human rights. They failed dismally in setting and implementing strict codes of 
conduct with regard to the role of non-partisan security forces. At best such commissions 
seem to be a less acceptable second best option with positive outcomes far from guaranteed. 
This insight came about as I scrutinised other cases not initially intended to be an integral part 
of the study. But such is the nature of social science research; findings may crop up that 
inform the involved researcher outside the initially envisioned parameters or process of the 
intended study, and thus benefit the research community. 
 
This finding, I feel, is worth keeping in mind when venturing into future theoretical work. 
 
7.3. Future policy options 
 
I am convinced that the SATRC did not contribute as much as it could in South Africa to 
facilitate sound CMR. Rather, the onus fell on the constitutional provisions and the 
legislature, including parliamentary committees, civil society and the media, to achieve this. 
Thus far, it seems South Africa still has a way to go … or perhaps, rather, grow (see Chapter 
6 for references to civil-military control challenges in a future South Africa). Perhaps, in our 
case it should lead to a repetition of the DRP, with increased participation from the South 
African civil community/society. Necessarily, improving CMR when they are not seen as 
satisfactory remains a political (and moral) obligation in South Africa and elsewhere. 
 
As borne out for example by problems concerning the arms deal at the beginning of the 
millennium, one may argue that more incisive parliamentary oversight over the arms 
acquisition process may have minimised both costs and the potential for corruption. The same 
could apply to deployment in peace operations as currently undertaken by the SANDF 
elsewhere in Africa. The recent announcement that South Africa is going to import armoured 
fighting vehicles (AFVs) from Scandinavia rather than upgrade current AFVs for which the 
technological platforms already exist, is another example. While we are not confronted with 
human-rights abuses here, the principle of oversight over the armed forces remains relevant, 
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also in more mundane issues such as budgets, arms acquisition, force upgrading, human 
capital utilisation and deployment. 
 
I have to mention at this point that the interviews and the solicited e-mail feedback provided 
interesting perspectives – in some cases complementing one another, in others contrasting 
with one another. For some research participants, the TRC had little or no bearing on future 
CMR. For other participants in the study, the SATRC was part and parcel of the new 
approach and assisted to an extent in improving civil control over the military.386 Other 
participants pointed out that despite possible “cross-pollination” between the SATRC and the 
DRP, the future civil-military interface in South Africa is in need of further attention. 
 
The same argument applies to the majority of the other case studies where TRCs and non-
TRC approaches were compared. The findings from the spectrum of data obtained, I believe, 
when read together with the qualified research question and with the critical process-informed 
interpretations attached to it, will assist future researchers in deciding on applying a macro- or 
micro-approach to further research on the subject. This again may have an impact on future 
policy planning and making. 
 
There is one remark related to the above that I believe should be made: Some participants in 
the study (the minority in this case) seem to assume the “export value” of the South African 
TRC experiment uncritically.387 I remain hesitant about uncritically exporting an approach or 
a conceived “model” to other societies without proper study beforehand. An experiment 
decided upon in one community and transformed into policy within that particular community 
does not by definition translate into the successful imposition or exportation of such an 
experiment to other societies. 
 
                                                 
386 At least one South African interviewee (interview 2) argued this point. At least two of those who 
responded via e-mail explicitly or implicitly argued this. This concurs with the views expressed in an 
earlier article I co-published with the late Rocky Williams, in which we argued that normatively, 
ethically and in a generic sense, the Christian ethos could strengthen military professionalism, because 
the TRC was immanently Christian in character. Since then in reflection, I have become less certain 
that this will be an automatic consequence in the case of a TRC. As can be seen, not all research 
participants made these connections, or if so, they did not see the TRC as a major contributing factor in 
the realm of CMR. It was perhaps most vividly described in a brief telephonic interaction with a pro-
liberation struggle exile who returned and held a senior academic position. He remarked some time ago 
in a discussion: “I thought they had very little to do with each other.” His statement sharply 
contradicted the views of other persons that I interviewed, demonstrating the multitude of nuances in 
viewing the SATRC. 
387 South African TRC advocates or TRCs, in general, seem to make this assumption without the 
necessary critical reflection. 
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In using the findings of the current study and its tentative potential for constructing theoretical 
concepts, I want to caution that policy planners and makers should be aware that a TRC in 
itself is not sufficient, and does not ipso facto guarantee future civil control over the military 
despite the optimistic belief in certain circles that it may do so. In states that underwent a TRC 
exercise, good CMR are not a given, nor the sustainability thereof. Policies considered and 
implemented are determined by the needs and demands of a specific national community or 
nation of citizens with in mind positive outcomes. Again, circumstances and contextual 
developments play a role. As such future policy makers (or “exporters” of policies) should 
take care in reflecting on policy design, making, implementation and evaluation when it 
comes to socio-dynamics of choices for or against a TRC or any other approach for that 
matter. 
 
In this regard legislative bodies, constitutional institutions responsible for constitutional 
oversight such as the Constitutional Court, the civil community and the media should 
continuously be vigilant. Any lacunae or regression towards non-accountability, partisan 
politics or unjustified militarisation should be countered continuously and vigorously. 
Awareness of problems and problem-solving, as argued in earlier chapters, need to go hand in 
hand (also see the appendix on key concepts). Necessarily, public participation and the role of 
the media are of importance here. So is the debate on a broader mandate for a TRC process, if 
so decided. 
 
I believe that the important issue my findings raise is that CMR and civil control over the 
military are not a “one-way street”. As much as attitudes, or structural controls (subjective or 
objective), have to be enhanced and honed to keep the military in the barracks, as urgent – 
perhaps far more – is the need to establish an inculcated morality among political leaders not 
to give in to the temptation of bringing the military into politics. Further, one may argue that 
consideration needs to be given to ways and means of sanctioning political leadership that 
ventures into partisan politics that may invite security elements into the internal political 
arena. 
 
The data gathered in the research process made this abundantly clear: the issue of the military 
entering politics or placed in a potential praetorian role is not necessarily the doing of military 
officials, but frequently the consequence of politicians who for their own reasons facilitate 
conditions where the military is sucked into partisan rule to the detriment of the democratic 
community. I believe that I supplied ample examples as well as their outcomes for 
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consideration in the thesis. Clearly policy makers or those influencing policy need to be made 
aware of this. 
 
Certainly the greatest future policy challenge should by now be apparent: educating the 
political leadership to be responsible enough not to abuse the military for partisan gain. 
Perhaps even more complex is the question (or perhaps the need, rather) of structures and 
attitudes (institutions and ethos) being created pro-actively that could, if need be, even 
discipline or sanction political leaders if they slip into inviting the coercive arms of the state 
to be used against their own people. Perhaps it is not an overreaction to state that this 
resembles the single greatest challenge for future civil-military research and military 
sociologists and their peers in the armed forces. 
 
With regard to the possible exporting of a TRC exercise to other countries, I believe this study 
demonstrated the need for interpreting the mandate of a TRC somewhat wider in such a case 
without diminishing the intention to unearth the truth. I feel it would have value if advocates 
and implementers of TRCs from the “design phase” kept in mind that at least some concrete 
proposals, surpassing the cryptic references to those in past reports, should be offered in the 
final report. These proposals should among others relate to future structures, values and 
attitudes (habits even) concerning civil control over the military and the obligations that rest 
with the political leadership and the professional military in this regard. Certainly there is no 
reason why a TRC report cannot suggest or provide clear guidelines for the future civil-
military interface. Rather than distracting from the value of a TRC process and its public 
report-making, this will add value to such a process. In this regard it is conceivable that the 
role of and the participation by military sociologists in the design or implementation of a TRC 
mandate could be of much value. 
 
7.4. “Replicating” the study? 
 
In this case, namely replicating the study, I relate to two levels of the research insights – one 
more practical, one more theoretical. The first has to do with the replication of the study itself 
both locally and elsewhere. The second relates to the replication of a TRC type of exercise 
elsewhere, or the choice against a TRC that stems from the notion of forgive and forget, 
mixed approaches and ICTs (note that replication should not be confused with the term 
duplication). In qualitative research duplication of a study, if the same results are intended or 
envisaged, is rarely – if ever – possible owing to socio-dynamics and the human beings 
involved. 
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The first issue concerns the possibility or the advisability of repeating this study in the South 
African context, or alternatively, a choice made to repeat a similar study in a society with 
similar historical experiences and challenges. I believe that replicating this qualitative and 
auto-ethnographic study is to a certain extent possible and maybe advisable (one researcher in 
one particular exploratory study does not hold the “truth” or supreme knowledge 
exclusively)388. In lived experiences, as in history, as Nicholas Mansergh suggested, there are 
no imposed ends or beginnings (Van der Westhuizen, 2005: 300). As an exploration, a 
tracking exercise in this field, this study provided relatively dense and in many ways lived-
experienced material. For me as involved (not an aloof) researcher the study holds, despite 
and indeed because of its human nature, existential experiences and evolving social dynamics. 
These, in turn, have some “internal validity” and transferability potential. In the unfolding of 
concrete human experiences and resultant human genres, repetition of such a study locally, on 
the African continent or elsewhere, may hold value. 
 
Regarding the more practical issue of replicating approaches mentioned in the study, in other 
words repeating the alternatives discussed in this study, especially TRC-like approaches, the 
following is arguably important: This study suggests that TRC approaches and specifically 
those such as the SATRC need to be evaluated critically and thoroughly before “exporting” 
the concept to other societies that have arguably different circumstances and experiences of 
civil disorder and oppression within a different context and epoch. In the course of the study I 
came across dozens of articles and works that implicitly justified the exportation of the TRC 
approach, some even suggesting that such a process should be “internationalised” or 
“globalised” as an alternative to an International Criminal Court (compare Eisnaugle, 2003: 
209 quoted in Chapter 5). However, the issue is clearly not that simple. I demonstrated that 
there are as many communalities as there are contextual deviations and (unpredictable) socio-
political dynamics. Therefore, I believe it is more responsible to investigate whether a TRC 
process that seems to be working well in one country, should be exported uncritically to 
another. To put it more strongly: It may be worthwhile to consider or transfer a model or 
structure of civil control, provided that contextual and cultural differences are scrutinised 
properly and cognisance is taken of the potential social outcomes of such a structure rather 
than exporting a “model of national truth and reconciliation” or “national unity and 
                                                 
388 By nature qualitative research outcomes may be different. However, further studies may contradict 
this study’s findings, support them or more importantly, qualify them to the benefit of future research 
and its application. 
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reconciliation” uncritically.389 By contrasting my reservations about the export potential for 
both, I believe I illustrate my strong reservations about applying TRCs uncritically elsewhere 
as if they offer a panacea for national reconciliation and sustainable democracy alike, and that 
includes civil control over the military in a democratic community. 
 
Perhaps it is presumptuous to attempt finding answers to complex questions such as these, but 
I believe that my study contributed modestly in at least pointing out related areas/questions in 
considering the transferability of the SATRC (or any TRC for that matter) for application. 
 
It goes without saying that any repetition of a study such as this one should be handled with 
great care. 
 
7.5. Transferability of the present study’s findings 
 
I have already referred to various attempts to ensure the study’s replicability. I believe that, by 
working both inductively-deductively and by immersing myself in the experiences of many 
people and many social contexts and interacting with their real life experiences. I succeeded 
in having my study demonstrate transferability. Particularly important, I believe, is that as a 
researcher I was immersed intermittently in relevant experiences over an extensive period390. 
This enabled me to unravel unique and important insights. Additional data-gathering as 
described in the literature review and Chapter 6, as well as adherence to qualitative research 
guidelines, consistent dialogue with peers, including veterans from the liberation movements 
and the SADF, peer-debriefing by Gen Solly Mollo, Col (Dr) Louis du Plessis, Dr Rialize 
Ferreira (sociologist) and my promoters, further strengthened transferability.391 I remain 
thankful to all of them, as well as many other experienced people that stringently criticised 
some of the assumptions that I held. 
 
7.6. The quality issue: a final account 
 
Gummesson (1991) refers to the social dimension or aspects of research quality. These are 
important in assessing a qualitative researcher’s work. Assessing one’s own research by, for 
example, making use of peer-debriefing and establishing credibility is, as I found, not a 
                                                 
389 The observant reader will pick up that I expressed elsewhere [See Appendix 2, page 436 ff] my 
reservations about exporting “models of civil control”. 
390 See Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6. 
391 I need not to refer to all here. They are mentioned in the text and the acknowledgements. However I 
cannot but mention Rocky Williams and Ruhr Martin again here. 
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straightforward matter or a “given”,392 especially when a narrative enters the picture 
(Czarniawska, 2004). I tried to remind myself constantly of these challenges throughout this 
research journey and the tracking exercise. Before embarking on the study, I spent time 
reflecting on the study, its rationale and possible approaches. During the course of the study I 
did the same, also in discussion with peers, peer debriefers and practitioners. This element as 
part of the decision about the approach to the study, the initial phases, research choices and 
adaptations decided upon in the course of the study, is known in contemporary qualitative 
research as reflexivity. Reflexivity implies a process that occurs both in individual thought and 
through dialogue with others, which acknowledges the researcher’s own experience and 
perspectives (Lietz, Langer & Furman, 2006: 447).393 As such, reflexivity has close links with 
what is known in qualitative and ethnographical studies as trustworthiness (trustworthiness is 
frequently used in qualitative terminology rather than the term credibility used in more 
positivistic research). 
 
“Scientific credibility is not an ascribed quality of a study, but rather an achieved one” 
(Athens, 1984: 265). It is the responsibility of the researcher to make a study intrinsically 
credible or trustworthy. Thus, the researcher is obligated to supply an adequate account of 
the research along with the results. Another way to put it is: “An account is … the story told 
by the researcher about how he or she performed the research question” (Athens, 1984: 265). 
And, may I add, the related questions and insights that evolve on the track. But stories are 
seldom merely told … life is simply too complex. Lincoln and Guba (2002: 205ff)394 point out 
that the emergence of alternative paradigms to guide inquiry introduced important questions 
and challenges to judge the quality of work that explores such new approaches This is 
definitely true of this study. Next, I provide my argument on the study’s soundness. 
 
                                                 
392 I referred to Noy’s notion where he suggests as a measure of experience the “rite of passage”, the 
“right of passage” and the “write of passage” and the existential interconnectedness thereof in academia 
and practice. 
393 Lietz et al comment: “Finally reflexivity is not a (single) point in time event … Rather it is a process 
that occurs throughout the research” (Lietz, Langer & Furman, 2006: 447). In arguing this they follow 
Guillemin and Gillam (2004: 261 ff). 
394 Compare Wiesenfeld (2000) on prescription and action, practice and inquiry in the qualitative 
research process and Lincoln (1995) on evolving standards and changes in quality checks (for example, 
the research audit trail) within qualitative and interpretive research. Of relevance is also Maguire 
(2006) on the answerability and responsibility of the auto-ethnographic researcher towards the self and 
others in the human sciences, inclusive of the role of self-criticism and the use of social criticism. 
While auto-ethnography has become a thriving endeavour in most human science disciplines, one has 
to mention to political scientists among us that these new approaches are urgently needed in the current 
static political science environment in the USA and South Africa. Burnier’s arguments (2006) about to 
the need for auto-ethnographic work in political science are relevant here. 
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Through his/her research the researcher is obligated to tell, within personal constraints 
naturally, the fullest possible story, to describe the collage in as rich and dynamic detail and 
share the collected data in as transparent and truthful a way as humanly possible. However, 
one needs to be watchful throughout executing the research not to slip into too much self-
disclosure that shuts out research participants or the social narrative and shared experiences. 
Maintaining one’s “analytic stance” as far as possible and offering a candid and detailed 
account of the research process is no simple task, but a consistent endeavour that should be 
striven for. 
 
In this context the term audit trail has value. The audit trail implies that the researcher shares 
with the reader the research steps taken, as well as choices made when changing “track”. 
Sharing with the reader and fellow researchers/peers forms part of the audit trail. So does 
critical engagement. There is an additional element to the audit trail: “The audit trail allows 
the researcher the freedom to make unique research decisions not previously prescribed while 
still requiring that each decision and the justification for that decision be recorded all the 
way” (Lietz, Langer & Furman, 2006: 450). 
 
According to the tracking metaphor I had to prove that as researcher I used rather than abused 
the data as obtained/immersed in a dynamic and complex context as it confronted me. 
Simultaneously I had to endeavour to provide as clear as possible a description, the chosen 
casing, the relevant views and to relate comparative moments (the broader casing sensitive to 
the self and the other) of the issue under investigation. Added to this, one has to be aware of 
the real-life impact of the study. As involved researcher, one commits oneself not only to 
basic tracking, but also to track systematically and interpretively. But since tracking also 
entails sense, imagination and interpretation, there is always a speculative element. 
Speculation is part of the self, the other and “others’ reality” that forms essentially part of life, 
therefore also research. Can immersion into data be considered a measure of “groundedness, 
or reflexive involvedness”? Obviously! Elements of any worthwhile study embody involved 
research and critical thought. And perhaps most important of all, it is crucial that one points 
out to one’s fellow researchers or readers, when contradictory data restrain one, in fact, may 
compel one, to say: “I still do not know everything”. For far too many social scientists the 
temptation to say “I know” is still greater than the human capacity to say “I do not know 
everything”. Yet the former, in the school of life, holds less value than the latter … 
 
I believe I managed to confront and live through by checking and double-checking the data, 
reflecting on it all, where necessary adapting my approach, and above all, relying on peer-
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debriefing, frequent questions and consultations and “personal double checks” (reflection and 
reflexivity). I also shared the audit trail with the reader and my peers. Gaining access to data, 
immersing myself in, reflecting on and debating on concrete challenges in the area studied are 
not teaching/preaching or self-gain, but represent a reciprocal process of learning; to be taught 
in a way, or to be moulded by one’s study and one’s shared experiences. There comes a 
moment in time that one does not write a text but the text – and context – writes (through) 
one; the moment when the researcher becomes but a tool in a living context. The data and the 
subjects become as much teacher as subject. In retrospect this is a moment of trepidation and 
challenge, learning and critique with the stated intention to make a social contribution. It 
represents worthwhile moments. 
 
Like many others, I believe, that by opting for a peer-debriefing process, one adds quality to 
one’s study. By formal and informal immersion into data related to the broader casing over a 
lengthy period of time, by checking and comparing one’s own experiences with others, or 
even by adding e-mail interview schedules, sent out to expert practitioners and theorists in the 
field to provide feedback and act as critical soundboards, I believe one adds to the soundness 
of a project. My access to some articles, memoranda, solicited and unsolicited information 
provided by interviewees before or after our discussions, persons that I met or interacted with 
and checking these against the themes that arose in the interviews contributed substantially to 
ensuring quality within the constraints and opportunities of being an involved researcher and 
participant-observer. In this way the importance of achieving trustworthiness (“credibility”) 
remained a poignant issue, a constant reminder (see Holliday, 2007: 134–136). 
 
Let me emphasise: the knowledge gained and earned in the course of this study did not come 
through the latter-day knowledge/information society and the highly pressurised tractor-tyre 
factory-clones aimed at profit that many of our universities have become since the middle of 
the 1980s – thanks to apartheid educational technocrats and upheld since then by new 
incumbents. We as students and researchers and lecturers are apparently set for “high 
performance”, “bench-marking”, “core functioning”, “brand-marking”, frequently-evaluated-
by-outside-consultants, “service delivery orientated strategic institution” syndromes. 
Universities tend to become under technocratic guidance by “management” and “top-
management” tertiary bodies with visions and missions reproducing “objective” outputs; 
outputs such as large numbers of students that only satisfy the making of more money 
“guided” by inappropriately highly paid managerial types (the latter types frequently increase 
their salaries and bonuses by rationalising departments, forced and voluntary retirements of 
academics, and outsourcing of services). To gain knowledge through a research process? To 
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live through this syndrome only? So unfortunate I was not. Daily living, interaction with 
people on the street, with friends (some more frequently than others, yet all memorable), 
meeting sour and joyful practitioners, sharing insights (frequently of more value than those of 
their academic counterparts) and loyal compatriots, talking to colleagues that live art and hate 
war,395 and optimistic comrades provided more than the proverbial lion’s share of seeing new 
angles on surrounding developments. As added value, these experiences outside the world of 
“objective institutions” relieved tension, added experience once again and facilitated the 
human freedom/obligation to “relativise yourself”. What a joy and human animal privilege! 
But I digress from the discussion. Let us return to the question of assessing the quality/value 
of a qualitative study. 
 
Some scholars put considerable emphasis on the internal validity of qualitative research and 
triangulation. Let us take a closer look at this. Stebbens (1991), among others refers to a 
“bargain struck between the researcher and subjects including gatekeepers” (quoted by 
Schurink, 2004d: 5). Personally, I prefer the term relationships built, because fundamentally 
such human interaction and relationships allow not only for access to data but also for richer, 
experience-laden data and relationships. I contend that in this study these were generally 
applied and I trust achieved, despite shortcomings. I believe that my initial contacts and 
sourcing led to a steady and increased flow of data. But more: it strengthened relationships 
and cooperation between me, the researcher as subject, and the “subjects” of research, who 
provided more meaningful data – as much of this could be fleshed out in debate, dialogue, 
discussion and through consultation of reading materials and archival sources. I was in the 
fortunate position (more grace than skill) that the relationship between myself and many 
people was such that we could differ quite vividly – and sometimes less cordially – without 
interrupting or harming friendship or continued communication. 
 
My personal involvement during this and earlier fieldwork not only enabled me to develop 
concepts closely linked to those of the research participants themselves, but to live through 
many of these constructions, meanings, viewpoints, and their implications such as 
disappointment, pain and joy. This was in itself a deeply human trajectory that left some 
permanent images and recollections of experiences. In this sense, these experiences transcend 
the knowledge that I gained on site, which in itself is an added value. I believe that here the 
audit trail, reflexivity and critical engagement contributed to the trustworthiness of this study. 
                                                 
395 I cannot but remind myself about old friends such as Martin Mendelsohn and Mercia van Wyk in 
this category. Much further back, James Mathews the “tsotsi” under his mulberry tree in Gatesville 
writing on poisoned wells strikes a cord. So do my friend Charl-Pierre Naude and the lateVernon 
February.  
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As to “triangulation”, closely related to trustworthiness, I believe I was quite fortunate since I 
had access to various data sources. More particularly, (i) I got immersed in the behaviour and 
discussions of role players and gathered quite unique data (ii), I collected data by means of 
structured interviews, and (iii) I was able to solicit information from various documents. I was 
fortunate to have numerous informal interactions, many of them extensive. In addition, I had 
highly competent peer debriefers, some formal and some less formal.396 
 
I also collected materials of and by theorists and peers, and in many cases views based on 
discussions and experiences over more than two decades. Many persons shared their views 
and experiences. Some of these were never published, either by their own choice or owing to 
most unfortunate circumstances. I had access to personal archives dating back to 1972, more 
structured since 1983, I have to add. I was partially involved in the military, took part in anti-
apartheid campaigns and worked for activist research institutions and NGOs. I was fortunate 
to become part of a variety of initiatives and projects. In short, I could not have hoped to have 
a more amenable context to further my research and track the narrative on these topics and the 
thesis. 
 
I had the support of helpful friends and trusted colleagues to act as critical soundboards, 
sometimes even adversaries to correct and guide and to allow me to burden them with queries 
and peer debriefings, or simply to check patterns in the data gained or facts. Against this 
background, I was able to check and double-check my work and progress; to reflect and test 
my ideas (and frequently had pointed out to me, in less or more friendly ways, that aspects 
were missing, under-stated, and/or that certain parts of my text needed further attention, or 
were shabby).397 
 
On a personal level, I had the consistent support from my life partner, Mariaan, motivating me 
to continue with this particular research project, rather than get involved with other projects or 
side-tracked. The children were a source of inspiration by sharing their love, child-like views 
and being (more or less patient) while I spent time in front of a PC. 
 
Many friends who knew about my research shared ideas with me. Others shared their real life 
experiences or those of family members. Others brought along useful material, academic or 
fictional. In short, in my setting, I can only be grateful for the dynamic interaction that 
                                                 
396 Compare Lietz et al (2006: 450–453) on the use of triangulation and peer debriefing. 
397 In more direct talk some practitioners chose a much stronger word than “shabby”. 
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provided me with the tools to “validate” the study by “triangulation” and/or or reflection. My 
promoter and co-promoter remained in the picture, giving guidance, criticism and/or alerting 
me to relevant sources. 
 
In summary, the following table of Daymond and Holloway (2002: 101) incorporating among 
others views of Creswell (2003), Lincoln and Guba, (1985) and Marshall and Rossman 
(1999), as adjusted by Schurink (2005), provides an idea of criteria used in judging qualitative 
contemporary research projects. I adapted the table further as my study evolved on the chosen 
track by making use of insights by Denzin (2006), Maguire (2006), Lincoln (1995), 
Wiesenfeld (2000), Collins and Makowsky (2005), Hanna (1970), Neuman (2000), Luijpen 
(1980), Bryman (2004), Best (2006), Lietz, Langer and Furman (2006) and others:398 
 
Assessing the soundness of a qualitative study 
 
PARADIGM CRITERIA/BENCHMARKS/”CANONS” 
Realist or positivist 
research 
 
Reliability and 
validity 
Reliability, internal validity, generalisa-bility, 
relevance and objectivity, distance between 
researcher and objectified subjects 
 
Interpretative research. 
or Critical research or 
Tracking a human process 
Authenticity and 
trustworthiness 
Authenticity, credibility, transfer-ability, 
dependability, reflexivity and confirmability, 
immediacy, humanist and critical elements  
 
 
Strategies: Triangulation, member checking, peer debriefing, the audit trail, natural history, “rich” or 
dense” descriptions, self-reflection, clarifying researcher bias, presenting and sharing negative or 
discrepant information, spending prolonged time in the setting, formal and informal immersion in 
data, repeating observations and/or interviewing research participants, renewed or continuous 
interaction with research subjects or fellow beings. Keeping the self and authored others in mind. Do 
not claim to hold innate knowledge and rather admit shortcomings in data and/or data gathering. Tell 
a human story through others and your own experience. 
 
Tactics: Practitioners frequently share more valuable insights than distant academics. Be aware and 
sensitive to this. As far as possible, be yourself. (Attempt to) care for/about a better world. Research 
is an important experience, but life is more than research and knowledge and stems from many 
sources, most of all, others around you. If stuck in a dead end, retrace your tracks and start again (a 
good tracker seldom stalls, even if reflecting). Know through your experience shared with others that 
induction and deduction, like the macro and the micro, are always intertwined. Do not shy away from 
interdisciplinary work with application value. Be aware that doing a DLitt et Phil stifles your 
publishing record but is needed in the “objective” world of Academia. And consider that (perhaps) 
strategies and tactics are not as far apart as text-books claim. That one informs the other is worth to 
remember. 
 
                                                 
398 The work by Collins (1952) mentioned and reflected in the source list played some role too, less so 
perhaps than others mentioned, but still. See also appendices and acknowledgments. 
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This table, with the necessary adaptations in the process of study, was particularly helpful 
when it came to discussing, planning and the execution of the study. 
 
The process in which I immersed myself as it evolved assisted in identifying and at least 
minimising some biases. Reflexivity; the process during which one reflects critically on one’s 
own role and preconceptions throughout the research process needs to be a constant 
companion, a proverbial ever-present shadow. For Bryman (2004), reflexivity is a term used 
to refer to reflectiveness among social researchers about the implications for the knowledge of 
the social world they generate by/through their methods, values, biases, decisions and mere 
presence in the very situations they investigate. 
 
I believe that using such an evolving framework added to the quality and trustworthiness of 
this study. I have already mentioned that this was done in the spirit – or rather attitude – of 
intersubjectivity; I want to restate the point here. 
 
Also necessary to restate in conclusion is that where I was confronted (or stumbled upon) 
contradicting evidence or ambiguous information (specifically “deviant” or “negative” cases), 
it needed reflection while moving on the track. This forced me into reflecting on particular 
issues. In this sense my research became re-search; re-flecting, re-thinking, re-checking, re-
phrasing, re-working, re-writing (see Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007: 81ff on the value of re-
writing). Peer debriefing, i.e., colleagues intermittently reviewing one’s work by re-
analysing the raw data and by discussing one interpretation of them with one was crucial, as 
in any other research project or the application of one’s skills. 
 
The preceding reflects Daymon and Holloway’s (2002: 100) argument: “All research should 
have an audit trial by which others are able, to some extent at least, to judge the validity of the 
study. The audit trial is (a) detailed record of decisions made before or during the research 
process”. 
 
In the case of the auto-ethnographic narrative and where other genres and a broader casing 
enter the picture, this “audit trail” involves informing the reader and sharing limitations of the 
study. It includes pointing out at which points one got side-tracked, had to choose between 
different courses and/or stumbled on new questions and challenges. Sharing with the reader or 
peers why you broadened the casing of the study is equally important. One also shares with 
the reader and others through the nature of qualitative research where one “feels” that one is 
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moving in the realm between systematic, interpretive or speculative tracking, because as a 
process package this relates the scientific and personal narrative with all its strengths and 
limitations. This I abided with through the process of research here. 
 
7.7. Learning about being a student (“candidate”), study guidance and being an 
examiner 
 
The study and the process through which it took place, taught me much. I will briefly share 
this with the reader by means of quotations that others shared with me in the course of the 
study.  
 
“There are dreadful and exceptional ways of masters and doctoral supervision. In my case I travelled a 
long journey with sharp contrasts. While any life journey is tough and bumpy because of what needs to 
be accomplished and the unknown that crops up, it can either be joyful knowing that something 
worthwhile will be discovered and accomplished at its completion or it can be very strenuous and 
emotionally tiresome”. 
– Person 1 
“The first part of my doctoral journey was highly unpleasant and uphill, mainly because of very poor 
guidance. The final part was far from plain sailing, yet pleasing and inspirational. In short, on my 
journey I experienced first hand how supervision should not and how it should be done. While my 
second supervisor was always supportive and critically at hand the guidance of the chief supervisor I 
originally chose was not up to scratch, in fact left much to be desired. Naturally this was not conducive 
for the candidate/supervisors/promoters team effort required for a doctoral study. Following a negative 
experience with my first promoter, I requested and was assigned a new competent and interested first 
promoter. The interaction between the three of us led to a cohesive team. Of course, the new integrated 
team did not mean that I had less responsibility or that the chosen track became smooth, easy or 
without potholes and diversions. I had to work consistently since both my promoters continuously 
provided meticulous, directed and critical feedback. I had to continue my lecturing duties and 
continued working on other publishing projects at the same time.” 
– Person 2 
“The difference for me and my friend was that working with skilled supervisors took place in a warm 
atmosphere and with an unselfish spirit of sharing on the part of the promoters. Their interaction with 
their students brought the best out of the candidates.” 
– Person 3 
 
 395
 
“As lecturer or someone teaching in the human sciences I also have the responsibility to guide students 
and examine dissertations and theses. Being a doctoral candidate and exposed both to ‘how not to guide 
a student’ and ‘how to do it’ I learnt unique – more than just important – lessons. It is clear that one 
should not agree to supervise a doctoral candidate or master’s student if one does not have the interest, 
knowledge and time to provide proper guidance. A lesson I think, to take to heart.” 
– Person 4 
“Having travelled the ‘doctoral road’ personally and acting as promoter has not only re-affirmed some 
realities. It reminded me of experiences numerous other doctoral and masters students had with their 
promoters and supervisors and even examiners399. I had vivid personal experience of the negative 
effects created by lax or uninvolved promoters who do not have sufficient knowledge of a particular 
methodology. I cannot disregard my duty as a member of a higher learning institution by not appealling 
to my colleagues and superiors that we need to sharpen our policy and strategies of appointing 
supervisors and examiners (even sanctioning supervisors that do not live up to their responsibilities). 
As responsible educators it is our responsibility to oversee this crucial task if we want to serve our 
students.” 
– Person 5 
“I am convinced that anyone who is truly committed as creative partners in research supervision has to 
create an optimally managed and profitable research environment in the social sciences and qualitative 
research. In particular we have to recognise the tremendous responsibility that rests on the shoulders of 
the younger generation of qualitative researchers in the sociological, organisational, leadership, welfare 
and health sciences, policy research and other fields of study to undertake quality research that can 
inform both policy and the human condition.” 400 
– Person 6 
 
 
                                                 
399 Over years several colleagues and students also shared their reservations with me about examiners 
that were appointed outside their field of expertise – usually to the detriment of the student. 
400 The last quotation comes from a qualitative researcher and supervisor of many successful students 
with whom I have worked closely over the past years. The rest of this person’s observation is of equal 
importance: “From my own experience of having been privileged to lecture students and provide study 
guidance on qualitative research methods for more than two decades, I am convinced that only 
experienced researchers who are ready to lend a hand to committed youngsters who display particular 
personal qualities can fulfil this task successfully. More particularly we need to develop and employ 
experimental pedagogies that are in line with the characteristics and potential of our students and 
facilitate joint ventures with them in order for these young Turks to develop into dedicated and creative 
researchers who are well-equipped to explore, describe and explain the many ways leaders and other 
people in post-Apartheid South Africa create their work while assigning meaning to other areas of their 
lives together with others”. 
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As to my own experience I can concur with most of these statements. The research track, 
unless you write a book or an article, also involve the choice of supervisors and promoters. At 
the same time it requires responsibility in supervisor/promoter and the student/candidate. It 
translates into an imperative of due agreement, cooperation and communication if we are 
interested in advancing academia and more so, applied human science to the betterment of 
society. 
 
I believe the above leaves us with more than enough to reflect about. 
 
On the research track experienced here a general remark: Recently I read a thesis by a 
qualitative researcher (Avraamides, 2007). The author argues that the research path and the 
auto-ethnographic genre chosen by her, provided valuable reflections with practical outcomes. 
Firstly, if aimed at, and grounded in personal and other’s experience, such work leads to 
empowering society and individuals. Secondly, the personal narrative as integrated into the 
social, can assist in problem solving or individual/social therapeutic interventions, despite 
some criticism by positivists that it may be “indulgent”. Thirdly, whatever genre we choose 
(or if you wish, call it a research paradigm or research approach) can be personal (some 
would say subjective) and yet aimed at betterment of society and contribute to the common 
core of humanity through the elements of dialogue and shared experience. 
 
I cannot but agree more with this view. Underlying all our ventures in life, research as one 
lived experience, should not be confined to the mind but to humanity. These insights also 
apply to how we live and construct a democratic society and deal with the coercive arms of 
the democratic state of self-chosen citizens committed to transparency and the nurturing of 
human rights and human security in its broadest sense. 
 
7.8. “Leaving the field” 
 
The whole process of writing the doctoral thesis was like many other life experiences such as 
doing a master’s degree, taking part in social processes and personal actions to achieve and 
nurture a democracy, growing up with one’s children, training for war, acting aggressive or 
against aggression or attempting to make peace, going on an exploratory trip into lesser know 
or unknown countries or communities or seriously training in martial arts, etc. 
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Despite some tedious moments and various repetitive elements, a doctoral research track can 
be an enriching and adventurous experience that opens new vistas to be chased and 
transformed into reality. 
 
But leaving a territory or a track leaves one with mixed feelings. Sadness, because the track 
may not be wandered on again, some faces you will never see again, and yet the known 
feelings of excitement cannot be suppressed. New challenges beacon and some new and old 
tracks may cross again in new territories, be it deserts, harsh red sands, high snowy mountains 
or the wet lands. 
 
What more can be said? 
 
7.9 Conclusion 
 
In a rather under-researched field, I feel it was worthwhile if not imperative that this 
explorative study was launched to explore some research questions related to TRC processes 
and the one applied in South Africa and its treatment of the military. The study provides 
answers to these questions with certain qualifications. I also feel that the identified areas for 
future research and policy research are helpful in this regard. 
 
This work, albeit modestly, contributes to the field of military sociology locally, if not 
globally. While risking being regarded as presumptuous, I believe that the study may be 
considered for future deployment, provided that comparative and contextual differences are 
kept in mind. Some scholars may certainly argue that my work applies to one country under 
one particular government, and therefore does not resemble a good “export product”. This 
may be true, but that is for future studies to discern. On cases distinct from TRCs this 
statement also applies to both the choices for and against TRC-type processes as well as 
researching institutions/attitudes/education/training for civilian oversight over security forces, 
the military leadership and elected politicians in particular. Civilians, politicians – even 
religious leaders – clearly need to be aware of this while they strive continuously for the 
improvement of CMR and civil control over professional armed forces. 
 
Regardless of the preceding, this study and its implications at least untangle one single truism: 
A government should not mobilize an army out of anger, military leaders should not provoke 
war out of wrath. Act when it is beneficial, desist if not. Anger can revert to joy, wrath can 
revert to delight, but a nation destroyed cannot be restored to existence, and the dead not 
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restored to life. Therefore an enlightened government is careful about this, a good military 
leadership is alert to this. This is the way to secure a nation and keep the armed forces whole 
(Sun Tzu, translation by Griffith, 1971: 59). 
 
In these words, I suggest lies immense wisdom for political leaders, military commanders, the 
civil community and social science scholars trying to un-puzzle relationships between the 
civil and the military within and among states … 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Articles on reconciliation, retribution, the SATRC, civil-military relations in South Africa, the 
SADF/SANDF and related issues (co-authored articles included): 
 
(1) Perspectives on the TRC, its possible value and role 
 
“Apartheid, Guilt and Retribution: To confess or not to confess”, Prospects, 1(4), December 1992: 
14–15; 
 
“Geen uniek, maar een universeel moordscenario”, Het Parool (The Netherlands), 23 May 1996; 
 
“Gaan die waarheid ook vryheid bring?”, Zuid-Afrika Bulletin, 10 October 1996: 168–169. 
 
 
(2) The SATRC in a comparative perspective 
 
“The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Context, future and some 
imponderables”, SA Public Law, May 1996, No. 11: 123–159. 
 
 
(3)  The TRC and historical reflection – including notions on a historians’ debate in 
South Africa 
 
“Debating our Past: The road to a human rights culture”, In Focus Forum, Vol. 5(5), 1998: 24 - 30; 
 
“Die WVK in Suid-Afrika en die implikasies daarvan vir ’n Suid-Afrikaanse Historikerstreit en 
eietydse geskiedskrywing”, Joernaal vir Eietydse Geskiedenis, 22(1), June 1997: 98–114; 
 
“Die WVK: Refleksie op ’n proses en die naloop van ’n historiese gebeurtenis – enkele tentatiewe 
opmerkings”, Fragmente, 3, 1999: 113–126; 
 
“Can the deep political divisions of the South African society be healed? A philosophical and 
political perspective”. Politeia, Vol. 15(1), 1996: 48 – 64 (co-authored with P. Duvenage). 
 
 
(4) The TRC and its impact on the South African military 
 
“The impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the SANDF”, International Studies 
Journal, 14(2), 1999: 89–112, co-authored with R.C. Williams. 
 
An earlier and shorter working paper co-authored by Wiliams appeared in IDP Papers, No. 13, 
November 1996. 
 
 
(5) The SATRC and its implications for sustainable democracy 
 
“Pathway to democracy: The case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process”, Social 
Identities, 4(3), 1998: 541–558 (co-authored with A. Zegeye). 
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(6) Civil-military Relations 
 
Civil-military relations and arms procurement in South Africa: 1994–2002. Society in Transition, 
2004, Vol. 35(1): 61–86 (with R. Ferreira); 
 
Civil society as defence policy formulator: For real or token partner? Journal for Contemporary 
History, 2004, Vol. 29(2): 173–203 (with R. Ferreira); 
 
Civil Control over the Security Institutions in South Africa: Practical Suggestions for the Future. 
1999. http://www.hsrc.ac.za/delivered/control 1.html. 
 
Later published on invitation in the African Journal for Conflict Resolution as: 
 
“Civil control over security institutions in South Africa: Suggestions for the future and notes on 
replicating the experience in Africa”. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1 (1), 1999: 7–
101 (co-authored with C. Schutte & A. Minnaar). 
 
 
(7) Militarisation/The Military/Military Integration/Demobilisation 
 
“Apartheid’s Military in Politics: Naked Power Revealed”. Journal for Contemporary History, 
Vol. 15(1), 1990: 130–141; 
 
“The Integration of the Military in Post-Liberation South Africa: The Contribution of 
Revolutionary Armies”. Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 24(1), 1997: 105 – 132; 
 
Loyal Service and Yet “Demobbed” – What now? Demobilization and Economic Reintegration of 
South Africa’s Demobilized Military personnel. Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 37(3–
5), 2002: 299–317 (with M. Roefs and R. Ferreira); 
 
South African Public Attitudes on Participation in Peacekeeping, Personnel Issues and Labour 
Relations in the Military, African Security Review, Vol. 6 (6), 1997: 3–18 (with J. Cilliers, L. 
Heinecken and B. Sass); 
 
Public Attitudes regarding the Image and Future of the South African Military and Defence 
Industry, African Security Review, Vol. 6(5), 1997: 25–35 (with J Cilliers, B. Sass and C. Schutte); 
 
Public Attitudes Regarding Women in the Security Forces and Language Usage in the SANDF, 
African Security Review, Vol. 6 (3), 1997: 3–14 (with J. Cilliers, L. Heinecken and B. Sass); 
 
Reflections on the integration of the military in South Africa. African Security Review, Vol. 4(2), 
1995: 26 – 30 (with R. Brownlee). 
 
(8) Reports 
 
Demobilization and its aftermath II: Economic reinsertion of South Africa’s demobilized military 
personnel. Report for the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) funded by the European Union 
(2000). Published under the title mentioned before as ISS, Monograph Series, No. 61, August 2001 
(With Roefs, M., Ferreira, R. & W. Schurink). 
 
(9) Other 
 
The impact of war on Angola and South Africa: Two Southern African Case Studies. 2006. Journal for 
Contemporary History, Vol. 31(3): 42 – 73 (with R. Ferreira). 
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Van der Merwe, H W, Liebenberg, I & Meyer, G. 1991. Changing political styles in South Africa. 
Peace Review, Winter: 38 – 40. 
 
(10) Articles translated 
 
“Demobilisation and the Economic Reintergration of Soldiers into Civil Society: A South African 
case Study”, Yuz Afrika, 2006: 107 – 120. 
 
Attitudes concernant l’image et l’avenir de l’industrie militaire et de la defence dans l’opinion 
publique sud-africains. Alternatives Sud, Vol. V (2), 1998: 177 – 185 (with J. Cilliers, C. Schutte 
and B. Sass). 
 
 
• Total Articles: 21 
• Co-authored: 12 
• Independently authored: 9 (chapters/contributions/ to books and newsletters,  excluded) 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
KEY CONCEPTS 
 
Humans observe the world around them through sets of spectacles or lenses, called concepts 
and relational terms – Eugene Meehan, 1988: 45. 
 
As I moved through the process of developing my research ideas, I grappled with the 
questions of how … (I as scholar) might engage with present phenomena in such a way as to 
offer transformative alternatives …These questions are predicated on the assertion that 
research can and should be political and researchers have the privilege and ethical 
responsibility to attend to dimensions of social justice – Jacqui Gingras, 2007: 7. 
 
We should blunt our sharp points, and unravel the complications of things; we should temper 
our brightness, and bring ourselves into agreement with the obscurity of others … 
– Tao Te Ching, circa 500 B.C. 
 
A word in advance 
 
Humans (sociologists therefore also) see the world in concepts and relational terms, as the 
Meehan epigraph suggests. Concepts so central to our lives are abstract words that represent 
concrete phenomena (Dane, 1990: 22) or, at the very least, attempt to give outline to 
observable phenomena … things that we see happening around us in the daily flow of life or 
politics. Sometimes we have to find our way into and out of a morass of words to track the 
meaning of social processes or the constant changes in human-made phenomena – with or 
without associated unintended consequences. Grappling with research questions invokes 
concepts as our human tools to grasp a changing world in search of answers or explanations. 
Some may find a discussion of terminology in an appendix somewhat outside the “prescribed 
research structure”. I could have discussed terminology as part of the background, the chapter 
on methodology or the literature review. In reflecting on this choice I simply felt that it would 
make for (1) too lengthy a text and (2) perhaps also too dense a text401 and (3) subtract from 
the arguments made, the advocacy, explication and deployment of the auto-ethnographic 
approach and the focus on truth and reconciliation attempts and their effects on civil control 
                                                 
401 Not everyone/anyone aspires to equal Leszek Kolakowski in writing a thesis/dissertation that spans 
three volumes. I certainly had neither the intention, nor the concentration, to write “Main Currents of 
Reconciliation and CMR” as Lezek did in Main Currents of Marxism, Volumes One to Three (1978). 
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over the armed forces. At the same time I felt that informative or illustrative concepts should 
be available for the interested reader. 
 
The reader will be able to follow arguments and narratives in this work without “delving 
deeply” into these key concepts. For the focussed reader these concepts will add value as a 
contextual backdrop. As Sǿndergaard remarks: “We cannot escape discourse. We can move 
within discourse, find fissures, ruptures and contradictions to move with or against. We can 
turn … up and down, interrupt or leave alone – in the search for alternative ways to push and 
move the already constituted towards new discursive practices” (Sǿndergaard, 2005: 298 
quoted by Gingras, 2007: 1). 
 
In a study such as this, meaning and experience closely intertwine and terms and concepts 
form the ground from where the “theoretical” grass grows (derived from Taylor & Bogdan, 
1984: 6; Bogdan & Biklen, 2003: 51; Neuman, 2000: 48; and implicitly Buchler & Puttergill, 
1997: 195). 
 
For people trained, as distinct from educated, as I was, for a while at a white South African 
university such as the University of Stellenbosch, our training/education included interesting 
features. Some lecturers tried to convince us as students of history, that the forces of history 
were like a deterministic coin that had two sides: nationalism and communism. In choosing 
Philosophy as a subject one could choose Philosophy or Political Philosophy (the latter not 
advised if one was thinking about becoming a pastor or staff member of Military Intelligence, 
Foreign Affairs or the National Party apparatchik, the former useful as advanced benchmark 
of a thinking and liberal future ruler). Marxism was a phenomenon, not a movement or a 
living body. One read about it mostly in the work of interpreters of Marxism. To study 
original documents (which were banned), one applied to read then and then had the 
opportunity to access them from shelves that were kept under lock and key and overseen by 
“responsible people” (O yes, and one had to be a post-graduate student, one has to 
mention).402 In Political Science we had hard-core approaches. We were neutral. We read 
Huntington and we were objective. We also studied American election politics … 
 
I suppose one never knows where scepticism starts and knowledge begins. One picks it up, 
however, if someone tries to suggest steering clear from some areas of study or social 
                                                 
402 The Institute for the Study of Marxism (Afrikaans: Instituut vir die Studie vir Marxisme - ISMUS) at 
Stellenbosch happened to be one of the places where permission had to be obtained beforehand and 
students that made use of the facility had to sign a register when consulting “banned literature”.  The 
institute was partly funded by the military intelligence during the 1980s. 
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activities. One does know for some or other reason when people are beginning to lie or are 
lying to one. Perhaps to do so forms part of our original imprint as human animals. We could 
not discuss the ANC or UDF in class – except as a distant research object. In UDF circles 
progressives were not to discuss the PAC or the Marxist Worker’s Tendency, or at own risk 
(very much as American children, for example cannot/had better not discuss the issue of 
whether Al Quada, Hamas or objectors to the occupation of Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine 
should be called liberation fighters rather than “terrorists”. In South Africa the so-called 
“white” population grew up with the notion that all who thought differently were terrorists, 
except our leaders in power. Those that were not terrorists were liberals or useful idiots, 
which amounted to pretty much the same thing). The interview with Van Zyl Slabbert which I 
deal with in Chapter 6 gives more detail on this attitude by the elite and the educational cohort 
of the authoritarian state. However, training turns into education and the latter, I assume, into 
lived experiences. I still love and live history and politics as a living, breathing elements of an 
ever-changing evolution-revolution of the human animal; this despite the fact that some 
people have tried/are still trying to do it “their” way, the “right” way. Yet I could feel the 
DIS-stance. It is unsure whether that type of teaching of history and politics left me or 
whether I left that type of teaching. 
 
I am not interested here in discussing the pleasures or costs of effective or defective memories 
of sociologists – or any other being for that matter. Memory, re-memory, forgetting and/or 
suppressing thoughts is universal (see Best, 2006 for an interesting contribution in this 
regard).403 
 
Behaviouralists and (logical) positivists are right. There is such a clinical and objective world 
(cut out by and for them). I assume they might be somewhat off-target when they think that 
“other worlds” and experiences only constitute one paradigm or digm. Some subject 
disciplines, by virtue of their origin and history, seem to be more prone to solidifying into The 
Object. Burnier makes a useful point when she suggests that political scientists are apparently 
cast within statistics; they live in historical/constitutional structures, frequently caught up in 
behaviouralist research methods and mathematical modelling (the author is writing about the 
USA). Burnier as a political scientist writes against the grain of political “scientists”. She 
expounds ideas against isolated hard-core grains; she subverts ruling orthodoxies, it seems. In 
doing so she re-confirms what we know: “ … references to the self (in political science, 
especially) are more formal and social-scientific … and are less personal … ” (Burnier, 2006: 
                                                 
403 For an example of RE-memory in the history of South Africa related to the Second South African 
War/Anglo-Boer War/Boere-oorlog, see the more than just insightful work by Snyman (2005). 
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415). Her argument is evocative and clear, up close and personal: “Not only does political 
science lack autoethnographic research, but its overarching commitment to become a science 
has excluded the personal, the self, from scholarly research and writing … rarely do political 
scientists write about their lives …” (Brunier, 2006: 411). Burnier’s experience in writing 
about political science in the USA is not much different from South African experiences in 
this regard. 
 
Historians, but especially also political scientists and theologians, are slow to discover the 
personal, for reasons unknown. Here and there some avenues are opened up through hard 
slogging and personal sacrifice that bring academia back into humanity and people-being 
without an overriding dictating Objectivity. In Africa and Latin America and Eastern 
civilisations we had, and I trust will continue to have, oral tradition. If all else fails auto-
ethnography as deployed here may be an option. 
 
Sociology in South Africa, was perhaps more fortunate than other subject disciplines. The 
discipline “arrived” in South Africa in the 1930s, long after colonialism404. Perhaps through 
sheer experience in South Africa, sociology both in inputs and bench-ma(r)king and outcomes 
went further than quantifying. In South African sociology we were perhaps more fortunate 
with the ebb and flow of one imported Western “academic” discipline. Admittedly it was seen 
here and elsewhere as a lesser discipline (read: less scientific). To an extent different from for 
example historians and political scientists, South African sociologists found themselves 
involved with socio-economic, political economy or politics and critically so; not woven into, 
but working among and against social orders. Sociology had scarcely arrived in South Africa 
(the 1930s) before Geoffrey Cronje and Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd propagated apartheid. The 
latter implemented it as policy, structure and attitude with a full battery of Roman Dutch 
legislation. Other South African sociologists advanced liberalism and pluralism (Nic Rhoodie, 
Leo Kuper for example and if you wish, Merle Lipton). Liberals advanced their school of 
                                                 
404 Much later than talks about one nation, communism, or freedom and retribution and later the 
practice of colonialism and capitalism. 
(Personal) writing is hybrid in character, it blends and combines an individual’s 
story  with his or her personal story. It is writing that is not strictly scholarly 
because it contains the personal, and yet it is not strictly personal because it 
contains the scholarly … It erases the false dichotomy between scholarly and 
personally (Burnier, 2006: 412). 
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thought to correct a racially clouded South African society to achieve merit-based equity. 
Some, not necessarily only liberal, advanced Karl Popper’s thinking and entered politics in an 
attempt to bring about rectifications on an eschewed society. In advocating the open 
community (enacting an open society) they ceaselessly advocated a negotiated solution to 
conflict of class and race (I would mention Van Zyl Slabbert and H.W. van der Merwe here). 
Other sociologists, like a host of other South Africans before and after them, opted for radical 
options. One may refer to radical sociology, critical theory, or Marxist analysis (the gods 
forbid that anyone says praxis). During apartheid some academics experienced oppression 
too. Some sociologists went into exile. Harold Wolpe should be mentioned here. Ben 
Magubane and the late Sam Nolutzhungu and Archie Mafeje are examples of sociologists, 
who were in exile405. Some sociologists, in contrast to those advocating apartheid, fought it. 
Ruth First, a sociologist, died as a result of a parcel bomb sent by apartheid agents instructed 
by their politicians. Others in other subject disciplines suffered a similar fate: The philosopher 
Rick Turner and anthropologist David Webster were killed by apartheid security forces, 
roughly ten years apart. Rightly or wrongly or belatedly, academics were knitted into society. 
But it is time to talk concepts … 
 
 Some concepts can be used to illuminate the (auto-) ethnographic approach, the SATRC (and 
other TRC processes), and the politics of transition to democracy and the evolving role of the 
military in social settings in a scientific narrative. The following I consider a minimum at this 
moment. 
 
Auto-ethnography 
 
Ethno means people or culture; graphy means writing or describing. Ethnography then means 
writing about or describing people and culture (Ellis, 2004). 
 
Since auto mean self, auto-ethnography can be seen as writing about oneself as a particular 
person and a member of a particular culture – Ellis suggests it straddles autobiography and 
ethnography, and is both yet neither of these two concepts (Blenkinssopp, 2007). 
 
An auto-ethnographer suggests that since 2000 the term has come to encompass an array of 
approaches from all social sciences disciplines. In such an approach the researcher to some 
degree ‘gets in front of the camera’ … what auto-ethnography involves is the development of 
                                                 
405 The argument is made that exiled South African sociologists strengthened British sociology, for 
example Mike Morris, Doug Hindson, John Rex and Shula Marks (Gelderblom, 2003: 8).  
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a life history, through the practical benefit of having a participant (the researcher) who is 
willing and able to write and re-write his/her story in pursuance of a deeper understanding of 
how the processes in a specific context unfold (Blenkinssopp, 2007). Auto-ethnography and 
narrative research have the tendency to become “up close and personal” (Josselson, Lieblich 
& McAdams, 2003).406 Etherington advances that in fields such as sociology, anthropology, 
educational and health sciences auto-ethnography established itself, while in organisational 
and management sciences it also found favour (Etherington, 2006: 140). Other subject fields 
where it is increasingly explored are communication studies, sports science, literature and 
theatre studies. 
 
While ethnography traditionally focussed on the ‘other’ as an object of study, typically 
spending time to observe other people in their cultures and societies, the role of the reflexive 
researcher gained importance. “Auto ethnography therefore feels a familiar way and useful 
way of conducting research, and has (over time) provided a methodology that legitimizes and 
encourages the inclusion of the researcher’s self and culture as an ethically and politically 
sound approach that takes into consideration ‘the complex interplay of our personal 
biography, power and status, interactions with participants, and written word’ ” (Rossman & 
Sallis [1998: 67] quoted by Etherington [2006: 141]). 
 
Philaretou and Allen argue that auto-ethnography as a reflexive variant of the qualitative 
research tradition is based on the “one-ness” of the researcher and the subject of research 
(Philaterou & Allen, 2006:65). They also point out, following Steier, Ronai, Cooley and 
Olney, that a topic the researcher deems worthy of research is shaped by his or her 
background, maturity level and state of mind. In this the researcher’s academic background 
plays a role (Philaterou & Allen, 2006: 65), as much as her/his socialisation from cradle to 
grave. The reflective researcher utilises a life course perspective (as pointed out by Bengston 
& Allen, 1993) by including objective markers and turning point experiences that help push 
the individual from one development stage to the other (Philaterou & Allen, 2006: 66). The 
last mentioned authors are at pains to point out that even if the objects of study are living, 
breathing (and temperamental) human beings, the consultation of printed materials and a 
serious look at literature assist one to engage, evaluate and relate to both literature and 
experience (Philetarou & Allen, 2006: 67ff). Hence one cannot escape from understanding 
that our being in a changing context means working with the tools we have. These tools may 
                                                 
406 The complexities of being an auto-biographer, analysing data in this realm and processing such data, 
are described well by Tenni, Smyth and Boucher (2003). 
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be differential, suitable, unsuitable or adaptable, even if one finds oneself in the fog and hence 
needs “to part the clouds”, as implied by the quotation of Tao Te. 
 
The auto-ethnographer and his/her reader will have to live with spatiality and situationality – 
or, if you wish, ‘subjective conclusions’. The auto-ethnographer knows this and warns his/her 
reader. In this sense, as an attempt to “part the clouds” of social fog and mist is and should 
remain humble, truth and understanding are partial and temporary. There is a relevant, 
positive corollary attached: ”If we scratch the surface about what is said about such 
‘objective’ methods, they have much more in common with their ‘subjective’ counterparts 
than many would like to admit … the task for all researchers is to recognise and come to 
terms with their/our partial and situated ‘subjectivity’ rather than to aspire to an impossible 
distanced ‘objectivity’. Once this is done, ‘subjectivity’ is much less a problem and much 
more a resource for deeper understanding” (Crang & Cook, 2007: 13). I cannot agree more. 
 
Transition 
 
TRC processes and choices on how to deal with a violent past are related to countries that 
have experienced a transition from one form of government to another. The new form of 
government, the recently achieved status of the polis, can usually be defined as that of being a 
(constitutional) democracy, while the previous government could be regarded as oppressive, 
dictatorial, highly partisan or authoritarian. In Southern Europe countries with a similar 
history include Italy, Greece, Spain (some classify Turkey also in this category). In Latin 
America eight countries, namely Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexica, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela, had experienced transitions by 1990. In 1989/ 1990 Poland, Hungary, East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania followed. 
 
In such a context, “transition” may be defined as “the interval between one regime and 
another. It implies a rapid and deeply changing situation in which the rules of the game are 
arduously contested, and with political identities and strategies in constant flux” (O’Donnell 
& Schmitter, 1987; see also Van Vuuren, 1990 and Du Toit, 1990: 1). By implication, 
transition theory “challenges conventional political wisdom and reduces the possibility and 
applicability of existing deterministic methods of analysis. It calls for a new type of 
theoretical analysis” (Van Vuuren 1990:1). 
 
The transition may be viewed as a complex (even obscure process) in which the fixed lines 
present under authoritarian rule are less clear. In other words, the rules of the game are in 
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constant flux and are contested by the “old” incumbents of power and the contestants of the 
old order. In the old order there was no place for “politics”; but now the space for “politics” is 
created amid these “contestations”, as transition theorists refer to it. During the transitional 
stage, there is an upsurge in opposition and resistance, and a resurgence of grassroots politics. 
In this new context, while there are not yet formal political parties and civil society is weak, 
grassroots organisations gain momentum. In due time civil society is resurrected (Du Toit, 
1990: 3). Transition theorists refer to this as a popular upsurge that is critical to the transition. 
 
Transition theory calls for an escape from rigid theoretical frameworks or paradigms used by 
those that analyse or describe the political world. (The escape from rigid frameworks is one 
common area shared by transition theory and qualitative or exploratory research.) For those 
taking part in this constant flux of dynamic politics, an escape from ideological prisons is 
more applicable – if not more advisable. “Trade unionists, grassroots movements, religious 
groups, intellectuals, artists, students, clergymen … all support each other’s efforts towards 
democratisation, and coalesce into a greater whole which identifies itself as the people” and 
“emerging popular fronts take to the streets and press to exploit and expand the limits of 
liberalisation” (Schimmer & O’Donnel quoted by Du Toit, 1990: 3). 
 
In recent history it seemed that there was some generic, if not universal movement towards 
democracy, if not in practice, then at least globally in the conception of people. There was a 
tendency to embrace democracy – and hopefully the practical application of it – on a fairly 
universal level (Schmitter, 1990: 2; Du Toit, 1990). To an extent some aspects of this vision 
remain in the international community. This tendency can be observed in Latin America, 
Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and Africa (among others in Mozambique, see Riley 1991:2 
ff). Some argue that this also applies to some of the republics that previously belonged to the 
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (Higley & Pakulski, 1992). This seemingly universal 
trend towards democracy is observed by, inter alia, George Modelski (1990: 2), Riley (1991: 
2ff), Diamond (1989a: 5), and Gitonga in Chege et al. (1988:2). Countries/societies in 
transition enter a context of non-predictables. The transition itself is an uncertain process 
(O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead, 1988). “The key role of uncertainty (is) an overriding 
factor in transitions. (This implies) a need for a new political theory and even epistemology: 
possibilism defined as distinct from determinism and probabilism.” Transition, in practice as 
well as in theory, is thus uncertain, open-ended and reversible. This certainly applied to South 
Africa during the 1990s (Slabbert, 1992b: 5; Slabbert, 1987: 5ff). Transition can lead to a 
democracy, even if fragile (one has to admit that regression to a non-democracy remains an 
ever present reality). Quite clearly, the end of an authoritarian regime does not spell a 
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democracy, nor protection of human rights. The sociologist Anthony Giddens cautions that 
the perceived “globalisation of social life” imposed by powerful hegemons may lead to 
greater divisions: poverty and social disruption (read: conflict) rather than democracy. Think 
for a moment about Afghanistan, Iraq after the 1990/91 and 2001 wars, and Zimbabwe. On a 
cautionary note: Even so-called stable or highly developed (industrial) democracies in times 
of perceived crisis can regress to authoritarian states, a recent example being the USA. “Don’t 
be misled by (a) simplified summary to think that there is a single and inevitable process of 
transition to democracy at work in history. (There remains) the complex and uncertain nature 
of transition, the many ways it can go wrong, be aborted, or be turned back” (Du Toit, 1990: 
2). 
 
As an open-ended process, transition reflects the following characteristics: 
 
The “hard-soft” dichotomy: Authoritarian regimes, at some point in their existence, reach 
a kairos (a moment of truth) regarding continued repression and legitimacy of the state. 
The hard-liners and soft-liners within the ruling authoritarian regime begin disputing, 
arguing, and challenging each other about the viability of the status quo. Such internal 
disputes may be the result of external pressure or internal infighting, or a combination of 
both. The difference between hard-liners and soft-liners (Spanish: duros and blandos) is of 
great importance. In the South African context of the latter half of the 1980s and the first 
half of the 1990s these actors were described as verkramptes vs. verligtes, valke vs. duiwe, 
securocrats vs. neo-verligtes. The former were pro-status quo imposed with security 
measures, the latter debated forms of reform (Liebenberg, 1990: 106ff; 1994(a), 1994 (b): 
113ff; 1998, 137ff. Also see Sam Nolutshungu in an earlier work, 1975: 382–383, 
Slabbert, 1970: 13ff). 
 
Liberalisation: A process – though limited – of redefining and extending rights to people 
who did not have them previously (the masses – if you like), “… making effective certain 
rights that protect individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by 
the state or third parties” (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1989: 7). As a result of the difference 
between hard-liners and soft-liners, and following the growing influence of the soft-liners, 
politics become liberalised. “The hard-liners (or duros) are those who, contrary to the 
consensus of this period in world history, believe that the perpetuation of authoritarian rule 
is possible and desirable …” In stark contrast to the duros, one finds the soft-liners or 
blandos who “increasingly become aware that the regime, to survive needs to be legitimate 
and to attain that legitimacy internally and internationally. It speaks for itself that while the 
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duros fail to see that imposed power cannot hold in the long term, in contrast the blandos 
come to the realization that continued imposition of harsh power measures cannot hold. It 
does not mean that blandos necessarily have good intentions in their arguments for change, 
nor that they are altruistic. International and internal resistance can force them to this 
position. They may well take the blando position for opportunistic reasons. South Africa 
was a case in point. Some liberalisation is needed” (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1989: 15–
16). In fact liberalisation becomes a social commodity, unseen before. It is at this point 
that space for politics opens up and the limited recognition of rights takes place (read: 
limited reform). This is usually accompanied by some movement towards the rule of law 
or at least some recognition of the rule of law. 
 
In the words of a South African scholar, liberalisation is “the transition from autocratic 
rule to recognition of individual and other rights and the establishment of rule of law” (Du 
Toit 1990: 1). Logically these “new freedoms” brought about by liberalisation open 
“strategic gaps” for the challengers to push for more changes and can be used to usher in 
real democracy. Multiple manifested elements of, for lack of a better word, civil society 
are established. (Personally, I prefer the term civil community in our context – for obvious 
reasons.) Differently phrased, the active conglomerate of pressure groups, activist bodies, 
unions, churches and religious bodies undergoes a ‘generalised mobilisation’— called the 
“resurrection of civil society” by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1989: 48). 
 
Liberalisation is not irreversible. Not even democracy is. The hard-liners in the state can 
take over again, or begin to dominate politics, thus closing strategic gaps or reversing the 
process of liberalisation (or hard-liners may choose to undermine hard-won democratic 
structures and attitudes). At the stage of liberalisation, incumbents and contenders are 
usually proposing juxtaposed hegemonies (Du Toit & Esterhuyse, 1990). 
 
Keeping what has been said look and reflect on the figure below:* 
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* “Young” and “mature” democracies on various levels remain prone to regression, one has to 
mention. 
 
Further liberalisation of politics is frequently followed by negotiated transitions. The stage of 
transition through negotiation usually takes place when both contenders and incumbents 
come to terms with the fact that the state is not going to give way or collapse, and that it will 
have to be transformed through negotiation in the process of transition. By implication, the 
military will have to follow suit within such a context. If not, the process will stall (Agbese, 
2004: 199–200; Rantete, 1998: 143ff, 161ff, 254–257; Slabbert, 1987: 7). 
 
It is usually during the era of liberalisation that “gaps” occur where individuals and 
organisations start arguing about how to address human-rights transgressions. In South 
Africa, these types of debates began circa 1991/1992 in institutions such as Idasa, Laywers 
for Human Rights and the “Justice in Transition Project” (see Boraine, 2000: 16–18; 
Boraine, Levy & Scheffer, 1994; Kollapen, 1993: 1ff; Liebenberg, 1992: 14–15; 
Liebenberg, 1996: 127ff). The period of transition through negotiation – where 
contending antagonists start talks about talks and then enter negotiations for a regime 
change or transfer of power – often arises during the period of liberalisation as a prelude to 
transition. 
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Following liberalisation and negotiated transition from authoritarian rule to some form of 
democracy, the new polis or political community decides on ways and means to deal with 
past injustices. They may choose to “forgive and forget” (i.e. the South African Union 
government following the Anglo-Boer/South African War [1999–1902]; the Zimbabwean 
government after the war of liberation [1980]; Namibia following its independence in 
1990; the Spanish people in 1977 after the demise of the Franco regime), or decide on a 
truth and reconciliation process (i.e. Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Rwanda, East Timor, 
Cambodia). 
 
In conclusion, it should be noted that a TRC as a post-transitional measure is not 
synonymous with transition or democratisation, nor a requisite. Not all countries that made 
the transition from authoritarian rule opted for TRCs. Furthermore, one needs to note that 
not only human-rights issues but also the integration of the armed forces, their new 
structures, institutional arrangements, vision, mission and future posture are being mooted 
at this stage (see Ginifer, 1995: 49ff; Nathan, 1994: 52ff; Phiri, 2001: 127ff; Williams, 
2002: 17ff; Frankel, 2000: 30ff, 47ff). 
 
Democracy 
 
In current debates and dialogues the concept of democracy stands central. The “universal 
acceptance” of democracy as a notion in its root-meaning differs from context to context. 
Compare, for example, Larry Diamond’s arguments about the value of liberal democracy with 
Ramose’s (1999) on African-based democracy. Or think about the trend concerning 
deliberative democracy as a substitute or complementary to representative democracy. Or 
conceive of deliberative democracy as an attempt to give some body to radical, grassroots or 
direct democracy. Amid a war of words and an array of contending theories it may be 
worthwhile to explore (or track) the trials and tribulations of the notion through its seeming 
obscurity, in order to construct a contextual working definition of democracy or, to put it 
differently – search for a bare minimum or generic outline as to what constitutes democracy 
in generic terms. 
 
Terms such as democracy and ideology present a war of words, even a linguistic morass, 
which has driven many societies into semantic battlefields and real-life trenches, with ghastly 
consequences. In an exploratory study such as this, it was not the aim to solve this debate, but 
to take note of it as an inescapable backdrop. It speaks for itself that not all nuances and 
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interpretations, nor the full spectrum of debate on definition, can be accommodated. What is 
rather intended is a discussion of the spectrum, related approaches and/or definitions of the 
term. This section will demarcate core features or dimensions, and illuminate some 
approaches to the concept and practice of democracy. I do this because the notion of transition 
and democracy (negotiated in the case of South Africa) relates closely to attempts to deal with 
post-conflict reconciliation (or at least social accommodation). In this sense democracy 
“achieved” cannot be separated from the post-transitional choices on how to deal with human-
rights abuses. I also deal with the concept here as the democratic state and references to 
democracy frequently come up in this document. 
 
One has to bear in mind that a mere change of government sometimes also invokes retaliatory 
steps to deal with the previous incumbents. In the case of South Africa this option could not 
be entertained as a legitimate instrument of effecting reconciliation or cultivating working 
CMR. In such cases, it has to do with revenge alone, not necessarily the enhancement of 
CMR and the sustained and value-added protection of human rights (the recent execution of 
Saddam Hussein and the continuing civil crisis, in many respects worse than before the rule of 
Saddam, come to mind here). 
 
Robert Dahl presents one definition of democracy when he states that democracy reflects 
“processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders” 
(Vanhanen, 1990: 8). He distinguishes three types of democracy: Madisonian democracy (an 
ideal type with a balance of power between majorities and minorities), populist democracy 
(majority rule – an ideal prototype; popular sovereignty of the masses and political equality) 
and polyarchal democracy (a “regime of elected representatives which is characterized by a 
degree of public contestation and participation that approaches the ideals of democracy” 
(Vanhanen, 1990: 8). For Dahl, a “conservative democrat”, democracy cannot be attained in 
the real world (Dahl, 1989: Chapters 5 and 6). Therefore, polyarchy is to be accepted as the 
best alternative. Dahl’s polyarchy implies a relatively stable mix of liberalisation and 
democratisation (see O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1989: 12). Like Milbrath (1965), Dahl does 
allow for political participation. But an important qualification enters the picture: Public 
participation forms but a part of representivity and the central role of the elected elite. 
 
Lijphart (1987) identifies two models of democracy: Westminster majoritarian democracy 
and the consensus model of democracy. These two constructs differ at several levels. The 
former may not always strive for consensus. The latter – by catering for selected groups (and 
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their respective elites) – may not satisfy the more extremist groups (and elites) as it 
continuously seeks consensus. 
 
Rolf Schwendter (1974) argues that democracy has become an “empty” concept, that there is 
a need to redefine and, ipso facto, radicalise the term. His concept of democracy is an explicit 
criticism of Dahl’s polyarchy. Thus, Schwendter speaks of models of radical democratisation 
(Dutch: modellen voor radikale demokratisering) and suggests the following options or a mix 
of them: (1) a model of decentralisation, (2) a rotation model, (3) a team model and (4) a 
concurrence model (Schwendter, 1974: 7, 32 ff). By constructing these models, Schwendter 
attempts to radicalise the concept and to bring it back to the person in the street, the place of 
work and rural areas; a return to grassroots. 
 
Lukács (1991: 153), an influential Marxist thinker, argues in Demokratizierung Heute und 
Morgen for a revitalised non-liberal democracy; non-Stalinist, yet thoroughly Marxist, which 
“is still qualitatively distinct from bourgeois behaviour …” The end result cannot be foreseen 
(an argument that reminds one of the later Marcusian and Habermasian “neo-Marxist” 
insights). Yet, the outcome should be striven for and lead “us to that future” (Lukács, 1991: 
170).407 The result may well be a democratic polity beyond the free market, globalist new 
order advocacy or “Stalinist” interpretations of communism, thus providing an optimal and 
radical fusion of the horizons of previous exclusive notions/paradigms of democracy. 
Following the disintegration of one socialist state, the Soviet Union, many believed that 
communism had died, that a new global order was on the horizon and that liberalism and 
capitalism in tandem had spoken the final word (Fukuyama, 1990: 8 – 13). A short time later 
it became clear that, far from freedom or wealth, capitalism did not improve the state of the 
poor (Giddens, 1995: 536ff; Martin & Schumann, 1998: 139ff, 163ff, Marais, 2003). New 
social movements arose internationally, countering capitalism and what they perceived to be 
authoritarian liberalism (Anheier et al., 2001: 20; Glasius et al., 2002). With societies 
increasingly active against the “New World Order”, some started speaking of “the rise of 
postmodern socialisms” as an alternative to capitalism and liberalism or the relativist anti-
                                                 
407 Interestingly Ellis and Bochner refer in their advocacy of auto-ethnography as part of the qualitative 
approach to “textual responses to a modern condition”, taking a cue from Lukács (1920). Lukács refers 
to the individual novel bearing a quality of yearning … for integral communities and a desire for 
immanence and continuity in the midst of fragmentation, in other words “transcendental homelessness” 
(Ellis & Bochner, 1996: 187). The debate on the contents of a democracy resembles metaphorically the 
auto-ethnographer’s inward look, yet retaining the involved look outward (“wrestles with a shadow, 
certain of never laying a final hold on it”). Those grappling with the monumental, yet momentary 
nature of democracy find themselves “now” having a grip on it, but the reality of the slippery grip 
remains unchanged (Afrikaans: die verglydende greep). 
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historical school of post-modernism (Burbach, Nunez & Kagarlitsky, 1997). Others chose 
radical situationalism (Plant, 1992).408 On the imperative for economic equality Ivan Ollevier 
remarks: “De beperkingen en de interne kontradiksies van de vrije-markteconomie zijn er, na 
de val van de Berlijnse Muur, niet kleiner op geworden … (Misschien) creert de 21ste eeuw 
opnieuw antikapitalistische horizonten … de morele engagement blijft overeind” (1997: 309). 
[English: “The limitations and contradictions of the free market system did not became less 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall … (it is likely) that the 21st century will create anew anti-
capitalist horizons … the moral engagement (against capitalist exploitation) remains”.] 
Ollevier’s statement suggests not surprisingly that after the fall of the Berlin Wall social 
contradictions are not less, the free market neither really free nor shared and that new anti-
capitalist horizons and struggles come to the fore. In Latin America a revival of anti-capitalist 
ethos seems to be on the move. 
 
Although the Marxist or even the seemingly discredited notion of a Marxist-Leninist 
conception of democracy differs drastically from Western definitions, Vanhanen (1990: 11) 
rightly contends: “Marxists also mean the rule of the people”. The same applies to anarchist-
syndicalist approaches to democracy (Joll, 1979; Marshall, 1992). The debate about, and 
notion of, democracy ensues from vast conceptual differences. 
 
Seymour Martin Lipset defines democracy as “a political system (that) supplies a regular 
constitutional opportunity for changing the governing officials. This provides a social 
mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major 
decisions by choosing among contenders for political office.” According to Vanhanen this 
definition has been derived from those of Schumpeter and Weber (Vanhanen, 1990: 9). For 
others, responsibility (to the people) is the key to democracy. 
 
In contrast, Sartori argues that democracy can be deduced from making clear what it is not. In 
my view, Sartori holds a worthwhile perspective: For him democracy is the opposite of 
autocracy, thus non-autocracy (Vanhanen, 1990: 9). 
 
In more limited definitions as used by Diamond, Lipset and Linz, democracy denotes a 
system that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among 
organised groups and individuals; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the 
                                                 
408 I remain thankful to the late Ruhr Martin, a trusted friend and colleague with an uncompromising 
mind and piercing sociological intellect, for bringing the Situationist International to my attention. 
Ruhr, a not particularly conventional contemporary Marxist, remained open to other radical gestures to 
achieve a society of non-negotiable equality. 
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selection of leaders and policies; as well as sufficient civil and political liberties to ensure the 
integrity of political competition and participation (Vanhanen, 1990: 10). 
 
Leonardo Mortino provides another definition when he describes democracy as “a set of 
institutions and rules that allows competition and participation for all citizens considered as 
equals”. This includes free, fair and recurring elections, male and female universal suffrage, 
multiple organisations of interest, different and alternative elections and sources of 
information (Vanhanen, 1990: 10). In this, public participation on all levels plays a crucial 
role. 
 
For O’Donnell and Schmitter, and the South African political scientist Willem van Vuuren 
(1993: 11–12), citizenship is the guiding principle of democratisation. There should be, 
flowing from this principle, a procedural minimum that includes secret balloting, universal 
adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, 
and executive accountability and perhaps even “economic democracy” (O’Donnell & 
Schmitter, 1989: 8). The procedural minimum that O’Donnell and Schmitter (1989) identify 
makes a lot of sense in combination with Vanhanen’s definition of democracy as “a political 
system in which ideologically and socially different groups are legally entitled to compete for 
political power and in which institutional power holders are elected by the people and are 
responsible to the people” (Vanhanen, 1990: 11). 
 
The above definition implies, at the very least, regular elections, multi-party democracy and 
the rule of law. Furthermore, it could include economic democracy (Slabbert, 1992a and b; 
Houston & Muthien, 2000). For Slabbert (1992a; 1992b) this, apart from the two 
“fundamental political principles” of “contingent consent” and “bounded uncertainty”, boils 
down to the following “rules of democratic procedure”: (1) political decisions binding on 
society to be taken by elected officials, (2) regular elections free of coercion and partisan 
manipulation, (3) adult suffrage (with limited provisos), (4) freedom of organisation, speech 
and access to information, (5) no external imposition of political decisions (demonstrable 
state autonomy), and (6) no interference by non-elected officials in the state’s policy making 
or implementation (Slabbert, 1992a: 4). Under Slabbert’s last category one would necessarily 
include state bureaucracy. Relevant to this study are especially the military, security agencies 
such as intelligence services and the police service. [For South Africa, given its recent history 
of apartheid and developments under the Mbeki government, this early warning needs to be 
heeded. See also recent criticism by Slabbert on the state of the democratic state in South 
Africa (Slabbert, 2006: 142ff)]. If these rules of democratic procedures are constitutionally 
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entrenched and allow for the free flow of information, competition among contenders, 
continued debate about social responsibilities that includes the liberal-radical debate 
(implying social change), as well as economic and political restructuring, the resultant 
political entity may be termed a democracy. 
 
In concrete terms, political democracy is not the sine qua non, but should be socialised to 
include economic democracy. Practically, this would equal “(radical) social democracy” or 
“democratic socialism”.409 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1989) remind us however, that 
frequently, if not by far in the majority of cases, economic democracy is not attained. New 
democracies tend to “freeze” at the moment when political democracy is achieved and 
economic democracy is left behind. To concretise the argument, the following is relevant: In a 
global capitalist economy based on the free flow of capital, cheap extraction of material 
resources and human capital, as well as “liberalisation of the labour market” that builds on the 
dependency (and exploitation) of peripheral economies to the benefit of the financial elite of 
rich countries, achieving economic democracy seems to be a mirage. Unless globalisation can 
be “turned upside down” economic democracy will not be attained. On the contrary – even if 
economies of peripheral states grow positively, such as in Southern Africa – the net result 
remains an increasing gap between rich and poor, or at best “jobless growth” with the 
financial and political elite sharing optimally in the free flow of capital and profit and the 
greater part of the population remaining the “disadvantaged” (Compare Marais, 2000). 
 
Regardless of the definition of democracy used (I am in favour of radical social democracy or 
variations of economic democracies or even democratic socialism), for the purposes of the 
study the much-needed “sound CMR” and the protection/safeguarding of human rights are 
constitutionally imperative. New or young democracies, in addition to the above, are faced 
with the challenge of how to deal with an oppressive past. Thus the link between 
                                                 
409 Social democracy and democratic socialism are two different forms of democracy. In terms of focus 
on the welfare of the citizenry and provision of services by the state, they bear some similarities. 
However, in terms of historical and intellectual roots they differ. Radical social democracy 
accommodates both the market and the state. It aims to protect the citizenry from the negative 
exploitative effects of the free market, but accepts the market as a reality – albeit a problematic one. 
Democratic socialism has its roots in forms of communalism. These intellectual roots may stem from 
anarchist or anarchist syndicalist approaches. The latter may be complemented by Marxist approaches. 
Democratic socialism may also derive its praxis and vision as an alternative to centralist Marxism, such 
as Marxism-Leninism or a centralised communism influenced by a strong leader (the Soviet Union 
under Stalin, for example) – a rigid ideology of communism thus, subsumed by a personality cult. In 
democratic socialism attempts are made to move away from centralism, but the eventual vision of 
doing away with the market remains. Democratic socialists criticise such centralism. They make it their 
commitment to democratise the socialist system. 
 455
democratisation, democracy and the four typologies of post-authoritarian choices, of which 
TRCs form one, needs to be addressed. 
 
Another definition, not unrelated to the preceding, is the notion of participative democracy 
(not participatory democracy) in current South Africa. Among others, Houston (2001) 
accepts that South Africa has entered a stage where corporatism plays a role, where the 
country’s democracy is not labelled a popular democracy, or participatory democracy, and 
where elite structures have a major influence. Public participation is encouraged through the 
various constitutional, national, regional and local structures. Houston (2000) argues that the 
mediation of participative structures implies that the current form of democracy in South 
Africa may best be termed participative democracy. Again both participative democracy and 
participatory democracy (the latter more so than the former) imply optimum public 
participation by the civil community (Roefs & Liebenberg, 1999: 279ff). The South African 
philosopher, Rick Turner, assassinated by apartheid agents in the 1970s, suggested a radical 
participatory democracy for South Africa (Turner, 1972, The Eye of the Needle: Towards 
Participatory Democracy in South Africa. New York: Orbis Books). At the time his proposal, 
to say the least, was not well received. 
 
Held (1987), in a seminal work, identifies several models of democracy, namely classical 
democracy, protective democracy, developmental democracy, direct democracy, and more. 
Other terms that crop up are referenda- and indirect democracy, demarcy (a random selection 
of citizens to represent others to take decisions, usually within demarcated areas of 
governance), grassroots democracy, non-party democracy, such as the past experiment in 
Uganda (Libya as another possible example), e- or internet democracy and world democracy 
(http:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy/varieties). 
 
Some also add “deliberative democracy”. Within in a blinding array of theories of democracy 
the term deliberative democracy or discursive democracy comes up. On a website such as 
Wikipedia at least 14 forms of democracy are listed. Among these manifestations of 
democracy are anticipatory democracy, consensus democracy, direct democracy, illiberal 
democracy, liberal democracy, non-partisan democracy, representative democracy, republican 
democracy and social democracy, some of which I referred to. Wikipedia at the time made no 
mention of the notion of non-party democracy, such as was implemented in Uganda under 
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni following his coming to power in 1986 (George, 2004: 5, 8–9, 10–
11). 
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Deliberative democracy came to the fore as a model that attempts to increase levels of 
participation through a moral commitment to inclusive discourse. It had to take note that 
indirect democracy or representative democracy, which more often than not results in 
government by the elite, does not offer enough in democratising economies.410 Moreover, 
when it comes to assisting in problem-solving and hands-on levels of policy-making for the 
citizen, deliberative democracy is suggested if not advocated as a viable alternative. Some 
argue that deliberative democracy as a concept offers little new as its sources are existing 
models and attempted applications of and reconciliation of these notions. Sources of 
deliberative democracy (a notion that was coined in the 1980s) are among others social 
democracy, participatory democracy, republican democracy, democratic socialism411 and the 
longing for direct democracy, grassroots democracy and elements of communitarian 
alternatives. 
 
Deliberative democracy is frequently offered by its advocates as an alternative to other forms 
of democracy. Deliberative democracy, in contrast to direct democracy or classically termed 
pure democracy that is based on the thesis that all citizens can directly participate in political 
decision-making (http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy/varieties), refers ostensibly to a 
system of political decision making based on some trade-off of consensus decision making 
and representative democracy. Theorists of deliberative democracy argue that lawmaking can 
only arise from public deliberation by the citizenry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative 
…).412 How much this definition differs from, or agrees with, consociational democracy as 
advanced by Lijphart in terms of consensus-seeking, is an open question not addressed by 
“deliberative democrats” – especially outside Europe where its roots are found. (One has to 
mention that in Europe the term tends to be discoursive democracy.) 
 
The South African political philosopher Johan Degenaar became known for his saying that in 
a democracy every term is contested and that each term has to be negotiated and re-negotiated 
                                                 
410 It is common knowledge that individuals such as John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Carlos Nino and in 
South Africa, Johannes Degenaar, in their work committed themselves to bring morality in politics 
“back in”. Once morality is mentioned, “discourse” follows and so does human agency. So do directed 
attempts to inclusion. Incidentally the former characteristics apply to virtually all definitions of 
democracy.  
411 Democratic socialism in turn has many sources. Some advocacy of it can be found in the work of 
Gramsci, Lukács, and various others.  
412 The term deliberative democracy was originally coined by Joseph Bisette in the 1980s 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative), though much of the original impetus of the rational 
discourse was implied much earlier in the works of Jürgen Habermas. Others that contributed later 
were John Elster, Joshua Cohen, John Rawls, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson and Seyla Benhabib 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative). Another name that immediately comes to mind is Carlos 
Nino. 
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continuously. Deliberative democracy entails much of this. Joshua Cohen, a student of Rawls, 
outlines some conditions for deliberative democracy: 
 
• Ongoing independent association 
• Deliberation (on issues) is the deciding factor, and may be resumed at any stage 
• The deliberative procedure is the source of legitimacy of the discursive process of 
decision making 
• Respect for plurality and the discursive ability of the others in the process 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative). Such deliberation aims at a rationally 
motivated consensus and exhausts all possible alternatives before a decision is taken 
and implemented. Even then it still remains open for deliberation. 
 
While some argue that deliberative democracy is a left-wing political idea, others present it as 
it is a neutral and open-ended process (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative). The 
argument that deliberative or discursive democracy has leftwing origins carries weight. Some 
names associated with the notion, such as Jürgen Habermas, Joshua Cohen and Jon Elster, in 
their earlier works are associated with Marxist thinking.413 
 
The above is not the case everywhere. In the USA where Marxism tends to be feared and 
despised, the term is frequently advocated. In the USA many see deliberative democracy as a 
project that has application value on local government levels. In some quarters it became a 
near enterprise. The Deliberative Democracy Project argues: “Deliberative Democracy fosters 
a democratic dialogue among citizens and offers a useful middle ground between traditional 
representative democracy and direct democracy” and “Deliberative Democracy forges a new 
relationship between citizens and their government, changing the nature of public discourse to 
focus on problem solving and a shared search for solutions” (http://www.uoregon.edu/-ddp). 
The notion of democracy is influenced by context and in travelling from one society to 
another adapts or transforms. In the USA where strong arguments are made against direct 
democracy, representative democracy is seen as a possible optimum (described by Robert 
Dahl as poliarchy)414, deliberative democracy may manifest itself differently, for example in 
the Netherlands or Germany or India if put into practice. For the Deliberative Democracy 
                                                 
413 For an example of contributions made by Jon Elster and Josua Cohen to the Marxist debate, 
historical materialism and human agency, see Martin (1995: 26 – 34). Together with Theodor Adorno, 
Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm and Max Horkheimer, Habermas became closely associated with the 
Frankfurter Schüle. 
414 Bachrach correctly remarks that it should better be termed democratic elitism, a branch of indirect 
democracy (Vasović, 1992: 90). 
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Project deliberative democracy “is founded on the belief that citizens care enough and are 
smart enough to participate meaningfully in the deliberative process of making public policy” 
(http://www.uoregon.edu/-ddp). 
 
What identifies deliberative democracy, its advocates contend, it is that it frequently reflects 
an outreach process to marginalised groups, isolated or ignored groups. Supporters of 
deliberative democracy claims that it gives “a different kind of citizen voice in public affairs”, 
that it can be complementary to other’s approaches and “will cultivate a responsible citizen 
voice capable of appreciating complexity while simultaneously recognizing the legitimate 
interests of others – including adversaries and that it can generate a sense of common 
ownership and action” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative). The critical reader may 
ask: What form of democracy anywhere does not attempt to reach out to marginalised groups 
or does not attempt (even if only in theory) to achieve equality and does so among others, 
through verbal contestations and agreements? 
 
The notion of discursive democracy (as with many other views of what constitutes 
democracy) rests on the rationality of human beings and accommodation of differences. If I 
read him correctly, Jürgen Habermas, to whom I referred as one of the most prominent 
contemporary proponents of discursive democracy, makes a point that one has to accept: Most 
likely such a form of democracy is best suited to a nation of self-chosen citizens. 
 
One may agree with Sirianni and Friedland (2007) that deliberative democracy rests on the 
core notion of citizens and their representatives deliberating about public problems and 
solutions under conditions of reasoned reflection and refined judgment. One may agree with 
the notion that deliberative democracy is “often an open discovery process, rather than a 
ratification of fixed positions” and “having potentially transforming interests” 
(http://www.cpn.org/tools/dictionary/deliberate.html). 
 
The notion of deliberative democracy brought some arguments into the vast arsenal of views 
and contestations about democracy and its applications. For its supporters it means new 
avenues and applications. How much of it can be followed through is another matter. Whether 
it gives insights other than what we already find in the creative application of elements and 
insights of other forms of democracy as discussed here is to be seen. What is indisputable is 
that it has become an energetic theoretical enterprise since 1980, building on the work of 
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Jürgen Habermas’s notion of rational interactive communication, as well as the ideas of 
earlier radical social democrats.415 
 
In discussing policy choices such as the TRC Act, one may argue that not all options to deal 
with past transgressions of human rights and methods to deal with the transgressors were 
deliberated in South Africa and that the SATRC was largely a policy decision implemented 
before the discourse on other options was exhausted. The SATRC was partly a result of a 
negotiated transition, partly a deal between elites that did not want to open up the past fully, 
partly a result of advocacy by people that found the Latin American examples attractive and 
in the final instance was a policy decision. Some may argue that it was a totalising project 
from the beginning and hence less democratic, while others may argue that its totalising 
nature was an unintended consequence of the experiment. If deliberative democracy was 
applied and exhausted in the process, one may argue that any one of the other options 
mentioned in my typology could have been used. My discussion of the SATRC - and for that 
matter TRCs elsewhere - relates closely to transition, democratisation and the maintenance of 
democracy. The Rwandan approach following the genocide allows for deliberation on how to 
deal with past transgressions of human rights.416 
 
My personal view on deliberative democracy, especially when it is construed as a 
‘programme’ (usually by a foundation or appointed network), rather than social attitude, is 
that it brings little more to the available array of democratic theories and applications in the 
collective historical warehouse of democratic experiments that we have. All democratic 
activities reflect – or should be honed to reflect/embody - processes, participation, choices, 
policies and individual/collective deliberation. Whatever deliberative democracy can offer as 
an institutionalised programme, we find already on the smorgasbord of previous theories, 
models and applications. What rather matters, is how the best elements of existing approaches 
can be intertwined, arranged and fused in a complementary manner and applied to the 
optimum benefit of society, social justice, and equality to benefit the citizenry, including 
marginalised groups or classes, such as the jobless and the poor. 
 
From the preceding discussion, it may be argued that democracy within a self-chosen territory 
with structures chosen by such a nation of citizens, entails rule by the people or the citizenry. 
Differently phrased: It is a choice for a democratic system by a self-chosen nation of citizens - 
                                                 
415 The discourse on deliberative democracy in the USA tends to “purify” the notion from its Marxists 
roots, which is not surprising. 
416 See my notes on the Rwandan approach in Chapter 4. 
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the latter derived from Habermas’s notion of a nation of self-elected citizens (see, among 
others, Liebenberg & Duvenage, 1996: 53). Such a system usually entails a written 
constitution or an unspoken, yet firm, tradition of accommodating participation and dissent. 
The citizenry, whether through multiparty systems or other inclusive participative structures 
and processes, is enabled to depose one leadership for another. 
 
In my view a working definition would imply the following among others: 
 
In its most generic form, the preceding implies inclusion, the right to dissent, public 
participation on all levels of government, and full protection from abuses by the state or 
antagonistic groups within the territory. Moreover, this approach includes not only the 
political but also the economic sphere, and allows for processes aimed at economic inclusion 
and equality (versus mere equity); or, what other theorists referred to as socialisation of the 
market, redistribution of scarce resources and sharing of wealth. 
Jürgen Habermas, in an essay titled “Three normative models of democracy”, argues for a 
democratic process that is inclusive and wide-ranging enough to eclipse both Republican and 
Liberal notions of democracy and “more” (Habermas, 1994: 1– 4). For him, communication 
and discourse theory, the insight into it and application of such insights can lead to an 
enriched notion of democracy and application of the socio-political consequences of it. 
“Discourse theory invests the democratic process with normative connotations stronger than 
those found in the liberal model … it takes elements from (different) sides and fits them 
together in a new way” (Habermas, 1994: 7). “Discourse theory has the success of 
deliberative politics (in not only depending) on a collective acting citizenry but on the 
institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication. 
Proceduralised popular sovereignty and a political system tied into the peripheral networks go 
hand in hand with the image of a decentered society” (Habermas, 1994: 7). 
 
The law or the legal system has a role to play: “On the other hand, politics must still be able 
to communicate, through the medium of law, with other legitimately ordered spheres of 
action, however these happen to be structured and steered” (Habermas, 1994: 10). The 
definition of, and content given by him, for an ideal workable democracy indeed provides 
challenges for a new state or polis. 
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Democracy and “developing states” 
 
Abootalebi (1995), Enemuo (1992), Oyugi et al (1988), Fortman (1994), Mamdani, 
Mkandawire and Wamba-dia-Wamba (1988) refer at length to the challenges facing 
democratising states in Africa. These challenges include curbing the influence of power-
hungry elites, cleptocrats, resource-grabbing by agencies/actors outside the country, 
fragmentation under warlords or “strong men” and the abuse or monopoly over the military 
and/or militant factions. 
 
I will not deal here at length with all controversies concerning democracy in “developing 
countries” or young democracies. They are manifold, such as the role (or rather, negative role 
in my view) of modernisation theory as pointed out by Copans (1991), the possibilities of 
return to non-democratic rule (Riley, 1991), the strengths and weaknesses of dependency 
theory in Africa, conceptual and practical differences on democracy as a notion when 
democracy is discussioned (Ake, 1992; 1994; Mamdani, Mkandawire & Wamba-dia-Wamba, 
1988; Enemuo, 1992; Ihonvbere, 1992) and issues of the gap between theories of democracy 
and theories of democratisation (Allison, 1994). As with the notion of deliberative 
democracy, I do not intend to enter the extensive debate on the democratic developmental 
state that White (1995) addressed. For the benefit of the reader, I will spend some time 
discussing the democratic system and attempted reconciliation and controls over security 
forces in South Africa. 
 
With regard to the transition to democracy in South Africa, Gloppen remarks that the 
following constitutional issues influence the content of South African democracy: Firstly, 
both the interim constitution (IC) and the new constitution (NC) reflect elements of 
participation and representation. Secondly, she argues that the “justice-model” of the South 
African constitution emphasises “participation rather than representation” (Gloppen, 1997: 
237). Importantly, however, she ventures into suggesting that the NC does not depart from 
participation, and is “directed more towards representation” (Gloppen, 1997: 238). Perhaps 
for this reason Gregory Houston opted for the term participative democracy referred to above. 
 
Taking Gloppen’s view into account, and considering the discussion above, one may expect 
future tension between various elements in South African political dynamics. Some of these 
tensions are already evident in the conflict between labour and government, the ANC Youth 
League and the presidency, and differences on the macro-economic policy of government, 
land reform and the widespread occurrence of crime and corruption. At the moment it seems 
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that a consultative and deliberative approach between the ANC, Cosatu and the Communist 
Party still balances these tensions. It is, however, also clear that rather enhanced 
manifestations of socio-political conflict are occurring that may potentially forge an(other) 
organic crisis onto the South African political system417. 
 
The nature of the South African democracy allowed for a consultative process such as the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). For some it represented 
corporatism, for others deliberative democracy, and for others elite agreements (Houston, 
Mpanyane & Liebenberg, 1999: 75ff). 
 
In South Africa’s emerging democracy the DRP is one example: through public participation 
citizens – even from contending backgrounds – were allowed to participate in, and review, the 
vision, mission, role, force projection and budgetary requirements of the new SANDF. And, 
of course, the SATRC formed part of the compromises within the emerging democracy. The 
TRC Act however allowed for wide national and regional participation. At the same time it 
cannot be denied that some may have viewed the TRC as a “totalising project”, an attempt to 
rewrite history, to create a single, unified consciousness. This sparked debates on the role and 
outcomes of the exercise, in my view. 
 
Democratisation 
 
Democratisation is closely linked to “democracy”, as the move from liberalisation to 
democracy is termed democratisation. Mere “change” should not be confused with 
democratisation. “There are instances in which looking only for democracy is a losing 
proposition. First we need to identify WHAT it is we wish to study. Then we need to 
challenge our use of terms to be sure what we say is as accurate a reflection of what we 
observe as possible” (Cole, 1990: 3). With regard to South Africa I concur with Du Toit that 
merely using the word change “in an unspecified way can mean many different things, and 
not all of them are necessarily positive developments” (Du Toit, 1990: 1). 
 
While the terms liberalisation and democratisation are not synonymous, they have a close 
historical relationship (see O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1989: 9). What is important is that 
liberalisation may exist without democratisation. However, it is difficult for democratisation 
                                                 
417 The political analyst Hein Marais (2001) refers to an “organic crisis” that led to the demise of the 
apartheid state and the negotiated transition built on compromises – and hence possible future 
contradictions – that may put severe stress on South Africa’s new-found democracy. 
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to be triggered without measures of liberalisation. In most instances, “the attainment of 
political democracy was preceded by a significant, if unsteady liberalisation” (O’Donnell & 
Schmitter, 1989: 11). One also needs to keep in mind that liberalisation may prove to be 
easily manipulated and retracted at the convenience of those in government (O’Donnell & 
Schmitter, 1989: 9). 
 
It should be noted that, as with liberalisation, democratisation is not irreversible. It can 
degenerate again into autocracy, authoritarianism, dictatorship or oppression. Among others, 
the process of democratisation can be stalled by a coup d'état. Finally, part of liberalisation 
can be the normalisation of politics marked by the return to ad hoc democratic rules of the 
political game. 
 
For Slabbert, democratisation in South Africa – apart from constitutionalisation (or mere 
constitution-making) – should, inter alia, entail the following: 
 
• Democratising the state: moving current bureaucratic structures to a post-apartheid 
system that is effective, legitimate and providing ways and means for the majority of 
people to control the political and economic machinations of the state effectively 
(Slabbert, 1992a: 62). Political analysts such as Houston and Muthien (2000: 36) echo 
the same argument. 
• Democratising the budget: fiscal parity to be achieved in education, pensions, health, 
housing and local government. This is a major task, but could create a balance 
between expectations and redistribution (Slabbert 1992a: 65; see also Houston & 
Muthien, 2000). 
• Democratising the economy: redistributing wealth, while attaining a higher economic 
growth rate, instituting social upliftment and forestalling pre-emptive action from the 
private sector (for more detail, see Slabbert 1992a: 66 ff; Khoza, 2000). 
 
Consolidation (of democracy) 
 
Although democracies “are never to be fully consolidated, (because) they should contain 
within themselves the potentiality for continuous change and eventually self-transformation” 
(Schmitter 1991: 4), a basic level of consolidation is needed. This level is to be regulated, 
demarcated and ratified within the two fundamental political principles of bounded 
uncertainty and contingent consent (Slabbert, 1992a: 3). 
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“Democratic consolidation can be seen as the process (or rather, processes) that makes such 
reassurances (mutual trust, civic culture, structural reassurance) possible and, therefore, that 
makes regular, uncertain and yet to be circumscribed competition for office and influence 
possible” (Schmitter, 1991: 6). Apart from this theory, but linked to it, Schmitter (1991) 
developed a model of democratic consolidation. For him, at least in my view, consolidation is 
akin to the Giddensian notion of “structuration”, and the result of the transformation of ad hoc 
patterns of relatively peaceful competition to stable structures. However, structures can be 
(re)structured by historic agents in their interplay with each other and the structures within 
which they are situated. 
 
Akin to the aforementioned agreed-upon rules of competition (under-utilising or not utilising 
the reciprocal ability to destroy each other), competitors/adversaries settle into a structured 
mode of competition by the negotiated or agreed-upon rules of the game (Schmitter, 1991: 
11–12). In the case of South Africa, this came to the fore during the negotiated transition 
(1992–1995). Slabbert (1992) remarks that it is important to know that the country is not 
suddenly going to “become democratic” merely because political elites have reached 
consensus on mechanisms of transition and the outlines of a constitution. The views of 
Slabbert remain as relevant today as they were a decade ago. See his recent criticism of the 
ANC-led government regarding subversion of the intended democracy by current tendencies 
in governance in South Africa (Slabbert, 2006: 136, 142ff). The problem of successful 
transition is not only to “normalise and democratise, but to sustain and consolidate a 
democratic system of government after negotiated transition is over” (Slabbert, 1992a: 71). 
The same applies to other emerging democracies. 
 
In a seminal work on Italian democracy, Democracy Italian Style (1987), Joseph 
LaPalombara (1971) points out how difficult this can be.418 Only through normalisation and 
democratisation (implying tireless work and an uphill struggle), can the need for 
consolidation be approached. Thus, it implies that, following the “instance of democracy”, the 
commitment, struggle and hard work to inculcate and guarantee sustainable democracy has 
only just begun. The same applies to civil control over the military and CMR. 
 
It is during the transition-through-negotiation phase that truth and reconciliation phases are 
mooted. On entering the transition to democracy through founding elections and the formal 
transfer of power to the new regime, TRCs are chosen (or other paths followed) to address 
                                                 
418 Lemarchand (1992: 183ff), Ake (1991) and Decalo (1991:153, 157, 158–159) in their works on 
(re)democratisation in Africa refer to the same difficulties and challenges. 
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past abuses. Such processes continue into the consolidation phase. Needless to say, truth and 
reconciliation processes are instigated and influenced by perceptions found in civil society; 
that is, viewpoints of spokespeople of different groups or elite decisions on entering the new 
democratic state. 
 
Civil society 419 
 
The choice for a TRC in South Africa may not have been instigated by a popular upsurge, yet 
elements of civil society advocated the options. The debate and advocacy about the TRC, 
even if we assume that not all options (see the typology earlier on) were shared with the 
citizenry, was to an extent in the public domain during transition. In that sense civil society, 
the process of a negotiated transition, democratisation, the SATRC, inclusive of consequences 
and its long-term aftermath, as well as future debates/discourses on reconciliation, are 
intertwined. This also applies to other countries that face similar choices. Hence civil society 
or the civil community deserve attention. 
 
Scholars normally use the term “civil society” (derived from the French, société civile) when 
democratisation is described or analysed (see O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 48ff; Schmitter 
1991: 23; Sedaitis & Butterfield 1991: 197ff). In South Africa, as in other emerging or young 
democracies, the concept has formed part of the dialogue on democratisation (Atkinson, 1992: 
1ff; Shubane, 1992: 33ff; Swilling, 1992a: 75ff). Generically, civil society is defined as self-
organised and includes autonomous institutions and movements independent from the state, 
such as churches, universities, trade union and workers organisations, civic organisations and 
issue-based groups. 
 
Atkinson (1992) points to four views or “angular optics” views on civil society in South 
Africa. These are (1) civil society being identified with economy (private companies, labour) 
linked to individual property rights; (2) civil society where the economy is included but not 
restricted to economic relations and institutions; (3) civil society as a separate sphere from 
both the state and the economy, i.e. Swilling’s use of “civil society” as a “voluntary non-profit 
sector”; and (4) a differentiation between “civil society”, the “public sphere”, the economy, 
and the state as used by Shubane (Atkinson, 1992: 10–11). 
 
                                                 
419 To be noted is that the author in this study uses the term civil society interchangeably with civil 
community, the latter being more applicable in the (South) African context, in my view.  
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The preceding approaches point to the pervasiveness of the notion, but also to lack of 
consensus among academics about a precise definition. For the moment, following Camerer 
(1992: 3), civil society – with some provisions – will be defined as: “An inherently pluralistic 
realm, distinct from, yet interacting with the state and processes of production, consisting of 
numerous associations and organized around specific interests with the following 
characteristics in common: communally organised, independent, voluntary, autonomous, able 
to form links with other interest groups and not in any way seeking to set itself up as an 
alternative authority to the state.” 
 
My provisos include that, in the absence of normalisation, democratisation or a tangible move 
towards broad-based economic inclusion, or at the moment of regression to authoritarian rule, 
civic action may be sought or civil society may emerge as an alternative authority to the state. 
While Camerer’s definition – taking note of the Gramscian and liberal roots of civil society – 
tends to be liberal, the one I use in my approach includes the notion of networking at 
grassroots level, civil opposition, a search for economic equality and community action. It is 
thus a more radical notion of democracy and citizenship bound into the context of a civil 
society or community. In such a context, civil society reflects in many instances the “will to 
power”, or the notion of “putting hands on the wheels of power”. In the reality of politics it 
follows that such alternatives, if peacefully advocated, do not get a hearing from the ruling 
regime, some civil disturbance, if not violence, is bound to follow. 
 
This working definition is strongly influenced by Gramsci, both in a cultural and political 
sense, and regards – as interlinked entities – political economics and the process of effecting 
change, exercising power and acting practically to attain scarce resources in the inclusive 
democratic process. Thus, civil-society activities may go beyond liberal notions of democracy 
while not necessarily excluding some tenets of liberal notions (Lukács, 1991: 81ff, 137ff). 
 
Civil community activities include the debate about the liberal-radical, reform/revolution, and 
the activist networking resulting from the discourse and experiences of the citizens. It also 
entails the argument proposed in Latin America about the need for social welfare and 
“network communities”, i.e. basis communities or basismos and a polis aimed at empowering 
the poor (as opposed to only the power-elite and/or workers) on various levels. 
 
Necessarily, the civil community plays a role in the eventual choice of approach that should 
be adopted to deal with the past/unburdening of the past or not. This is evident in the case of 
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Spain, Argentina, Chile and South Africa. The same applies to the evolution of CMR within 
the (new) state. 
 
CMR and civil control 
 
In a generic sense CMR refer to how the military relates to civilian authorities. The term is 
not confined to democratic states or for that matter states that are perceived to be democratic 
from for example, Western viewpoints such as bi-party democracies as one finds in the USA 
or for all practical purposes in Britain. Nor does CMR only apply to multi-party democracies 
or non-party states (i.e. Uganda). The term applies to all societies. In South Africa the term 
relates to what we assume is a multi-party democracy and a constitutional state. In the 
negotiated transition choices were made on how to deal with past human rights abuses. In this 
sense there is a link with the SATRC even if some do not make this link, as is done in this 
study. 
 
“The relationship between the military, political leadership and society at large has always 
been one of intense intrigue and is as old as humanity itself … evolving from the moment that 
society had to depend on part of its population to fight aggression” (Ngoma, 2001: 1). CMR 
as sub-discipline of sociology are relatively young. For example, in the indexes of Jackson 
Toby’s book (1964/1971 editions) on sociology and that of Horton and Hunt (1964/1980/1984 
editions) on the same subject, neither the term civil society nor the term CMR features. 
Another work dealing with comparative studies in defence policy formulation – including 
studies of Australia, South Africa, France, India and Japan – does not refer to CMR or 
parliamentary control (consult Roherty, 1980). 
 
A useful and highly informative work dealing with the impact of sociology, edited by 
Douglas and published in 1970, makes no reference to CMR or militarisation or military-
industrial complexes. The use of terms such as civil control hardly exists in the work.420 One 
reason for this may lie in the fact that “the political control of armed forces in liberal 
democracies promises to be both more complicated and more problematic” (Boëne, 2000: 26). 
Boëne (2000: 26) also argues that a study of CMR might have been complicated by the 
diminishing of the so-called Cold War psychosis. 
                                                 
420 Readings in the Social Sciences: The impact of sociology is not devoid of social criticism. Various 
chapters point out the danger of science and ideology becoming mirror images, the danger of the 
sociologist becoming a “servant of power”, the dangers of objectivity and various other contributions 
(see Baritz, Dahrendorf, & Bottomore in Douglas, 1970). The issue of CMR and civil control over the 
military was simply not centrally conceived at the time. 
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Samuel Huntington regards CMR as military-security policy. This, together with internal and 
situational security policies, is an aspect of national security policy working at operational 
security levels (Ngoma, 2004: 5). Necessarily, Huntington’s limited definition of such 
relations, coupled with his rather conservative views on developing countries and the 
uncritical assumption of modernisation theory, does not work for me in this context. 
Duvenhage argues: “Huntington se klem op orde, stabiliteit en mag as vertrekpunte verleen 
aan sy beskouing ’n konserwatiewe en status quo konnotasie.” Duvenhage, in describing 
Huntington’s emphasis on order, stability and power, quotes Kesselman’s criticism of 
Huntington: “Order is (no longer) a prerequisite for achieving the highest political good but 
itself becomes the highest political good” (Duvenhage, 1992: 31). Leys refers to 
“Huntington’s obsession with authority” and the dangers it holds (Leys quoted in Duvenhage, 
1992: 320).421 For people that survived apartheid rule Ley’s observation is painfully true. Also 
here authority (that slip-slided or was marched into authoritarianism) became an obsession 
with the goose stepping ORDER of modernisation. 
Ngoma (2004) and Rupiya (2004) argue that among others Huntingtonian views emanate 
from liberal and democratic philosophies that champion market economies and related social 
arrangements and perceive the Western political sciences as the hub of the civilised Western 
word. Therefore, approaches such as those of Huntington relate to attempts to fit developing 
nations into the hierarchy of “a world dominated by the ‘victorious’ West” (Rupiya, 2004: 6). 
It has been argued that these approaches have limited value in the African context because of 
their traditional Western bias. Thus, a new viewpoint is required when CMR are at stake in 
Africa (Ngoma, 2004: 12; Rupiya, 2004: 12–15). 
 
On the other hand, research to establish the attitudes of soldiers and military personnel for 
“purposes of (assistance in) policy formulation” is not a new phenomenon (Toby, 1971: 63). 
CMR as a sub-discipline in sociology in a more traditional perspective is both “something 
more and something less”, and was demarcated for the purposes of this study as such. 
                                                 
421 Students, including the author who studied Political Science (“Staatsleer”) at the University of 
Stellenbosch during the 1980s, will recall the frequent emphasis on Huntington’s work, i.e. Political 
Development and Political Decay (1965) and especially the voluminous Political Order in Changing 
Societies (1968). In fact Political Science students were fed mostly Western – especially US theorists – 
such as Lipset, Almond and Verba, Apter, Dahl and Milbrath, as if African and other “Third World” 
authors on the topic did not exist. It was not until 1987 (during a vist to West Africa), and 1988 during 
a visit to the Netherlands, my stay at IDASA (1986–1990) and a further research visit to the 
Netherlands (1996) that I discovered the rich warehouse of African and other so-called Third World 
“critical theorists” on democracy and democratisation, and needless to say, immersed myself in these 
new vistas. For me, at least it was clear that the discourses at Afrikaans universities at the time and 
elsewhere on the globe – at least with regard to countries that shared our situation – were worlds apart. 
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Cilliers et al. (1994: 4) regard civilian control as a condition to be achieved in ensuring that 
the military operates according to the constitution and parliament (see also Ferreira, 2006). 
Civil control thus refers to the control of the military by elected representatives of the people, 
as opposed to appointed officials, and implies the “principle of civilian supremacy” (Ferreira, 
2000: 66). Therefore, the mechanism used to bring about civil control provides for the shared 
overseeing or control of the military by the legislative, the executive and the judiciary, in 
order to assert democratic control over the armed forces and defence policy (Ferreira, 2000: 
66). 
 
Ngoma (2004: 4) argues that, “the nature of democratic CMR implies an adherence to 
principles that conform to accountable, legitimate democratic authorities, and the existence of 
a parliament that exercises oversight over the military … (and) democratic CMR is also 
defined in terms of good governance …”422 It is for this reason that the South African 
government (since 1996 and with the acceptance of the New Constitution, Act 108 of 1996), 
has institutionalised a civilian defence secretariat. The Defence Secretariat (DefSec), 
according to Chapter 11, Article 204 of the Constitution, “must be established by national 
legislation to function under the direction of the (relevant) Cabinet member responsible for 
Defence” (Republic of South Africa, Constitution: Act 108 of 1996: 114). 
 
Further to parliamentary control over the military, the role of the multi-party Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Defence is highlighted. Necessarily, Chapter 11 of the new 
Constitution must be read in conjunction with Chapter 2, The Bill of Rights. There is one 
qualification: “This sort of civilian control mechanism is not aimed at usurping or interfering 
with the military chain of command, or with the military disciplinary code. Defence policy 
should thus be determined by parliament, debated and agreed upon by the Standing 
Committee on Defence in parliament and accepted by cabinet” (Ferreira, 2000: 66–67). (Note 
that the terms civil control, civilian control and democratic control are often used 
                                                 
422 This study relates to societies that made the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, 
resulting in multi-party systems within constitutional states – which in itself is a Western-orientated, if 
not Eurocentric, concept. Valuable insights can undoubtedly be gained from studies of societies that do 
not adhere to the multi-party concept and the way in which their CMR are structured. A case in point is 
the earlier attempts to build a non-party state in Uganda. Pre-communist Cuba provides another 
example – in this case where civil-military issues became fused under authoritarian rule and the corrupt 
government of Batisda, with detrimental effects to human rights. See Perez, L.A. 1976. Army Politics 
in Cuba, 1898–1958. University of Pittsburg Press. Other case studies that may bring some interesting 
insights to the fore as examples of “non-democratic” states are China and Cuba under socialist rule. 
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interchangeably, even if contested and debated by various more puritan authors. For the 
purposes of this study the term civil control was used.) 
 
“The central issue in theories of CMR is that of civilian control of the military” (Segal, quoted 
by Von Bredow & Kümmel, 2000: 125–126). More importantly: “Democratic control 
comprises all formal norms and rule, laws and regulations which are designed to integrate the 
organization of the armed forces into the democratic political system and the soldiers, 
especially the officer corps, into the democratic political culture” (Von Bredow & Kümmel, 
2000: 126. For a more specific application to South Africa, consult Liebenberg, Schutte & 
Minnaar (1999: 84ff): “Recommendations for the future”). The important flip side of the coin 
is a military that has developed an ethos and professional attitude not to be drawn into 
partisan politics by politicians, as countless examples testify. One may choose to refer to it as 
a constitutional military or in a post-authoritarian state as a reprofessionalised military. 
 
Human rights 
 
Human rights reflect long-standing debates - in some senses a discourse without end. I will 
limit myself to a general discussion related to the area. 
 
If human rights were not at stake, resistance against authoritarian states would be unlikely. 
Without resistance liberalisation would not occur and transition to democracy not become a 
reality. If it were not for the (large-scale) abuse of human rights, it is unlikely that post-
authoritarian societies would face a choice on how to deal with the past. South African society 
through its new leadership chose the TRC approach. Human rights and human-rights abuses 
are thus interwoven with democracy and related concepts. It is knotted into any discussion on 
processes of attempted reconciliation. 
 
The notion of Habeas Corpus appeared with the move away from feudal rule and non-
democratic monarchies. For the purposes of the study, I decided to assume an informed 
readership and not go through the toil and turmoil of human-rights debates since 1688. 
Furthermore, I also assume that human rights are not the prerogative of liberal-capitalist 
states. 
 
International initiatives are to be mentioned, and perhaps they are more important than 
national attempts at defining human rights and the protection thereof. Examples here include 
the International Declaration of Human Rights (1948), where an outline of human rights was 
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defined to be binding on all states regardless of their political composition. In the past, many 
conferences on the African continent were called to pursue the attainment of human rights in 
a one-party state. For example, issues such as human rights in a one-party state received 
vigorous attention during the 1960s and 1970s (International Commission of Jurists, 1978). 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) aims to reconcile human rights (and to 
envision human dignity) in liberal, socialist and centrally-controlled states. The Organisation 
for African Unity (OAU), subsumed by the African Union (AU) in 2002, also attempted to 
draft declarations that include the rights of people in one-party states. 
 
In South Africa, the issue of human rights is not without complications. The country moved 
from an authoritarian state to democracy through a negotiated transition (1990–1995). As a 
result of protracted negotiations, a constitutional state (comparable with a Rechtstaat) was 
achieved that included a declaration on human rights in the Constitution (the so-called Bill of 
Rights, Chapter 2 of Act 108 of 1996). However, the liberal constitutional character of the 
new democratic state has been criticised for not allowing enough space for social rights (third-
generation rights). So it seems that South Africans collectively at least assume the right of 
individuals to be protected as in the classical liberal state, “plus more”. The “more” 
apparently implies including community-directed rights (the realisation of ubuntu?) or third-
generation human rights in a South African context (see Seleoane 1996; Sindane & 
Liebenberg, 1999). In short, human rights in the South African context encapsulate the 
minimal liberal-constitutional rights (inclusive of the right to life and rights of the private 
person) and more: empowering people to eradicate poverty, have access to land, and to have 
collective rights to health and work. 
 
CMR and civil control of the military have to follow suit in accommodating the above 
insights on human rights (inclusive of human security) on the continent. Part of this discourse 
evolved from the debates on CMR, civil control over the military, and security sector reform, 
the latter aimed at human security as imperative (see Rupiya, 2004: 3ff; Le Roux et al., 2004: 
85ff). The SATRCR (Volume 5) briefly refers to some other international agreements that 
should be inculcated within the South African social-political ethos (1998: 348). 
 
Policy, policy-making and policy implementation 
 
In its most generic form, policy is about what governments, role players or groups of people 
choose to do or not to do and how they do it (Anderson, 2000: 4). Wayne Parsons (1995: 85) 
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argues: “Policy-making may be viewed as a form of ‘collective puzzlement’ on society’s 
behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing.” Heclo (1972: 84), while indicating that at least 
some consensus exists on the definition of policy, provides the following broad statement: 
“As commonly used, the term policy is usually considered to apply to something ‘bigger’ than 
particular decisions, but ‘smaller’ than general social movements … Policy is a concept 
placed roughly in the middle range (and an) essential element is purposiveness of some kind.” 
Simply put, policy is more than a decision. It is a decision implemented in order to benefit 
people, the citizenry of a country or a nation of self-chosen citizens. It is (and should be) 
action-orientated if it is to benefit human beings at a certain place and time. 
 
Anderson (2000: 4), following Friedrich, is more to the point by postulating that policy 
provides a proposed course of action by a person, a group, or a government within a specific 
context to overcome obstacles or provide opportunities to reach a goal or realise an objective. 
In the case of this study, policy relates to the enhancement of CMR, inclusive of civil control 
over the military in new/emerging democracies. 
 
It is often stated that the definition of a problem is part of the problem. The genesis of a policy 
(and the decision to embark on such a policy) involves inter alia the recognition of a problem 
(Parsons, 1995: 87). In this study, the discussion on civil-military policy relates to problem 
solving, in other words a problem-solving approach (Mouton, 2001: 52; Parsons, 1995: 92ff; 
Meehan, 1988). Here one may consider the following sequence: 
 
 
ISSUE     PROBLEM   POLICY 
 
Conflictual relations   Military imposes  Implement 
between civilian government ¾ its own rules  ¾ policies to subject 
and the military    on society   the military to   
         civilian rule * 
  
* This process to include educating, or the socialisation of political leadership not to call on the 
military or “invite them into” politics to uphold a partisan (or repressive) state or government. 
 
In the present study, discussions of policy relate generally to policies directly linked to TRC 
processes or constitutional references to the role of military and security institutions. With 
regard to military and security institutions, reference is made in the study to policy where 
 473
applicable to CMR and civil control over the military – and where such policies can solve 
observable problems or resolve potential civil-military tension in a new or emerging 
democracy. However, other policies put in place in South Africa, i.e. as an outcome of the 
White Paper on Defence, also formed part of this discussion. 
 
Policy analysis deals with the interface between policy-making, people, government and the 
necessary policy outputs to attain and sustain “a better life for the citizen”. The point of 
departure or genesis of such policy decisions and steps to implement policy in this case, is the 
recognition of a specific problem. Provided that the problem is sufficiently defined, corrective 
policy steps can be taken through policy decisions, formulation of policy and implementation 
of policy. 
 
The Eastonian Black Box of Policy making 
 
Source: Adapted from Easton by Parsons in Parsons (1995: 97) 
 
Finally, in the present study, policy-related topics implied enhancing and honing CMR and 
civilian control over state-security organs with the view to sustain and expand the culture of 
human rights and human security for the citizenry. It also embodies the notion of working 
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CMR and civil control of the military in a rather new democracy. Needless to add that again 
these observations and arguments will be viewed through the researcher as part of the 
research process. The researcher as the eye (“I” also) and tool within the broader process 
again enters the picture. 
 
Important to note is that in the interface between the needs and demands of the citizenry and 
the policy maker forced to take action that satisfies (or at least attempts or pretends to satisfy) 
demands, certain outputs or actions are necessary. The analogy of policy-making can also be 
found in other choices made by a government, i.e. on pathways to reconciliation. The SATRC 
was not initially intended as a policy. It was under various pressures a choice to adopt a public 
process. The analogy remains. The DRP and the White Paper (“Defence in a Democracy) was 
intended to become policy decided upon and implemented. Again the analogy remains. This 
thesis touches on the lack of realisation, the lack of foresight that these processes could have 
complemented, informing one another and adding benefit (add value if you wish) to working 
CMR and nurturing human rights in South Africa. Policy choices and implementation in the 
field of study remain an inescapable sub-text. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
SCHEDULE FOR FACE-TO-FACE INTERVIEWS 
TRCs and civil-military relations/civil control over the military 
 
General/Biographical information 
(in the case of interviewee not known to the interviewer) 
 
Country in which you live currently 
Country of birth 
Current nationality 
Past involvement in the military/civil-military field (brief notes) 
Would you describe your current position as one of observer or participant in political 
processes? 
 
Questions related to the focus of the research project 
(1) What is/was your personal experience in: 
1. 1 Military affairs; 
1. 2 Civil-military relationships; 
1. 3 Truth and reconciliation processes; 
1. 4 Describe briefly your role in terms of the civil-military relations/civil control over 
the military/ democratisation/civil society involvement, i.e., activist, professional 
soldier, elected member of parliament, member of the judiciary, official of a 
government department or administrator of policy. Indicate the area(s) of your 
involvement/experience (note by interviewer: if the interviewee covers wider 
territory that may be conducive to the study, do not interrupt. Make a mental note 
to ignore incriminating evidence. DELETE!) 
 
(2) How many years of exposure did you have in the specific relevant field(s)? 
 
(3) What was the situation in your country regarding civil control over the military before 
transition to democracy? 
 
(4) Did your country choose for a TRC process? If so, why? Did you agree with the 
choice? If so, why? 
 
(5) Did your country choose not to embark on a Truth and Reconciliation process? If so, 
why? Did you agree with the choice? If so, why? 
 
(6) If a TRC process was followed: (a) What effects did it have on the future guarantees for 
human rights? (b) Did it contribute to better civil control over the military in your view? 
(c) Did the military adapt themselves in terms of reprofessionalising as a military within 
a democracy following the TRC process? (d) What problem areas remain in the area of 
civil-military relations following transition? (e) Could your country have done better in 
terms of civil-military relations and civil control over the military without a TRC? 
 
(7)  If a TRC process was NOT followed: (a) Did the transition to democracy show positive 
effects on future guarantees for human rights in terms of civilian/military relationships? 
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(b) Did the transition to democracy contribute to better civilian oversight over the 
military? (c) Did the military as a professional institution adapt to the new democracy 
following the transition to democracy? If so; in what respects? (d) What problem areas 
remain in the area of civil-military relations? (e) Would your country have done better 
should you have had a TRC like process? 
 
(8) If you were in a position at the time to make policy proposals or recommendations what 
recommendations or proposals would you make? (a) Suggest a TRC process; (b) go 
without a TRC process (c) Rather advocate a ‘forgive and forget’ approach and rather 
retrain/educate the military about the need for civil oversight and the role of the 
professional soldier in democracy and the maintenance of human rights? (Probe: If you 
reflect on the past, what mistakes and/or oversights happened. A more personal probe: 
How do you feel about how we dealt with these oversights?) 
 
(9) If in a position to influence security policy depending on your involvement and 
experience (See earlier questions) what would you improve? (a) Civil-military 
interaction (b) Proper control by citizenry or their representatives (c) reprofessionalising 
of the military to adapt to a constitutional state/democratic structures. 
 
(10) Anything that you would like to add? 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR VALUABLE TIME AND CONTRIBUTION TO THIS STUDY 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
SCHEDULE FOR E-MAIL QUESTIONS – SELECTED PARTICIPANTS 
TRCs and civil-military relations/civil control over the military 
 
General/Biographical information 
Country in which you live currently 
 
 
 
Country of birth 
 
 
 
Current nationality 
 
 
 
Would you describe your current position as one of observer or participant in political 
processes? 
 
 
 
 
Questions related to the focus of the research project 
 
(1) What is/was your personal experience in: 
1. 1 Military affairs; 
1. 2 Civil-military relationships; 
1. 3 Truth and reconciliation processes; 
1. 4 Describe briefly your role in terms of the civil-military relations/civil control over 
the military/ democratisation/civil society involvement, i.e., activist, professional 
soldier, elected member of Parliament, member of the judiciary, official of a 
government department or administrator of policy. Indicate the area(s) of your 
involvement/experience [Please expand in no more than 300 words]. 
 
 
(2) How many years of exposure did you have in the specific relevant field(s)? 
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(3) What was the situation in your country regarding civil control over the military before 
transition to democracy? 
 
 
 
 
(4) Did your country choose for a TRC process? If so, why? Did you agree with the 
choice? If so, why? 
 
 
 
 
(5) Did your country choose not to embark on a Truth and Reconciliation process? If so, 
why? Did you agree with the choice? If so, why? 
 
 
 
 
(6) If a TRC process was followed: (a) What effects did it have on the future guarantees for 
human rights? (b) Did it contribute to better civil control over the military in your view? 
(c) Did the military adapt themselves in terms of reprofessionalising as a military within 
a democracy following the TRC process? (d) What problem areas remain in the area of 
civil-military relations following transition? (e) Could your country have done better in 
terms of civil-military relations and civil control over the military without a TRC? 
 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
 
(7)  If a TRC process was NOT followed: (a) Did the transition to democracy show positive 
effects on future guarantees for human rights in terms of civilian/military relationships? 
(b) Did the transition to democracy contribute to better civilian oversight over the 
military? (c) Did the military as a professional institution adapt to the new democracy 
following the transition to democracy? If so; in what respects? (d) What problem areas 
remain in the area of civil-military relations? (e) Would your country have done better 
should you have had a TRC like process? 
 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
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(8) If you were in a position to make policy proposals or recommendations what 
recommendations or proposals would you make? [This question applicable to TRC and 
non-TRC interviewees. Please specify CLEARLY whether you are from a country which 
had a TRC process or NOT. If any other process, i.e. International Tribunal or no 
action taken (“forgive and forget”)]. (a) Suggest a TRC process; (b) go without a TRC 
process (c) Rather advocate a ‘forgive and forget’ approach and rather retrain/educate 
the military about the need for civil oversight and the role of the professional soldier in 
democracy and the maintenance of human rights? 
 
a. 
b. 
c. 
 
(9) If in a position to influence security policy depending on your involvement and 
experience (See earlier questions) what would you improve? (a) Civil-military 
interaction (b) Proper control by citizenry or their representatives (c) reprofessionalising 
of the military to adapt to a constitutional state/democratic structures. 
 
a. 
b. 
c. 
 
(10)  Anything that you would like to add? 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR VALUABLE TIME AND CONTRIBUTION TO THIS STUDY 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT 
 
This agreement serves to confirm that the research subject (participant) mentioned below kindly gave her/his 
consent to participate in a qualitative study regarding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Civil-military 
relations in South Africa. The research participant agrees to provide the researcher with his/her experiences and 
views of the area of research to the best of his/her ability. 
 
The undersigned participant understands the purpose and nature of this study and understands that her/his 
participation is voluntary and that s/he may stop the interview/compiling solicited essays/memoranda at any time. 
The participant further grants permission for the data collected to be used in fulfilment of part of the requirements 
for the degree DLitt et Phil by Ian Liebenberg. 
 
The data collected will be used for research purposes only, the researcher undertakes neither to disclose the 
identity of any of the participants, nor the origin of any of the statements made by any of them, unless the 
participant choose to do so and has given his/her informed consent. The undersigned participant understands that 
in terms of the ideals of the study’s methodology that the researcher are obliged to make use of verbatim 
statements from the transcribe taped interviews and/or excerpts from solicited essays and/or any other visual (e.g. 
photographs) in order to illustrate the world of the research participants and their perspectives in the research 
report. 
 
The participant grants permission for the audio recording (where so mutually decided upon) and that the 
researcher may make notes of her/his views and experiences. 
 
 
The participant undertakes to give a full personal interpretation of her/his perspective 
and/or her/his experiences as far as possible and in terms of qualitative research ethics. 
 
 
 
I, …………………………….the undersigned participant, agree to meet at mutually agreeable times and duration(s) 
or other means of communication, e.g. by e-mail or telephone, as reasonably necessary to enable the researcher 
to gain a through understanding of the process to be researched. I further acknowledge that I received a copy of 
this agreement or that it has been discussed and confirmed between the interviewer and myself and that I may 
contact any one of the under mentioned if I have any subsequent queries. 
 
Signature of research subject: …………………………… Researcher: ………………………… 
Title, initials & surname: ……………………………………… Employer: …………………………… 
Tel: ……………………………………………………………… Date:………………. ………………… 
E-mail: …………………………………………………………… 
Place: ……………………………………………….………… Fax: …………………………… 
 
 
Research supervisor/study leader: 
Prof Willem Schurink: Tel/Cell: 082 779 2294 
Prof. Vladimir Shubin: Vladimir.shubin@inafr.ru 
 
 
The participant is welcome at any given time to consult with the study leaders and or to direct enquiries to 
the promoters. The same applies to the above- mentioned researcher. 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
A STORY WITHIN A STORY: IMAGES OF A RESEARCH PROCESS 
 
 
 
 
The beginning of all studies: Experience and reading … 
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In 2003 I met with Vladimir, later to become my second promoter, to discuss the study. Photo taken at 
a street café following our meeting at the Institute for African Studies, Spiridonovka Street, Moscow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With Rocky and Dries Liebenberg, an old varsity friend at 107 Valley Street, Clydesdale.  
Frequent discussions with Rocky led to some joint publications related to the SATRC  
and civil-military relations. 
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In August/September 2004 I eloped to Rooigat, a farm of friends, Tienie and Hettie in the bushveld to 
work in relative isolation. Top photo: The stone with the name of the farm. Second photo: I took all the 
material along in “Bakkie” and set up a work station (third photo) – quite a logistical challenge.  
I was to repeat the exercise again in October 2005. 
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Editing on the go. When attending conferences such as one in Cuba (February 2007)  
I took separate chapters to work on/edit. 
 
 
 
 
In the course of the study I seldom had the priveledge to have one static workstation. Rooigat, the 
wendy at our home in Valley Street, the deck, Mariaan’s study and a laptop when on the go had to 
suffice. I seldom worked at my place of work due to frequent interruptions. 
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With Willem Schurink, promoter, 2006: Discussing revision and research in progress.  
We met frequently for discussions and feedback. And frequently, I had more homework  
to do and report upon … 
 
 
 
 
March 2007: Willem Scurink (chief promoter) and Vladimir Shubin (co-promoter) met at our  
home to give joint feedback on work done by the candidate. Both promoters were critical  
yet very supportive and gave feedback timely. This assisted with progress. 
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A STORY AROUND A STORY … 
 
 
 
 
Friendship circles and support structures: Karateka40 provided for a supportive group of people  
sharing an interest outside our world of work. We shared sweat and and frequently laughter. Left to 
Right: Marlene, Mariaan, Louis, Pieter, Stephan, Jan, the author, Senseini Len Els and Solly Pokroi. 
 
 
 
 
Family and extended family. The author, Marian, I-Ben and Juliet.  
In the front – nuisance factor, Miga. 
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During a break with Mariaan, I-Ben and Marian. Mariaan’s support was an import motivating  
factor and the young lions offered patience (to a measure of scale, obviously!).  
Overall a most amicable and supportive environment … 
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ABBREVIATED CV: IAN LIEBENBERG 
 
 
Holds an M.A. Degree in Development Studies from the Institute for Development Studies (ISD) at the 
University of the Western Cape (1994), a Masters degree in Political Science from the University of 
Stellenbosch (1988) and B.A. Hons in Philosophy (1985). He worked as tutorial assistant and junior 
lecturer at the University of Stellenbosch (1984–1986) and as a part-time researcher for the Centre for 
Intergroup Studies at the University of Cape Town during 1985–1986 and 1991. In November 1986 he 
joined the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) as a regional and student coordinator in an 
activist role, which served as a test for and honed organisational skills. 
 
In the following year he became a research consultant and a year later Director of Research for IDASA. 
In 1991 he took up a post at the South African Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) as a senior 
researcher within the Group Social Dynamics. In the Group Democracy and Governance he acted as 
project leader for Social Identities research and was involved with the Policy Analysis Programme 
where he directed projects on public participation in South Africa for the HSRC and produced together 
with Gregory Houston of the South African Democracy Education Trust a book on the topic. In 2000 he 
became a Research Associate of the Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria. He 
lectured part-time in Political Science at the University of Johannesburg and the University of Pretoria 
(2nd years, Hons and MA modules) between 1993 and 2005. 
 
As an independent consultant (1999–2000) he produced reports for funding principals such as the 
European Union, Department of Science Arts and Technology, the African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Conflicts and the Institute for Security Studies. 
 
Research interests of the applicant resulted in completed research, contract projects, reports and 
publications in the fields of Democracy and Democratisation, Democratic Nation Building, Civil military 
Relations, Civilian Oversight over Security Institutions in Young Democracies, Public Participation, the 
struggle for liberation and transition to democracy and a variety of others over the past twelve years. He 
is a member of various academic associations. 
 
On invitation of the Ministry of Defence and the South African Defence Secretariat, he participated in the 
first National Defence Review Process. The applicant assisted the Independent Complaints Directorate 
with a major research document on deaths in police custody during 1998 and he published widely. 
Among his publications are seven co-edited books and one independently authored work (a variety of 
chapters contributed to the edited works), approximately 80 articles (25 or more in accredited national 
and/or in international journals and 30 popular articles in newspapers). Papers delivered at conferences, 
mostly national, accounts for 25+ (12+ international). 
 
He was a member of staff of the Department of Sociology at the University of South Africa (2000–2007) 
and involved with multi-national inter-disciplinary research projects. In 2007 he was appointed to the 
Centre for Military Studies at the Military Academy of South Africa in Saldanha, Faculty of Military 
Science, University of Stellenbosch as a full time researcher and lectures at the Department of Political 
Science at the faculty. 
 
 
